34 - <strong>Lessons</strong> <strong>Learned</strong> <strong>from</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Sudan</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Civilian</strong> <strong>Sites</strong> - UNMISS and the PoC <strong>Sites</strong> Targeting <strong>of</strong> UNMISS The perception that UNMISS is not willing to use force was also an issue even before the December 2013 crisis. Young men interviewed across Jonglei in 2012 and 2013 believed that UNMISS troops carried no ammunition for their weapons and were s<strong>of</strong>t targets. 35 The tragic attack on peacekeepers in Pibor in April 2013, which led to the deaths <strong>of</strong> five Indian peacekeepers and seven civilian staff, underlined this perception as the attackers, reportedly teenagers, escaped largely unscathed. 36 In the pre-crisis April 2013 “Guidelines for civilians seeking protection at UNMISS bases,” it states that “It is not considered likely that UNMISS bases in which civilians have sought protection will be overrun by armed actors in the same way as Srebrenica” (p. 3). Only days after the conflict erupted this assumption proved untrue. On 19 December 2013, the UNMISS base in Akobo was overrun by armed youth, and at least 27 Dinka civilians seeking protection inside were killed along with two peacekeepers. UNMISS reported that 2,000 Lou Nuer youth had attacked the base, meaning that UNMISS was outnumbered and there was little it could have done to repel the aggressors. Still, the perception that UNMISS soldiers are s<strong>of</strong>t targets was reiterated. Only four months later, the major UNMISS base in Bor was attacked by a “large group <strong>of</strong> armed individuals” who were protesting in front <strong>of</strong> the gates in April 2014. 37 According to the UNMISS report on the event, rumours <strong>of</strong> an attack against the IDPs in the Bor PoC site existed weeks before the incident occurred and there is significant evidence to suggest that it was a well-planned attack (ibid.). Celebrations by the Bor IDPs after the capture <strong>of</strong> Bentiu by SPLA-IO forces on 15 April further exacerbated tensions between Nuer IDPs in the Bor PoC site and Dinka residents in Bor town. A group <strong>of</strong> between 100 and 300 Dinka protesters marched to the Bor PoC site on the morning <strong>of</strong> 17 April <strong>from</strong> Bor town. Reports reached UNMISS by 9:30, and UNMISS closed the main gate <strong>of</strong> the base (ibid., p. 19). However, the armed group walked to the other PoC gate instead, and, at 10:55, some <strong>of</strong> the members forced their way over the perimeter and then opened the gates to let in the rest <strong>of</strong> the group (ibid., p. 20). Once they breached the PoC site, the attackers killed at least 47 civilians and beat, looted and abducted Nuer IDPs staying in the site for protection. At least 100 people, including two peacekeepers, were injured. A QRF was deployed by UNMISS 20 minutes after the attack began and reached the PoC site ten minutes later (ibid., pp. 21–22). Meanwhile, government forces stood by and observed the attack, and at one point even prevented the other QRF <strong>from</strong> moving around the base to flank the attackers (ibid., p. 22). Despite 90 minutes <strong>of</strong> warning that an armed mob was approaching the gates and after weeks <strong>of</strong> rumours <strong>of</strong> an imminent attack, the attackers had a further 30 minutes within the base to attack the IDPs before they were confronted by UNMISS military. By the time the perpetrators were engaged by the QRF and chased out <strong>of</strong> the camp, dozens <strong>of</strong> civilians were murdered and even more injured (ibid., p. 22). While at least three <strong>of</strong> the perpetrators died, no arrests or punitive actions have been made (ibid., p. 29). The incident caused significant frustrations and raised questions within and outside the mission about how these types <strong>of</strong> breaches could occur within an UNMISS base. After receiving information about the attack, some IDPs in the Bentiu PoC site travelled by foot and raft all the way to Akobo on the border <strong>of</strong> Ethiopia, a distance <strong>of</strong> 400 km. Despite having to cross half the country and multiple front lines <strong>of</strong> the conflict, these IDPs deemed it safer than staying in the Bentiu PoC site. 38 The incident is an illustration <strong>of</strong> the belief among some <strong>South</strong> <strong>Sudan</strong>ese civilians that UNMISS has lost its legitimacy as an actor who can protect them. The chief <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>of</strong> UNMISS military at the time, Petter Lindqvist, explained that to understand how these type <strong>of</strong> failures occur, three factors <strong>of</strong> peacekeeping have to be recognized: variation in the quality <strong>of</strong> troops, lack <strong>of</strong> experience many TCCs have with joint operations, and philosophical differences between member states and mission leadership as to whether UNMISS is purely a monitoring and observation mission and if and when the use <strong>of</strong> force is to be sanctioned. 35 36 Interviews <strong>of</strong> Murle and Lou Nuer youth <strong>from</strong> earlier research by the author in Jonglei State, 2012 and 2013. <strong>Sudan</strong> Tribune. “Jonglei ambush kills 5 UN peacekeepers, 7 civilian staff,” 9 April 2013. 37 38 UNMISS, Attacks on <strong>Civilian</strong>s in Bentiu and Bor April 2014, 9 January 2015. Interviews <strong>of</strong> IDP women <strong>from</strong> earlier research in Akobo, by the author, March 2014.
Peacekeepers stand guard before a food distribution queue. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon 35
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