Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites 2013–2016

58 - Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites - Complications Facing PoC Sites
Challenges of Neutrality,
Demobilization and Reintegration
As early as January 2014, President Kiir accused UNMISS
of running a “parallel government” and protecting rebels and
weapons in the PoC sites. 56 The accusation originated due
to the presence of several high-profile Nuer politicians and
military commanders in the Juba PoC sites at the beginning
of the conflict. Most of the high profile IDPs in Juba later
left the PoC sites, and UNMISS took steps to preserve the
civilian character of the bases through frequent weapon
searches. The confiscated weapons and uniforms were not
turned over to the SPLA as demanded, and the Government
of South Sudan has continued to accuse UNMISS of lacking
impartiality and even arming the rebels. High profile incidents,
including the overland transport of weapons by the Ghanaian
Battalion in March 2014 and the confiscation of 55,000 litres
of petrol and seven weapons from UNMISS transport boats
in Upper Nile in October 2015 by SPLA-IO allied forces,
have exacerbated this perception and increased animosity
between UNMISS and the Government. 57
One of the principal challenges in maintaining the civilian
character of the PoC sites is the existence of former
combatants in the sites. It was 18 months into the conflict
before UNMISS created guidelines regarding the arrival of
armed combatants, and decision-making is still, to a great
extent, left to UNMISS state leadership. UNMISS’s position is
that if an armed combatant takes off his uniform and hands
over his weapon, then he is considered to be a civilian and
treated like any other new arrival to the camps (Interview 50).
Humanitarian actors have pushed for a reintegration
process to be carried out for new arrivals, which has
only just recently begun in Malakal (Interviews 29, 50).
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
was removed from the UNMISS mandate in May 2014.
However, reintegration without demobilization creates
many complications. DDR programmes in South Sudan
have not been successful in the past, such as during the
CPA implementation period, despite significant funding and
established institutions involving the concerned parties, i.e.
the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. DDR in the
current, politicized environment is premature. Unless the
Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), when
formed, is politically supportive of the DDR process, it is
likely to once more be an expensive and difficult prospect.
According to a senior UNMISS staff member, identifying a
military combatant from an armed civilian in South Sudan
is extremely complex and beyond the ability of the mission
(Interview 50). As seen in the current conflict, as well as
during the second civil war and post-CPA period, armed
civilians are frequently mobilized for political violence,
blurring the distinction between civilians and the military. 58
Rather than running the risk of turning away people who
might get killed as a consequence, UNMISS would rather
risk having a few active combatants in its bases (Interviews
15, 16, 50). While identifying former combatants in South
Sudan would be a very difficult task, there should be a
distinction between armed civilians and soldiers who “selfidentify”
by coming to the bases in uniforms (Interviews
11, 68). UNMISS in Malakal have, for instance, recently
begun separately identifying combatants upon arrival for
reintegration into the PoC community. They are taught
about their responsibilities as civilians in the PoC site and
receive medical treatment as required (Interview 16). Some
UNMISS staff members, however, expressed concerns
over the potential risks associated with separating former
combatants from the civilians, making them potential
targets for the civilian population inside the camp and the
opposing forces outside (Interviews 16, 50).
Many of the humanitarians interviewed were, on the other
hand, worried about how active combatants, in the absence
of a demobilization programme, could abuse the PoC
sites as a means of temporary safety, increase security
risks within the camp and severely reduce the civilian
character of the PoC sites (Interviews 5, 11, 68). When
the SPLA-IO-aligned Shilluk commander Olony launched
offensives on Malakal town, hundreds of Shilluk youth in
the PoC site mobilized to take part in the armed conflict
(Interviews 5, 11). When the SPLA retook the town, the
youth returned back to the PoC site for safety, hiding their
weapons outside the perimeter. While this incident clearly
was problematic, it further illustrates UNMISS’s argument
regarding the difficulties of making distinctions between
military combatants and armed civilians.
Another example from Malakal PoC seems more
straightforward. In April 2015, when heavy fighting erupted
in Malakal, SPLA reinforcement troops from the Equatoria
region fled to the Malakal PoC site for safety (Interview 15).
An Equatorian SPLA soldier, captured by Olony’s men, was
escorted to UNMISS as they claimed they had no problems
with the Equatorians (ibid.). Another 26 SPLA soldiers ran to
the Rwandan Battalion at the airport when fighting broke out
as they were new to the area and did not know where the
UNMISS base was located (ibid.). Eventually, after the SPLA
recaptured Malakal, the former combatants re-joined the
military (ibid.). If the PoC sites, especially Malakal, continue
to serve as a place of temporary sanctuary for combatants
of both sides of the conflict, then there is a great risk that
the sites will become a target for the warring parties. The
attacks on the Akobo, Bor and Malakal PoC sites are stark
illustrations of the possibilities of such a scenario.
Even though UNMISS does carry out disarmament upon
arrival and attempts to reintegrate combatants, ensuring
the civilian character of the PoC sites is not feasible without
demobilization. The main risks to the civilian character of
the PoC sites is actually from armed civilians using them as
a refuge, rather than soldiers in uniform. These civilians, or
local defence groups, commonly comprising all physically fit
males, are not part of formal military structures and cannot
be so easily identified for a demobilisation or reintegration
programme. 59 Other solutions should be considered to
reduce the engagement of IDPs staying in the PoC with
the conflict outside. Messages of reconciliation are likely to
fall on deaf ears as the conflict continues, and restricting
movement during periods of conflict poses other risks. There
are no easy solutions, but it is clear the issue of maintaining
the civilian character and impartiality of the PoC sites faces
immense challenges in the current political climate.