Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites 2013–2016

Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites - Complications Facing PoC Sites - 57
Case Study
The UN House PoC Site "Takeover"
The leadership in one section of the UN House PoC site, known as
PoC 1, was selected by the IDPs themselves at a community meeting
shortly after arriving on 19 December 2013. At that time, it was unclear
if NGOs or the UN were going to provide services, and people
were fighting over space and needed some means of organizing
themselves, so they set up blocks within the camp (Interview 73). As
the first leaders in the camp, there were rumours that they received
salaries from NGOs. Despite denial from the leaders, “rumours spread
quickly in the crisis” and persisted (Interviews 73, 75). After nine
months, IDPs decided they wanted to select new representatives from
another “greater” area. The first chairman was from Unity, and the next
was selected from greater Akobo (ibid.). Towards the end of 2014,
WFP was pushing to replace general food distributions with a voucher
system in which people use their vouchers to buy food from traders; this
served as a catalyst for the change in leadership that occurred (ibid.).
Rumours quickly spread that the implementation of a voucher system
would give Dinka traders the opportunity to poison the food. In
addition to the rumour that leadership were receiving salaries from
NGOs, stories were told to the media that the current leadership
was supporting the “questionable” voucher system. Doubt regarding
the leadership grew (Interviews 73, 75). One former leader believes
that others who wanted to compete for the position of camp chairman,
including youth leaders and the eventual successor, Hoth, encouraged
these rumours as a means of undermining the leadership. Hoth, who
claimed he would stand up to the NGOs and stop implementation
of the new voucher system, was selected to be the new chairman
(ibid.). Hoth explained that it was all due to a crisis in leadership over
the voucher system (ibid.). Either way, for four months, no food was
distributed and eventually an ultimatum was given: either the IDPs
use local Nuer traders, outside traders or WFP traders. The people
selected local Nuer traders who go out and buy the food from people
they trust. Despite the promises to stop the voucher system, it was finally
implemented (ibid.).
The change in leadership to Hoth led to a significant power shift in
the camp itself. The youth, via the CWG, gained considerable power
under Hoth and began to be used as tax collectors for the camp
leadership (Interview 74). Chairman Hoth admits that the leadership
taxes NGO workers who are IDPs and live in the camp but claims
they use the taxes for administrative purposes to support the community
watch group, the same group that collects the tax (Interview 75). Many
IDPs view the taxes an example of abuse of power (Interview 74, 99).
In addition to taxing local NGO staff salaries, the CWG also tax the
traders involved in the voucher system or those bringing goods into the
camp (Interview 74). How much of these taxes go to the pockets of the
leadership and how much is spent on CWG costs is unclear. Chairman
Hoth claims some of the money goes to the families of the CWG,
while the rest is used for “running costs” of the CWG (Interview 75).
With no clear rules regarding camp leadership’s ability to tax IDPs,
the taxation cannot be stopped, leading to many questions about the
potential abuse of power in these situations.
UN House PoC site, September 2015 / Population: 28,000 IDPs.