With few options for work in the PoC site, most residents depend on humanitarian support. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
<strong>Lessons</strong> <strong>Learned</strong> <strong>from</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Sudan</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Civilian</strong> <strong>Sites</strong> - Complications Facing PoC <strong>Sites</strong> - 57 Case Study The UN House PoC Site "Takeover" The leadership in one section <strong>of</strong> the UN House PoC site, known as PoC 1, was selected by the IDPs themselves at a community meeting shortly after arriving on 19 December 2013. At that time, it was unclear if NGOs or the UN were going to provide services, and people were fighting over space and needed some means <strong>of</strong> organizing themselves, so they set up blocks within the camp (Interview 73). As the first leaders in the camp, there were rumours that they received salaries <strong>from</strong> NGOs. Despite denial <strong>from</strong> the leaders, “rumours spread quickly in the crisis” and persisted (Interviews 73, 75). After nine months, IDPs decided they wanted to select new representatives <strong>from</strong> another “greater” area. The first chairman was <strong>from</strong> Unity, and the next was selected <strong>from</strong> greater Akobo (ibid.). Towards the end <strong>of</strong> 2014, WFP was pushing to replace general food distributions with a voucher system in which people use their vouchers to buy food <strong>from</strong> traders; this served as a catalyst for the change in leadership that occurred (ibid.). Rumours quickly spread that the implementation <strong>of</strong> a voucher system would give Dinka traders the opportunity to poison the food. In addition to the rumour that leadership were receiving salaries <strong>from</strong> NGOs, stories were told to the media that the current leadership was supporting the “questionable” voucher system. Doubt regarding the leadership grew (Interviews 73, 75). One former leader believes that others who wanted to compete for the position <strong>of</strong> camp chairman, including youth leaders and the eventual successor, Hoth, encouraged these rumours as a means <strong>of</strong> undermining the leadership. Hoth, who claimed he would stand up to the NGOs and stop implementation <strong>of</strong> the new voucher system, was selected to be the new chairman (ibid.). Hoth explained that it was all due to a crisis in leadership over the voucher system (ibid.). Either way, for four months, no food was distributed and eventually an ultimatum was given: either the IDPs use local Nuer traders, outside traders or WFP traders. The people selected local Nuer traders who go out and buy the food <strong>from</strong> people they trust. Despite the promises to stop the voucher system, it was finally implemented (ibid.). The change in leadership to Hoth led to a significant power shift in the camp itself. The youth, via the CWG, gained considerable power under Hoth and began to be used as tax collectors for the camp leadership (Interview 74). Chairman Hoth admits that the leadership taxes NGO workers who are IDPs and live in the camp but claims they use the taxes for administrative purposes to support the community watch group, the same group that collects the tax (Interview 75). Many IDPs view the taxes an example <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> power (Interview 74, 99). In addition to taxing local NGO staff salaries, the CWG also tax the traders involved in the voucher system or those bringing goods into the camp (Interview 74). How much <strong>of</strong> these taxes go to the pockets <strong>of</strong> the leadership and how much is spent on CWG costs is unclear. Chairman Hoth claims some <strong>of</strong> the money goes to the families <strong>of</strong> the CWG, while the rest is used for “running costs” <strong>of</strong> the CWG (Interview 75). With no clear rules regarding camp leadership’s ability to tax IDPs, the taxation cannot be stopped, leading to many questions about the potential abuse <strong>of</strong> power in these situations. UN House PoC site, September 2015 / Population: 28,000 IDPs.
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