Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites 2013–2016

Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites - PoC Exit Strategies - 63
Closure of UN House PoC Site for
Foreign National
Unlike the Tongping relocation, the foreign national section
of UN House, known locally as PoC 2 UN House, was
closed completely at the end of 2015. It was a unique
situation as the people staying in the section were foreign
nationals, not IDPs. At the beginning of the conflict, the
shooting, looting and general security threats in Juba
led some foreign nationals to also flee to UNMISS for
protection. However, being foreign nationals, they were
not perceived as sympathizers of SPLA-IO or as potential
targets for security forces in Juba if forced to leave the
camp. It was thus decided it was justified to close the site
by the end of August 2015.
Due to their status as foreigners, UNHCR was also
engaged. The people were given two options, either to
move back to Juba town and apply for refugee status or
move to Makpanda refugee camp in Yambio, Western
Equatoria, while their application for asylum would be
processed (Interview 79). Each registered person was
given USD 300 and those who moved to the refugee camp
also received an NFI kit. A group of IDP representatives
were brought to Makpanda camp to make an assessment,
but their reports about the conditions in the camp were
negative. As a result, only one third of the people signed up
for one of the two options offered (Interview 79).
When the original deadline of 31 August passed and people
were still in the camp, it was decided to copy a tactic used
in Tongping, in which people could leave the camp, but
not be allowed to re-enter. As many of the displaced were
shopkeepers, this directly restricted their livelihood and
some moved to other sections of UN House PoC and set
up shops there instead (Interview 79). Humanitarian staff
claim that it was agreed that services would not be cut off
until everyone left; however, on the evening of 31 August,
UNMISS stopped the delivery of water to the camp starting
the next day (Interview 79). Water had to be shipped into
the site and it was decided by UNMISS that if the people
had no water they would be forced to leave and be blocked
from entering again.
After three days, UNMISS leadership relented and allowed
in some water trucks on 4 September (Interview 79).
UNMISS then held more meetings to discuss what to do
with the remaining 200 people, but, according to camp
management, did not include or inform humanitarians of
the decisions. 66 On 5 September, several humanitarian
organizations working in the camp learned by an UNMISS
Twitter message that the remaining people would be
forced to leave on Monday 7 September (Interview 79).
The humanitarians working in the site were further banned
from entering it on Monday, as it was described as a
“military operation”. Soldiers were placed every 10 m of the
perimeter, and the foreign nationals were put onto busses,
and they claimed to the humanitarians they did not know
where they were being taken at the time (Interview 79).
They were moved elsewhere in Juba and stayed in hangars
for another week while UNHCR asked them to select one
of the options again. Not surprisingly, the decision to not
inform the humanitarians working in UN House about the
plan directly, or where the people were being taken, put a
significant strain on the relationship between humanitarians
working in the site and UNMISS.
These two case studies on Tongping and UN House
illustrate the difficulties surrounding relocation and
closure of PoC sites. There are no simple solutions and a
contingent of people will almost always demand to remain,
no matter the circumstances. Although the IDPs were
eventually pleased with the move from Tongping to UN
House, the tactics employed by UNMISS raises significant
protection concerns. Attempts to move people to sites
where humanitarians can offer better services, or where
the land is better for shelters, is always a major challenge.
Indeed, precedence exists within South Sudan itself with
the attempt to move refugees in Upper Nile and Unity to
different sites that were not prone to flooding. Because
of the sensitivity of the matter, every stakeholder, from
the mission to protection actors, need to be practical,
flexible and transparent with each other. Local leaders in
camps are usually dependent on the continuation of social
and political structures and are unlikely to give up their
positions of power easily.
Regardless, the unilateral decision by UNMISS to cut
off basic services, like access to water, and the forced
dismantling of shelters should not become accepted
standards for future closures of PoC sites. Agreed
guidelines should be in place for the closures of future
sites, and all actors must improve communication and
transparency with each other in their expectations on the
best practice.
Whether more PoC sites will be closed in the near
future will heavily depend on both the success of
the August 2015 peace agreement and the ability
of IDPs to return with freedom of movement.
66 UNMISS leadership interviewed were under the impression the humanitarians had been
informed, but the NGOs deny they received any information following the meetings.