PRIVATE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

PRIVATE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
by setting up a mechanism that was based on negotiating voluntary
licences. They sought assurances that the MPP would take on the
principles of the Doha Declaration. The memorandum of understanding
between UNITAID and the MPP, as well as the MPP’s constitution, refer
to the obligation to make sure that terms and conditions negotiated are
consistent with the WHO GSPOA and other international instruments
and declarations, which is a reference to the Doha Declaration. 129
The brand new initiative received an early boost when the US National
Institutes of Health became the first licensor and committed patents it
held related to the ARV, darunavir, to the MPP in 2009. The agreement
came with a strong endorsement from the US government. The White
House blogged about it under the title “US Government first to share
patents with Medicines Patent Pool.” 130 This high level political
endorsement helped to establish the MPP as a recognised entity and
encouraged companies to engage with it. 131 Engagement with
pharmaceutical companies was not at all a given when the initiative took
off; some were openly hostile to the idea. For example, Dominique Limet,
CEO of pharmaceutical company ViiV, said in July 2010 to the Financial
Times: “The pool’s key focus has been political in getting access to IP
without explaining how it will work. It’s not the issue. It’s about the will
and money to invest in new drugs, and ensuring there is enough demand
and infrastructure to ensure access. The €4.7 million they will spend
could save thousands of lives [by buying drugs].” 132 The first commercial
company to enter into negotiations with the MPP was Gilead Sciences,
which in 2011 licensed its IP related to products to treat HIV and hepatitis
B to the MPP. Other companies, including ViiV, would follow soon.
The MPP offers a predictable remedy to the effects of HIV medicines
patenting by negotiating licences with HIV medicines patent holders and
by licensing out to generic producers that have the capacity to make lowcost
quality HIV treatments. The availability of licences makes treatments
more affordable because it makes generic competition possible. The MPP
also works to encourage the development and production of fixed-dose
combinations of ARVs, in accordance with the recommendations of the
WHO and the development of adapted formulations, such as ARVs for
children. It contributes to quality assurance of the medicines by requiring
in its sub-licence agreements that generic companies seek WHO
prequalification or stringent regulatory approval.
The MPP creates the availability of sources of low-cost generic production
that otherwise would not exist because of patents. This is important for a
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