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CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES<br />

• Require FIs to implement preventive measures with respect to PEPs, and wire transfers in line<br />

with the FATF standards, and monitor (e.g. through targeted inspections) and ensure<br />

compliance by all FIs of their obligation to confirm the accuracy of beneficial ownership in<br />

relation to all customers.<br />

5<br />

• Enhance the dialogue with DNFBPs other than casinos to increase their understanding of their<br />

respective ML/TF vulnerabilities and AML/CFT obligations, in particular with real estate<br />

agents, dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS) (with greater involvement of the<br />

provincial regulators and the relevant trade and professional associations). Update ML/TF<br />

typologies and specific red flags addressed to the different categories of DNFBPs to assist in<br />

the detection of suspicious transactions.<br />

• Consider introducing a licensing or registration regime, or other controls for DPMS.<br />

• Monitor and ensure DNFBPs’ and small retail MSBs’ compliance with TFS obligations.<br />

• Issue further guidance, especially to non-FRFIs, on the new requirements related to domestic<br />

PEPs.<br />

• Strengthen feedback to small banks and the insurance sector on the use of STRs.<br />

• Issue guidance for all REs to facilitate the detection of the possible misuse of open loop prepaid<br />

cards in ML and TF schemes.<br />

The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is I04. The<br />

recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R9-23.<br />

Immediate Outcome 4 (Preventive Measures)<br />

Understanding of ML/TF Risks and the Application of Mitigating Measures<br />

205. The level of understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, as well as the<br />

application of mitigating measures vary greatly amongst the various REs.<br />

206. FIs are aware of the main threats and high-risk sectors identified in the NRA, as well as of<br />

the level of ML/TF vulnerabilities associated to their activities. Recent trends in the FIs’<br />

understanding of risks and AML/CFT obligations is not immediately apparent in the supervisory<br />

data (because the latter aggregates as “partial deficiencies” both minor and more severe failures),<br />

but, according to the authorities, have been positive. The major banks have developed<br />

comprehensive group-wide risk assessments and implement mitigating measures derived from<br />

detailed consideration of all relevant risk factors (including lines of business, products, services,<br />

delivery channels, customer profiles). Several other FIs stated that their risk assessment and<br />

mitigating measures are already in line with the findings of the NRA. Specific attention is paid to cash<br />

(including potentially associated to tax evasion) and to the geographic risk (which, especially in the<br />

case of large banks, takes into account the index of corruption developed by relevant international<br />

organization and includes offshore financial centres). Some FIs also consider trust accounts held by<br />

lawyers and other legal professions as presenting a higher risk and, as a result, conduct enhanced<br />

78<br />

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in <strong>Canada</strong> - 2016 © FATF and APG 2016

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