Canada
MER-Canada-2016
MER-Canada-2016
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CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES<br />
• Require FIs to implement preventive measures with respect to PEPs, and wire transfers in line<br />
with the FATF standards, and monitor (e.g. through targeted inspections) and ensure<br />
compliance by all FIs of their obligation to confirm the accuracy of beneficial ownership in<br />
relation to all customers.<br />
5<br />
• Enhance the dialogue with DNFBPs other than casinos to increase their understanding of their<br />
respective ML/TF vulnerabilities and AML/CFT obligations, in particular with real estate<br />
agents, dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS) (with greater involvement of the<br />
provincial regulators and the relevant trade and professional associations). Update ML/TF<br />
typologies and specific red flags addressed to the different categories of DNFBPs to assist in<br />
the detection of suspicious transactions.<br />
• Consider introducing a licensing or registration regime, or other controls for DPMS.<br />
• Monitor and ensure DNFBPs’ and small retail MSBs’ compliance with TFS obligations.<br />
• Issue further guidance, especially to non-FRFIs, on the new requirements related to domestic<br />
PEPs.<br />
• Strengthen feedback to small banks and the insurance sector on the use of STRs.<br />
• Issue guidance for all REs to facilitate the detection of the possible misuse of open loop prepaid<br />
cards in ML and TF schemes.<br />
The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is I04. The<br />
recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R9-23.<br />
Immediate Outcome 4 (Preventive Measures)<br />
Understanding of ML/TF Risks and the Application of Mitigating Measures<br />
205. The level of understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, as well as the<br />
application of mitigating measures vary greatly amongst the various REs.<br />
206. FIs are aware of the main threats and high-risk sectors identified in the NRA, as well as of<br />
the level of ML/TF vulnerabilities associated to their activities. Recent trends in the FIs’<br />
understanding of risks and AML/CFT obligations is not immediately apparent in the supervisory<br />
data (because the latter aggregates as “partial deficiencies” both minor and more severe failures),<br />
but, according to the authorities, have been positive. The major banks have developed<br />
comprehensive group-wide risk assessments and implement mitigating measures derived from<br />
detailed consideration of all relevant risk factors (including lines of business, products, services,<br />
delivery channels, customer profiles). Several other FIs stated that their risk assessment and<br />
mitigating measures are already in line with the findings of the NRA. Specific attention is paid to cash<br />
(including potentially associated to tax evasion) and to the geographic risk (which, especially in the<br />
case of large banks, takes into account the index of corruption developed by relevant international<br />
organization and includes offshore financial centres). Some FIs also consider trust accounts held by<br />
lawyers and other legal professions as presenting a higher risk and, as a result, conduct enhanced<br />
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Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in <strong>Canada</strong> - 2016 © FATF and APG 2016