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Investigation of Linux.Mirai Trojan family

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51<br />

51<br />

.text:0804C218 push 9 ; sig<br />

.text:0804C21A neg [esp+1228h+var_120C]<br />

.text:0804C21E mov ecx, [esp+1228h+var_120C]<br />

.text:0804C222 push ecx ; int<br />

.text:0804C223 call ___GI_kill<br />

.text:0804C228 mov [esp+122Ch+fd], 0 ; status<br />

.text:0804C22F call ___GI_exit<br />

The MAC address <strong>of</strong> the network adapter is not sent to the C&C server, and network commands are received<br />

one by one.<br />

The run_scanner function, which was borrowed from the <strong>Linux</strong>.BackDoor.Fgt <strong>Trojan</strong> <strong>family</strong> and which is<br />

responsible for searching for vulnerable devices, has been slightly changed—the C&C server’s address,<br />

to which information on infected computers is sent, is extracted from the configuration.<br />

HTTP flood is now missing from the list <strong>of</strong> types <strong>of</strong> attacks performed, and commands have been reordered:<br />

Number<br />

Type<br />

0 UPD random<br />

1 TSource<br />

2 DNS flood<br />

3 TCP flood 2 options<br />

4 TCP flood random data<br />

5 TCP flood<br />

6 UDP over GRE<br />

7 TEB over GRE<br />

In the examined sample, virus makers tried to carry out a DNS amplification attack: the DNS server’s address<br />

is retrieved either from the resolv.conf file or from a list <strong>of</strong> public DNS servers hard-coded into the<br />

<strong>Trojan</strong>’s body.

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