Necessity as the mother of invention monetary policy after the crisis
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Table A2. Determinants <strong>of</strong> mandate discussion and <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> unconventional <strong>monetary</strong> policies (univariate probit regressions)<br />
Mandate<br />
discussions<br />
outside<br />
Mandate<br />
discussions<br />
inside<br />
Adopted<br />
rates near<br />
zero<br />
Adopted<br />
negative<br />
rates<br />
Adopted QE<br />
with govt<br />
debt<br />
Adopted QE<br />
with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>as</strong>sets<br />
Adopted<br />
forward<br />
guidance<br />
Adopted<br />
macro<br />
prudential<br />
Adopted<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r tools<br />
Adopted<br />
calendarb<strong>as</strong>ed<br />
FG<br />
Adopted<br />
data-b<strong>as</strong>ed<br />
FG<br />
Adopted<br />
qualitative<br />
FG<br />
Advanced economy 0.271** 0.010 0.376*** 0.212*** 0.275*** 0.097 0.174 0.112 0.052 0.163 0.090 1.466*** 0.160**<br />
(0.132) (0.146) (0.059) (0.073) (0.077) (0.085) (0.140) (0.141) (0.145) (0.101) (0.134) (0.477) (0.080)<br />
Crisis (LV dummy) 0.438*** 0.176 0.265** 0.194*** 0.287*** 0.140 0.381*** -0.110 0.125 0.234** 0.377*** 1.603*** 0.066<br />
(0.136) (0.161) (0.112) (0.075) (0.079) (0.085) (0.131) (0.148) (0.156) (0.095) (0.100) (0.394) (0.094)<br />
Inflation targeting 0.169 0.050 0.210** -0.105 0.028 -0.105 0.313*** 0.287** -0.079 0.102 -0.094 0.607 0.061<br />
(0.134) (0.137) (0.106) (0.099) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.120) (0.138) (0.103) (0.130) (0.393) (0.085)<br />
Openness -0.002** -0.002** -0.002 -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004* 0.001<br />
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)<br />
Flexible exchange rate 0.176 0.073 0.350*** 0.079 0.131 0.003 0.384*** 0.161 -0.017 0.253*** 0.115 1.243*** 0.003<br />
(0.137) (0.141) (0.070) (0.085) (0.102) (0.090) (0.097) (0.134) (0.142) (0.083) (0.128) (0.444) (0.090)<br />
CB independence -0.362 -0.289 -0.053 0.257 0.095 0.464 0.334 0.035 0.075 0.453 0.445 1.153 0.139<br />
(0.447) (0.464) (0.433) (0.352) (0.376) (0.381) (0.444) (0.412) (0.463) (0.380) (0.400) (1.307) (0.373)<br />
Change in CB independence 0.518 0.242 -0.828 0.808 0.267 1.309* 0.317 1.368 1.727 -0.485 1.292 -5.476 -1.211<br />
(1.253) (1.346) (1.239) (0.847) (0.927) (0.729) (1.323) (1.137) (1.241) (0.983) (1.025) (3.705) (1.089)<br />
Notes: The table reports marginal effects <strong>of</strong> probit models that explain governors’ responses <strong>as</strong> to whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong>re h<strong>as</strong> been a discussion about <strong>the</strong> central bank mandate<br />
(left panel) and whe<strong>the</strong>r or not certain <strong>policy</strong> instruments have been adopted (middle and right panel). Each coefficient comes from a separate regression using <strong>the</strong><br />
maximum number <strong>of</strong> observations for each regressor-regressand pair. Numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors. */**/*** identifies statistical significance at <strong>the</strong><br />
10%/5%/1% level. Source: Authors’ calculations b<strong>as</strong>ed on survey among central bank governors conducted in 2016.<br />
Adopted<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r FG<br />
47