Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army
ARMY
February 2016 www.ausa.org $3.00
Kicking Tires
On the JLTV
Winning When It’s
Not War We Want Page 12
Our Ethical Climate
Needs Measuring Page 29

ARMY
The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army
February 2016 www.ausa.org Vol. 66, No. 2
DEPARTMENTS
ON THE COVER
LETTERS....................................................3
SEVEN QUESTIONS ..................................5
WASHINGTON REPORT ...........................6
NEWS CALL..............................................7
FRONT & CENTER
Readiness and Capability
Are Intertwined
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.
Page 11
Winning the War We’ve Got,
Not the One We Want
By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.
Page 12
Yep, Those Were the Good Old
Army Days
By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret.
Page 14
FEATURES
Army Women: Highlights
With the announcement lifting gender
restrictions on all military jobs, we take a
pictorial look at the role of female soldiers
throughout U.S. history. Page 18
Cyber Capabilities Key to
Future Dominance
By Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon
Unlike the other domains, cyberspace is
continuously evolving and adapting along
with each entrepreneur, inventor and actor
using it. To retain dominance, the Army
must keep up with this evolution. Page 22
Muscle for an Uncertain World:
Performance, Payload and
Comfy Seats
Stories by Scott R. Gourley
The latest generation of Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles has moved well
beyond the traditional role of Army
trucks and into the realm of what can
be described as “muscle trucks.”
Page 36
Cover Photo: The independent suspension
system in the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle allows it to traverse the toughest
terrains.
Oshkosh Corp.
18
14
HE’S THE ARMY......................................17
THE OUTPOST........................................57
SUSTAINING MEMBER PROFILE...........60
SOLDIER ARMED....................................61
HISTORICALLY SPEAKING.....................63
REVIEWS.................................................65
FINAL SHOT ...........................................72
22
February 2016 ■ ARMY 1

Fighting for Relevancy in the Gray Zone By Maj. David B. Rowland
Successfully responding to conflicts that exist between normal international
competition and open conflict requires the Army’s conventional forces to alter
training mentality and methodology. Page 26
Curtain’s Always Rising
For Theater Army
By Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, USA Ret.
Recent events provide a vehicle for
exploring the versatility of the theater
Army in a manner far more dynamic than
its equally important role as an Army
service component command. Page 49
49
It’s Time to Establish
Ethics-Related Metrics
By Col. Charles D. Allen, USA Ret.
The Army needs to construct a way to
measure the character of its leaders and
ethics within the profession of arms to
ensure we are “getting it right.” Page 29
Creativity Could Boost
Regionally Aligned Forces Concept
By Col. Allen J. Pepper
Army leadership’s vision involves a force
that is globally responsive and regionally
engaged. An important aspect of turning
this vision into reality is the concept of
regionally aligned forces. Page 32
40
Creative Answers for Sagging Morale
By Capt. Robert C. Sprague
One of the most critical ideas to foster
within an organization is innovation;
without it, soldiers are doomed to repeat
the same errors indefinitely. Page 43
The Evolving Art of Training
Management
By Col. David M. Hodne and Maj. Joe Byerly
An evolution in training management is
reflected in current Army doctrine and is
fueled by the hard-earned combat
experience of leaders across the Army, new
digital training tools, and an institutional
resurgence in Mission Command. Page 45
Birth Era May Factor in Risk
of Suicide
By Col. James Griffith, ARNG Ret.,
and Craig Bryan
The marked increase in soldier suicides may
not be related to deployment, combat
participation or an overall high operating
tempo but instead, an indication of a
broader trend of increased vulnerability
among more recent generations of young
adults. Page 53
53
Deep Roots of the Army’s
Dental Corps
By Daniel J. Demers
From its inception in 1901 after Spanish-
American War veterans experienced
extraordinary dental problems, the U.S.
Army Dental Corps has grown in size, skill
and influence. Page 40
45
2 ARMY ■ February 2016

Letters
Good Mentoring Makes
Good Memories
■ I was delighted to see the article by
retired Maj. Wayne Heard in the December
issue, “Mentoring Stands Test of
Time,” about Col. Robert L. Jackson.
Jackson was a great man, and I owe much
to him. I worked for him when he was
the deputy chief of staff for operations of
U.S. Army Pacific. His counsel, coaching
and friendship helped me through some
very challenging times. Kudos to Heard.
Col. Lawrence E. Casper, USA Ret.
Oro Valley, Ariz.
AUSA FAX NUMBERS
ARMY magazine welcomes letters to
the editor. Short letters are more
likely to be published, and all letters
may be edited for reasons of style,
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Share Battle of Ganjgal Lessons
■ Another excellent essay by retired
Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr. (“‘Ride to
the Sound of the Guns,’” September).
How does ARMY magazine keep finding
great writers, decade after decade?
But I request a follow-up article on
why so many leaders did not provide
support to the warriors in battle that
day. Why was it necessary for “the Army
[to act] swiftly to fix responsibility after
the battle, issuing career-ending reprimands
to key leaders judged to have been
at fault”?
We read, for example: “Meanwhile,
the battalion commander [of a unit that
had been radioed for fire support] remained
in his office.” But it seems implausible
for one who has risen to that
position and rank to intentionally repudiate
responsibility.
Had he just returned from an exhausting
patrol and fallen asleep at his desk?
Was he talking to his family back home?
Had he even been made aware of the situation
on the ground? If so, he was not
alone in dereliction of duty. What was
going on that so many did not rush to
help comrades in peril?
In Paul Harvey’s words, give us “the
rest of the story.” Otherwise, we learn
what happened but not why it happened.
Hooker tells us, “Army leaders worked
hard to circulate lessons learned and today,
those lessons are taught throughout
our service.” Please share the lessons
with those of us no longer in uniform.
Chief Warrant Officer 5 Steve Kohn,
USA Ret.
San Antonio
Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret.
President and CEO, AUSA
Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, USA Ret.
Vice President, Education, AUSA
Rick Maze
Editor-in-Chief
Liz Rathbun Managing Editor
Joseph L. Broderick Art Director
Ferdinand H. Thomas II Sr. Staff Writer
Toni Eugene
Associate Editor
Christopher Wright Production Artist
Laura Stassi Assistant Managing Editor
Thomas B. Spincic Assistant Editor
Jennifer Benitz
Staff Writer
Contributing Editors
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.;
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.; Lt.
Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret.; and
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret.
Contributing Writers
Scott R. Gourley and Rebecca Alwine
Lt. Gen. Jerry L. Sinn, USA Ret.
Vice President, Finance and
Administration, AUSA
Desiree Hurlocker
Advertising Production and
Fulfillment Manager
ARMY is a professional journal devoted to the advancement
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February 2016 ■ ARMY 3

Seven Questions
For Female Veterans in Texas, There’s H.O.P.E.
Retired Army Lt. Col. Hope Jackson is the founder of H.O.P.E.
Institute, a Texas-based nonprofit organization dedicated to helping
homeless female veterans become self-sufficient and independent by
offering housing, education and other services. The acronym stands
for healing, optimizing, perfecting and empowering.
1. Why did you create H.O.P.E. Institute?
I was about 20 years into my career when I got to Fort Bliss in
2006. I was ready to retire here. It struck
my spirit—that here we are next to one of
the largest and fastest-growing military
installations in the world, and there’s
nothing for [homeless] female veterans. I
purchased a home to house homeless female
veterans. That’s how H.O.P.E. Institute
was born. We received 501(c)(3)
status in June 2012.
2. What is H.O.P.E. Institute’s mission?
Our focus is homeless female veterans.
Of the nearly 22 million veterans in this
country, around 2.1 million are women.
Of that population, almost 5 percent are
homeless. What you have to keep in mind
is, that only accounts for the female veterans
who identify as homeless, because
there are still some out there who we don’t
know about yet.
Something’s wrong with that picture.
Retired Lt. Col. Hope Jackson
That could have been any of us given different
circumstances, maybe different
choices, maybe different exposures. So the focus today is to
serve those who gave of themselves so selflessly and now can’t
find a place to call home. Those numbers, this situation, isn’t
going to go away because women are still raising their right
hand to serve and defend.
3. What services does the institute provide?
Every veteran’s needs will be different. When a woman
comes in, she and I will sit down and put together what I call
an individual development plan, which is really her road map
for success. I want the resident to identify what she defines as
success. When she tells me what she wants to do in the next
phase of her life, then we will put together a road map to get
her from where she is to where she deserves to be. It is a selfgoverning
program.
The first 30 days is an acclimation period. There are not going
to be any passes. We are going to go through everything in
terms of their finances, to see if they’re getting all of the benefits
that they are entitled to. We have a job placement program in
place. We’re partners with an organization that has an online
U.S. Army/Sgt. Adam Garlington
platform for higher education that caters to the military. Any
woman coming into the program will get her education through
this organization for free.
One thing that is critically important to understand is that
this isn’t a place where these ladies can come in, go back out,
and continue along the same path that they were on before they
came in. This is a place that is about changing lives. They just
lack the resources, the mentorship and the leadership to help
them make that transition.
4. Are there specific qualifications for
these services?
Yes. First, they must be a veteran. In order
to prove that, I just need a DD-214
[certificate of release or discharge from active
duty] and a VA identification card. It
doesn’t matter their discharge status because
this is a no-judgment zone. We take
you how you come. If you are willing to
work hard to get back on your feet, to have
a life you’ve chosen and your version of the
American dream, we’re here to help.
5. How is the institute funded?
I give presentations around the city to
social and civic organizations and as a result,
many of those groups make donations
to the institute. Citizens in the community
sometimes make small donations, and the
rest comes from me.
6. What does H.O.P.E. Institute need
to continue?
Funding, funding, funding is what we need to run a facility like
this. This is a home, just like you and I live in. My military training
has taught me that the smaller the group, the larger the
chance for success. This is a four-bedroom home that has been
completely renovated. Each room houses two women, so we are
working with groups of six to eight women. It takes resources to
provide food, keep the lights on, pay the water bill. We’re looking
at anywhere from $9,000 to $10,000 a month to keep the house
operational. So that’s how people can help. They can go to our
website at www.theinstituteofhope.org and make donations.
7. What do you hope the institute will accomplish in the future?
The flagpole is here in El Paso, Texas, but the needs of female
veterans are expanding around the entire country. I see
H.O.P.E. Institute being a household name over the next five to
10 years. Anywhere that there’s a large population of female veterans
combined with a military installation, H.O.P.E. Institute
will have a footprint. We are here to change lives, one duty station
at a time.
—Jennifer Benitz
February 2016 ■ ARMY 5

Washington Report
Congress Urged to Approve More Base Closings
An Army that has readiness as its top priority cannot afford
to waste money maintaining excess infrastructure, a panel of
Army installation officials has warned Congress.
In a renewed plea for Congress to approve another round of
base closings, Lt. Gen. David D. Halverson, commanding
general, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, and
assistant chief of staff for installation management, said the
estimated $480 million a year spent maintaining unneeded facilities
would be better spent on training and readiness of
troops or on addressing deferred maintenance and upkeep of
facilities that are needed.
“Fiscal realities are showing in the decline in our facilities,
and it is affecting our future readiness,” Halverson told a
House Armed Services Committee panel in early December.
Having that half-billion dollars from excess bases for other
purposes would help the Army, he said. “That would buy a
lot of readiness, and it would also focus our efforts that we
need for investment purposes.” He listed improvements in
ranges as one of the top readiness priorities.
“Persistent funding constraints and the cumulative rising
costs of energy, construction, water and engineering services
have forced the Army to take risks in installations to maintain
the ready force,” Halverson said.
The withdrawal of significant combat forces from overseas
has an impact on domestic bases, he said. “We never had the
full force at home station at the same time,” he said. Having
everyone home and in need of postwar training to restore
readiness has led to complications, such as scheduling time on
ranges. With increased demand, planning is more complicated.
With tight funding, training rotations are sometimes
taking longer, making scheduling even more difficult, he said.
Col. Andrew Cole Jr., garrison commander at Fort Riley,
Kan., said Army posts are suffering from years of underfunding,
having to pay for standard maintenance versus restoration
and modernization. “We make choices, and we make some decisions,”
he said. “Ultimately, if there is a catastrophic failure,
then we have to end up allocating our funding against that.”
An example, he said, was a leak in the heating and cooling
system of a historic building that likely was the result of not
spending money on adequate preventive checks. The leak
caused significant damage over three floors of the building.
Halverson said the Army is filled with other examples, like
how problems with air conditioning in hot locations can lead
to mold and health issues.
Congress is not ready to accept additional base closings and
has flatly denied spending any Pentagon money for planning
closures. However, the 2016 National Defense Authorization
Act includes a provision calling on DoD and the services to submit
a 2017 comprehensive inventory of worldwide installations,
looking at current and future needs. They want to see a 20-year
force structure plan to avoid shutting down bases that might be
excess today but could be needed in the future. Additionally, the
Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, is working on a report about excess infrastructure,
with the intention of assessing the value of keeping more posts
and installations than needed to provide surge capacity.
Funding Bill Includes $122 Billion for Army
The battle over the fiscal year 2016 budget concluded with
an elusive compromise after President Barack Obama on
Dec. 18 signed into law a $1.1 trillion spending bill that included
$514 billion in basic defense spending plus $59 billion
for overseas contingency operations, a $26 billion increase
over the fiscal year 2015 budget.
The Pentagon, White House and Congress will get to do
the whole thing all over again for FY 2017, which begins Oct.
1, 2016. Passing a 2017 budget will be even more complicated
because it is a presidential election year, when politicians
find it difficult to reach any compromise.
The spending levels in the FY 2016 Omnibus Appropriations
Act match a bipartisan agreement made in October. The
measure, combining discretionary spending for all federal agencies
into one bill, was the last significant piece of legislation
Congress had to pass in 2015 before going home for the year.
The Army’s share of the budget is about $122 billion, excluding
money for contingency operations. The FY 2017
Army budget is expected to be only 2.2 percent larger.
The agreement includes $129 billion for military personnel,
a $1.2 billion increase over FY 2015. Operations and
maintenance spending increase by $5.8 billion, to $167.5 billion
for FY 2016. There are large increases for procurement
and research programs. Procurement spending is $110 billion
for 2016, a $17 billion increase over the 2015 budget. Funding
of research and development programs is $69.8 billion for
FY 2016, a $6.1 billion increase.
The Army’s share is $53.5 billion for active, National
Guard and Army Reserve personnel; and $41.7 billion in the
base budget for operations and maintenance. For procurement,
the compromise gives the Army $5.9 billion for aircraft,
$1.9 billion for tracked vehicles, $1.6 billion for missiles,
$1.2 billion for ammunition, and $5.7 billion for other
procurement. The Army also receives $7.5 billion for research,
development, test and evaluation; and $1.5 billion for
military construction and family housing.
6 ARMY ■ February 2016

News Call
Animal-Assisted Therapy Can Help With PTSD
Animal-assisted therapy is offering
an alternative or supplement to the
cognitive processing and prolonged exposure
therapies currently in use to
help military veterans who suffer from
nightmares, depression and other effects
of post-traumatic stress disorder.
The trauma-focused talk therapies have
been known to help, but as a study recently
published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association notes, “nonresponse
rates have been high.” Some
PTSD patients, for example, find the
therapy so upsetting that they drop out.
Dogs have served soldiers for decades
and have proven helpful in easing PTSD.
Horses have helped, too. Brooke Army
Medical Center in San Antonio offers
equine-assisted therapy. So do VA facilities
in Bedford, Mass., and Albany,
N.Y. In 2010, retired Lt. Col. Bridget
Kroger founded her own organization.
After equine therapy helped her recover
from PTSD, the 24-year Army veteran,
who served two tours in Iraq, established
the Wounded Warrior Equestrian
Program to help riding facilities
and horse-rescue farms provide services
to service members and veterans around
the country.
Patrick Bradley, a Vietnam veteran
who suffered from PTSD, recognized
the symptoms when his son Skyler left
the Army after more than a decade in
uniform and multiple tours in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Bradley, director of the
raptor program at a Florida nature park,
persuaded his son to visit him at work.
Skyler Bradley found peace among the
wounded birds of prey and soon was
spending a lot of time at the park. He
also began training the birds.
Together, the Bradleys established the
Avian Veteran Alliance and have teamed
with the local VA center where Skyler
was once a patient. Veterans visit the
park twice a week to work with wounded
raptors, and Patrick Bradley takes the
birds to the VA center each month.
Matthew Simmons, who served in
Operations Desert Storm and Desert
Shield, directs operations at the Serenity
Park Parrot Sanctuary on the West Los
Angeles VA campus. His wife, clinical
psychologist Lorin Lindner, founded the
park in 2005. It adopts sick, wounded
and abandoned parrots and lets wounded
warriors care for and establish relationships
with them.
Simmons and Lindner also established
the Lockwood Animal Rescue Center
north of Los Angeles in 2011. It shelters
and rehabilitates wolves and wolf dogs
from around the U.S. and pairs them
with veterans who suffer from PTSD.
Research has shown that touching an
animal can lower blood pressure, relieve
stress and reduce anxiety. As veterans
work with and care for the animals, they
build confidence and self-esteem as well
as accept responsibility.
—Toni Eugene
Staff Sgt. Cedric Richardson rides Gary the horse at the Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston
Equestrian Center. Riding is part of the Soldier Adaptive Reconditioning Program at Brooke Army
Medical Center.
Army Warns: Be Vigilant Against Online Scams
This Valentine’s Day, you might be
someone’s sweetheart and not even know
it. That’s because imposter accounts online
have proliferated. No one is immune;
as Gen. John F. Campbell, commander
of Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan, posted on his official Facebook
page about this time last year: “The
intent of this page is to inform readers
about activities here in Afghanistan. Unfortunately,
there are individuals who
copy the photos and comments from this
page and create fake pages using my
name to find romance and/or try to scam
people out of money.”
The post also noted that in the six
months prior, more than 700 fake sites in
Campbell’s name had been identified.
The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
Command has already warned people
involved in online dating to “proceed
with caution when corresponding with
persons claiming to be U.S. soldiers currently
serving in Afghanistan or elsewhere.”
In addition, the Army recently
released a tip sheet for soldiers to reduce
the chances that their names and images
will be appropriated by scammers.
“Imposter Accounts, Romance Scams,
and Unofficial Sites” suggests soldiers
take the following steps to reduce their
vulnerability:
■ Conduct routine searches on social
media platforms for your name; public
affairs professionals should also search
for the names of senior leaders they rep-
U.S. Army/Lori Newman
February 2016 ■ ARMY 7

esent. Be sure to search using similar
spellings; imposters often use these to
remain undetected.
■ Set up a Google alert (www.google.
com/alerts) for your name and the names
of leaders you represent in an official capacity.
This notification service sends
emails when it finds new results—including
web pages and blogs—that match
the given search terms.
■ Ensure privacy settings are set to
the highest available for professional as
well as personal accounts.
The tip sheet warns that it can be difficult
to remove fake accounts without
proof of identity theft or scam. It also offers
links for reporting imposters on Facebook,
Twitter and Instagram: www.
facebook.com/help/17421051939,
https://support.twitter.com/forms/
impersonation and https://help.instagram.
com/contact/636276399721841.
For more information about identifying
and reporting fake accounts on social
media or dating sites, go to www.army.mil/
media/socialmedia.
New Undersecretary Utilizing
His Service in Army, Congress
The new undersecretary of the Army
said he believes his experiences as an
Iraq War veteran and member of Congress
will help him in the job.
Patrick Murphy, a former Army captain
and staff judge advocate, spent eight
years in uniform. He deployed to Bosnia
in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, and also served
as a constitutional law professor at the
U.S. Military Academy. The 42-year-old
served two terms in the U.S. House representing
Pennsylvania’s 8th District.
Murphy was confirmed by the Senate
in a voice vote on Dec. 18, a few days after
appearing before the Senate Armed
Services Committee alongside the nominees
for Air Force and Navy undersecretaries.
Murphy told the committee
that if he were confirmed for the post
that makes him the Army’s chief management
officer, he would engage in a
top-to-bottom review looking for “efficiencies
within the organization so we
can refocus on those warfighters who are
keeping our families safe.”
“I will make sure that the Army is
manned, trained and equipped to accomplish
what [Army Chief of Staff]
Gen. [Mark A.] Milley recently articu-
SoldierSpeak
On Helmets
“Until I took this job, I had no idea what went into making this equipment, and it’s
been eye-opening,” said Col. Dean M. Hoffman IV of Program Executive Office-
Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Va. “Every helmet is tested probably 67 times. We take
each lot that comes off the production line. We keep some, and we put them in extreme
cold, hot; and constantly every year, we’re pulling them off the shelf and
retesting them to make sure they’re the best.”
On Clearing Drop Zones
“The bittersweet is my personal archenemy,” said Ben Amos, Integrated Training
Area Management coordinator at Fort Devens, Mass., about the Oriental Bittersweet,
an invasive species. “It’s a very rapidly growing vine that chokes out trees. It
spreads like wildfire. Not only are you going to begin losing trees, which impacts
the habitat, but you have dead trees falling into landing zones, dead branches
falling onto people trying to train, and just basic maneuver impacts.”
On A Female Soldier’s Worth
“Female military members’ remarkable service in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that
no military can achieve its full potential without utilizing the talents and abilities of
its female citizens,” said Maj. Gen. David S. Baldwin, adjutant general of the California
Army National Guard, before meeting with state legislators and Guard
leaders to discuss the opening of all military occupations to women. “Rescinding all
combat restrictions was more than a move toward equality, but a tactical advancement
as well.”
On Fighting Spirit
“If you can’t fight and win, then I don’t want you on the team,” said Sgt. 1st Class
Matt Torres of Fort Bragg, N.C., during a leadership seminar at Fort Leavenworth,
Kan. He worries some NCOs have become stagnant in their careers and are willing to
“sit back and chill” while waiting for retirement.
On Turkey Jerky
“To see soldiers eat and like something that you have developed, and see that it
improves their morale and helps them perform their mission better—I think that is
the most fulfilling my job as a researcher can get,” said Dr. Tom Yang, a food
technologist at the Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering
Center’s Combat Feeding Directorate in Massachusetts. He helped develop
turkey jerky and turkey bacon for soldiers, using inexpensive technology and creating
food that “has much less salt and stays moist.”
On Mama Bears
“If you thought the enemy was bad in Afghanistan, wait until my mother finds out
you’re sending me to Texas,” said medically retired Capt. Florent “Flo” Groberg,
recalling when Army officials said they might send him to San Antonio Military
Medical Center to recover from severe injuries after he thwarted a suicide bomber
in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in 2012. Groberg, who earned the Medal of Honor
for his actions, wound up at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, near his
family’s home in Maryland. He spent almost three years recovering.
On Giving Back
“If we get wings, it’s an extra bonus,” said Staff Sgt. Micheal Tkachenko of the
65th Military Police Company, Fort Bragg, N.C. “But it’s more or less about just
being able to participate and give back.” Tkachenko waited in line about 26 hours
to donate a toy and be first to win a chance to jump with a partner-nation jumpmaster
and earn foreign jump wings, in the 18th annual Randy Oler Memorial Operation
Toy Drop. Since inception, the toy drop has collected more than 100,000
toys for underprivileged children.
8 ARMY ■ February 2016

COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR and SERGEANTS MAJOR CHANGES*
Command Sgt.
Maj. J.A. Castillo
from 19th ESC,
Camp Henry, Korea,
to ACC, RA, Ala.
Sgt. Maj. R.J.
Dore from USA
Adjutant General
Sgt. Maj., Fort
Knox, Ky., to
Forces Cmd. G-1,
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Command Sgt.
Maj. E.C. Dostie
from USARJ and I
Corps (Forward),
Camp Zama, Japan,
to ARCENT, Shaw
AFB, S.C.
Command Sgt.
Maj. C.A. Fagan
from 101st Airborne
Div. Artillery
(Air Assault), Fort
Campbell, Ky., to
FCoE, Fort Sill, Okla.
Command Sgt.
Maj. M.A. Ferrusi
from 3rd Bde., 10th
Mountain Div., Fort
Polk, La., to USARAK,
JB Elmendorf-
Richardson, Alaska.
Sgt. Maj. D. Gibbs
from HQ, USASOC,
Fort Bragg, to
Command Sgt.
Maj., USAJFKSWCS,
Fort Bragg.
Command Sgt.
Maj. R.B. Manis
from 205th Infantry
Bde., Camp Atterbury,
Ind., to First
Army Division East,
Fort Knox.
Command Sgt.
Maj. D.L. Pinion
from 3rd Squadron,
1st U.S. Cavalry Rgt.,
Fort Benning, Ga., to
Sgt. Maj., USAREUR
G-3, Wiesbaden,
Germany.
Command Sgt.
Maj. R.J. Rhoades
from 21st TSC,
Kaiserslautern,
Germany, to
Sgt. Maj., ACSIM,
Washington, D.C.
Command Sgt. Maj.
A.T. Stoneburg
from RRS to USAREC,
Fort Knox.
Command Sgt.
Maj. M.A. Torres
from 1st MEB, Fort
Polk, to 13th SC (E),
Fort Hood, Texas.
Command Sgt.
Maj. R.F. Watson
from Fort Belvoir
Community
Hospital, Fort
Belvoir, Va., to
PRMC, Honolulu.
■ ACC—U.S. Army Contracting Cmd.; ACSIM—Army Chief of Staff Installation Management Cmd.; AFB—Air Force Base; ARCENT—U.S. Army Central; Bde.—Brigade;
ESC—Expeditionary Sustainment Cmd.; FCoE—Fires Center of Excellence; HQ—Headquarters; JB—Joint Base; MEB—Maneuver Enhancement Bde.; PRMC—Pacific Regional
Medical Cmd.; RA—Redstone Arsenal; Rgt.—Regiment; RRS—U.S. Army Recruiting and Retention School; SC (E)—Sustainment Cmd. (Expeditionary); TSC—Theater
Sustainment Cmd.; USA—U.S. Army; USAJFKSWCS—U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School; USARAK—U.S. Army Alaska; USAREC—U.S.
Army Recruiting Cmd.; USAREUR—U.S. Army Europe; USARJ—U.S. Army Japan; USASOC—U.S. Army Special Operations Cmd.
*Command sergeants major and sergeants major positions assigned to general officer commands.
U.S. House of Representatives
Patrick Murphy
lated as his fundamental task: to win in
the unforgiving crucible of ground combat,”
he said. “And I’ll make sure that
our troops do not have a fair fight, that
they have a tactical and technical advantage
against our enemies.”
Murphy told the committee that when
he left Congress five years ago, the Army
had “45 brigade combat teams on active
duty. We are now down to 31.”
Resources are another concern, he
said, noting the tradeoff the Army is
making in slowing modernization to
pay for readiness.
Neera Tanden, president of the Center
for American Progress, said “the
Army and the nation are lucky” to have
Murphy confirmed. The former senior
fellow “contributed greatly to our work
by leading on issues that affect 21st-century
fighters, and he will no doubt do
the same for the Army,” Tanden said.
Briefs
Army Takes Over as Chair of
Conference of American Armies
This month, the U.S. Army becomes
chairman of the Conference of American
Armies, a group of 20 member armies,
five observer armies and two international
military organizations from Central,
South and North America that have
met since 1960 to exchange defense ideas
and plan conferences and exercises.
The chairmanship rotates every two
GENERAL
OFFICER
*CHANGES*
Maj. Gen. J.
Caravalho Jr. from
Dep. Surgeon Gen.
and Dep. CG (Spt.),
MEDCOM, Falls
Church, Va., to Jt.
Staff Surgeon, Jt.
Staff, Washington,
D.C.
Brigadier Generals: R.J. Place from Asst. Surgeon
Gen. for Quality and Safety (P), OSG, and Dep. CoS,
Quality and Safety (P), MEDCOM, Washington, D.C.,
to CG, RHC-A (P), Fort Belvoir, Va.; R.D. Tenhet
from CG, RHC-A (P), Fort Belvoir, to Dep. Surgeon
Gen. and Dep. CG (Spt.), MEDCOM, Falls Church.
■ CoS—Chief of Staff; Jt.—Joint; MEDCOM—U.S.
Army Medical Cmd.; OSG—Office of the Surgeon
General; (P)—Provisional; RHC-A—Regional Health
Cmd.-Atlantic; Spt. —Support.
*Assignments to general officer slots announced by
the General Officer Management Office, Department
of the Army. Some officers are listed at the
grade to which they are nominated, promotable or
eligible to be frocked. The reporting dates for some
officers may not yet be determined.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 9

West Named Army Surgeon General
Maj. Gen. Nadja West is sworn in as the Army’s
44th surgeon general and commanding general
of U.S. Army Medical Command by acting
Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning. As part of
her new assignment, West will be promoted to
lieutenant general, the first African-American
woman in the Army to hold the rank. She succeeds
Lt. Gen. Patricia D. Horoho, who retired.
years; this is first time in 24 years that it
has fallen to the U.S.
“Our cooperation over the past 55
years has promoted regional security and
the democratic development of our
member countries,” Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Mark A. Milley said at the closing
of the group’s 2015 conference in Colombia.
It “provides our armies the opportunity
to increase cooperation and
integration … and, most importantly,
identify the topics of mutual interest in
defense-related matters to develop solutions
that are beneficial to us all.”
DoD: Security in Afghanistan
Deteriorated Last Half of ’15
DoD has acknowledged in a recent
report, “Enhancing Security and Stability
in Afghanistan,” that “the overall security
situation in Afghanistan deteriorated”
in the second half of 2015, “with
an increase in effective insurgent attacks
and higher ANDSF [Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces] and Taliban
casualties.” The report, the second
mandated by Congress in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015, covers the period from June
1 through Nov. 30.
“Fighting has been nearly continuous
since February 2015,” the report says.
SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
ANNOUNCEMENTS
R. Kazimer, Tier 2, from
Dir., Corporate Info., CIO,
USACE, Washington, D.C.,
to Dep. to the CG, CCoE,
TRADOC, Fort Gordon, Ga.
Tier 1: L. Swan to Dep. Dir., Rapid Capability
Delivery, JIDA, Washington, D.C.
■ CIO—Chief Information Officer; CCoE—
Cyber Ctr. of Excellence; JIDA—Joint Improvised-
Threat Defeat Agency; TRADOC—U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Cmd.; USACE—U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers.
The ANDSF are now capable of clearing
areas of insurgents, but their ability
“to hold areas after initial clearing operations
is uneven [and] they remain
reluctant to pursue the Taliban into
their traditional safe havens.”
In the six-month reporting period, 12
U.S. service members were killed in
Afghanistan, and 40 were wounded in
action. Insider attacks are still a threat,
although the number continues to decline.
Terrorist and insurgent groups—
particularly al-Qaida—and the possible
expansion of extremist groups such as
the Islamic State are threats to progress
as well as security.
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, now
numbering nearly 10,000, are expected
to remain through most of 2016.
Summit Links Soldier
Readiness To Sleep
Fatigue can lead to mistakes, and the
Army has begun to focus on the importance
of adequate and quality sleep to
soldiers’ performance.
Staff Sgt. Jacob Miller, 2015 Drill
Sergeant of the Year, told attendees at a
sleep summit sponsored by the Army
Office of the Surgeon General that he
recognized he had put himself and his
soldiers at risk more than once due to
exhaustion after serving long duty
hours. Miller acknowledged that the
Army has accorded more time for sleep
since then, but he believes more enforcement
of that guidance is needed.
Army sleep specialists at the summit
agreed that quality sleep is imperative to
good safety and that more data is needed
to show the link between fatigue and
poor performance. Sleep, they noted, is
a critical element in the Army’s Performance
Triad, which also includes activity
and nutrition. The Office of the Surgeon
General is currently conducting
Performance Triad pilot studies.
Sky’s ‘Unraveling’ Earns Praise
From Literary Critics in 2015
Emma Sky, a noted Middle East
expert and contributor to ARMY magazine,
released her memoir, The Unraveling:
High Hopes and Missed Opportunities
in Iraq, last year—and the literary
world took notice.
Her book was named one of The New
York Times’ 100 Notable Books of 2015
and a Times Editors’ Choice, one of the
Financial Times Books of the Year, a
New Statesman [U.K.] Essential Book
of the Year, a Times [U.K.] Book of the
Year, and one of Military Times’ Top 10
Books of the Year. The book was also
shortlisted for the Samuel Johnson
Prize for Nonfiction for 2015.
Sky is the director of Yale University’s
World Fellows program and a senior fellow
at Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global
Affairs. Although initially opposed to
the war, she volunteered to help rebuild
the Iraqi government after Saddam Hussein
was overthrown in 2003.
She served as the Coalition Provisional
Authority’s governorate coordinator
of Kirkuk, Iraq, from 2003 to 2004,
and as Gen. Raymond T. Odierno’s political
adviser from 2007 to 2010. ✭
John Martinez
10 ARMY ■ February 2016

Front & Center
Readiness and Capability Are Intertwined
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired
There is no question about readiness
being the prime responsibility of today’s
Army leaders. Every public speaker,
report, news column and magazine article
stresses the requirement and commitment
necessary to guarantee combatready
forces to meet the demands of
national security.
I have no argument with that requirement,
having lived with it in every command
assignment from World War II
through the Cold War. But during my
years of senior command, if anyone
asked for a one-word identification of
my prime responsibility, I would have
answered “capability.”
Readiness is the responsibility of combat
and combat support forces that may
be committed immediately to a crisis situation—those
closest to the crisis at the
highest degree of readiness. Battalion and
company commanders bear the brunt,
but platoon and squad leaders are the
front line of action. Squad leaders ensure
each soldier knows his or her job and has
the skills required by his or her MOS.
They also create the confidence and team
spirit essential for combat operations.
Platoon leaders ensure that squad
leaders have done their jobs, then mold
the teams that must be ready to engage
in the tactical tasks they are expected to
perform. Company commanders supervise
and validate readiness training; they
also are responsible for the first rung of
the capability ladder as they exercise the
ability to call for and employ intelligence,
fire support, logistics and coordination
with other companies engaged in combat
operations. They are the principal contributors
to the development of the next
war’s band of brothers.
Battalion and brigade commanders
also supervise readiness, but their primary
concerns are adequate planning and then
directing operations. Requiring their attention
as battle action unfolds are communications
that obtain fire support and
resupply, maintain contact with adjacent
units and higher and lower echelons, and
control the activities of attached units.
Division and corps commanders direct
combat campaigns. They supervise readiness
training during peacetime, but must
presume readiness when ordered to combat.
They direct combat activities, make
decisions essential for sustaining operations,
and ensure their staffs are sustaining
the support requirements of their
subordinate units. They are also responsible
for recommending or requesting
the additional support or resources that
could expedite action or prevent failure.
The highest commands in a theater of
operations are almost completely concerned
with capability. They must assume
the readiness of the forces committed
to them by the services as they plan
their campaigns, guaranteeing mission
success or explaining the risks involved
and recommending steps to alleviate
those risks.
A perfect example of such a requirement
was the request for an additional
corps in the troop list for the Persian
Gulf campaign in 1990–91. The same
responsibility is borne by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon, where
the ultimate demands of combat operations
must be satisfied.
When a national crisis occurs, the
president is concerned almost exclusively
with capability. After approving the National
Military Strategy and with assurances
by the Joint Chiefs of the adequacy
of forces to accomplish missions appropriate
to that strategy, he or she can confidently
make decisions to achieve political
objectives. When that system works
as designed, we have military operations
like Just Cause in Panama and Desert
Storm in the Persian Gulf. When the
system is not operable, we have had
World War II and three years of losses,
the Bataan Death March and the Battle
of Kasserine Pass while building the
forces necessary to win in Europe and
the Pacific; and we have had Korea and
the infamous Task Force Smith tragedy.
More recently, we have had unsatisfying
results in Iraq and Afghanistan, where
initial successes were squandered by inadequate
or overcommitments and early
withdrawals.
Fulfilling such a national strategy today
would require an Army closer to the
780,000 strength of Just Cause and the
Persian Gulf than the 450,000 currently
programmed for the future. It would
also require restoring the Navy and Air
Force of the 1990s and a continuing
modernization of our nuclear deterrent.
We can hope that Congress and our
presidential candidates are aware of
such a need and will provide a budget
that does not require the services to accommodate
a too small number and a
great risk.
■
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly
served as vice chief of staff of the
U.S. Army and commander in chief of
U.S. Army Europe. He is a senior fellow
of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare.
U.S. Army/Rick Rzepka
February 2016 ■ ARMY 11

Winning the War We’ve Got, Not the One We Want
By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army retired
We need some hard thinking. We
are not winning the war against
al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in
Iraq or Syria, or elsewhere across North
and East Africa, the greater Middle
East, South Asia and beyond. At best,
one might argue that we are holding our
own, but this is far from winning. The
sooner we come to realize this, the more
likely we are to identify a successful way
forward. Calls for reassessment and new
options with respect to the U.S. approach
to this problem—especially in
light of the attacks in San Bernardino,
Calif., Paris and Lebanon, and the
downing of the Russian civilian airliner
in Sinai—have yielded little so far.
The first step to any solution is to
recognize the problem for what it is.
The next is to recognize what has not
worked. Only then can the outlines of
probable solutions emerge. Neither the
“lash out, do something” approach nor
the “stay the course; it’s a long war” approach
will do.
We are facing a global revolutionary
war, with a narrative that resonates with
many. Most strategists are familiar with
revolutions within a state; the near-global
dimension of this revolution makes it different
and more complex. Our enemies
are not mere criminals. They have conquered,
controlled and now govern territory.
As their own strategic documents
describe, their intent is to eject Western
influence from the region, depose apostate
(in their view) governments and redraw
boundaries—as they already have
between Iraq and Syria, ultimately remaking
the map and adjusting the international
order by creating a caliphate
along the lines of the former Ottoman
Empire. This is part of the context
within which to understand our enemies’
ongoing operations and activities,
whether in one of their regional theaters
of operations or against those they consider
the “far enemy”; that is, Europe,
the U.S. and now, Russia.
Other parts of this global revolution
include several power struggles: one between
the Arabs and Persians; another
between Sunni and Shia. Further, this
revolution is an intra-Sunni struggle between
the very small percentage of radical
and violent Sunni Muslims seeking to
redefine the faith of the vast majority of
other Sunni Muslims. While the broad
dimensions of this power struggle are
important to understand, as in any revolution,
the microdynamics of how it
unfolds in each particular area are perhaps
more important. And again, like all
revolutions, this one has not only political
but also social and religious dimensions
to it. The violence our enemies
use is a means to further their revolutionary
ends and prevail in the regional
power struggles.
Finally, the geographic scope of this
revolution’s context makes it an international
problem, not just a regional
one. In fact, one aspect of this revolutionary
movement is to undo the international
order produced after World
War II and sustained throughout the
Cold War. The stability produced by
this order was, in part, a result of nations
primarily resorting to institutions
rather than violence to resolve differences.
Al-Qaida, the Islamic State and
their like reject these institutions, preferring
violence to establish the “order”
they seek. All nations have a stake in
the international system that is under
attack, and those with a bigger stake
have more responsibilities to preserve
and adapt that system.
Several conclusions derive from the
type of war we’re in. First, success in this
war will require a new Western-regional
coalition, one that is committed to sufficiently
common principles and goals and
will follow a common civil-military strategy.
Given the divergence of interests in
the region, no “grand alliance” seems
likely. But a lesser coalition, perhaps
even several bilateral arrangements, may
be possible. Under these conditions, no
rigid universal strategy will work; a more
flexible, general one may.
A precisely defined “end state” may be
the wrong construct to use in this war.
Rather, the strategy will have to be a
combination of creating local successes
that build toward the future the coalition
seeks. And this war cannot be won without
more participation from our Arab allies.
We need to study carefully, learn
from and adapt to the reasons why they
have been hesitant.
Second, ideas and narratives are the
fuel of revolutions, so the main effort of
whatever counterstrategy is adopted
must attack the enemies’ narrative both
by coalition domestic and international
actions. A counternarrative campaign is
not a “spin campaign.” Rather, it stitches
together domestic and international actions
concerning governance, economic,
social and religious policies in ways that
prove our enemies’ narratives wrong, reinforce
the coalition narrative, and show
our enemies for what they really are.
All security actions must support this
main effort. Our current counternarrative
campaign remains weak because
our actions are disjointed and unconnected
to a vision of a future different
from and more compelling than that of
our enemies.
Third, the “tissue” that connects our
enemies is as important as our enemies
themselves. This connective tissue consists
of the means our enemies use to recruit,
radicalize, plan, prepare, execute, finance
and sustain their activities. This
tissue lies in the open space of normal
civil and economic communications flow,
a space controlled by sovereign states and
their security services. We have taken
some action against this “tissue” but after
14 years of war, our actions clearly have
not been sufficiently robust, coordinated
or timely. Whatever coalition is formed
will have to develop domestic and
transnational norms and methods to deal
with this connective tissue.
Fourth, while the “solutions” to this
revolution are clearly local, local governance,
economic, social and religious
policies are as much causative to the rise
of the revolution as are the policies and
actions of “external” powers. So our reassessment
must address the domestic
policies of coalition members that our
enemies are using to their advantage.
Last, the security aspects of whatever
strategy the coalition adopts must include
both military forces and domestic
as well as transnational police forces.
Our enemies operate in the space be-
12 ARMY ■ February 2016

tween crime and war, and between
peace and war. The coalition must close
these spaces.
We have allowed the revolution to
spread. Like the cancer it is, the ground
that this revolutionary enemy controls
and the networks they have established
must be reduced; how and when are the
only questions. Our current efforts to reduce
this threat have been insufficient. In
fact, in the face of our efforts, both enemy-held
territory and their networks
have expanded.
We are fighting a war of attrition, acting
as if time is on our side. It is not.
The main effort—the counterideology
campaign and its governance, economic,
social and religious components—will
not succeed in the current security environment.
So while it is a supporting effort,
successful military and police security
operations are essential. Here, the
coalition faces one of its many hard
choices: Reduce our enemies’ control
and influence—in at least some of the
areas in which our enemies have
grown—using coalition air, ground and
special operations forces in conjunction
with local forces; or pace reduction
upon local security force capacity. The
former option will accelerate the pace of
our current operations but incur one
kind of risk. The latter drags out an already
too-long war, which incurs other
kinds of risks.
This global revolution has been clear
to some for years. Also clear is that the
U.S. strategic approaches used since the
Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have not
been sufficiently successful. Our enemies
have occasionally been disrupted, parts
have been dismantled; but they have not
been defeated and certainly are not destroyed.
In fact, they have morphed and expanded—despite
14 years of war and billions
of dollars spent, hundreds of “highvalue
targets” and thousands of others
killed, thousands of our own casualties,
tens of thousands civilians dead or
wounded, and hundreds of thousands of
refugees spread throughout the world.
Simply put: While we have had some
successes, neither the expansive, nearunilateral
strategy of the former Bush
administration nor the minimalist, gradualist,
surrogate approach of the Obama
administration has worked. One might
even say that both strategies have used
approaches that have strengthened the
enemies’ narrative and ideology rather
than diminished it. The same can be said
of some of the domestic policies adopted
by nations in as well as out of the region.
Both administrations have treated
coalition members as “contributing
nations,” where contributions are sometimes
combat, advisory or support troops;
and other times funds, equipment, or
other military or nonmilitary capabilities.
This approach can create the illusion of a
multinational effort, but it does not reflect
a serious attempt to align nations
around similar interests and common
goals. Nor does it reflect an attempt to
have coalition partners, together, ascribe
to common principles and develop common
goals and a common strategic approach
to attaining those goals. A more
traditional approach to coalitions would
add legitimacy to the international actions
that are required in waging and
fighting the war against our global revolutionary
enemies.
With rare exception, neither administration
has been able to develop and execute
a set of coherent civil-military strategies,
policies and campaigns. Whether
viewed domestically or internationally, if
the approach so far were a musical score,
it would be described more as cacophony
than harmony. Going forward, we need
not only a better coalition and strategy,
but also better collaborative bodies and
processes to make decisions, take coordinated
action, and adapt faster than our
enemies. We have been, consistently, too
slow.
Where do we go from here? Most important
is to rethink what we’ve been doing.
Intellectual change must precede
any changes in approach. Too much of
our post-9/11 collective action has been
taken in the haste to “do something” or
to demonstrate strength. Too much has
been reactive to the crisis of the day or
has been discrete actions unconnected to
a coherent campaign that, if successful,
will attain strategic aims. And too much
has been done sequentially, not simultaneously.
Further, our reassessment must acknowledge
that in the kind of war we’re
in, “defeat” and “destruction” cannot be
defined in strictly military terms. Bombs,
raids and any other kind of kinetic actions
are necessary, but they are not sufficient
to defeat a revolutionary enemy.
Destruction of a revolution requires
more. Revolutions ignite moral indignation
about one power arrangement,
then maneuver to replace that arrangement
with another promulgated as better.
Bombs and raids do not take the
wind out of the sail of moral indignation.
As long as we act as if defeat or
destruction is a military task, success
will continue to elude us. We need a coherent
set of civil and military strategies,
policies and campaigns, in service
to a broader goal.
Any reassessment worthy of the name,
therefore, must start by answering this
question: What kind of durable political
outcome will actually produce a better
peace? So far, we have heard little in answer
to this question. Members of whatever
coalition that forms must agree at
least to the principles that will guide
them to a satisfactory answer.
The answer to this question is fundamental
because in war, strategies, policies
and campaigns, whether military or nonmilitary,
are merely instruments. Their
value is relative; their worth can be
judged only relative to their capacity to
achieve the end or ends sought. What
are we seeking beyond destruction of our
enemies? The answer to that question
must be compelling and to sustain domestic
and coalition support, our actions
must clearly demonstrate that we are
making progress toward that end.
We cannot define the war to fit our
own biases. Nor can we “spin” it to fit
what we want to do rather than what has
to be done. The worth of whatever
strategies the coalition finally chooses
will be a function of how well those
strategies fit the realities of the war,
whether they attain the common goals at
reasonable costs and time, and how easily
the coalition can adapt as the war unfolds.
We may not like the war we’ve
got, and we may wish things were otherwise,
but success in war results from
dealing with reality as it is. ■
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.,
Ph.D., is a former commander of Multi-
National Security Transition Command-
Iraq and a senior fellow of AUSA’s Institute
of Land Warfare.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 13

Yep, Those Were the Good Old Army Days
By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, U.S. Army retired
With the Army in a time of change,
it is good to look back at the “good
old days.” The Army between the two
world wars is the best remembered “Old
Army.” The Old Army has been called
an athletic club, a school, a home for
wayward youth and a boys’ camp, all
rolled into one.
The Old Army was predominately
horse-drawn and very traditional.
When mechanization arrived in
the 1930s and the horses left the
stables, it was more traumatic
than just trading in brown boots
for black ones and campaign
hats for overseas caps. Individual
squad drill was replaced by
massed battalion marching formations;
the M1 Garand rifle
replaced the legendary Springfield
with its Mauser bolt action.
When it came to getting out
of personal debt, there was a
saying in the rural parts of the
country: Don’t sell the farm. It
was understood that if families
could afford to hold on to their
farms, they’d never starve. Also,
government-subsidized life insurance
for soldiers in 1917 was
$10,000—about the same amount as the
average farm mortgage. Thus, when a
soldier was killed, the death payment to
his family “bought the farm.”
Another good old saying at the turn of
the century was by author Hilaire Belloc:
“Whatever happens, we have got the
Maxim gun and they have not.” It was
the Maxim gun and its follow-on derivatives
that allowed English-speaking
countries and France to rule most of the
discovered world. But that lasted only as
long as “we” had it and “they” did not.
With the demise of the Old Army
went wrap leggings, hand-powered telephones
and signal flags, washpan helmets,
and afternoons off for athletics.
The mood of the Army changed as the
War Plans, locked in the orderly room
safe, changed from repelling an invasion
of Texas from Mexico to defending
overseas areas from the threat of global
war brought on by Asian and European
enemies.
Long-service regulars were the trademark
of the Old Army as soldiers gathered
around the company bulletin board
to see who made private first class after
six years of service, compared with about
six months today. Ordinary privates
earned $21 per month; privates first
class, $30; and corporals, $42. A second
lieutenant started out at $125 per month,
a dollar less than a master sergeant.
This illustration accompanied an October 1948 article in Infantry
Journal (a predecessor to ARMY magazine) about “the old Army.”
Apparently, it was not the pay that
kept men in the Old Army. Instead, it
was something called “The Outfit”—the
self-contained company, troop or battery
that took care of the soldiers’ mess, supply
and personnel management. It provided
everything a man needed: food,
clothing, shelter, and security from the
civilian world where no one was in
charge. This was especially true of the
Army during the Great Depression.
First sergeants were next to God in
units. No one spoke to “Top” without
permission except the “Old Man.” This
was the commanding officer—an experienced
captain or first lieutenant—who
relied on the first sergeant to keep things
running like a well-oiled machine. Buck
sergeants and corporals were barracks’
barons who could “field-strip” a deadbeat
recruit without breaking stride while
walking across a barracks quadrangle.
NCOs held their rank only as long as
they stayed in the unit that promoted
them. For an NCO to transfer with his
stripes intact, he was required to arrange
a trade with another NCO of equal rank
and speciality in another unit.
Gen. John J. Pershing wanted soldiers
who could “shoot and salute.” That was
good enough for the Old Army. The Old
Army did not do as much as the Army
does today, but what it did do was done
very well indeed. Enlisted men hardly ever
saw an officer because NCOs
were perfectly capable of running
things. There was no need, as
there is today, to first examine
insignia closely before saluting.
An officer’s uniform was distinctive.
It was usually Class A, never
fatigues, with “pink” trousers or
riding breeches and boots, and a
Sam Browne belt. In the Old
Army, it was a pleasure for soldiers
to lay a salute on an officer
from 100 yards away.
Most soldiers lived in the
barracks and took their fun
where they could find it in
bars, dance halls with nice or
not-so-nice women, or at games
of chance as long as their pay
lasted. When a soldier’s pay
ran out, he stayed on post, went to the
movies on credit, played pool in the
dayroom, or fired small-caliber weapons
on the unit’s indoor range. Some even
read books. When a soldier tired of
stateside duty, he could pull a hitch of
foreign service in one of several overseas
regiments in such exotic places as
Panama, Puerto Rico, China, Alaska
and Hawaii.
Duty with the 15th Infantry Regiment
in Tientsin, China, was especially prized.
It had the highest alcoholism and venereal
disease rate in the Army, but it always
came out on top in inspections.
Each year, the War Department inspector
general went out to inspect the “Can
Do” regiment there. It finished first because
soldiers hired Chinese peasants to
do their menial duties. Kitchen and stable
police jobs were performed by Chinese
coolies at a trivial cost per man. Every
soldier had a Chinese striker who shined
his boots, polished his brass, and kept his
14 ARMY ■ February 2016

part of the barracks spic and span.
In Panama, crossing the Isthmus on
horseback was considered very adventuresome
and a test of soldierly skill. The
Army believed it had a tremendous stake
in the Caribbean Basin as well as the
Pacific Rim. Puerto Rico and Cuba
guarded the approaches to the new
Panama Canal, the defense of which was
of paramount importance. Army garrisons
in the Philippines were a hedge
against further Japanese expansion in the
Pacific after the Russo-Japanese War,
and Japan’s takeover of Germany’s Pacific
possessions during World War I.
The Army garrisons in Hawaii were
considered a source of great assurance to
the security of the American West Coast
and trade routes in the Pacific.
Athletics were king and constituted a
large part of the soldiers’ daily program.
It could be fairly claimed that World
War II was won on the playing fields of
Army posts between the two world wars.
The quality of athletics was high, and
competition between individuals and
units was keen. Most soldiers played
baseball, but football and boxing were
also popular. Jogging had not caught on
yet; a man out running was probably a
boxer doing a little “road work.”
Officers played golf, tennis and polo to
improve their hand and eye coordination,
and to be considered gentlemen.
During periods when units were in garrison,
athletic activities were scheduled almost
every afternoon. Off-duty soldiers
participated or rooted for their favorites.
Field duty consisted of long road
marches at 2 and a half miles an hour.
There was little motor traffic on the dusty
roads around military posts in those days.
At night, soldiers pitched two-man pup
tents and camped along the roadside.
Maneuvers in such places as Texas were
no more than chasing jackrabbits through
the cactus and mesquite. In the tropics, it
meant chasing monkeys through the trees
and avoiding jungle reptiles.
Field duty acquainted soldiers with
tactical operations, field communications,
supply procedures, and the experience of
hardship living in the open. But it did
not teach soldiers what it was like to face
a well-armed and determined enemy.
Gen. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell was known
for his ability to walk long distances and
live in a Spartan field environment.
These qualities came in handy when he
had to lead his corps command group
out of Burma and back to India on foot
after the Japanese defeated his Chinese
forces in 1942.
The Old Army gave way to the New
Army with the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940. Another big milestone
for the Army was when the draft
was suspended in January 1973, and the
Army went back to being a long-service,
professional force. Did Old Army practices
creep back into the current Army?
Did we sell the farm or not? ■
Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret.,
is a West Point graduate who served in
field artillery, Special Forces, civil affairs,
community/public affairs and force
development. He also worked as a civilian
contractor for the Battle Command
Training Program until retiring in
2002. He is the recording secretary/photographer
of the Society for Military
History.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 15

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
Membership Benefi ts*
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With the AUSA Platinum Visa from First Command Bank,
you’ll enjoy a low variable interest rate, no annual fee, and great
rewards. Call 855-565-AUSA (2872) for additional information.
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ILW offers writing programs; conducts conferences and
symposia; publishes essays, Defense Reports, newsletters;
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ext. 4630 for details.
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Discounts offered to AUSA members on dental services
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If you or a family member gets injured or sick while on
travel, this plan will provide medical assistance, bring a
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In states where available, a special member discount
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or contact Member Support at membersupport@ausa.org or 855-246-6269 / 703-841-4300

He’s the Army
Surgeon Will Serve ‘As Long as I Can’
Dr. Frederick Lough had been out of uniform for more
than a decade at the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. The former Army lieutenant
colonel had served for 17 years before
separating to pursue a civilian career
as a heart surgeon. Still, in the weeks
and months following 9/11, he felt the
urge to do more for his country.
So he did just that. Lough joined
the Army Reserve in 2007; two years
later, he was promoted to colonel. And
in 2013, at the age of 64, Lough returned
to active duty.
“When I looked at my life, the Army
had been everything to me,” Lough
said. “They educated me through college,
through being a surgeon. … With
the fights going on in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the casualties coming, I
felt that I just could not stand on the
sidelines.”
Lough grew up in a military family;
his father was a career Army officer
who served for four decades. The family
moved frequently until finally settling
down near the U.S. Military
Col. (Dr.) Frederick Lough
Academy. Naturally, Lough said, a military career seemed like
a perfect fit.
Lough graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served
as an engineer officer with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
A few years later, he turned his attention to medical school.
Although the Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences (USUHS) did not exist at the time, there was a
scholarship program for Army officers to attend civilian medical
schools. Lough was accepted into the program and went
on to graduate from George Washington University’s School
of Medicine and Health Sciences in Washington, D.C.
After completing residencies in general surgery and thoracic
and cardiovascular surgery at what’s now Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Md., Lough remained
at Walter Reed as a general surgeon. As time went on,
he served in Korea and came back to continue his training at
Walter Reed.
As Lough approached 17 years of service, he received a call
from a former military surgeon asking him to join a practice in
Pennsylvania. Lough separated from the Army and as a civilian
surgeon, continued perfecting his craft, performing thousands
of surgeries.
By the early 2000s, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq going
full force, Lough felt an obligation to get back to the Army
and be involved again. He worked with medical recruiters and
about six years after 9/11, joined the
Army Reserve. In 2010, he was deployed
for three months to far western
Afghanistan, where he led a group of
U.S. doctors working alongside Bulgarian
surgeons at a Spanish-run NATO
hospital.
“We were the first American group
of physicians to be in this non-Englishspeaking
NATO hospital,” Lough said.
Despite the language barrier and different
styles of medical care, Lough and
his colleagues made it work. “It was a
great challenge, but it was also very
stimulating; fun, in a certain way,” he
said. “Every day was a new, ‘OK, how
do we do this?’ and at the same time,
we’re getting combat casualties in who
are, in some cases, severely wounded
and you have to negotiate with other
people how to do things. It required a
lot of mental agility.”
Lough deployed in 2012 to another
area in Afghanistan, where he faced a
much higher volume of combat casualties.
“I felt like I was dealing with situations that were why I became
a doctor in the first place,” he said. “Someone would be
hurt and the only question was, what was wrong and could
you help them and could you make them better.”
“It was great that the people that I worked with were totally
dedicated to trying to make this soldier better,” he said. “It
didn’t matter whether the soldier was an American soldier, an
Afghan soldier or a Spanish soldier—or whatever nationality.
Everybody did everything they could. So it really was, from a
physician standpoint, just spectacular because you really were
doing your craft. You were really working as a surgeon to take
care of things.”
After returning home from his second deployment, Lough
requested to return to active duty full time and in 2013, he was
officially welcomed to the surgery department at USUHS in
Bethesda. Today, he continues his work as a surgeon, professor
and mentor.
“The privilege and the opportunity to serve is so precious
that every day is a gift,” Lough said. “I am really benefited by
working at the great medical school here … and with great
people. It is no question that I’ll keep going as long as I can.”
—Jennifer Benitz
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Sharon Holland
February 2016 ■ ARMY 17

Army Women:
Highlights
1781–83
1864
With Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s announcement
lifting gender restrictions on all military jobs, we take
a look at the role of female soldiers throughout U.S.
history. Here are some highlights.
1941–45
Library of Congress
Deborah Sampson of Massachusetts enlists as a
Continental Army soldier under the name Robert
Shurtliff and serves in the Revolutionary War.
1942
Library of Congress
U.S. Army
More than 200,000
women serve in the
Army during U.S. involvement
in World
War II; 16 are killed in
action. Among those
captured by the
Japanese in the
Philippines in 1942
and held as POWs are
67 Army nurses; they
are released in 1945.
National Archives
Congress creates
Women’s
Army Auxiliary
Corps, or WAAC,
later renamed
WAC (Women’s
Army Corps).
June 11, 1970
1972
Anna Mae Hays,
left, Army Nurse
Corps, and WAC
director Elizabeth
P. Hoisington,
right, are promoted
to rank of
brigadier general.
Army ROTC
opens to
women.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army
U.S. Army
1976 1978
U.S. Army
Women matriculate
into
U.S. Military
Academy and
other service
academies.
Bernard H. Schopper
Congress abolishes
WACs,
leading to direct
assignment
of female
soldiers to noncombat
branches of the
Army.
18 ARMY ■ February 2016

1901 1917–18
Dr. Mary Walker is
captured by the
Confederates
while volunteering
as a surgeon on
the front lines of
the Civil War. She
is awarded the
Medal of Honor at
war’s end.
More than 21,000
Army nurses serve in
military hospitals at
home and abroad
during U.S. involvement
in World War I;
several are wounded
in the line of duty.
DoD
U.S. Army
Army Nurse Corps is established.
1948 1950–53 1964–1973
President Harry Truman signs into law the
Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, imposing
a 2 percent ceiling on the number of women,
excluding nurses, allowed in the military.
U.S. Army
Almost 12,000 WACs serve in the Korean War.
1973 June 4, 1974
Draft ends; establishment
of
an all-volunteer
force opens the
door for expanding
servicewomen’s
roles
and numbers.
U.S. Army U.S. Army
U.S. Army
About 13,000
WACs serve in
Southeast Asia
during the Vietnam
War years,
most of them
nurses.
Second Lt. Sally Murphy
is the Army’s first female
helicopter pilot.
Dec. 20, 1989 1990–91
UNCG University Libraries
Capt. Linda L. Bray
becomes the first
woman to command
American soldiers in
battle, during the invasion
of Panama.
About 770 women
deploy to Panama in
Operation Just Cause;
two command Army
companies.
National Archives
About 26,000 Army
women deploy during
Operations Desert
Shield and Desert
Storm; five are killed
in the operations.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 19

1993
2002
2004
U.S. Army
Staff Sgt. Jill Henderson is named Army’s
first female “Drill Sergeant of the Year.”
U.S. Army
Michele S. Jones is sworn in as command
sergeant major of U.S. Army Reserve, the
first female NCO to serve in the top enlisted
position in any military component.
U.S. Army
By year’s end, 19
female soldiers are
killed in the Iraq War,
the most servicewomen
to die as a result
of hostile action
in any U.S. war. U.S.
Army Capt. Kimberly
Hampton is the first
female pilot in U.S.
history to be shot
down and killed by
an enemy.
2005
2008 Jan. 24, 2014
Army National
Guard Sgt.
Leigh Ann
Hester is
awarded the
Silver Star
Medal for gallantry
in close
combat.
U.S. Army
Dennis Steele
Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody pins on her fourth
star, the first woman in uniformed service
history to achieve the rank.
Australian Army
About 33,000 Army positions previously
closed to women will integrate by April.
August 2015
December 2015
Defense Secretary
Ash Carter declares
all military
combat specialties
open to
women.
U.S. Army
Capt. Kristen Griest, left, and 1st Lt. Shaye Haver, right, graduate from U.S. Army
Ranger School.
U.S. Air Force
20 ARMY ■ February 2016

Cyber Capabilities Key
By Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon
One of the stunning trends since 2001 is the tactical
dominance of the American military, especially
ground combat units. This success was not gained
by accident or chance; it resulted from hard training
and the ability of units to harness combat power down to
the tactical edge. The historically unprecedented tactical
prowess of our ground forces is enabled by a network, with
systems and data, connected globally in ways that deliver
power to the edge.
This level of connectivity, however, has created expectations
within our formations that may no longer be realistic as
cyberspace is increasingly contested. This is why mission assurance
is so critical. Small ground units connected in ways to
harness the power of the U.S. military have a much higher
probability of mission success, and in many ways provide an
overmatch that is second to none. At the same time, cyber itself,
either alone or through its use to change the physical
world or human understanding, has evolved to the point that
it can lead to lethal kinetic effects, given the increasing connectivity
in the world. Our adversaries also recognize this po-
U.S. Army/Bill Roche
U.S. Army/Capt. Meredith Mathis
22 ARMY ■ February 2016

to Future Dominance
tential and will surely employ these capabilities to challenge
our formations the same way.
Unlike the land, sea, air and space domains, cyberspace is
continuously evolving and adapting along with each entrepreneur,
inventor and actor that uses it. There is an ever-changing
convergence and divergence of people, technologies and
processes characterized by disruptive technologies and applications.
Time is an important component. Software can change at
the speed of code; hardware at the speed of chips; and the people
change this domain at the speed of human thought, creativity
and learning. This distinctiveness translates to a domain that
is uniquely contested and competitive; and one that is passive
and active, hyperanimated and inanimate, all at the same time.
The growth of cyber capabilities has been exponential and is
not limited to the U.S. military. We have peer competitors, and
the struggle is for both competitive advantage and dominance.
To help bring clarity to the U.S. military’s approach to cyberspace,
U.S. Cyber Command recently published its vision, titled
“Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace.”
Most importantly, this vision recognizes that cyber will change
both military science and military art, requiring changes in joint
and service doctrine, capabilities and operations.
The Army and its headquarters with primary responsibility
for cyberspace operations, U.S. Army Cyber Command (AR-
CYBER), are organized to support this vision by focusing on
priorities to strengthen both joint and Army cyber capabilities
to support operations, including capabilities to enable ground
forces to continue their dominance in the land domain.
Mutually Supporting Priorities
Shortly after becoming Army chief of staff, Gen. Mark A.
Milley stressed the priority of readiness for the Army to fulfill
its primary mission to win in ground combat. ARCYBER
and Second Army embraced this priority by pursuing three
mutually supporting priorities: operationalize cyberspace operations
to support combatant and Army commands at echelon;
pursue a more defensible network; and organize, staff,
train and equip ready cyber forces.
The first priority—operationalize cyberspace operations to
support combatant and Army commanders—is evident in the
establishment of ARCYBER’s Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber
at Fort Gordon, Ga. It employs joint cyber forces and
conducts cyberspace operations to achieve cyberspace effects
in support of combatant commanders, and continues to grow
in both breadth and depth of capabilities.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. George Davis
Clockwise from top: Soldiers participate in a cyber exercise at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord, Wash.; members of the Ohio National Guard Computer
Network Defense Team train at Camp Atterbury, Ind.; soldiers from the
25th Infantry Division develop cyber capabilities at the U.S. Army Cyber
Center of Excellence, Fort Gordon, Ga.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 23

Sgt. 1st Class Richard
Miller, left, and Chief
Warrant Officer 2
Larry Elrod, U.S. Army
Cyber Protection
Brigade, discuss the
response to a simulated
cyberattack at
the Joint Readiness
Training Center, Fort
Polk, La.
U.S. Army/Bill Roche
To support the Army’s tactical forces, we have made delivering
cyberspace operations capabilities to Army corps and
below a major focus. Last year, the Army’s chief of staff challenged
us to demonstrate tactical cyber integration at the
brigade combat team level in home-station training and at
the combat training centers. Lessons learned from these pilots
continue to inform the Army’s employment and integration
of cyberspace capabilities and the convergence with information
operations and electronic warfare.
Our second priority—pursue a more defensible network—
is another critical component of our abilities to execute operations
across highly networked forces operating in all domains.
The integration of networks, systems and data has delivered
unprecedented awareness and warfighting capability to the
tactical edge, to the point it is now a dependency that, by extension,
makes it a vulnerability that must be protected. The
Army continues to improve and protect its networked information
technology capabilities and the cybersecurity of networks,
systems and data through modernization efforts and
cyberspace operations.
Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon, commanding general of U.S. Army
Cyber Command and Second Army, has commanded at every
level from company through division. He holds a bachelor’s degree
from the U.S. Military Academy, and master’s degrees in
national security and strategic studies from the National War
College and the U.S. Naval Command and Staff College. Portions
of this article appeared in Joint Force Quarterly.
Creating a more defensible network will also improve our
situational awareness in cyberspace. Army Cyber Command
is pursuing foundational cyber analytics capabilities to gather
unprecedented quantities of data across cyberspace, giving us
a clearer picture of our networks, systems and data. Coupled
with architecture modernization, this effort is critical to protect
the future force and our ability to fight and win.
Our third priority—organize, staff, train and equip ready
cyber forces—is a joint effort that has produced significant
change across the Army. Over the past two years, the Army
has started aligning command and control by assigning the
Network Enterprise Technology Command to Army Cyber
Command and building our active component cyber mission
force, with the goal of having all 41 Army cyber mission force
teams operating by the end of fiscal year 2016.
Reserve component forces are also an essential part of the
Army’s cyberspace force. Army Cyber Command is a multicomponent
organization of active and reserve soldiers. The
Army is building 21 additional cyber protection teams: 11 in
the Army National Guard, and 10 in the Army Reserve.
These teams expand the depth of talent and capability of our
overall force and are critical partners in this domain.
‘The Ultimate Enablers’
The Army will use exercises this year to inform the concepts,
organizations and capabilities needed to support ground
forces. It is increasingly clear there is a convergence of cyber,
tactical intelligence, signal, electronic warfare, information op-
24 ARMY ■ February 2016

erations and, at times, space capabilities in conducting cyberspace
operations.
People are the ultimate enablers of the joint cyber force.
Nothing is more important and vital to the growth of our cyber
forces and our cyberspace capabilities than our ability to
attract and retain the best people. To help meet the Army’s
demand for cyberspace talent, last September the Army created
its first new combat arms branch in nearly 30 years: the
Cyber Branch and Career Management Field. Its mission is
to centrally manage cyber talent for the Army.
In addition to the joint cyber components and the National
Mission Force at U.S. Cyber Command, the Army’s cyber
community includes two critical partners. The Cyber Center
of Excellence at Fort Gordon is our institutional cyber component
and is currently developing its structure, curriculum
and methods to meet future challenges and mission requirements.
The Army Cyber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy
is the primary cyber innovation agent and bridge builder.
It’s responsible for developing partnerships between the
Army and academia, government and industry while providing
insight into future cyber challenges through interdisciplinary
analysis on strategic cyber initiatives and programs.
While the Army’s cyber force and capabilities have grown
significantly over the last five years, several opportunities and
challenges will define how well the Army and the joint force can
provide cyber capability for the nation’s future defense. Partnerships,
talent management, acquisition agility and an innovative
culture are some of the factors that will have an impact.
Partnerships Are Critical
Partnerships with industry, academia and government agencies
are critical to our ability to respond and anticipate cyber
threats and maintain the joint force’s competitive advantage.
Because the cyber domain is a combination of public, private,
governmental, commercial and military activity, the Army
does not enjoy a monopoly on cyber capability, talent or innovation.
To succeed in the cyber domain, our partnerships with
the brightest minds and most innovative organizations must
be cultivated and retained to ensure our ability to operate on
the leading edge and succeed in this dynamic domain.
The demand for cyber talent in both the public and private
sectors has renewed calls to adapt Army and joint personnel
and acquisition policies. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has
encouraged DoD to challenge its most sacrosanct personnel
policies and practices to become and remain competitive for
talent. He has also called on DoD to refine acquisition structures
and processes to deliver timely and cost-effective material
solutions. Without these reforms, our current processes
will continue to struggle to keep pace with the changing demands
of the cyber domain.
Finally, despite our dependence on technology, wars will
continue to be decided by people. So we must also create a
cultural shift in which we value the innovators, experimenters
and creative thinkers despite drawdowns and resource
constraints. Our military structure must find ways to
accommodate these skills within our cyber forces, including
the ability to think in new and innovative ways. We will
push to maintain these values of innovation in all our soldiers
and leaders.
U.S. Cyber Command’s vision is extremely timely and provides
a broad, unified approach on the way forward as we
continue to adapt, innovate and transform for the future. Operationalizing
cyber, either alone or with other capabilities, to
support joint and Army commanders is essential. A more defensible
network for mission assurance is imperative. Harnessing
the power of talented people will enable us to stay
ahead and to win in this domain through the American traits
of innovation, adaptability, resilience and creativity. Now,
more than ever, we will look to our soldiers and civilians for
solutions in this contested space. Both today and as we look
to the future, the Army will remain operationally focused and
ready. Our nation’s security depends upon it. ✭
U.S. Army/Bill Roche
At U.S. Army Cyber
Command headquarters,
Fort Belvoir, Va.,
ARCYBER leaders listen
as Marc A. Zissman,
standing, associate
head of the Cyber Security
and Information
Sciences Division at
the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology’s
Lincoln Laboratory,
describes developing
cyber technology.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 25

Joint force soldiers brace against a Chinook’s rotor wash in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, in 2009.
U.S. Army/Spc. Walter Reeves
Instead of formal battles on traditional battlefields, the
Army’s conventional forces need to be prepared to fight in
what’s come to be known as the gray zone. Army Gen.
Joseph L. Votel, commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command, used the term last March during budget-review
testimony to Congress. He described the gray zone as the state
of existence between “normal international competition and
open conflict,” and said the gray zone is where “we see our very
best opportunities to help shape the future environment.” The
term has since gained traction in the special operations forces
community and is migrating to other parts of the Army.
To have the requisite capability to successfully respond to
gray zone conflicts, conventional forces must alter their training
mentality and methodology. Preparing for gray zone conflicts
requires Army commanders to prioritize regionally
aligned forces training, take advantage of home-station training
opportunities, increase training cooperation with special
operations forces, and become more expeditionary in nature.
The Army Operating Concept discusses gray zone-type environments
as the “prevent and shape” phases on the spectrum
of conflict. However, unlike the “win” phase, the prevent and
shape phases require a much longer time horizon. Regionally
aligned forces (RAF) are the Army’s designated units where
prioritizing training for competing in the gray zone must take
precedence.
An example of RAF training includes what’s known as
CREL—cultural, regional expertise and language—training.
This type of training enables Army units to gain specific
knowledge so they understand how to fight for dominance and
relevancy in gray zone conflicts. Part of the challenge in training
for these types of conflicts is that the end state may not be
a decisive win like in a large battle or campaign (sometimes
replicated at combat training centers). Army leaders must be
comfortable with accomplishing missions with inconclusive
outcomes, and understand that investment in CREL training
may take a long time.
Home-Station Training
Conflicts in the gray zone are complex. They combine the
dynamics of culture, history, economics and interpersonal rela-
26 ARMY ■ February 2016

By Maj. David B. Rowland
tionships and have a long time horizon. This complexity is
difficult to simulate at a combined training center in a one- or
two-week scenario.
Instead, units must develop home-station training scenarios
that can simulate this mix of complexity. Home-station training
is more cost-effective than deploying units to combined
training centers and can provide a variety of scenarios to leaders.
Many installations have the facilities to use the live, virtual,
integrating architecture to build the multilayered intricacies
needed for gray zone conflict training.
Training at home station puts less pressure to cram the complexities
into an intense training center scenario. It also allows
units to develop information, gain understanding and refine intelligence
over a longer time horizon, just like conflicts in the
gray zone. Therefore, combined training centers can remain focused
on decisive action scenarios for which they are well-resourced
and -suited.
Home-station training allows continued repetitions and
builds on previous training exercises as units mature and learn
new skills, tactics, techniques and procedures to operate in
gray zone conflicts. Exercise Gryphon Tomahawk, conducted
in February 2014 by the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., serves as a good example.
Training at home station must include all aspects of gray
zone conflict including working with special operations forces,
which typically operate in gray zone areas before conventional
forces arrive.
Uniquely Trained, Equipped
The Army’s special operations forces (ARSOF) are uniquely
trained and equipped to operate in the gray zone. However,
there are not enough Special Forces, civil affairs and psychological
operations soldiers available to deploy to every area
where the nation is in gray zone competition. ARSOF makes
up less than 5 percent of the active and reserve components and
cannot meet all the needs of combatant commanders.
Conventional forces must be ready to fill this capacity gap
with the regionally aligned forces. RAF units, which are oriented
on different parts of the world, give the Army opportunities
to coordinate operations and build habitual relationships
between special operations and conventional forces.
Exercises such as Combined Resolve V, at the Joint Multinational
Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany; and the Joint
Forcible Entry Exercise, at the National Training Center at
Fort Irwin, Calif., are good examples that demonstrate special
operations-conventional force interoperability. These training
exercises can also be scaled and replicated at many installations.
While Army RAF units learn from ARSOF units and integrate
best practices, they firmly remain conventional units.
Maintaining the mastery of combined arms maneuver, certainly
at the platoon and company level, keeps conventional
forces prepared for the entire spectrum of conflict. Pre-eminence
on the high-end battlefield remains a deterrence to our
nation’s enemies. Army conventional units will still be able to
learn valuable lessons from the ARSOF cultural and language
experts. Training with ARSOF, then, must begin at home
station or the combined training centers, well before a unit arrives
at the host nation or in unfriendly territory.
Become More Expeditionary
The Army must become more expeditionary so it can deploy
to theaters with gray zone conflicts. The days of shipping multiple
containers by air and sea—like the Army has done in
Afghanistan and Iraq—are over. This is no longer affordable for
the Army nor acceptable for the customer, whether it is a combatant
commander or the State Department. Deploying large,
brigade-size units is not always an option in smaller countries,
as seen when partnering with our allies in the Pacific or Africa.
U.S. Army/Lt. Col. Sonise Lumbaca
Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, train
in a mock tunnel system at Fort Bliss, Texas.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 27

Right: Soldiers of the
1st Armored Brigade,
3rd Infantry Division,
conduct a convoy
brief during Combined
Resolve V in Hohenfels,
Germany; below right:
Another soldier provides
security during
exercise cordon-andsearch
operations.
Foremost, smaller, more agile sustainment footprints allow
Army units to gain access to and compete in these conflict areas.
Multisource logistics combining a reach-back to the continental
U.S. and locally procured service and support allow Army units
to reduce the overall “tooth-to-tail” ratio. Operationalizing the
Reinvigorating Sustainment Home Station Training initiative is
an excellent concept to help achieve this goal.
Additionally, as deployment numbers are scrutinized, units
will need to capitalize on the communication network backbone
by using significant reach-back capability. This may include
having a robust intelligence section or running the network
support package from home station. For example, as
troop levels in Afghanistan started to decline in 2013, the 4th
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, started
redeploying intelligence soldiers back to Joint Base Lewis-
McChord before the unit’s deployment ended. Upon return to
home station, intelligence soldiers continued to provide analytical
support to the forward-deployed soldiers.
Communications, intelligence and sustainment elements of
the command will perform essential functions as the forces deploy
forward while keeping the deployed numbers to an acceptable
level. Engaged leaders can make this expeditionary
use of enablers effective.
Lessons Gleaned
History may not exactly repeat itself, as the old adage says,
but we can glean some important lessons following our experiences
in Iraq and Afghanistan as the Army is forced to reduce
in size and prepare for future conflicts. Current events in the
Maj. David B. Rowland, an infantry officer, served most recently
at U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He has served on
combat deployments with Ranger, airborne and Stryker units.
He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy
and a master’s degree from Georgetown University.
Middle East and Africa demonstrate that we are not entering
an era of perpetual peace; neither are we likely entering an era
of direct conflict with a near-peer competitor—or at least, we
hope not. The Army will more likely find itself supporting national
objectives fighting in the gray zone, that undefined and
complex environment between war and peace. Preparing for
this type of conflict requires deliberate decisions by Army
leaders to focus on a specific training path. Sometimes, it’s the
road less traveled.
✭
U.S. Army/Spc. Shardesia Washington U.S. Army/Sgt. Ian Schell
28 ARMY ■ February 2016

It’s Time to Establish
Ethics-Related Metrics
By Col. Charles D. Allen, U.S. Army retired
In July 2006, DoD initiated the “Check It” campaign as
part of its internal management controls program and coopted
the military aphorism “what gets checked gets
done.” To check that something is being done correctly
requires measurement and metrics.
During the past decade, DoD has sought to measure the effectiveness
of its counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan
and Iraq. It also sought to measure the effect of fiscal year
2013 sequestration using varied metrics for readiness, modernization
and force structure of the armed services. DoD is still
struggling to find appropriate metrics to assess the efficacy of
the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.
The difficulties in measuring these areas of strategic concern
do not bode well for DoD as it strives to check the character of
its leaders and ethics within the profession of arms to ensure
that we are “getting it right.”
The White House and Congress have paid a great deal of attention
to the ethical missteps and misbehavior of DoD leaders
in the early years of the 21st century. In response, the secretary
of defense in 2014 appointed a senior advisor for military professionalism
to focus its efforts for military ethics, character and
leadership development. In a report in September 2015, however,
the Government Accountability Office found that DoD
“has not fully implemented two key tools for identifying and
assessing ethics and professionalism issues, and it has not developed
performance metrics to measure its progress in addressing
ethics-related issues.” In the years since the renewed
focus, ethical issues have continued in operational and institutional
settings throughout the Army as well as in other services.
Too Many Failings
News accounts of officer, enlisted and civilian personnel
misconduct are, unfortunately, not infrequent and are generally
met with cynicism. The perceived lack of accountability
for senior leaders is aptly captured by author Tom Ricks’ quip,
“different spanks for different ranks.” While the 2011 Army
Profession Campaign and study sought to revive trust in the
Army as an institution, there are still too many incidents of
ethical failings within the ranks.
In early 2015, my U.S. Army War College colleagues, research
professor of military strategy Leonard Wong and professor
of behavioral sciences Stephen J. Gerras, revealed in
“Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession” a
pervasive culture of false reporting resulting from overwhelm-
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Adam C. Keith
Lt. Gen. Stephen R.
Lanza, I Corps commanding
general,
welcomes Joint Base
Lewis-McChord,
Wash., soldiers to a
Junior Leader Army
Profession Symposium
designed to
gather feedback on
the Army ethic.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 29

U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class John D. Brown
Leaders from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, discuss ethically challenging
situations during a professional development program at Fort Campbell, Ky.
ing and burdensome requirements, and the accepted norm of
telling higher headquarters what they want to hear.
Wong and Gerras are known to be provocative in asking
tough questions and publishing research findings that are uncomfortable
for military members. Ultimately, they challenge
the self-image and professional identity of Army officers as well
as the Army profession itself. Self-image and identity contribute
to the frame of reference developed through career imprinting
from the first unit assignment.
Monica C. Higgins, a professor in education leadership at
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, offers that career
imprinting is a “form of learning that encompasses the professional
impression left on individuals by an organization.”
Given that career imprinting influences individual leader
choices and behavior in an organizational context, then it
would also affect the ethical climate of a unit set by its leaders.
In an article last spring for the U.S. Army War College quarterly
Parameters, I asserted that the Army’s recent focus has
been on the lack of character of individual leaders and of their
supporting staff to confront and mitigate unethical behavior. A
missing component is an appreciation for a unit climate that
discourages ethical behavior. Importantly, organizational scholars
Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver and Scott J. Reynolds
offer that ethical climate is “a shared perception among organization
members regarding the criteria … of ethical reasoning
within an organization.” This perception is formed through the
day-to-day experience of unit members of what is acceptable,
and by observing the interactions of leaders and subordinates.
Lack of Survey Instrument
Unfortunately, neither the Army nor DoD employs a validated
survey instrument to assess ethical climates within units.
The Government Accountability Office noted that the senior
advisor for military professionalism office
was completing an inventory of climate,
professional development and psychometric
tools that are used across the department
to enhance interdepartmental
visibility of these tools and promote best
practices, and that the office staff “stated
that while these tools could be used to
assess ethics-related issues, none of the
tools were designed exclusively for that
purpose.”
It is puzzling that DoD would consider
using survey instruments inappropriate
to assess something as important
as ethical climate. Rather than rely on
anecdotal evidence or the gut feel of senior
leaders far removed from units, it
would be prudent for the Army to either
develop a survey instrument or adapt an
existing tool specifically designed to assess
ethical climate. One such available
tool is the Ethical Climate Questionnaire, a valid assessment
instrument that measures five dimensions of climate developed
from scholarly research.
My sense of that aspect of a unit climate was not based on
formal survey but from my own career imprinting with an assignment
to a field artillery battalion in a mechanized division
during the height of the Cold War. Imagine being a young
lieutenant or junior NCO in Germany in the late 1970s, when
Army units were stationed on overcrowded kasernes and
subinstallations; units shared headquarters buildings, barracks,
maintenance bays and motor pools. Our artillery battalion collocated
its vehicle parking area with the division cavalry
squadron and an engineer company.
With the shared parking, there were concurrent nightly
guard mounts, ostensibly to protect the equipment from offpost
outsiders. In reality, the unit guards were protecting their
vehicles and equipment from “midnight requisitions” by other
units. Many of us remember painting the bumper numbers on
the canvas doors of our vehicles—jeeps, Gama Goats and
GOERs—only to be dismayed when those items still disappeared
overnight.
For proper supply accountability, Army regulations required
hand receipts for property, and periodic inventory. Shortage
annexes documented missing items and components for vehicles,
sets, kits and outfits. It was common practice to update
hand receipts after maneuver exercises, and record “field
losses” on shortage annexes. Part of command supply discipline
was to engrave unit designation on the components of
the various tool kits. While the practice may have aided accountability
during inventory, it was more likely to facilitate
recovery from those who had “borrowed” the tool. I remember
the absurdity as the maintenance sergeant attempted to engrave
a set of Allen wrenches.
Col. Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., is professor of leadership and cultural
studies in the Department of Command, Leadership and
Management at the U.S. Army War College.
‘Get It Done’
A critical event for each leader was the unit’s annual general
inspection. With its numerous checklists and metrics, the in-
30 ARMY ■ February 2016

spection and the Army training and evaluation program were
the objective measures of performance—for success and failure—and
inevitably recorded on officer and NCO evaluation
reports. In a zero-defect Army, failure had implications. “Can
do” attitude morphed into “get it done.”
During the inspection week, there were the perpetually dispatched
vehicles unavailable for inspection, relocation of storage
containers holding excess parts and equipment, and the
mysterious storage site outside the unit area. In a time of uncertainty
and turbulence for the big Army, the impact at the
unit level was the necessity to look good even when the resources
were not available to be good. Hence, the “shared perception
among organizational members” of ethical behavior
was not consistent with the espoused professional ethics. While
these recountings are anecdotal, they provide an indication of
an ethical climate even without a formal survey instrument.
Army historians have documented the challenges and resultant
shortfall in funding for training hours and miles (referred
to as operating tempo), ammunition and fuel during the post-
Vietnam War era. Perhaps the greatest shortfall was in the professionalism
of the Army. This coincided with the end of a major
conflict and the implementation of the all-volunteer force,
with the attendant growing pains of the volunteer Army. As
the nation tried to leave Vietnam behind, it also sought a peace
dividend to assist in the recovery from the U.S. recession of
1973–75 and lessen the impact of the 1973 OPEC embargo
that resulted in a fourfold increase in oil prices.
Accordingly, with the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam,
by 1974 the Army faced a 40 percent budget cut and a
50 percent reduction in force structure from the Vietnam-era
peak of 1.57 million soldiers in 1969 to 785,000.
The strain on the Army was palpable and confirmed in the
Army chief of staff-directed Army War College “Study on Military
Professionalism” in 1970. One of the study’s key findings
was that junior officers were “deeply aware of professional standards,
keenly interested in discussions about the subject, and intolerant
of those—either peers or seniors—who they believe are
substandard in ethical or moral behavior or in technical competence.”
The study also related a “preoccupation with ‘measurable
trivia’ … devised by senior leaders” that contributed to “inaccurate
reporting—rampant throughout the Army and perceived
by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7.” Fortyfive
years later, the conditions reported by Wong and Gerras in
“Lying to Ourselves” have either re-emerged or persistently endured
in spite of efforts to maintain a professional Army.
Army Struggles for Relevance
In our current circumstance, the Army is once again struggling
to establish its relevance in an uncertain and turbulent
national security environment. The nation seeks to shift its
balance to the Asia-Pacific region and away from the ground
combat-centric operations in the Middle East. The scale of
deployments for the Army has been greatly reduced, and another
peace dividend is sought from DoD and the Army as the
nation seeks to deal with its federal debt. Like in the 1970s,
the decade-plus cost of operations for the war on terrorism
and the 2007–09 recession have contributed to our financial
concerns. As the Army reduces force structure from its activeduty
peak of 570,000 to 450,000 soldiers by the end of fiscal
year 2018, the competition for promotion and retention of talented
personnel will increase.
With fiscal austerity comes greater scrutiny, along with calls
for accountability and efficiency. As the Army goes back to
basics, greater emphasis will be placed on fiscal responsibility,
training management and command supply discipline. Each
of these areas begs for metrics and drives the call for data and
reports to higher headquarters. What can be measured will be
reported with potentially little regard for the efficacy of the reporting.
And increased accountability will drive the need for
more compliance inspections, with the potential for zero-defect
mentality to emerge across the force.
Such an institutional culture will have a direct impact on
units and their people at the lowest level—for the lieutenants
and sergeants who are the direct leaders of our Army. The career
imprints for this generation of junior leaders with be based
on their experiences and the ethical climates within their units.
Accordingly, the perceptions of Army
personnel should be assessed and monitored
as leading indicators of unethical
behavior in their quest to accomplish assigned
tasks and missions.
Whether in the operating or generating
force, as important as what gets done
must be how it gets done. One would expect
that unit leaders will dutifully communicate
the Army Values, but behaving
in accordance with those values will be
based on the perception of what is really
important in the organization. ✭
U.S. Army/Sgt. Tara L. Cook
Command Sgt. Maj. David L. Stewart of the
Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, West
Point, N.Y., delivers a message about trust at
Fort Stewart, Ga.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 31

Creativity
Could Boost
Regionally Aligned
Forces Concept
By Col. Allen J. Pepper
A 12th Combat Aviation Brigade AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter flies over Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany.
U.S. Army/Gertrud Zach
Army leadership’s vision involves a force that is globally
responsive and regionally engaged. An important
aspect of turning this vision into reality is the concept
of regionally aligned forces. This concept, which the
Army has been executing since early 2013, provided U.S. Africa
Command with trained and available forces for a range of missions;
supported U.S. Pacific Command in the pivot to the Pacific;
and enabled a rapid response by U.S. European Command
and NATO to Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Despite these early successes and other recent accomplishments,
the concept of regionally aligned forces (RAF) leaves
room for improvement to foster the development of soldiers
and leaders for future Army readiness and thereby support geographic
combatant commands. In particular, the Army must
work creatively to find opportunities to deploy these units into
their theaters, improve continuity between RAF rotations, include
regional affiliation in officer and NCO assignment decisions,
and select promising junior and midlevel leaders for regular
small-unit missions within the RAF construct.
The concept of regionally aligned forces involves aligning
select units from both the active and reserve components of
the Army to the geographic combatant commands. As highlighted
in a September 2014 briefing from the Army Staff,
these units and soldiers should develop enhanced situational
understanding of their designated region and increase their
readiness for serving through on-the-job training and active
engagement. Improved situational awareness will help make
them better partners for both the U.S. interagency and allies.
RAF units are primarily involved in activities to shape the operational
environment, with an emphasis on building relationships
as well as partner capacity. However, the deployment of
part of an infantry company to protect the U.S. Embassy in
South Sudan for five months in 2013–14 showed that RAF units
are not strictly limited to shaping the operational environment.
Start With Decisive Action Training
The training pipeline for the brigade combat team around
which each geographic combatant command’s RAF is built
starts with decisive action training, including a combat training
center rotation, resources permitting. This is augmented with
geographic combatant command-specific training requirements
and cultural, regional expertise and language training.
The Army intends for the RAF concept to provide benefits
to combatant commanders, soldiers and units. U.S. Africa
Command, the test-bed geographic combatant command for
regionally aligned forces, saw stark improvements in the availability
of trained troops for security cooperation activities with
the implementation of the RAF concept. The European Command
has also benefited from the assured availability of Army
forces, as the U.S. has provided a portion of a brigade combat
team to the NATO Response Force for the first time since that
force’s inception in 2003. That same brigade combat team—
the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division—also participated in the
NATO exercise Combined Resolve II, and assured regional
partners with U.S. presence in Poland and the Baltics as part of
the NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.
32 ARMY ■ February 2016

U.S. Army/Sgt. Gemma Iglesias
Above: Soldiers from African nations visit the
Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,
Germany; left: Soldiers from the 173rd
Airborne Brigade demonstrate room-clearing
techniques to Ukrainian troops in Ukraine.
U.S. Army/Spc. Joshua Leonard
For Army units involved in RAF, the devotion to a particular
region helps provide purpose for home-station training, ensuring
that they focus on what combatant commanders want. With
“engagement” now listed as one of the Army’s warfighting functions
and “shaping the security environment” counted among
the core competencies of the Army, the security cooperation nature
of many RAF-executed deployments demonstrates that a
unit’s participation in RAF can directly contribute to its preparedness
to execute some of the Army’s core missions.
Prepare for Domination
Several RAF activities to build partner capacity were conducted
alongside special operations forces with long experience
in the region, with general purpose and special operations forces
complementing each other’s capabilities. All of this prepares
units to dominate the human domain, as ground forces are
called upon to do. Small-unit, geographically distributed expeditionary
missions also provide excellent leadership and command
opportunities, and force the exercise
of Mission Command at a time
when situational awareness tools seem to
allow this prerogative of effective operations
to be a popular theme that is often
ignored in practice.
Despite these clear successes, criticisms
of the RAF concept remain, and some of
them are valid. The concern that implementation
would be too costly to the
Army has been shown to be largely unfounded,
as many RAF-executed activities
are financed with Title 22 (Department
of State) funding for activities
related to building partner capacity, or through exercise-related
funds. This money would be spent anyway, regardless of which
unit participated in the exercise.
There is, however, an opportunity cost for a unit involved in
RAF. For example, time spent on learning to use a foreign
weapon for an activity related to building partner capacity is
time that is not spent conducting battle drills. Some 20 years
ago, soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia
developed the small-unit leadership skills and attributes that
proved to be essential in operations in Afghanistan over the
last 15 years. We should expect similar intangible benefits and
training offset from soldiers conducting activities that are new
to them in regions they do not know well today.
Some of the more common criticisms of the RAF concept are
related to its definition and why it’s important. Since its inception,
RAF has meant different things to different people: a new
focus on building partner capacity, to some soldiers; predictable
availability of troops, to geographic combatant commands; per-
February 2016 ■ ARMY 33

U.S. Army/Sgt. Alexandra Hulett
U.S. Army/Pfc. Craig Philbrick
Above: Soldiers from the 1st Armored Division
and Spanish Legionnaires during African Readiness
Training 15 in Spain; right: An 82nd Airborne
Division soldier helps a Polish soldier during an
exercise of NATO nations in Hohenfels, Germany.
haps additional help for security cooperation,
to the Department of State; and a
new tool to keep American troops out of
major foreign operations, to isolationists.
These different interpretations point to a
problem with the messaging associated
with the concept of regionally aligned
forces. This messaging problem leaves
room for the criticism that the RAF concept
is nothing substantially new but instead,
a gimmick to defend force structure
in a period of sequestration.
Improve Concept
The Army can, however, improve the
RAF concept and its implementation and
thus, reduce the risk of such an interpretation.
Four concrete measures can help
ensure that the RAF concept endures and provides better
trained and available forces to the joint force while also contributing
to the development of future leaders.
First, the Army’s service component commands must search
for opportunities for RAF units and soldiers to operate in
their area of responsibility. The service component commands
should work with partner nations to develop combined
training activities, and also with the U.S. Army Forces
Col. Allen J. Pepper is an infantry and Sub-Saharan Africa foreign
area officer currently serving as the senior defense official/defense
attache in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo. He holds
a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s
degree from the University of Strasbourg, France.
Command to provide the funding for RAF units to deploy
and participate in this training. Section 1203 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for 2014 authorizes expenditures
for this kind of training, allowing the service component
command to present attractive proposals to partner nations.
In a time of reduced training money, the service component
commands likely will face considerable resistance for such expenses.
But the chief of staff’s prerogative for the Army to be
the leader in the human domain makes such deployments important
tools for Army readiness and relevance.
In addition, the service component commands must work
with geographic combatant commands to develop proposals
for security assistance programs and cases, with the training
aspects executed by RAF tactical units and soldiers from the
34 ARMY ■ February 2016

institutional Army. These activities to build partner capacity
will assist the State Department and geographic combatant
commands in accomplishing their objectives while also providing
soldiers with exceptional training opportunities.
Second, the Army should rethink its rotation of units. The
current force-generation plan has the core brigade of the RAF
shifting from one division and post to another, with units not
having recurring RAF duty within a single region. With RAF
responsibility shifting this way, “battle hand-off” and continuity
between one RAF rotation and the next has been lacking,
with new units often receiving few insights from their predecessors
and not participating in planning iterations for events
to be executed during their period of responsibility.
The Army should adjust the timing of the combat training
center rotation for a brigade combat team scheduled to serve
as the core of the RAF. That would allow the combat training
center rotation to be completed in time for the unit to participate
and focus on key planning events for exercises, security
cooperation and operational activities in the month or two before
assuming RAF responsibility.
Keep Regional Alignment in Mind
Third, the Army needs to begin taking regional alignment
into account in assignment decisions for officers and NCOs.
The brief segment of cultural, regional expertise and language
training in the pre-execution phase and awareness training
throughout the year at home station can help orient soldiers to
the region in which they will operate. However, this limited
training will not transform a soldier into a foreign area officer
or a special operations forces soldier—far from it.
While it is helpful for organizational planning reasons to
habitually align units with the same geographic combatant
command, an additional benefit would come from habitually
assigning officers and NCOs to units that will be picking up
RAF rotations during their assignment. This will allow them
to build a knowledge and experience base somewhat similar to
what soldiers with repeated assignments to Germany or Korea
over the past decades had.
The benefits of such familiarity with a region can extend to
all phases of military operations. This additional assignment
consideration will put a new burden on U.S. Army Human
Resources Command, and it is unrealistic to expect a leader’s
entire career to be focused on one region. However, this effort
should start now. The Army will reap the benefits of such an
approach in the decades to come.
Fourth, commanders of RAF units must select their best officers
and NCOs for repeated deployments to their region of
interest. As U.S. Army Africa strategists recognized when
they looked back on early rounds of RAF, the concept can
play an important role in shaping the Army of the future.
Twenty years from now, will the Army want as a brigade commander
an officer who has had a series of combat training center
rotations as his formative leadership experiences, or an officer
who has had perhaps half as many training center rotations
but also a series of deployments into complex operational areas?
If commanders believe it is the latter, then they should
contribute to developing those future senior leaders now by selecting
them to lead soldiers in expeditionary missions, and
granting them repeated opportunities to adapt and excel.
The concept of regionally aligned forces has already proven
valuable. By working creatively to deploy these units more often,
and then supporting regional alignment at the institutional
level via personnel assignment decisions, the Army can
use the concept to more effectively develop future senior leaders
and provide enhanced support to the geographic combatant
commands.
✭
U.S. and Zambian observers monitor soldiers during a live-fire exercise in Zambia.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Michael A. Simmons
February 2016 ■ ARMY 35

Muscle for an Uncertain
Performance, Payload and Comfy Seats
Stories By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer
With a smoother ride, roomier and more comfortable
cab, and performance that is off the
charts, the latest generation of Army trucks has
moved well beyond the traditional role of tactical
wheeled vehicles and into the realm of what can only be
seen as “muscle trucks.”
A classic example can be found in the new Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV), which was developed under an Armyled
joint acquisition with the U.S. Marine Corps. Following a
successful Defense Acquisition Board and subsequent approval
by the defense acquisition executive, the U.S. Army
awarded Oshkosh Corp. a firm-fixed-price production contract
for the JLTV in late August 2015.
Scott Davis, U.S. Army program executive officer for combat
support and combat service support, said current light tactical
fleet capabilities mean combat commanders “often have
to choose between payload, performance and protection.”
“It is often said that in terms of the JLTV, there were no
significantly stretching technologies,” he said, “but the magic
was in balancing those three things to come up with an optimal
solution.”
Davis also said JLTV will provide protection similar to the
MATV, or MRAP all-terrain vehicle, but at about 2/3 the
weight. The protection will be substantially greater than that
of the Humvee, he said.
One design element that separates U.S. Army muscle trucks
from most other wheeled vehicles involves the need for armor
protection.
“It’s amazing what we learned from 14 years of war,” said
Kevin Fahey, who recently retired as director of the assistant
secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
System of Systems Engineering and Integration Directorate,
following earlier service as program executive officer for
combat support and combat service support.
“The survivability we can give to a tactical wheeled vehicle
now would have been unheard of 15 years ago,” Fahey said.
“The things we learned about shaping, space, how you strap
people in seats, resulted in a ‘4X’ increase in survivability for
MRAPs.”
The JLTV family of vehicles is comprised of two-seat and
four-seat variants as well as a companion trailer (JLTV-T). The
two-seat variant has one base vehicle platform, the Utility
36 ARMY ■ February 2016

World
Photos by Oshkosh Corp.
All photos on this and facing page:
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is shown
from different angles.
(JLTV-UTL). The four-seat variant has two base vehicle platforms:
the General Purpose (JLTV-GP) and the Close Combat
Weapons Carrier (JLTV-CCWC).
The Army anticipates the acquisition of 49,099 new platforms,
with the Marine Corps set to acquire 5,500. The
late August contract award will provide the first 16,901 vehicles
toward those totals.
Oshkosh won the contract for the initial production order
over AM General and Lockheed Martin. Lockheed appealed
to the Government Accountability Office, putting a temporary
freeze on the program that was lifted Dec. 15. Lockheed
has now sued. The Army has given Oshkosh the go-ahead to
begin work and has until Feb. 16 to respond to the suit.
The new JLTVs will replace a
slice of the Army’s current Humvee
fleet that—well, let’s face it:
There’s nothing in the Kelley
Blue Book that talks about a vehicle
that’s been up-armored, shot
at and seriously overburdened
while being driven across some of
the toughest terrain on the planet.
So whether the Army drives, tows
or pushes that trade-in fleet slice
into the dealer, the anticipation is
definitely focused on signing a
DD250 Material Inspection and
Receiving Report and driving the
new ride off the lot.
“JLTV is probably one of the
best acquisition programs, where it went through a real program
of record, that we have ever managed,” Fahey said. A
lot of the success was because of partnerships with the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command “on things like cost,
schedule and performance tradeoff analysis. And there’s no
doubt that when everything is resolved with JLTV, the Army
will get a great truck.”
When soldiers do finally get into their truck, they will notice
lots of differences from the old ride. To begin with, the
Oshkosh TAK-4i intelligent independent suspension system,
incorporated with 20 inches of usable wheel travel, will provide
unprecedented levels of off-road performance across the
world’s toughest terrains.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 37

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is small enough to be carried on many military transports.
The new ride is speedy, too, with the manufacturer
pointing to “70 percent faster offroad
speeds” than Army tactical wheeled vehicles
like Oshkosh’s own MATV.
JLTV’s digitally controlled engine provides
an optimized engine power-to-weight
ratio with superior acceleration, mobility and
“speed on grade” capabilities, as well as improved
fuel economy in both idle and operational
modes.
When it does come time to stop, a highperformance
disc brake solution provides exceptional
stopping and grade-holding capabilities.
And when it’s time to put the vehicle
onto a longer-range transport platform, interior
controls enable an adaptable suspension
to be raised and lowered to meet those transportability
requirements.
Soldiers shouldn’t complain about a
bumpy ride, either. Floating seat designs are
not only comfortable but, combined with re-
Retired Colonel Was Expert on Armoring Trucks
While advances in tactical wheeled vehicle armoring
have accelerated during the past 15 years, they were
actually built on a foundation of more than three decades
of experience. And when it comes to armoring Army
trucks, few individuals have the rich background knowledge
and experience that were possessed by retired Army
Col. John Stoddart. He spoke with ARMY magazine on
the topic shortly before he died in December.
Long before Stoddart served as a former U.S. Army program
manager for heavy tactical vehicles and program executive
officer for tactical wheeled vehicles, he developed a
personal history with U.S. Army truck armoring that traces
to the command of a company that ran convoys from Da
Nang up to what was then Vietnam’s Demilitarized Zone.
“What you had back then was a ‘thin-skinned’ vehicle,”
he said. “The Viet Cong would put out a mine, which was
a precursor to a ground attack. So the guys started making
what they called ‘gun trucks.’ But the Army came back
and said, ‘No, we’re not armoring wheeled vehicles. We’re
going to keep trucks as payload carriers, not to fight. And
the more you put on them, the better.’”
Stoddart pointed to several major Army systems that were
in development around that time, including the Apache helicopter,
Bradley fighting vehicle, Humvee and the Heavy
Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). “The Humvee
and HEMTT gained prominence due to the fact that
the logistical burden they had to carry was significant,”
Stoddart said. “But they still had canvas for protection.”
Citing the contributions of influential vehicle designers
and testers during that period, Stoddart identified a renewed
interest in both armoring and equipping the platforms
with more rugged tires “to give them a capability to
go places where they couldn’t go before.”
“That was during the early ’80s, and we started getting
feedback from around the world that people were taking
out trucks very easily,” he said. One result was that he led
a team to El Salvador in his role as commander of the Detroit
Arsenal Tank Plant. Stoddart and his team helped to
armor a 5/4 ton truck.
“We took that truck down and tried to turn it into a
quasi-fighting vehicle,” he said. “The problem was that
they really weren’t engineers. They just put a bunch of
iron on there to stop them from shooting through. Great
intentions, but it’s not that easy.”
Stoddart said some in the Army expressed interest in armoring
Humvees, “but no good deed goes unpunished. …
You can’t put weight on a vehicle without paying a penalty.”
The net result was a return to the philosophy of trucks as
cargo carriers.
“That’s good until the fight breaks out,” he said. “And
either you can’t go or you add armor, and you are suddenly
destroying your vehicles.”
Once again, folks started with the best intentions, Stoddart
said. However, “they were doing the same darn
things—just sticking more metal on it.”
He described the “rock and a hard place” situation as
“the genesis for the move into MRAP vehicles, because we
then started running into an enemy whose mines were not
a precursor to the fight. Instead, the mines were the fight.”
“But it all evolved to [what] we have today,” Stoddart
said, “which are effective logistics vehicles [that are] very
effective at protecting the soldier.”
38 ARMY ■ February 2016

straints and a stowage system, help save lives and protect soldiers
against injuries in case of accidents or other incidents.
Vehicle survivability is like an onion, however, and the enemy
has to get through several layers before the seats even
come into play. The outer layer of the onion is the previously
cited mobility that means JLTVs will have the performance to
avoid high-threat situations in the first place. Then, if there is
an attack, the JLTV features an advanced hull design to protect
against both blast and ballistic effects.
Several Protective Layers
Peel off those outer layers and you get to the survivable seat
designs—and more. The entire integrated system is designed
to absorb and deflect blast energy. There are also automatic
fire-suppression systems.
JLTV has a new integrated electronic digital backplane as
part of its original design. “The only truck today that has a
digital backplane in it is MRAP and … it didn’t come that
way,” Fahey said, adding that it was made part of the engineering
change proposal package and completed “over time
because we knew it had to carry the network when we were
doing Capability Set 13.”
“But JLTV is basically the first ground vehicle to be VIC-
TORY compliant,” he said. VICTORY is an acronym for vehicular
integration for command, control, communication,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance/electronic
warfare interoperability.
“We put chat standard in the previous” engineering and manufacturing
development phase, he said, “and we will update it
consistent with the VICTORY standard being upgraded.”
JLTV’s VICTORY-compliant backbone is “integrationready”
for a wide range of warfare, including subsystems and
capabilities such as weapon systems, exportable power, IED
defeat devices, enhanced situational awareness and improved
navigation. Moreover, forget simple backup cameras. Think
about expanded options for backup, forward and side cameras,
and shot detectors.
In addition to providing warfighters with the perfect muscle
truck for an uncertain world, the success of JLTV may pave
the way for the Army’s next generation of truck models.
“The next trucks that will be targeted for modernization will
be the medium and heavy” tactical wheeled vehicles, Fahey
said. Cautioning that he is “biased” and emphasizing that he
“is certainly no longer in charge” of the Army’s wheeled vehicles
portfolio, he said, “I know they are already going down
the path of how to sort of follow the JLTV path.”
“How do I do a hefty tech demonstration—the Army and
the Marine Corps—and how do I actually look at the truck
missions from medium to heavy and maybe come up with a
more modular design, perhaps a modular truck that can do
medium or heavy types of things?”
“And my personal opinion is that it may follow the same type
of path,” Fahey said. “We’ll do a tech demonstration of what’s
achievable. Then we’ll do a demonstration of industry delivering
trucks to us. We’ll go right into [engineering and manufacturing
development] based on cost/schedule/performance doable.
“And then we’ll go right into production,” Fahey said, adding
that he thinks the JLTV model “has proven to be a good one.
And I think the next-generation truck will follow the same
path.”
✭
U.S. Army
JLTV systems are
tested at the Communications-Electronics
Research, Development
and Engineering
Center at Aberdeen
Providing Ground, Md.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 39

Deep Roots of the Army’s
Before 1901, the Army didn’t pay much attention
to soldiers’ teeth. In order to serve
during the Civil War, Army recruits simply
had to have six opposing upper and lower
teeth to bite off the tough paper powder cartridges
that were used in muzzle-loading rifles. By 1900,
those wishing to serve in the Army had to have only
four teeth—the minimum number required to chew
food. Ironically, the nation’s first commanding general,
George Washington, had only one real tooth
when he was sworn in as president.
Despite repeated pleas dating from the Civil War
for Army dentists, the idea was largely ignored.
Congress was finally forced to enact legislation creating
an Army Dental Corps in 1901 as a result of
the Spanish-American War. American soldiers campaigning
in Spain’s tropical colonies such as Cuba,
the Dominican Republic and the Philippines were
confronted with extraordinary dental problems.
According to Dr. John Sayre Marshall, the Army’s
first dental surgeon, soldiers who served in these
tropical environments experienced climate conditions
and “changes in the habits of life” that were
“enervating and debilitating to the general system.”
Marshall noted that as a result, the soldiers’ resistance
to disease was “greatly lessened,” consequently
predisposing them to dental diseases.
$150 per Month
Initially, Congress authorized 30 dental positions
that paid $150 per month as well as free housing.
About 1,000 civilian dentists applied. The legislation
provided that the dentists would not be actual soldiers
but “contract dentists,” with a pay grade equivalent to
a first lieutenant. The reason for this was that many in Congress
were skeptical about the need for dentists at all. The compromise
that was reached was an experiment to determine if a dental
corps was a useful adjunct to the Army.
Those chosen were obligated to work seven hours a day for
the Army. After that, they could work up to two additional
hours to treat soldiers’ families and civilian employees, charging
the regular fee. Military dependents were not covered under
the legislation.
Marshall assigned the successful candidates to various posts
around the nation and overseas from his headquarters at the
Presidio of San Francisco. Newspapers reported that each
dentist was provided with a “kit of operating machinery …
costing in the neighborhood of $300.” The operating machinery
and other dental paraphernalia were the same as what was
found in offices of the “highest class of dentists in civil life,”
with the exception of the dental chair. The dentist’s chair was
“a folding article of furniture and therefore portable.” Marshall
bragged they were so light that they could be carried on the
Tooth extraction in 1898 during the Spanish-American War
backs of two mules. (In 1901, the Army was not mechanized.)
By 1903, in the Annual Reports of the War Department for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, Marshall was able to report a
remarkable success story: “The services of the Dental Corps
have been highly appreciated by officers and enlisted men of
the Regular and Volunteer Armies,” he wrote, adding that the
dental corps relieved “a great amount of acute suffering” and
was able to “conserve a large number of teeth and restore them
to a healthy condition, thus almost immediately returning to
duty many cases that were previously carried for several days
upon the company sick report … greatly reducing the loss of
valuable time to the service, incident to diseases of the mouth,
teeth and jaws.”
Officer Dentists Authorized
From the moment he took office, Marshall fought for the
inclusion of dentists within the officers’ ranks. He finally attained
his dream in 1911, when Congress authorized a dental
corps made up of officers. He was the first dentist commis-
Library of Congress
40 ARMY ■ February 2016

Dental Corps By
Daniel J. Demers
sioned as a first lieutenant, but the almost
65-year-old was forced to retire
shortly after accepting his commission
because of mandatory age restrictions.
However, Marshall was advanced to the
grade of captain with the inclusion of his
Civil War service for pension purposes—likely
a pat on the back for a job
well done.
When America entered World War I
in April 1917, newspapers reported that
the corps had grown to 58 dentists,
though Army historical documents
claim 86. As draftees gathered at various
Army camps, it became apparent that
Army dentists were quickly becoming
overwhelmed. The law provided one
dentist for every 1,000 men. But as conscripts
swelled the ranks, the dental
corps couldn’t keep up with the demand
even though more dentists were added.
American civilian dentists filled the
void, mobilizing their efforts nationwide
through an ad hoc Preparedness League
of American Dentists.
Throughout the nation, local dentists
volunteered upward of two hours every
day “to give free dental treatment to all
men accepted for the national army.” An
article in the Arizona Republican helped
exemplify the league’s patriotic work by
explaining that Arizona dentists agreed
to place “the molars of Arizona boys in
such condition that they may at least
masticate their food and be free from
toothaches.” A Chattanooga [Tenn.] News
article explained the specialty was to “remove
abscessed teeth and old roots, to
clean the teeth and thus to remove causes
of focal infection.”
Within a year after entering World
War I, the dental corps’ work was widely
lauded. For example, the Ashland [Ore.]
Tidings in March 1918 noted: “Men
who were formerly sent home on sick
leave, whose only trouble was their molars,
are now kept at the front. … A division
and a half have thus been spared
to the army. [It is also recognized] that a
wounded man with bad teeth makes
slow recovery. … The man with poor
teeth ‘bolts’ his food and loses strength
and endurance.”
Above: Dr. John Sayre Marshall was the first dental surgeon when the Army Dental Corps was established
in 1901; below: A dental ambulance served the soldiers at Camp Meade, Md., in 1918.
U.S. Army
National Archives
February 2016 ■ ARMY 41

Acknowledging the dental corps’ benefits to combat, by
mid-1918 the War Department decided to increase the dentist-to-serviceman
ratio from one dentist to two for every thousand
servicemen.
Office on Wheels
By 1918, “dental ambulances” were introduced. According
to an article in the Ogden [Utah] Standard, they were “an entirely
new thing in warfare. It is a dentist’s office on wheels—
an automobile specially built to contain such an outfit.” These
ambulances were actually built and funded by local dental civic
groups that contributed them to the war effort. The first completed
and delivered dental ambulance came from the dentists
of Cleveland, while a second was donated by the Red Cross.
The vehicles were “a marvel of compact completeness,” the
Standard article said, noting that the ambulances included “a
wall-case with many drawers for instruments, tanks of ‘laughing-gas,’
acetylene lamps for illumination, an oil stove, hot and
cold water, a water tank … and all the other necessaries.”
They were “better equipped than nine out of ten ordinary
dental offices.” The cars had an attached canvas roll on each
side that could be extended “into pen-roofed wall tents, each
of them equal in size to the quarters available inside the automobile
body.” One side was “to afford sleeping accommodations
for the dentist and his assistant,” and the other was
“available as a supplementary dental operating
room.” The cars were leveled
with “one or two ‘jacks’ under [their]
corners.”
By July 1918, the number of dentists in
the Army had grown to 4,620, according
to Army historical documents—a number,
reported the Flagstaff, Ariz., newspaper
Coconino Sun, to care for 5 million
men. The War Department announced it
would make no further additions.
Dental Heroes
There were a number of dental heroes
during the war. One who stands out is
Dr. Sophie Nevin, a Brooklyn dentist.
She was the only female American dentist
in the French Medical Corps, and then only by necessity
and happenstance. The U.S. Army was still a mostly male bastion.
Nevin had gone to France as a volunteer for four months
to help refugees until the regular dentist returned. After her
dental duties were over, she pitched in as a nurse when Spanish
influenza hit the Western Front. She “aided 11,000 U.S. soldiers,”
according to the Evening World.
During World War I, the dental corps performed over 2 million
procedures. Besides the approximately 5,000 Army dentists
at war’s end, it was estimated another 15,000 “agreed to give
Daniel J. Demers, who served in the Nevada National Guard in the
1970s, researches and writes about 19th- and 20th-century events
and personalities. He also owns and operates a sports bar in
Guerneville, Calif. He holds a bachelor’s degree from George
Washington University and an MBA from Chapman University.
Above: A dental surgeon, with his assistant, operates on a patient in France
during World War I; below: Dentists of the 92nd Division in France in 1918.
gratuitous service in examining the teeth of the enlisted soldiers,
and several hundred thousand operations” had been performed.
Seven dentists and seven dental assistants were killed in action,
eight dentists died of disease, and 36 were wounded, according
to the Office of the Chief of the U.S. Army Dental
Corps. As the Army was reduced to 137,000, the number of
retained dentists leveled at 158—twice that of the prewar contingent.
Additionally, the Army established its own dental
school and also initiated an ROTC dental program.
As the war came to a close in November 1918, it was obvious
the efforts of the nation’s dentists and the U.S. Army’s
expanded dental care had transformed dentistry forever. Before
the war, dentistry as we know it today was in its infancy.
During the war, 4 million soldiers were educated in dental
care and hygiene—lessons they brought back home and extolled
in civilian life.
✭
U.S. Army
U.S. Army
42 ARMY ■ February 2016

Creative Answers for
Sagging Morale By Capt. Robert C. Sprague
U.S. Army/Sgt. William A. Parsons
A 1st Cavalry Division platoon during a training exercise in Grafenwoehr, Germany
The way of today’s Army is to “do more with less.”
This phrase is a foolish oxymoron; the concept of
completing more tasks does not call for stretching the
existing process beyond its means but instead for innovative
ideas and strategies. To embrace such creativity allows
for a true transition in thought.
Applying this thinking to an aviation maintenance company
offers opportunities for more efficient completion of its
multifaceted mission. As an aviation maintenance company
(AMC) maintenance platoon leader, I witnessed firsthand the
impact of attempting to do more with less. From my perspective,
this mentality was toxic to the unit’s morale, esprit de
corps, and faith in the chain of command.
The modified table of organization and equipment describes
the standard structure of an AMC. The company is broken
into three standard platoons—headquarters, maintenance and
shops—that have their own individual command structures
and sections. These independent platoons must work constantly
to accomplish the two demands of their job: maintenance
and training.
To complete maintenance tasks, all three platoons must work
in harmony. This sounds simple enough but the required training,
additional tasks and personal soldier appointments all increase
the complexity of the situation tenfold. To balance all the
demands, leaders attempt to keep the ratio of time, tasks and
available troops coordinated with one another. More likely than
not, either training or maintenance suffers on behalf of the other.
Constant Unpredictability
For my unit, this caused longer workdays with constant unpredictability
as to what the top priority of the unit truly was.
The consequence of this method of operation caused a severe
drop in the unit’s morale; many soldiers questioned the intentions
and competence of their leadership.
As with any issue, the procedure to find a solution must begin
with identifying the problem. Often, however, many in the
chain of command are unable to see the underlying problem
and instead, focus on the symptoms. In my unit, the symptoms
included low morale, slower turnaround for maintenance tasks,
and more training tasks completed with the bare minimum
level of success obtained. The implementation of many control
measures had a minimal effect on rectifying the symptoms.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 43

Members of the 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment,
work on a helicopter in New Mexico.
Establishing a designated release time
was an effort to solve the soldiers’ morale
issues. The solution to the slow maintenance
process was to increase work hours
so all tasks could be met. The way to become
better at training was to require 100
percent participation in all training activities.
These solutions, while effective for
their individual symptoms, totally contradicted
each other.
It is important to examine the sum of
all the symptoms—which, in this case,
led us to discover that the conventional
modified table of organization and equipment
organization structure was not
compatible with current demands placed on the AMC.
Address Tasks
With the problem identified, applying an innovative solution
should increase efficiency and morale within the unit.
Given that the AMC has two primary constraints—maintenance
and training—tailoring the solution to address these
tasks is critical. The logical resolution would incorporate
transforming the classic three-platoon concept into a twoforce
configuration.
The two forces would mirror one another and be on a rotational
schedule; for the sake of this article, a week will be the
arbitrary time. One force would be on maintenance for a week
while the other force focused on training, additional tasks and
soldiers’ personal appointments.
Certain portions of the company would be exempt from the
organizational restructuring. These include the command section
(commander, first sergeant and orderly); the production
control, quality control, supply section and tech supply officers
in charge/NCOs in charge; and phase teams. These sections
would operate independently of the new structure to meet the
demands of their positions.
The two forces would operate on separate schedules in an
effort to maximize productivity. The maintenance force would
work from 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.; soldiers within the maintenance
force would be given segmented meal times that match the
operating hours of the dining facilities. The emphasis during
meal periods would be to separate the dining schedule so all
Capt. Robert C. Sprague is a student management officer and Basic
Officer Leader Course instructor for Company D, 1st Battalion,
145th Aviation Regiment, at Fort Rucker, Ala. Sprague attended
U.S. Army Flight School at Fort Rucker and qualified as a
UH-60M pilot. He served as an assistant S3 as part of a future
operations cell at Fort Drum, N.Y., and deployed to Afghanistan
from April 2013 to January 2014 with Fort Drum’s 2nd Battalion,
10th Combat Aviation Brigade. He returned to Fort Rucker
and completed the Aviation Maintenance Officers Course and
Aviation Captains Career Course.
soldiers could eat without letting maintenance ever come to a
complete stop. Physical training would be from 4 to 5 p.m.
Maintenance is the only focus of this force. Protection for
the members of this force keeps them from performing other
duties. In addition, personnel within this force may schedule
personal appointments only on a case-by-case basis. During
slower maintenance times, members of this force focus on
MOS training. This schedule and protected status allow the
AMC to solve the higher unit’s maintenance problems by providing
a ready and guaranteed maintenance force.
Areas of Focus
In contrast to the maintenance force, the training force
would have multiple areas of focus including required training,
inspection preparation, motor pool activities, personal appointments,
and additional tasks and duties. This week would
provide leaders the flexibility to design a training schedule that
would not hurt the unit’s maintenance tempo.
The daily schedule for the training force would be from 9
a.m. to 5 p.m. (standard meal periods in effect), with physical
training from 6 to 7:15 a.m. It would be at the leader’s discretion
to decide how fluid or rigid the training force’s schedule
would be.
The ideas presented here are merely a snapshot of the overall
multiple-step process to usher in a fresh era in the evolution
of the AMC. A quick examination of this idea demonstrates
how proper problem diagnosis gives birth to a solution that
would remedy all symptoms. Changing the organizational
structure of an AMC would increase productivity and stability
within the unit. Morale would increase as a result of soldiers’
value stability and predictability in their schedules. With a
dedicated maintenance force, the time it takes to complete
tasks would decrease, and the higher unit’s maintenance program
would improve.
With a force as well as a routine block of time devoted to all
things training, the quality of the training and completion rates
vastly increase. Of all the ideas to foster within an organization,
one of the most critical is to never discourage innovation. Without
it, you are doomed to repeat the same error indefinitely. ✭
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Candice Harrison
44 ARMY ■ February 2016

The Evolving Art of
Training Management
By Col. David M. Hodne and Maj. Joe Byerly
Photos: U.S. Army/Sgt. William Howard
Col. David M. Hodne, then-commander
of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division, addresses
soldiers before a rotation at the National
Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.
In the decade following Operation Desert Storm, the Army
maintained a firm foundation in training but arguably
lacked significant experience in direct combat. Episodic
and infrequent direct engagements occurred in relatively
short durations.
This changed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since
they found themselves turning to and from combat deployments
at a rapid pace, soldiers and leaders possessed significant
combat experience but were not always afforded the opportunity
to train collectively beyond the platoon level. Qualifications to
deploy hinged largely on mastering the “40 Warrior Tasks” and
individual skills in a counterinsurgency environment. Ironically,
over a decade later, some judge this cohort of young leaders as
accustomed to fighting but not to training properly.
The transition from a training-centric force to a combat-centric
force affected an entire generation of Army leaders. Those
who were junior leaders in the early years of operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are now first sergeants, sergeants major and
battalion commanders. Over the course of more than a decade at
war, these leaders became comfortable operating within a
“brigade combat team-centric” deployment system known as
Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN, to rotate and, in
some cases, build units frequently to meet demands overseas.
In executing this process, leaders across the Army were
forced to accept risks in the conduct and management of
training. Training management transitioned from decentralized
commander-led efforts to centralized mission-rehearsal
exercises. As Gen. Robert W. Cone, former commanding
general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
pointed out in a January 2013 Military Review article, “Commanders
lost ownership of their training—the warrior’s art
during times of peace.” As a result of this centralized approach
to training, many have argued in military education classrooms,
social media and professional journal articles that the
Army lost the art of training management.
We disagree with the notion that leaders are struggling with
retaking ownership of training management, and contend that
the Army hasn’t lost the art or understanding of managing
training. Rather, contemporary leaders evolved this important
process. This evolution in training management, which is reflected
in current Army doctrine, is fueled by the hard-earned
combat experience of leaders across the Army, new digital
training tools, and an institutional resurgence in what today’s
doctrine calls Mission Command.
We have also had the opportunity to observe this in practice
in reorganizing the Army’s newest Stryker brigade—the 1st
February 2016 ■ ARMY 45

Company commanders
exit a CH-47 during
a leader-development
exercise.
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division—within
an accelerated timeline. This task required building two infantry
battalions and an artillery battery; turning in equipment
such as Bradley and Paladin tanks; receiving new Strykers and
over 1,000 soldiers; and building a new culture that includes respecting
the art of training. Over the course of 18 months, all
members of the brigade participated a logical and decentralized
progression in collective training from the squad through the
brigade level at home station, and validated these efforts with a
successful rotation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
Calif.
Col. David M. Hodne was recently commander of the 1st Stryker
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson,
Colo. He also commanded the 3rd Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry,
in Iraq, and the 2nd Ranger Battalion in Afghanistan. He
received a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy
and a master’s degree from American Military University.
Maj. Joe Byerly is an armor officer and the operations officer for
the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade
Combat Team. He also has commanded a cavalry troop and a
headquarters company at Fort Stewart, Ga. He holds a bachelor’s
degree from North Georgia College and State University and a
master’s degree from the U.S. Naval War College. He frequently
writes about leadership and leader development on his website,
www.FromTheGreenNotebook.com.
Training, Operations Linked
Our training doctrine, which is the guiding document for
how we prepare as an Army, reflects an evolution in how the institution
views training. The combat experience earned by the
formation over the last 14 years has taught the Army the importance
of developing leaders who are able to quickly transition
from training to operations. Army Doctrine Reference Publication
7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders points out that
the Army once viewed the training management process as separate
and distinct from the operations process.
Now, the two are inextricably linked. Commanders must
apply the operations process to how they train their formations
through planning, preparing, executing and assessing
training as well as drive the process by understanding, visualizing,
describing, directing and leading. The doctrine is clear, so
it’s up to commanders to implement.
Because units leveraged experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan,
the transition from conducting operations to planning
and managing training is not as significant for leaders at the
battalion level and above, as some believe. They are able to operationalize
their intent and vision for unit-level training and
recapture the art of training management.
Additionally, leadership from the brigade level down to the
squad understands the realities and requirements of combat;
thus, they hold themselves accountable for individual and collective
tasks and know how to set the right conditions for training.
Many of today’s young leaders know the cost of complacency.
NCOs and company grade officers create tough and
realistic training conditions and push themselves toward a
higher level of readiness because many have seen the price paid
by units who hand-waved their training and failed their soldiers
on the streets of Iraq or in the mountains of Afghanistan.
The evolution in training management is further aided by
the creation of digital training tools that are at the fingertips of
company and battalion-level leaders. The combined arms
training strategies and Digital Training Management System,
along with websites such as the Army Training Network, were
developed in the middle of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom. These documents serve the same
purpose of the mission training plans they have replaced. As always,
it remains the responsibility of leaders to develop tailored
46 ARMY ■ February 2016

“crawl-walk-run” training methodologies;
however, the new suite of digital
tools makes this process easier.
Based on the collective tasks that
commanders select from the Digital
Training Management System, leaders
can more precisely focus evaluations
based on environment or the level of
training and readiness of the formation.
As the Army moves away from the AR-
FORGEN model to the Sustainable
Readiness Model, tactical-level leaders
will not have to worry about building
training plans on outdated materials, as
was the case when mission training
plans were used.
Strykers from the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team
at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.
Leverage Online Resources
Combined Arms Center-Training at
Fort Leavenworth, Kan., is already working
on updates to these digital tools. As
commanders focus more of their efforts
on home-station training, they need to
understand that effective training management
lies in leveraging these online resources.
All of this, of course, requires emphasis by brigade and battalion
level commanders familiar with both the legacy training
management tools and the rigors of combat. Senior leaders
have two choices. They can either reinforce the refrain that
young leaders do not know how to train, or they can proactively
educate and, in some cases, simply introduce young
leaders to the basic tools of training management. A culture of
accountability in training will be built by integrating a multiechelon
training approach with a multiechelon leader development
effort using leader professional development sessions,
developing standard operating procedures and communicating
clear intent.
For example, in addition to ensuring safe execution of training
during the “range walk,” this event conducted as a tactical
exercise without troops also affords an incredible opportunity
to develop and educate leaders. Young leaders must accept
that there is a difference between simply understanding all as-
A sniper-observer
team from the 1st
Stryker Brigade Combat
Team conducts
live-fire training at
the National Training
Center, Fort Irwin,
Calif.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 47

pects of fire control and fire distribution (many young leaders
have first-person experience in this), and developing a live-fire
training event that allows for decisionmaking to achieve desired
effects of their weapon systems. Young leaders arguably
do not have experience in designing the training that tests the
full range of capabilities; however, they certainly possess the
context to understand why this is important. Coaching them
through the “art” will achieve and maximize learning.
Finally, there has been resurgence in the philosophy of
Mission Command that has shaped the way in which leaders
at all levels train their formations. While Army Doctrine
Publication 6-0 Mission Command is a relatively new member
to the doctrine family, the idea has been around for a while.
The 1941 edition of Field Manual 100-5 Field Service Regulations,
Operations, states, “Every individual must be trained
to exploit a situation with energy and boldness, and must be
imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his initiative
and action.”
Over five decades later, in a 1992 issue of Military Review,
then-Lt. Col. James M. Dubik argued that for units to operate
decentralized in battle, commanders need to develop the culture
in garrison. (Dubik retired as a lieutenant general and is a
contributing editor for ARMY magazine.) Some could argue
that aspects of the larger Army culture in the late ’90s reflected
the opposite of the two examples cited. Training became more
centralized, with the end state being effective training management
and not a preparedness to operate decentralized in battle.
The tactical lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan taught leaders
that developing and nurturing the philosophy of Mission
Command in training was critical to success in combat. Even
though units are no longer on the constant rotation, this culture
has transferred to home-station training. Dubik’s 1992 vision
for a decentralized command is no longer the exception
to the rule.
Incorporate Mission Command
Commanders, from the company through the brigade, understand
that the principles of Mission Command must be incorporated
into all aspects of training. Battalion and brigade
commanders develop multiechelon training to build cohesive
teams through mutual trust. Company commanders and first
sergeants plan training in conjunction with their squad leaders
to create shared understanding. Disciplined initiative and prudent
risks must be valued over adherence to an Army training
and evaluation program.
A new generation is already emerging in the ranks of our
Army. The squad, platoon and even company host leaders and
soldiers who do not have experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This should not be a source of concern. In fact, this very condition
requires combat-seasoned leaders to reflect on how they
can effectively train their subordinates for the rigors of combat
without relying on “how we did it overseas.” Ultimately, effective
training meets published standards, tests the full range of
our capabilities, challenges decisionmaking skills, builds cohesive
teams, and instills confidence in soldiers and leaders. As it
was following Operation Desert Storm, it remains the responsibility
of all leaders to teach subordinates how to fight and
how to train. Assume nothing. By teaching your subordinates
how to train correctly, you have a direct effect on ensuring that
tomorrow’s Army stays as good as today’s. ✭
Soldiers check vehicles at Fort Carson, Colo.
48 ARMY ■ February 2016

Curtain’s Always Rising
U.S. Army/Master Sgt. Mike Lavigne
For Theater Army
By Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, U.S. Army retired
Command Sgt. Maj. Christopher K. Greca of U.S. Central Command, second from left, uses an interpreter to discuss training with an Iraqi soldier.
The following statement from Army Doctrine Publication
1, The Army, is important enough to be repeated in
the introduction to Field Manual 3-94, Theater Army,
Corps, and Division Operations: “The land domain is the
most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity—
its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics.” Looking across
the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility highlights the
critical role that Army forces—the main land power component
of the joint force—continue to play in the Middle East and
Central and South Asia, from Egypt to Pakistan. Recent events
provide a vehicle for exploring the versatility of the theater Army
in a manner far more dynamic than its equally important role as
an Army service component command.
The only constant in this volatile region is change—rapid
change. This sometimes manifests itself as violence that places
at immediate risk U.S. citizens and vital national interests of
the U.S. as well as those of our allies and partners. Properly
postured forces with established regional relationships provide
combatant commanders the tools for immediate employment
during emerging crises and contingencies.
The Army service component command, or theater Army,
represents the land capability and Mission Command of land
forces immediately available to combatant commanders. In
addition to their inherent Title 10 responsibilities for all Army
forces in a combatant commander’s area of responsibility, they
also provide Army support to other services and Army executive
agent responsibilities. Additionally, Army service component
commands provide immediate situational understanding
as a crisis begins to emerge, a byproduct of years of experience
in a given area of responsibility.
U.S. Army Central has operated in the U.S. Central Command
area of responsibility for 32 years and has an in-depth
knowledge of its political, social, religious, economic and cultural
environments. The command has gained an appreciation
for the battlefield geometry of the area of responsibility, has
fostered relationships through persistent partnerships and theater
security cooperation activities, and understands the requirements
it must provide for combatant commanders to
conduct joint operations. In this context, assigned theater-enabling
commands are indispensable.
Unique Capabilities
Theater-enabling commands—including sustainment, signal,
medical, military intelligence and, based on contingency
requirements, civil affairs—provide capabilities unique in scope
to the theater Army. The theater sustainment command, for
example, has the capacity to train multifunctional sustainment
organizations; conduct theater security cooperation activities
with partner sustainment forces; set and reset the theater
through distribution and redistribution of materiel across the
area of responsibility; conduct theater opening activities and
joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration;
and set the sustainment architecture for specific contingencies.
The theater signal command provides the tools for Mission
Command that include strategic and tactical networks
necessary to support combined and joint collaboration in the
electronic environment. The permanent presence of this network
in the area of responsibility serves as the base from
which expansion occurs when emerging missions require
more capabilities.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 49

Spc. Justin Yarnell,
3rd Brigade Combat
Team, 82nd Airborne
Division, helps an
Iraqi soldier during
weapons qualification.
U.S. Air Force/Senior Airman James Richardson
The theater medical command, organized for deployment
support, provides command and control to rapidly deploying
medical assets and significant oversight for Title 10 medical
functions. These include maintaining oversight of medical
materiel, preventive medicine, behavioral health, and veterinary
and personnel treatment requirements.
Meeting Combatant Commander’s Needs
The Army, with recommendations provided by the theater
Army, tailors rotational forces to meet the requirements of the
combatant commander. Continued analysis of the security
posture, theater security cooperation requirements, and readiness
to execute combatant commander plans resulted in several
adjustments to these capabilities in the U.S. Central
Command area of responsibility between the end of Operation
New Dawn and mid-2014.
U.S. Army Central land force capabilities, excluding the
aforementioned theater Army enabling commands, included an
armored brigade combat team, a theater aviation brigade with
airfield operations capability, and a force field artillery headquarters
with long-range surface-to-surface fires. Other forces
included an air defense artillery brigade with its air defense
warning, and persistent Mission Command for Patriot firing
batteries distributed around the Arabian Peninsula. Not widely
Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, USA Ret., commanded U.S. Army Central,
the Army service component of U.S. Central Command
based at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., from June 2013 to November
2015. He was dual-hatted as the combined joint task force
commander responsible for Operation Inherent Resolve. He previously
served as commander of the International Security Assistance
Force Joint Command and deputy commanding general,
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and commanding general, U.S. Army
V Corps.
understood, a military engagement team created from the senior
leadership of a brigade headquarters joined the mix of forces
that remained forward on an enduring basis. Maneuver support
capabilities including vertical and horizontal construction engineers,
military police, and chemical reconnaissance and decontamination
units rounded out the additional Army forces available
to U.S. Central Command around the clock.
A review of U.S. Army Central’s posture in the months and
years prior to June 2014 enables a better understanding of the
path the command took as it once again expanded its role
from that of a theater Army to a joint and combined force
headquarters. Lessons learned from recent operations supporting
Operation Inherent Resolve highlight additional capabilities
that proved critical for combatant commanders.
Spartan Shield Maintained Land Presence
In December 2011, the last U.S. forces crossed from Iraq
into Kuwait, ending Operation New Dawn. Simultaneously,
U.S. Army Central was completing a plan that operationalized
a new regional security construct that accounted for the additional
forces previously described. These forces, under the umbrella
of Operation Spartan Shield, provided the means to
maintain land presence in the Arabian Peninsula and Levant
at the conclusion of the direct U.S. role in Iraq. These forces
supported the theater campaign plan by conducting theater security
cooperation activities while at the same time providing
the base forces for a series of U.S. Central Command bilateral
and multilateral contingency plans.
Well-postured in the region, U.S. Army Central turned its
attention to the development of the Regional Land Power
Network in 2013. This concept included the development of a
coalition land operations center to fill a crucial gap. To gain the
most from the regional partnerships being developed through
theater security cooperation, there had to be a place, purpose-
50 ARMY ■ February 2016

U.S. Army/Sgt. Cheryl Cox
built, to allow for immediate and collaborative Mission Command
with Gulf Cooperation countries and long-standing allies
such as Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia
and France. This concept proved prescient in late spring 2014.
When the situation in Iraq reached crisis status in June
2014, the national command authority directed U.S. Central
Command to commence military operations against the Islamic
State group, known throughout the region as Daesh.
U.S. Army Central was designated the joint force land component
commander for operations in Iraq. Having matured
since the inception of the regional security plan in late 2011,
forces immediately available, including the robust theater architecture
established by the enabling commands, allowed for
rapid transition from Phase 0 focused activities.
The joint force provided its own contributions, including a
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command’s Fleet Anti-Terrorism Response
Team and a special operations forces crisis-response element.
This combination of capabilities allowed the joint force land
component commander to move rapidly into Iraq with the appropriate
Mission Command, security and sustainment capabilities
to make initial assessments and provide assistance to
Iraqi security forces. The joint force land component commander
also had reach-back capability that included longrange
fires and myriad sustainment functions.
Challenges Expanded
As allies and partner nations communicated their desires to
contribute capabilities, U.S. Central Command designated the
joint force land component commander as the combined force
land component command on Sept. 17, 2014. This expanded
the number of challenges facing the headquarters as it had to
integrate coalition capabilities while simultaneously establishing
Mission Command system networks to support multinational
collaboration.
Recognizing that operations against Daesh required full
joint integration, U.S. Central Command further designated
the combined force land component command as a combined
joint task force (CJTF) on Oct. 17, 2014, and eventually settled
on the designation “CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve.”
To staff the CJTF, the combined force land component command
staff developed and submitted completed joint staffing
documents.
The time frame from document submission until capability
was in place was anticipated at secretary of defense approval
plus 120 days. To mitigate this gap, U.S. Army Central was
able to work with the other U.S. Central Command service
components in theater—another Army service component
command standing relationship that proved vital—to assist
with joint fills until the respective service headquarters could
assess and fulfill their requirements. U.S. Army Central also
requested and received augmentation from the Joint Enabling
Capabilities Command and the Joint Intelligence Support Element,
which provided significant assistance with joint functions
and capabilities oversight.
Today, U.S. Army Central retains the designation of combined
force land component command for operations in the
joint operations area, while a corps headquarters serves as the
CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve headquarters. From the
start of operations against Daesh until the deployment of III
Corps, 15 months had passed in which U.S. Army Central
served dual-hatted as a combined force land component command
and CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve, while continuing
to accomplish its missions as an Army service component
command on behalf of the secretary of
the Army. No other command echelon
has the depth and versatility to simultaneously
perform these functions.
U.S. Army Central has served as the
land component command providing
Mission Command for land operations
in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility three times since 2001.
Based on this historical precedent as well
as lessons learned in recent contingency
operations in Iraq, the combatant commander
needs an immediately available
joint and coalition capability and the
theater-enabling capability inherent in
the Army service component command
to mitigate delays in responding to crises
and contingencies. The Army service
component command or theater Army,
embedded in the theater and with persistent
presence and enduring partnerships,
provides that capability. ✭
Pfc. Morgan Calebrese, an engineer with the
244th Engineer Battalion, teaches Iraqi soldiers
about the armored bulldozer.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 51

Birth Era
May Factor
In Risk
Of Suicide
By Col. James Griffith, Army National Guard retired,
and Craig Bryan
The U.S. military has seen a marked increase in the
number of suicides among personnel. For example,
the suicide rate rose from 10.3 suicides per 100,000
service members in 2001 to 15.8 suicides per 100,000
service members in 2008. This 50 percent increase across all
the armed services was largely due to the suicide rate in the
U.S. Army, which doubled during the same time period.
Because the Army contributed substantially to ground
forces in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom,
many have speculated that the increased prevalence of suicide
was related to military personnel who were deployed, participated
in combat, or experienced an overall high operating
tempo. We argue that these factors do not necessarily explain
the rise in suicides in the U.S. military. Rather, the increase
indicates a broader trend of increased vulnerability among
more recent generations of young adults.
We elaborated on this argument in a paper we wrote for the
journal Armed Services and Society, and we presented it last fall
to the Inter-University on Armed Forces and Society, an international
organization that studies social and behavioral issues
involving the military. The following is a summary of our
findings.
Birth Cohort and Suicide
Sociologists Jean Stockard and Robert O’Brien suggested in
a 2002 article for the peer-reviewed academic journal Social
Forces that increased suicide rates among young adults in the
general population reflected generational declines in social integration
and behavioral regulation. Social integration entails
having access to predictable, stable and enduring social ties
that can provide support and relief to individuals during times
of stress. Behavioral regulation refers to the strength of norms
that determine the acceptability of certain behaviors. These
two processes formed the cornerstone of Emile Durkheim’s
analyses of suicides among Protestants and Catholics in Europe
during the late 19th century, documented in his 1897
treatise, Le Suicide.
Both social integration and behavioral regulation are influenced
by demographic trends. Increases in birth rates and single
parenthood may strain social institutions that promote social
integration and behavioral norms such as families, schools,
recreational clubs and religious organizations. There are more
children to care for, but fewer adults are involved. Children in
these generations have less attention and supervision while
growing up, and social integration and behavioral regulation
may be lessened.
Stockard and O’Brien found that people from generations
with these characteristics had relatively higher suicide rates
throughout their lives. Their first finding was that among more
recent birth cohorts, suicide rates in the U.S. population have
increased among teenagers and young adults. They studied the
distribution of suicides for age intervals in three time periods:
1930, 1965 and 2000. In 1930, the total U.S. population
showed progressively increased suicide rates from younger to
older age intervals. In 1960, a similar pattern of rates occurred
until ages 55 to 59, where the increase was less evident. In
2000, this pattern of increase was even less apparent.
U.S. Army/Pfc. William Hatton
February 2016 ■ ARMY 53

Per 100,000
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Suicide by Age in Three Generations
10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Age Groups
Additionally, suicide rates rose dramatically among ages 10
to 14 through ages 20 to 24, reaching a peak at ages 40 to 44.
This peak was not exceeded until ages 75 to 79. Their second
finding was that suicide rates of age intervals at a given time
period have been reliably predicted by size of the birth cohort
and the percentage of nonmarital births—again, demographic
characteristics likely impacting social integration and behavioral
regulation.
Vulnerable Generations
We examined evidence related to increased vulnerability
among members of more recent generations of U.S. high
school and college-aged students in several studies. Analyses of
large-scale data sets across time have shown increased emotional
and behavioral problems among younger generations of
high school and college students, as well as generational shifts
in their values.
Of particular note, more recent generations of high school
and college students report that they value fame and wealth
Col. James Griffith, ARNG Ret., is a research fellow at the National
Center for Veterans Studies at the University of Utah. He
served 35 years in the Army active and reserve components and,
most recently, as an Army research psychologist assigned to the
National Guard Bureau. He received his Ph.D. from the Claremont
Colleges and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
Craig Bryan is a former Air Force captain whose service included
a 2009 deployment to Iraq. He is a clinical psychologist
and executive director of the National Center for Veterans Studies.
He is also an assistant professor of psychology at the University
of Utah.
1930
1965
2000
J. Stockard
more than earlier generations; they
value community relations, interest in
social problems and civic engagement
less. These changes have been especially
pronounced during the transition from
Generation Xers—those born in 1962
through 1981—to the millennials—
those born in 1982 through the early
2000s.
Findings from several military studies
are consistent with these larger
trends in U.S. society. For example,
military studies have reported more
psychological disorders among personnel
using medical treatment facilities,
and more waivers for those enlisting.
The Army Study To Assess Risk and
Resilience in Servicemembers research
team further indicates that mental health
conditions that exist before joining the
military play an important role in later
suicidal behaviors.
Evident in Military
Consequences of these trends are
likely more evident in the U.S. military
due to its circumscribed population.
First, the Army has proportionally more personnel who are at
greatest risk for suicide: young, male and white. Young age,
male gender and white racial identity have been identified in
both civilian and military research studies as risk factors for
suicide.
In addition, the U.S. Army has seen over time an increase
in the proportion of white soldiers and a decrease in the proportion
of racial minority soldiers. These changes in demographics
have particular relevance when considering that
O’Brien and Stockard found increased suicide risk across birth
cohorts greater for young white men than others. In other
words, the subpopulation for whom generational vulnerability
has increased the most is the same subpopulation that has proportionally
increased the most within the U.S. Army.
Second, recent studies also suggest that those who now
volunteer for military service are distinctly different from
non-volunteers of the same age. Recruits disproportionally
come from single-family households and households of adverse
childhood experiences, both of which are associated
with suicide risk. Using large-scale longitudinal data, Naomi
J. Spence, Kathryn A. Henderson and Glen H. Elder Jr. observed
that youth living in single-parent households had increased
odds of military enlistment independent of socioeconomic
status, characteristics of parent-child relationships, or
feelings of social isolation. Findings were reported in a 2013
article for Journal of Family Issues.
Third, increased vulnerability of soldiers in recent years
might also be explained in part by a considerable change in the
pool of applicants who are eligible for military service. Since
the implementation of the all-volunteer force, the number of
volunteers has diminished. Of this pool, nearly half are ac-
54 ARMY ■ February 2016

U.S. Army/Spc. Caitlyn Byrne
cepted into military service. This situation
contrasts with the last prolonged major conflict,
the Vietnam War era, during which
nearly all 18-year-old men were eligible for
conscripted service, though only a fraction
was inducted. In more recent times, larger
proportions of recruits have more waivers for
health conditions or behavior problems.
In sum, trends in vulnerability among the
more recent generations are more likely to be
evident in the military due to characteristics
of its changing population: few volunteers,
many of whom are young and male; and proportionally
more who are inducted. Evidence
also suggests that more recruits come from
nontraditional family structures, which often
are associated with less social integration and
higher suicide risk. These factors make increased
vulnerability more evident among
U.S. military service members than among
the general population.
Steps Toward Prevention
We have identified several possible directions
for the prevention of suicide in the U.S.
military. First, if increased prevalence in suicide is, indeed, related
to cohort vulnerability, with more recent birth cohorts
more susceptible, then the problem of suicide risk is much
broader than previously thought. That is, increased suicide
risk encompasses all members of specific cohorts within society,
not just military members. Second, for the military it
means more effective screening of prospective recruits, and for
those already in the military, more effective periodic assessments
for suicide risk.
Current assessments require soldiers to respond to specific
questions regarding suicide thoughts, plans and attempts. Although
positive responses to these questions are generally considered
by suicide experts to be among the most important
Capt. Pamela Alderman, a health officer with the 1st Infantry Division, counsels a soldier
suffering from depression while deployed in Kuwait.
warning signs or short-term indicators of imminent risk for
suicide, research suggests that more than half of those who die
by suicide actually deny suicidal ideation and/or intent during
their most recent screening. There may be an underlying,
chronic vulnerability that is not evident using existing screeners.
The question, though, is the specific content that enables
effective detection of these underlying risk factors.
Finally, the content of preventive strategies should be
aimed more directly at domains related to the desire for social
integration, such as training and experiences associated with
group identity and solidarity, leadership and group norms
that develop individual-to-group ties, providing social connections
and control of individual-level behaviors. Such
processes strengthen bonds among
group members through the physical
and social environments that promote
proximity and communication; behaviors
that are interdependent, satisfying
individual and group needs; shared feelings;
and having commonly identified
personal characteristics.
Re-examining the Army’s current and
past practices, in particular those associated
with soldier bonding and cohesive
ties among unit members, would not
only benefit readiness but also soldiers’
identification with others, the unit and
the Army.
✭
Sgt. 1st Class Jermaine Carter, standing, with
the 82nd Civil Affairs Battalion, teaches resilience
training to deployed soldiers in Liberia.
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Bernhard Lashleyleidner
February 2016 ■ ARMY 55

The Outpost
Fighting It Out at Chipyong-ni
By Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army retired
Retreat is not a word American soldiers like to use. You
won’t find the term in Army field manuals. There are
paragraphs on retrograde operations, to include delaying actions,
withdrawals and retirements. But retreat? Well, that’s a
ceremony at sunset when they lower the post flag. It sure isn’t
a recommended battle tactic.
Of course, doctrine is one thing while reality is another.
Even a cursory review of U.S. Army history reflects several
notable “retrograde” events: Gen. George Washington’s
bedraggled Continentals fleeing British redcoats in New York
and New Jersey in 1776; panicked Union troops legging it
north after the Confederates had their way at the First Battle
of Bull Run in 1861; and frantic G.I. backpedaling in the face
of German panzers at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in 1943.
There are other examples, from Brandywine to Bataan. Few
turned out well.
But when it comes to retrogrades, or retreats, those of the
first six months of the Korean War formed a particularly humiliating
category all their own. First, in the hot summer of
1950, the North Koreans ran the Americans south. Then,
once the U.S. Eighth Army recovered and pushed north in the
snows of an early winter, the Communist Chinese intervened,
triggering a series of disastrous one-sided clashes, thousands
of casualties and a wholesale rush south. U.S. Army trucks
eventually outran Chinese foot soldiers. But the ignominious
pullback generated a conviction up and down the ranks that
something was seriously wrong with American morale, discipline
and leadership—especially that last one. The troops who
had won World War II couldn’t hold a hill in the face of peasant
Chinese Communists with hand weapons.
Senior officers did not use the “R” word. They mumbled
into their wool winter shirts and hoped things would turn
around. Maybe it was time to pull off this godforsaken Korean
Peninsula. Or maybe it was time to drop the Big One, the
atomic bomb. But going at it man-to-man? There wasn’t much
interest in that. Better to just leave—the ultimate retrograde.
The troops also didn’t talk of retreat but they sang about it,
to the tune of a popular Hank Snow hit:
When the mortars started falling ’round the CP tent
Everybody wondered where the high brass went
They were buggin’ out—
Just movin’ on…
The generals and colonels tried to ban “Bugout Boogie.”
But the soldiers kept singing it. Worse, they kept doing it.
It’s hard to say where “Bugout Boogie” originated. Most
thought it came from the embittered privates of the 2nd Infantry
Division. That famous old outfit had been savaged trying
to break contact with Chinese regiments at Kunu-ri dur-
First Cavalry Division soldiers move north of
Chipyong-ni, South Korea, in late February 1951.
National Archives
February 2016 ■ ARMY 57

Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of Eighth Army, inspects
front-line positions in March 1951.
Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., was the commander of
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Previously, he served
as the deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, and as the commanding
general, 1st Cavalry Division/commanding general, Multinational
Division-Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds
a doctorate in Russian history from the University of Chicago
and has published a number of books on military subjects. He is
a senior fellow of the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare.
ing a horrific running gunfight on Nov. 30, 1950. A lot of
them made it out, but they left behind 65 blackened cannons;
dozens of shot-up trucks; and far more disturbing, hundreds
of men dead, wounded and lost. The rear guard, the doomed
2nd Engineer Battalion, lost 711 of the 977 soldiers assigned.
In a final act of desperation, the exhausted engineers burned
their colors rather than have them end up as trophies in some
Chinese dayroom. The bugout had been total and bloody.
Yet not all had gone wrong. By careful reconnaissance, securing
the high ground and marching rapidly, the 23rd Infantry
Regimental Combat Team (RCT) avoided the Chinese gauntlet
of fire at Kunu-ri. Tall, thoughtful Col. Paul L. Freeman Jr.
(who would later become a four-star general) had been an adviser
to Chinese forces in World War II. Because he spoke Chinese,
he often questioned prisoners himself. Freeman understood
that the Chinese planned well and executed violently. But
they did not adapt well to the unexpected. Rather than take the
obvious road south, Freeman’s team made it out of the Chinese
trap by going west over a scratch route. It was a smart call.
Afew levels up in the hierarchy, the new Eighth Army
commander noticed. Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
learned how to fight as a paratrooper in World War II.
He had also served in China in 1925–26 and thus, knew
something about the opposing side in Korea. They were good,
but they weren’t 10 feet tall. Ridgway believed that American
soldiers could beat the Chinese if they were well-led. He had
no intention of backing up. “There will be no more discussion
of retreat,” he growled. He meant it. And he kept his eye on
this man Freeman and the 23rd Infantry RCT.
Fifty miles south of the 38th Parallel, the prewar border,
Ridgway’s shaky Eighth Army stopped pulling back. Chinese
Communist forces hovered a few ridgelines to the north,
largely out of contact, no doubt getting ready for another offensive.
Taking advantage of the break in the action, undeterred
by the howling wind and snow squalls, Ridgway
roamed the front. He didn’t talk to just corps and division
commanders but spent a lot of time at regimental, battalion
and company level, spreading the new gospel: “Find them! Fix
them! Fight them! Finish them!” He then insisted on training
to reinforce that message. Training in combat? Some of the
officers were amazed. But the tough old sergeants got it immediately.
Training for close combat, for killing Chinese, became
the norm. Bugout was not in the cards anymore.
When the Chinese attacked again in February 1951, Ridgway’s
Eighth Army was ready. American artillery and airpower
wreaked havoc on Chinese columns exposed on the
slopes of treeless, snow-covered valleys. Some U.S. units bent.
None broke. But when the Chinese paused to resupply, Freeman’s
tough, veteran 23rd Infantry RCT was isolated well forward
in a perimeter defense, a rough oval about a mile or so
across, anchored on a set of low hills around a dot on the map
called Chipyong-ni. When the division and corps commander
suggested pulling back, Ridgway made it clear that wasn’t going
to happen. Those days were over. Freeman told his subordinates
the deal: “We’re going to stay here and fight it out.”
Freeman’s soldiers dug in, chipping away at the frozen dirt.
They sighted machine guns along mazes of barbed-wire entanglements.
Hundreds of mines were buried as well as 55-
gallon drums of fougasse: fire bombs ready to be triggered on
command. Artillery and mortars registered on key targets,
from distant hills to spots right on the wire. Freeman’s three
battalions held the north, east and south. An attached French
battalion—an all-star team led by a lieutenant general serving
under the nom de guerre of Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar—defended
to the west. Freeman’s 5,400 troops faced five understrength
Chinese divisions, about 30,000 men or so. To even
the odds, Ridgway promised plenty of supporting airstrikes,
aerial resupply drops, and a relieving force to break through
once the Chinese attacked. Well, maybe, but that depended
on the reinforced 23rd Infantry RCT holding its ground.
For 10 days, Freeman’s soldiers dug and kept watch. Early
on Feb. 13, patrols brought word that the Chinese were massing
their forces in the next valley over. As the weak winter sun
set, the Americans and French buttoned up their perimeter.
The French laughed and joked, passing around wine bottles.
After dark, the Chinese probed from the west. They had
found the French. Maybe the enemy thought the language
U.S. Army
58 ARMY ■ February 2016

arrier created a weakness. In any event,
both sides exchanged fire in the darkness.
About midnight, the Chinese
showered the defenses with 82 mm and
120 mm mortar rounds and a mix of
Russian 76 mm and American-made 75
mm pack howitzer shells. The barrage
ignited an American truck, and the Chinese
used the blaze as illumination to
guide additional shelling and the approaching
hostile infantry.
Out of the darkness came the tinny
bleat of bugles and shrill whistles, Chinese
signals that also served to unnerve
the defenders. The French immediately
cranked up a siren, and old Monclar directed
his forward platoons to fix bayonets.
As the first wave of Chinese ran
into the French wire, a squad of Monclar’s
men appeared on their flank, firing
rifles and tossing grenades. Stunned, the
Chinese backed off.
An hour or so later, the entire perimeter
erupted. Big 155 mm howitzers
of Battery B, 503rd Field Artillery, an
African-American unit, alternated shooting
up parachute flares with delivering
lethal bursts of high explosives. The defenders’ 105 mm artillery
fired round after round as the Chinese milled in front of the
barbed wire. Machine gunners ran through belt after belt.
Tanks maneuvered to pre-chosen firing steps, cranking off main
gun shots and steady machine-gun fire. Staff officers recorded
four major enemy thrusts but to the soldiers engaged, it was all
one long, awful night. But when dawn came, the Chinese
Communists pulled off.
Daylight brought the U.S. Air Force, and they did not hold
back. Heavy bombs and napalm canisters rained down. The
suffering Chinese replied by firing their mortars into the U.S.
positions. One lucky shot hit just outside the regimental command
post, killing one officer and wounding two others. One
Then-Col. Paul L. Freeman Jr., center, of the 23rd Infantry Regimental Combat Team, and then-Maj.
Gen. Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander, right, confer with other officers during the Battle of
Chipyong-ni, South Korea.
was Freeman. His left calf was ripped open, his shinbone
cracked. The colonel was in agony, but he refused evacuation
when aircraft landed to retrieve the wounded.
The Chinese tried again that night. They got close—too
close, in some spots. But the enemy never broke the RCT’s line.
Nor did the Chinese break the spirit of the American and
French defenders. Just before sunset on Feb. 15, a tank column
from the 1st Cavalry Division broke through. The siege was
over. The casualty toll was 51 killed, 42 missing and 259
wounded. The Chinese left behind almost a thousand dead.
What did it all mean? A historian of China’s People’s Liberation
Army understood. As Chen Jian put it: “Chipyong-ni
changed everything.” The Chinese had thought the Americans
wouldn’t stand and fight. Now, they
knew otherwise. There would be other
battles, and a lot more killing. There
would be no more mass bugouts. The
soldiers of the 23rd Infantry Regimental
Combat Team did not win the Korean
War. Neither side did. But the American
and French defenders ensured their
side wouldn’t lose. Sixty-five years ago
in Korea, that was enough. ✭
U.S. Army
U.S. Army
Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, left, and
Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond salute during the
presentation of a battle streamer to an attached
French battalion for service in the Battle of
Chipyong-ni, South Korea.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 59

AUSA Sustaining Member Profile
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60 ARMY ■ February 2016

Soldier Armed
Army Gets Precision Fires Upgrades
By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer
In parallel with ongoing procurement
involving guided cannon munitions
and precision guidance kits for artillery
projectiles, other recent activity across
Army rocket, missile and launcher platforms
promises to reopen dormant production
lines and further expand the
Army’s precision fires capabilities over
the next few years.
One evolving slice of the launcher and
munitions systems was outlined during
the recent Association of the U.S. Army
Annual Meeting and Exposition by Ken
Musculus, Lockheed Martin vice president
for tactical missiles, and Col. James
“Chris” Mills, U.S. Army program manager for precision fires.
“If you look at history going back to the M270 and M26 unguided
rocket, there has been a constant evolution of both the
launchers and the missiles,” Musculus said, adding that the
M270A1 tracked Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
launcher is being modernized “to bring the electronics essentially
into the 21st century. We’re putting new hardware in it;
redesigning the electronics in it; putting a new processor in it;
getting rid of obsolescence.”
Along with the electronics upgrades, Lockheed Martin has
also developed a new armored cab for the M270A1. It is more
spacious inside and has improved levels of protection.
“We increased the crew protection levels by redesigning the
armor,” Musculus said. “It’s really an entirely new cab: You
take the old cab off; you put the new cab on. You also put a lot
of the existing electronics back in it. But one of the things it
now does is put the commander in the center seat position,
making it common” with how the M142 high-mobility artillery
rocket system, or HIMARS, operates.
“We’ve done extensive testing on the new cab design,” he
said. “We have fired many, many rockets off this system at the
test range. It works perfectly. We’ve also proven out its ballistic
capabilities, and they have fired munitions at it.”
Three Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems on display
Cab No Longer Cramped
Pointing to a side-by-side picture of the old and new cab designs,
he showed where the new design picked up “about a foot”
of space. “It doesn’t look like much, but that difference of about
a foot makes a big difference inside the cab,” he said. “Plus, you
can see that it’s a little bit higher. So from a crew standpoint, the
old M270 is kind of cramped, but the new one feels spacious.”
Six prototypes of the new armored cab have been built for
testing, with some of those dedicated to blast trials. Production
plans for the new cabs currently project a rate of approximately
30 cabs per year beginning in fiscal year 2019.
Musculus said some company effort is also being directed
toward the M142 HIMARS wheeled launcher, focused on
possible exploration of a “next-generation launcher.” While
Musculus predicted it would be in the budget for FY 2017 or
’18, Mills was more cautious about the timeframe for a possible
HIMARS launcher replacement.
“The funding is a little bit further out for the next-gen
launcher,” he said. “But they are looking at that.”
When the Army was asked for clarification, Dan O’Boyle,
spokesman for the Army’s precision fires program management
office, said, “The Army understands the long-term potential
need for a new launcher platform,” so the next-generation
launcher development “is expected to begin in the near future.
The Army is currently studying future technologies that may
be leveraged to meet the future capability requirements.”
In parallel with the platform enhancements, other precision
fires activities are being directed toward both the guided multiple
launch rocket system rocket and Army tactical missile system
missile. Much of the effort focuses on replacing the cluster
munition designs in those systems. For the guided multiple
launch rocket system, that involves the dual-purpose improved
conventional munitions; for the tactical missile system, it involves
the anti-personnel and anti-materiel submunitions.
According to Mills, a 2008 DoD policy directs the Army to
meet the intent of the 2018 cluster munitions ban, which
means that by January 2019, “we have to meet less than a 1
percent dud rate on any weapon.”
With dual-purpose improved conventional munitions,
“there were a bunch of bomblets, with each one having its own
fuze,” Musculus said. “The issue is, depending on how the
bomblets hit, they don’t always detonate. So now you have un-
Scott R. Gourley
February 2016 ■ ARMY 61

U.S. Army/John Hamilton
During testing at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., clockwise from top inset: An M270A1 MLRS fires a training rocket; an improved armored cab affords
more crew protection; the redesigned cab puts the commander in the center.
exploded ordnance … and with the different ways a bomblet
can hit, there’s almost no way you can guarantee a less than 1
percent dud rate.”
The solution came in the form of the alternative warhead program.
Lockheed Martin worked with Orbital ATK to develop a
new warhead for the guided multiple launch rocket system that
features a high-explosive core surrounded by tungsten balls.
“We’re talking about 186,000” medium- and small-caliber
balls, Musculus said, so when the rocket detonates, the smallcaliber
balls are “going everywhere. It’s used for imprecisely located
targets and also for soft targets.”
The engineering and manufacturing development program
for the new warhead program began in March 2012, Musculus
said. Testing at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., resulted
in “100 percent mission success,” with detonations providing
“good effects on targets.”
Tactical Missile Modernization
Other efforts are directed toward old Army tactical missiles
containing anti-personnel and anti-materiel (APAM) submunitions.
“The government has a lot” of the Block I tactical missions
in inventory, he said. “These are the old ones with the APAM
warhead,” which will not be usable starting in 2018 because of
the cluster munition ban.
“So what we are doing is taking those old Block Is, bringing
them in, downloading and de-mating them from the pod,
salvaging a lot of the metal parts including the solid rocket
motor, which we’re washing out and refilling the propellant
so it’s like a brand-new motor,” he said. “We’re also building
new navigation electronics and upgrading the processors; replacing
the obsolete parts; doing the same replacement of obsolete
parts for the mission computer and putting a new
processor in there.”
Musculus said new builds of the inertial measurement unit
and control actuation system are also being added. As a result,
what had once been seen as a service life-extension program
is now dubbed modernization for the Army’s tactical
missile system.
“The systems are not stagnating,” Musculus said. “We are
continuing to upgrade the electronics in them. We are putting
new processors in. We are replacing the obsolete parts. We are
developing new warheads that are compliant with policies and
accords. We’re also putting new electronics in the launchers
and have developed a new armored cab to protect the soldiers
better. These are evolving products that are going to go on for
many more years.”
Musculus also said the restarted tactical missile system and
HIMARS lines are attracting foreign interest. “Countries are
now coming and saying, ‘Hey, we want to get in on that now.’
So that’s a good story,” he said. “And where it’s really a great
story is, as the foreign governments come in and buy these
munitions, it obviously helps out our U.S. customer with better
pricing.”
✭
62 ARMY ■ February 2016

Historically Speaking
Verdun at 100 By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired
Feb. 21 marks the 100th anniversary of the German assault
on Verdun, France. It launched the savage, 10-month
World War I battle that has become a metaphor for bloodshed
and indecisiveness. Soldiers on both sides endured incredible
hardships, providing their generation a vision of hell on Earth.
It was an experience no army wanted to repeat, fueling ardent
searches for ways to break the deadlock on the Western Front
other than by the means employed in this battle.
Our own Army became a benefactor of the resultant doctrinal
ferment. Our generations-long emphasis on decisive maneuver
warfare stands in stark contrast to the brutal attrition
the fighting for Verdun became.
In early 1916, Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the
German General Staff, faced a two-front war: in Russia and
on the Western Front. This had ground on for a year and a
half, with huge losses and no decision. Falkenhayn recognized
that Germany did not have the resources to conquer and occupy
either Russia or France while heavily engaged with the
other. He believed an attack on Verdun, surrounded on three
sides by the Germans and psychologically and physically vital
to the defense of France, would draw the French army into a
battle wherein it could be “bled white.”
Artillery fire had proven to be far and away the greatest killer
in World War I, and observed artillery fire was far more effective
than unobserved. A massive yet tightly controlled offensive
could quickly seize the high ground surrounding Verdun, giving
the Germans fields of view the French would lack. The
French would be forced to counterattack or to endure unrelenting
exposure to devastating observed artillery fire. French return
fire would be largely unobserved and thus, far less effective.
French counterattacks in the face of entrenched defenders,
machine guns and artillery would inevitably be costly.
The German Fifth Army assumed the mission of attacking
Verdun, and gathered over a million men and 1,200 guns to
do so. Of the guns, two-thirds were heavy. The Germans built
10 new rail spurs off their main line running just 15 miles
north of Verdun, and scheduled about 33 munitions trains per
day. They stockpiled enough artillery ammunition to fire 2
million rounds in the first six days, and another 2 million
rounds in the next 12.
The Germans planned on swarming in aircraft sufficient to
deny the French use of the air, depriving them of this other
potential source for observed artillery fire. The French had
stripped Verdun’s defenses of artillery to meet needs elsewhere.
However, alerted by their intelligence services at the
11th hour, the French rushed in artillery reinforcements sufficient
to give them 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns prior to
the German attack.
The German attack, preceded by a 12-hour bombardment,
U.S. soldiers line the trenches near Verdun, France.
advanced methodically and well during the first several days. It
penetrated the first and second trench lines in the attack zone.
The weight of the German attack was to the east of the Marne
River and here, they seized the key terrain of Fort Douaumont
by Feb. 25. This was about 4 miles from their start point. A
day later, the attack began to sputter. Snow, a thaw, ground
pulverized by artillery, and heavy traffic combined to turn the
terrain it was moving through into a muddy morass.
German artillery, in particular, had difficulty moving, soon
finding itself out of range of critical targets. French reinforcements
rushed in. Some French generals, under pressure, recommended
withdrawing from the east bank of the Meuse
River. Gen. Joseph J. Joffre, the French commander in chief,
promised to court-martial any general who retreated. He appointed
Gen. Philippe Petain to direct the defense. The
ragged and sawtooth French lines held.
Most notably, the French held on to enough of the high
ground east of the Meuse to see into the German rear. They
brought masses of observed artillery fire onto the Germans,
even as the Germans were bringing masses of observed artillery
fire onto them. Losses on both sides mounted. The
Germans ascertained that the French artillery was concentrated
on the high ground west of the Meuse, and resolved to
broaden their attack to the west to neutralize this threat.
A renewed attack beginning March 6 made some progress,
but not enough to seriously degrade the French artillery. By
April 9, the Germans had advanced perhaps 3 miles along the
west bank of the Meuse. They advanced in the east as well and
seized Vaux, but the French still held on to critical perches
east of the Meuse. The Germans had reached within 5 miles
of Verdun itself, but seemed to have forgotten that Verdun
was supposed to be bait rather than an objective in itself.
Library of Congress
February 2016 ■ ARMY 63

The French army trucked supplies and troops along the “Sacred Way”
during the Battle of Verdun.
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history
at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December
1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion,
66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned
to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry
Division, in 1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The
Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate
in history from Indiana University.
Ironically, the Germans found themselves caught in the same
kind of trap they had intended to inflict on the French. They
were subject to deluges of observed artillery fire, and these
could be relieved only if they seized the high ground from
which French artillerymen were directing their fires. This led
them into recurrent attacks—under fire. German commanders
believed their viable options were to go forward or to withdraw,
not to stay put.
Falkenhayn had envisioned a lopsided battle in which the
Germans held the high ground and hammered away at the
French while the French, blinded by the topographical relief,
were ineffectual in their response. Instead, he got a messy battlefield
where both sides had high ground enough to bring
their artillery into play. Rather than admit defeat and withdraw
into less exposed positions, the Germans deluded themselves
time and again that one more push would be sufficient to dislodge
and blind the French. Attacks proved costly. The French
were not the only ones who found it psychologically impossible
to withdraw from the blood-soaked ground of Verdun.
Assailed on all three sides of the Verdun salient, the French
mustered vehicles from across France to sustain La Voie Sacree,
the “Sacred Way,” trucking in supplies and reinforcements in
a continuous stream over this perilous road. They massed artillery
and counterattacked fiercely to sustain their line. Tactical
innovations did occur. The Germans introduced flamethrowers.
The French arrayed their defenses in depth. The
Germans led attacks with infiltration parties of infantry, engineers
and other arms eventually famous as Stosstruppen. The
French perfected a system for rotating units through Verdun
from all over France.
Both sides were ever more aggressive and creative in their
use of air power. Artillery tactics became more sophisticated as
well, particularly with respect to the proliferation and integration
of chemical munitions. None of this forced a decision or
reduced the carnage. The battle bubbled on in a seemingly
endless series of attacks and counterattacks large and small.
On June 4, the Russians launched their massive Brusilov
Offensive and on June 24, the British launched a similarly
massive assault along the Somme River. These offensives also
turned out to be indecisive bloodbaths, but they did divert
German attention and resources away from Verdun. Falkenhayn
was relieved in August, replaced by Field Marshal Paul
von Hindenburg. The Germans went over to the defensive
around Verdun. The French launched a major counteroffensive
in the fall and by mid-December had regained much of
the ground they had lost.
At Verdun, the French are reported to have suffered
542,000 casualties; the Germans, 434,000. The attempt to
bleed France white bled the Germans almost as badly. Losses
were so great, artillery so prolific and fighting so chaotic that it
proved impossible to identify most of the dead. The famous
Douaumont Ossuary contains the bones of over 130,000
unidentified dead, French mingled with German. Views into
the crypt through small windows offer as graphic an image as
one can imagine of the cost of war. Remains in the ossuary are
in addition to those of more than 16,000 Frenchmen who
were identified and individually buried in the nearby Douaumont
Cemetery.
The intractable problem presented at Verdun was that no
penetration was deep enough to prove decisive. Infantry advances
reached culminating points when they outdistanced
their artillery support, which is difficult to move forward
across shattered ground. Communications failed as well. Defenses
in depth could contain shallow penetrations while reinforcements
rushed in by road and rail. Observed artillery fire
hammered away at anything that moved. Maneuver turned
into attrition.
This phenomenon repeated itself on other battlefields;
Americans experienced it during the first bloody month in the
Meuse-Argonne. The situation begged for a technological resolution
to break the impasse. This came to fruition in a later
war with combined arms teams of tanks, planes, artillery,
mechanized infantry and engineers knit together by radio communications.
Verdun was the incentive to find another way. ✭
Additional Reading
Esposito, Vincent J., The West Point Atlas of American
Wars, Volume II: 1900–1953 (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1959)
Horne, Alistair, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London:
Penguin Books, 1994)
Jankowski, Paul, Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)
Library of Congress
64 ARMY ■ February 2016

Reviews
The Definitive History of America’s Top Warriors
Relentless Strike: The Secret History
of Joint Special Operations Command.
Sean Naylor. St. Martin’s Press.
560 pages. $29.99.
By Col. Steven P. Bucci
U.S. Army retired
For anyone who wants to understand
how Joint Special Operations Command
came into being and how the force
does its job, this is the book to read. Several
years in the making, the research is
exhaustive and accurate, the writing topnotch,
and the story compelling.
I discussed the book with author Sean
Naylor, a former Army Times reporter
who’s now with Foreign Policy. He said
he initially wanted to write only about
the command’s post-9/11 exploits but
quickly realized he could not do the subject
justice without first laying some historical
groundwork. To Naylor’s credit,
this was a wise decision that adds greatly
to the value of the book for historical researchers,
and to the ability of the layman
to understand the gravity of the
unit’s progress and accomplishments.
In the first seven chapters comprising
Part I, Naylor looks at the precipitating
events leading to the formation of Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC),
and the numerous early alerts for counterterrorism
missions that never got the
“go” command. It is finally during the
Panama invasion in 1989, led by Gen.
Carl Stiner, that JSOC hits its first real
strides. Following rapidly with the First
Gulf War, Somalia and the Balkans, the
breadth of the command’s mission set
continues to grow. Having witnessed all
of these events from the “white special
operations forces” side of the fence, I
found this a fascinating read, and this
was just the beginning. Part I’s title,
“The Ferrari in the Garage,” is apt, as
this wonderful asset was underutilized.
Part II, “A New Era Dawns,” begins
the chronicle of the real growth of
JSOC’s capability and reputation with
its wider government customers. The
exceptionally difficult and classified
missions that the organization began to
take on were remarkable. The chapter
“Rumsfeld Falls for JSOC” was especially
interesting to me, as I accompanied
the former secretary of defense on his
trip to Fort Bragg, N.C., and most of the
JSOC briefs he received. JSOC was responding
to the needs of the nation, and
this shows how they were doing it.
The seven chapters in “Building the
Machine,” Part III, will likely draw lots
of attention. This section maps the command’s
exploits in Iraq, and fills in the
gaps between a great many legends with
facts. Naylor really did his homework
here. The remarkable heroes that most
people think of when they hear “JSOC”
come of age.
The fourth and final section, “A
Global Campaign,” allows readers to
see what JSOC has become and what it
is truly capable of doing for America. It
also shows why our enemies are in no
hurry to face JSOC, no matter how
much bravado they may spout. The mystique
of America’s elite has been solidified,
and the mystique is real.
Naylor has done exhaustive research.
He spent time with the men and women
of JSOC, and it shows. He is a reporter
who understands the military but is still
able to remain objective. He remains respectful
but applies a penetrating eye. In
short, he gets it right. His prose is lively
and enjoyable.
When the book was first released,
there was one point of controversy that I
personally addressed with Naylor. He attributes
a set of actions to a particular
JSOC operator. That individual says he
declined to speak with Naylor, who got
the information from a different JSOC
member, and that the information is incorrect.
Naylor told me the individual
was given a chance to give him the information
or tell him the information was
incorrect, but declined. So Naylor went
with the source he had.
I also looked into the individual’s assertion
that Naylor had “outed” him as a
JSOC member and found the individual
prominently makes the JSOC connection
himself on a personal website.
Final assessment of Relentless Strike is
that this will be the definitive book on
JSOC for the foreseeable future. It deserves
a spot in any professional library
worth the name, and goes a long way in
filling in the blanks many have in understanding
a unit that has sacrificed more
than most. They are the quiet professionals.
Even with this infusion of illuminated
information, they remain so.
Col. Steven P. Bucci, USA Ret., is the director
of the Allison Center for Foreign and National
Security Policy Studies at the Heritage
Foundation. He is also a senior fellow
at the foundation for all issues involving
homeland security and defense. He served
as military assistant to Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld, and deputy assistant
secretary of defense, homeland defense, and
defense support to civil authorities.
February 2016 ■ ARMY 65

Dunwoody Set Above-Average Bars to Earn Stars
A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies
from America’s First Female
Four-Star General. Gen. Ann Dunwoody,
USA Ret., with Tomago Collins.
Da Capo Press. 286 pages. $25.99.
By Kelly S. Kennedy
Gen. Ann Dunwoody, the first female
four-star general in the Army, spent
her entire career being treated differently
because she was a woman, but succeeding
because she was a soldier.
She possessed many of the typical
traits of good soldierhood: She could run
fast for long distances. She could suck it
up and show the almost irritating excitement
about driving on that’s found in
general officers. (Five a.m. battalion inspection?
Whoopee!) And rather than
get caught up in bureaucracy, she picked
some battles, made her opinions known,
and even blew past her chain of command
when she believed it was necessary.
Dunwoody details her management
style—find good advocates, and ignore
and defy those who would hold one
back—in her book, A Higher Standard.
She writes about some of her early failures,
and uses them as examples of the
importance of preparation. They include
freezing up while reading an award citation
in front of her peers in 1977; and
failing to qualify on a firing range with a
9 mm pistol as the first female field
grade officer in the 82nd Airborne Division
in 1988.
Those lessons continued throughout
her career. She writes that she often felt
“that there was more expected of me in
order to gain acceptance and respect in
this man’s Army.”
When Dunwoody joined, following
several general officer family members,
her only option was the Women’s Army
Corps. Her first PT uniform consisted
of light-green culottes and a light-green
blouse with white Keds, an outfit she
called “ludicrous.”
She met with resistance throughout
her career, from her first jump to reporting
to Fort Bragg, N.C. Men received
positions ahead of her that they hadn’t
earned, she writes, leaving her sidelined
until other opportunities arrived. But
those opportunities always appeared.
She was one of the first women to attend
Airborne School for female officers.
“Without that opportunity, my career
would have been dramatically different,
and I certainly would not have earned a
seat at the retired four-star conference,”
she writes, hinting at the potential future
of the three women who recently graduated
from Army Ranger School.
On her first jump, one of the instructors
“smacked me hard on my rump with
what came to be known as the five-finger
tattoo,” although she writes that she never
saw that happen to anyone else. The instructors
had her jump first so the men
would be too embarrassed to “chicken
out.” She was one of four honor grads.
As a new officer in the 82nd, she went
through a ritual called prop blasting. She
was jolted by wires connected to a battery,
doused in ice water, smacked with
tree branches and told two filthy jokes.
She then had to tell a dirty joke of her
own to avoid going through it all again.
“Today it would be all over YouTube,
and heads would roll,” she writes. But she
saw the hazing as another way of showing
she could “hang tough with the boys.”
Some of the discrimination followed
more subtle paths. During Operation
Desert Storm, she became the 82nd’s
parachute officer, but she didn’t deploy
with the advance party. When she realized
it was because she was a woman,
she hopped a flight to Saudi Arabia
without orders—her only deployment.
As she waited for her angry commander,
the Army announced she’d made lieutenant
colonel—a year earlier than her
peer group.
Much of the book is about the men
who tried to hold her back, in contrast to
the advocates who recognized her abilities.
She writes about her first division
commander, who wouldn’t let women
jump out of an aircraft he was in. Others
believed she was promoted only because
she was a woman.
And yet, incredibly, she writes that she
was surprised about the assaults on
women at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Md., in the 1990s.
“At the time, I did not believe that sexual
assaults were part of the Army culture,
but instead that this bad behavior at
Aberdeen had been tolerated in an organization
with a subculture that clashed
with Army values,” she writes. And later,
“I had been in the service for 21 years and
had never encountered any direct form of
sexual harassment or assault.”
Dunwoody defends—no, champions
—the importance of women, and diversity
in general, in the ranks. It’s not a
matter of competition, as so often happens
in the military, so much as apparent
obliviousness about sexual harassment.
Should women be in combat? They
already are, she writes. And sexual harassment?
“One incident of sexual assault
is too many,” she writes. She had teams
entirely made up of women she chose
because of their merits and, in fact,
sought a male candidate at one point to
bring diversity to her team.
“Can a woman meet the same standard
required of her male counterparts?
If she can, then there is no reason why
women shouldn’t be able to do the job.”
Dunwoody certainly could do the job.
Kelly S. Kennedy served as an Army communications
specialist during Operation
Desert Storm and is the author of They
Fought for Each Other: The Triumph
and Tragedy of the Hardest Hit Unit
in Iraq.
66 ARMY ■ February 2016

Solomon Islands, which caused them to
change their strategy to one of containment.
Midway was indeed the turning
point in the war, Myers writes, because
it put an end to Japanese offensive
operations to the east. He again reminds
his readers that Japanese loss was not inevitable,
and that viewing it through the
lens of inevitability robs the situation of
its complexity and strategic richness.
This interpretation also lessens the accomplishment
of the American military
and strategists in defeating Japan.
In Chapter 3, Myers takes on Alan D.
Zimm, author of Attack on Pearl Harbor:
Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, who
argued that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor was actually a strategic defeat because
it drew the U.S. into the war,
which it eventually would win. Zimm,
Myers writes, also operates under the assumption
that U.S. victory was assured
from the beginning, which is a logical
fallacy. This assumption taints any further
conclusions. As an example of the
contingent nature of the war, Myers
writes that neither side expected to be
fighting decisive battles in the Solomon
Islands or in a series of naval meeting engagements.
Nor did they envision a war
of attrition being fought out island by island.
The war was a “matter of complex
linkages between plans and operations,”
Myers writes.
The Allied strategic and economic
plans are described in Chapters 4 and 5.
Myers describes the competing philosophies
in the American high command
between a focus on Germany or Japan.
While President Franklin D. Roosevelt
wanted the military’s primary focus to be
on Europe, Gen. Douglas MacArthur
wanted to take advantage of the situation
in the Pacific to achieve a swift victory.
The back-and-forth in American strategy
led to a gradual buildup of forces in
the Pacific. Had more forces been dedicated
to Europe, Myers argues, then the
Japanese might have been able to develop
a stronger defense that would have
caused the war to go on longer.
Similarly, had American economists
not developed a long-term financial plan
for financing the war, the U.S. might
have run out of money for its war machine
by the time it rumbled into the Pacific
Theater. Both the U.S. Army and
Navy had separate plans for victory in
the Pacific that were pursued along different
lines, while the Joint Chiefs of
Staff produced an evolving strategy for
the war. Allied strategy was hardly cut
and dried, Myers points out, and victory
was never taken as a given.
That the U.S. victory was an accomplishment
allows for appreciating what
the U.S. military did to win in a difficult
environment, Myers writes, adding
that the Navy responded exceptionally
well through innovation: task-organizing
ships in combat; a greater proliferation
of purpose-built amphibious ships;
the development and use of radar; and
the perfection of mobile logistics. These
helped the Navy overcome some of its
marked issues such as flawed torpedoes
that did not detonate on impact, and
smokeless powder that had such a bright
flash that it blinded the naval gunners.
This book is a valuable resource for
World War II students of strategy who
appreciate how strategy can evolve
through contingencies. It offers a solid
counterargument to the inevitability theses
and reads quickly, with 150 pages of
text. Based off both primary and secondary
sources from the Japanese and
Allied sides, this work gives a balanced
perspective on the conduct of the war.
1st Lt. Jonathan D. Bratten is an engineer
officer and command historian in the
Maine Army National Guard. He has
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history.
African-American Unit Defied Stereotypes
Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The
1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War’s
First African American Combat
Unit. Ian Michael Spurgeon. University
of Oklahoma Press. 454 pages. $29.95.
By Command Sgt. Maj.
Jimmie W. Spencer
U.S. Army retired
The sight of armed African-American
soldiers wearing blue uniforms was
disturbing for some at the outset of the
Civil War. For the Southerners in gray,
it was more than just disturbing; it was a
threat to the Southern way of life.
Soldiers in the Army of Freedom, by Ian
Michael Spurgeon, is an inspiring account
of one of the many black units
that wore blue uniforms during the Civil
War: the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry
Regiment. This largely forgotten regiment
played an important role in the
Union victory in the Trans-Mississippi
Theater of the Civil War.
The 1st Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment
has the distinction of being the
first black regiment raised in a Northern
state, and the first black unit to see combat
during the Civil War. Its battles were
small when compared to the fighting in
the East, but it was bloody combat
nonetheless.
The War Department mustered the
regiment into federal service in January
1863. It was the fourth black regiment
to be accepted into the Union Army.
William D. Matthews, a free black man
in Kansas in 1862, helped raise a company
of volunteers for the 1st Kansas
Colored Infantry and became one of the
regiment’s two black officers. The War
68 ARMY ■ February 2016

Department also authorized Matthews’
commission, which would have made
him the first black officer in the U.S.
Army. Unfortunately, his orders were
lost and never reached the regiment or
Matthews.
Spurgeon takes the reader through
the recruitment of the volunteers, the
process of mustering the unit into federal
service, and the desperate battles on the
war’s killing fields. He also addresses
how the regiment helped shape the
evolving attitudes of politicians and the
American people—Northerners and
Southerners alike—about African-American
combatants.
This is their story, told by a master
storyteller as accurately and fairly as possible.
Spurgeon makes use of war
records, soldiers’ letters and official reports
to help tell the soldiers’ stories. The
good, the bad, the emotional highs and
the disappointing lows are all included.
Soldiers in the Army of Freedom is the
story of the important contributions of
the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment
to the war, and to the end of slavery
in America. It is a welcome addition
to the growing body of our knowledge
and understanding of the role of black
units during the Civil War—and it helps
to rescue this important regiment from
the dustbin of American history.
Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmie W. Spencer,
USA Ret., is the former director of
AUSA’s Noncommissioned Officer and
Soldier Programs and is now an AUSA
Senior Fellow. During his 32 years of
active military service, he had a variety
of assignments with infantry, Special
Forces and Ranger units.
Expeditionary Forces in WWI: Untrained, Ill-Led
Thunder and Flames: Americans in
the Crucible of Combat, 1917–1918.
Edward G. Lengel. University Press of
Kansas. 470 pages. $39.95.
By Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy
U.S. Army retired
In this excellent book, Edward G.
Lengel covers the combat operations
and development of the American Expeditionary
Forces from the 1st Division’s
first combat, in November 1917;
to the end of the Second Battle of the
Marne and the reduction of the Marne
salient, in August 1918, by U.S. divisions
operating under French command.
This is the period before the creation
of the separate American Army in
Europe that would fight at St. Mihiel
and in the Meuse-Argonne.
Lengel, a University of Virginia professor
and editor-in-chief of the Papers
of George Washington, strips away 100
years of myth and exposes the ill-led,
raw, untrained and unprepared American
Army that arrived in France spoiling
for a fight with a superiority complex visa-vis
its French and British co-belligerents.
This complex led to the Army’s
willful disregard of the hard-won lessons
the French and British learned fighting
Germany before the U.S. entered the
war, and resulted in thousands of needless
casualties.
The book’s greatest strength is the author’s
use of French and German records
to provide a much more objective view of
the combat actions. Lengel makes many
excellent points as he examines the
American Expeditionary Forces’ various
battles, units and commanders. He successfully
debunks numerous misconceptions,
showing the French army was actually
better and more combat-effective
than contemporary American accounts
would lead one to believe. He demonstrates
that the German army was not
uniformly elite, had units with low
morale and diminished combat efficiency,
and made mistakes. He clarifies
that the German High Command’s offensives
in 1918 were not intended to
reach Paris but instead to pull French
operational reserves from Flanders to enable
a German breakthrough there.
Reading this book, I was struck by
how often U.S. commanders and troops
claimed credit for fighting achievements
that should have gone to the French,
who were fighting to the Americans’
front and flanks. A prime example is the
U.S. Marines’ battle in Belleau Wood.
French units decisively reduced German
combat power and enabled the final
clearance of Belleau Wood by the 2nd
Division. Further, the Americans’ lack of
understanding at the brigade and division
levels of French doctrine led to the
frequent opening of U.S. flanks by withdrawing
French units.
Described in contemporary U.S. accounts
as bugouts, many withdrawals
were preplanned to minimize the effects
of Germany artillery fire and maximize
February 2016 ■ ARMY 69

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terrain for effective fields of fire. Understanding
this, the reader should regard
the 3rd Division’s stand on the Marne
River on July 15, 1918, differently, at
least in terms of the criticisms leveled at
French units on the division’s flanks.
Lengel ably shows how U.S. commanders
exaggerated the importance of almost
every battle, claiming their units
fought at the point of main enemy effort,
against overwhelming odds and elite
German units, and without the considerable
support of their Allies, among other
factors. Again, the Champagne-Marne
defensive serves as a great example.
For 100 years, the 3rd Marne Division
proudly claimed to have saved Paris. It
didn’t. Lengel clearly documents that the
German attack on the Marne was a supporting
effort in a secondary area with no
intention of reaching Paris. This does not
denigrate the valor and sacrifice of the
brave men positioned along the Marne in
the middle of July, but it does place the
battle’s importance in proper perspective.
Lengel lays the responsibility for thousands
of needless deaths at the feet of inexperienced
and incompetent commanders
at all levels who failed to prevent
junior leaders and soldiers from using
outdated and fatal linear tactics in the
face of machine guns and massed artillery.
He discusses the age-old problem of
where on the battlefield commanders
should be to decisively affect the fight—
he takes the chain of command of the
2nd Division to task for this failure in
the battle for Belleau Wood, where commanders
made the wrong decision with
incomplete information while far removed
from the fight.
He also excoriates the 2nd Brigade,
1st Division’s commander, Brig. Gen.
Beaumont Buck, for “whizzing about the
battlefields, with no obvious purpose
other than to see what a real war looked
like” while his brigade was being decimated
in the attack south of Soissons,
July 18–22, 1918.
Lengel takes commanders at all levels
to task for not passing on their units’
lessons learned from early combat actions,
with new units repeating the mistakes
made by the “experienced” divisions
because they did not know better.
Brig. Gen. James Harbord, commanding
the 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, appears
to be criminally negligent in his failure to
pass on lessons learned by the Marines in
Belleau Wood to the 7th Infantry Regiment
that replaced them, condemning
that unit to failure and resulting in hundreds
of needless deaths.
This book contains many more critical
observations and new interpretations
that will challenge readers’ understanding
of the American Expeditionary
Forces’ performance in World War I.
Each point is well-argued and well-supported.
Commanders and units are exposed
to criticism, with some looking
better and some looking worse once seen
through Lengel’s lens.
Despite the many critical assessments
made in this book, the American soldiers
and Marines who fought in difficult conditions
under often-incompetent commanders
and with terrible logistic support
are judged to be brave men who
performed their duty as best they knew
how, and with an aggressive spirit and
abiding faith in the superiority of the
American way.
The French poilu and French colonial
troops are given the due they have
been denied by American historians for
nearly a century. The German landser is
shown to be no Superman, but is still
depicted as a brave and determined foe
who continued to fight with discipline
and cunning even as the cause appeared
to be lost.
I heartily recommend Lengel’s excellent
book to anyone interested in the
American Expeditionary Forces in World
War I, and the development of the U.S.
Army into a professional fighting force.
Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy, USA Ret., is the
historian for the 15th Infantry Regiment
Association and the Society of the 3rd Infantry
Division.
1-855-246-6269
That’s the toll-free number to call
AUSA national headquarters. The AUSA
Action Line is open 8 a.m.–5 p.m. Monday
through Thursday, and 8 a.m.–1:30
p.m. Friday, except holidays. If you have
a question about AUSA, give us a call.
70 ARMY ■ February 2016

Final Shot
U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Warren W. Wright Jr.
Spc. Cara Corley of the 173rd Airborne Brigade competes
in the European Best Warrior Competition at Germany’s
Grafenwoehr Training Area with a dummy not weighed
down by options such as clothing.
72 ARMY ■ February 2016

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