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Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

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U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Gemma Iglesias<br />

Above: Soldiers from African nations visit the<br />

Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,<br />

Germany; left: Soldiers from the 173rd<br />

Airborne Brigade demonstrate room-clearing<br />

techniques to Ukrainian troops in Ukraine.<br />

U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Spc. Joshua Leonard<br />

For <strong>Army</strong> units involved in RAF, the devotion to a particular<br />

region helps provide purpose for home-station training, ensuring<br />

that they focus on what combatant commanders want. With<br />

“engagement” now listed as one of the <strong>Army</strong>’s warfighting functions<br />

and “shaping the security environment” counted among<br />

the core competencies of the <strong>Army</strong>, the security cooperation nature<br />

of many RAF-executed deployments demonstrates that a<br />

unit’s participation in RAF can directly contribute to its preparedness<br />

to execute some of the <strong>Army</strong>’s core missions.<br />

Prepare for Domination<br />

Several RAF activities to build partner capacity were conducted<br />

alongside special operations forces with long experience<br />

in the region, with general purpose and special operations forces<br />

complementing each other’s capabilities. All of this prepares<br />

units to dominate the human domain, as ground forces are<br />

called upon to do. Small-unit, geographically distributed expeditionary<br />

missions also provide excellent leadership and command<br />

opportunities, and force the exercise<br />

of Mission Command at a time<br />

when situational awareness tools seem to<br />

allow this prerogative of effective operations<br />

to be a popular theme that is often<br />

ignored in practice.<br />

Despite these clear successes, criticisms<br />

of the RAF concept remain, and some of<br />

them are valid. The concern that implementation<br />

would be too costly to the<br />

<strong>Army</strong> has been shown to be largely unfounded,<br />

as many RAF-executed activities<br />

are financed with Title 22 (Department<br />

of State) funding for activities<br />

related to building partner capacity, or through exercise-related<br />

funds. This money would be spent anyway, regardless of which<br />

unit participated in the exercise.<br />

There is, however, an opportunity cost for a unit involved in<br />

RAF. For example, time spent on learning to use a foreign<br />

weapon for an activity related to building partner capacity is<br />

time that is not spent conducting battle drills. Some 20 years<br />

ago, soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia<br />

developed the small-unit leadership skills and attributes that<br />

proved to be essential in operations in Afghanistan over the<br />

last 15 years. We should expect similar intangible benefits and<br />

training offset from soldiers conducting activities that are new<br />

to them in regions they do not know well today.<br />

Some of the more common criticisms of the RAF concept are<br />

related to its definition and why it’s important. Since its inception,<br />

RAF has meant different things to different people: a new<br />

focus on building partner capacity, to some soldiers; predictable<br />

availability of troops, to geographic combatant commands; per-<br />

February 2016 ■ ARMY 33

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