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The Magazine of the Association of the United States <strong>Army</strong><br />
ARMY<br />
February 2016 www.ausa.org $3.00<br />
<strong>Kicking</strong> <strong>Tires</strong><br />
<strong>On</strong> the JLTV<br />
Winning When It’s<br />
Not War We Want Page 12<br />
Our Ethical Climate<br />
Needs Measuring Page 29
ARMY<br />
The Magazine of the Association of the United States <strong>Army</strong><br />
February 2016 www.ausa.org Vol. 66, No. 2<br />
DEPARTMENTS<br />
ON THE COVER<br />
LETTERS....................................................3<br />
SEVEN QUESTIONS ..................................5<br />
WASHINGTON REPORT ...........................6<br />
NEWS CALL..............................................7<br />
FRONT & CENTER<br />
Readiness and Capability<br />
Are Intertwined<br />
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.<br />
Page 11<br />
Winning the War We’ve Got,<br />
Not the <strong>On</strong>e We Want<br />
By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.<br />
Page 12<br />
Yep, Those Were the Good Old<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Days<br />
By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret.<br />
Page 14<br />
FEATURES<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Women: Highlights<br />
With the announcement lifting gender<br />
restrictions on all military jobs, we take a<br />
pictorial look at the role of female soldiers<br />
throughout U.S. history. Page 18<br />
Cyber Capabilities Key to<br />
Future Dominance<br />
By Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon<br />
Unlike the other domains, cyberspace is<br />
continuously evolving and adapting along<br />
with each entrepreneur, inventor and actor<br />
using it. To retain dominance, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
must keep up with this evolution. Page 22<br />
Muscle for an Uncertain World:<br />
Performance, Payload and<br />
Comfy Seats<br />
Stories by Scott R. Gourley<br />
The latest generation of Joint Light<br />
Tactical Vehicles has moved well<br />
beyond the traditional role of <strong>Army</strong><br />
trucks and into the realm of what can<br />
be described as “muscle trucks.”<br />
Page 36<br />
Cover Photo: The independent suspension<br />
system in the Joint Light Tactical<br />
Vehicle allows it to traverse the toughest<br />
terrains.<br />
Oshkosh Corp.<br />
18<br />
14<br />
HE’S THE ARMY......................................17<br />
THE OUTPOST........................................57<br />
SUSTAINING MEMBER PROFILE...........60<br />
SOLDIER ARMED....................................61<br />
HISTORICALLY SPEAKING.....................63<br />
REVIEWS.................................................65<br />
FINAL SHOT ...........................................72<br />
22<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 1
Fighting for Relevancy in the Gray Zone By Maj. David B. Rowland<br />
Successfully responding to conflicts that exist between normal international<br />
competition and open conflict requires the <strong>Army</strong>’s conventional forces to alter<br />
training mentality and methodology. Page 26<br />
Curtain’s Always Rising<br />
For Theater <strong>Army</strong><br />
By Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, USA Ret.<br />
Recent events provide a vehicle for<br />
exploring the versatility of the theater<br />
<strong>Army</strong> in a manner far more dynamic than<br />
its equally important role as an <strong>Army</strong><br />
service component command. Page 49<br />
49<br />
It’s Time to Establish<br />
Ethics-Related Metrics<br />
By Col. Charles D. Allen, USA Ret.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> needs to construct a way to<br />
measure the character of its leaders and<br />
ethics within the profession of arms to<br />
ensure we are “getting it right.” Page 29<br />
Creativity Could Boost<br />
Regionally Aligned Forces Concept<br />
By Col. Allen J. Pepper<br />
<strong>Army</strong> leadership’s vision involves a force<br />
that is globally responsive and regionally<br />
engaged. An important aspect of turning<br />
this vision into reality is the concept of<br />
regionally aligned forces. Page 32<br />
40<br />
Creative Answers for Sagging Morale<br />
By Capt. Robert C. Sprague<br />
<strong>On</strong>e of the most critical ideas to foster<br />
within an organization is innovation;<br />
without it, soldiers are doomed to repeat<br />
the same errors indefinitely. Page 43<br />
The Evolving Art of Training<br />
Management<br />
By Col. David M. Hodne and Maj. Joe Byerly<br />
An evolution in training management is<br />
reflected in current <strong>Army</strong> doctrine and is<br />
fueled by the hard-earned combat<br />
experience of leaders across the <strong>Army</strong>, new<br />
digital training tools, and an institutional<br />
resurgence in Mission Command. Page 45<br />
Birth Era May Factor in Risk<br />
of Suicide<br />
By Col. James Griffith, ARNG Ret.,<br />
and Craig Bryan<br />
The marked increase in soldier suicides may<br />
not be related to deployment, combat<br />
participation or an overall high operating<br />
tempo but instead, an indication of a<br />
broader trend of increased vulnerability<br />
among more recent generations of young<br />
adults. Page 53<br />
53<br />
Deep Roots of the <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
Dental Corps<br />
By Daniel J. Demers<br />
From its inception in 1901 after Spanish-<br />
American War veterans experienced<br />
extraordinary dental problems, the U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Dental Corps has grown in size, skill<br />
and influence. Page 40<br />
45<br />
2 ARMY ■ February 2016
Letters<br />
Good Mentoring Makes<br />
Good Memories<br />
■ I was delighted to see the article by<br />
retired Maj. Wayne Heard in the December<br />
issue, “Mentoring Stands Test of<br />
Time,” about Col. Robert L. Jackson.<br />
Jackson was a great man, and I owe much<br />
to him. I worked for him when he was<br />
the deputy chief of staff for operations of<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Pacific. His counsel, coaching<br />
and friendship helped me through some<br />
very challenging times. Kudos to Heard.<br />
Col. Lawrence E. Casper, USA Ret.<br />
Oro Valley, Ariz.<br />
AUSA FAX NUMBERS<br />
ARMY magazine welcomes letters to<br />
the editor. Short letters are more<br />
likely to be published, and all letters<br />
may be edited for reasons of style,<br />
accuracy or space limitations. Letters<br />
should be exclusive to ARMY magazine.<br />
All letters must include the<br />
writer’s full name, address and daytime<br />
telephone num ber. The volume<br />
of letters we receive makes individual<br />
acknowledgment impossible. Please<br />
send letters to The Editor, ARMY magazine,<br />
AUSA, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington,<br />
VA 22201. Letters may also<br />
be faxed to 703- 841-3505 or sent via<br />
email to armymag@ausa.org.<br />
Share Battle of Ganjgal Lessons<br />
■ Another excellent essay by retired<br />
Col. Richard D. Hooker Jr. (“‘Ride to<br />
the Sound of the Guns,’” September).<br />
How does ARMY magazine keep finding<br />
great writers, decade after decade?<br />
But I request a follow-up article on<br />
why so many leaders did not provide<br />
support to the warriors in battle that<br />
day. Why was it necessary for “the <strong>Army</strong><br />
[to act] swiftly to fix responsibility after<br />
the battle, issuing career-ending reprimands<br />
to key leaders judged to have been<br />
at fault”?<br />
We read, for example: “Meanwhile,<br />
the battalion commander [of a unit that<br />
had been radioed for fire support] remained<br />
in his office.” But it seems implausible<br />
for one who has risen to that<br />
position and rank to intentionally repudiate<br />
responsibility.<br />
Had he just returned from an exhausting<br />
patrol and fallen asleep at his desk?<br />
Was he talking to his family back home?<br />
Had he even been made aware of the situation<br />
on the ground? If so, he was not<br />
alone in dereliction of duty. What was<br />
going on that so many did not rush to<br />
help comrades in peril?<br />
In Paul Harvey’s words, give us “the<br />
rest of the story.” Otherwise, we learn<br />
what happened but not why it happened.<br />
Hooker tells us, “<strong>Army</strong> leaders worked<br />
hard to circulate lessons learned and today,<br />
those lessons are taught throughout<br />
our service.” Please share the lessons<br />
with those of us no longer in uniform.<br />
Chief Warrant Officer 5 Steve Kohn,<br />
USA Ret.<br />
San Antonio<br />
Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, USA Ret.<br />
President and CEO, AUSA<br />
Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, USA Ret.<br />
Vice President, Education, AUSA<br />
Rick Maze<br />
Editor-in-Chief<br />
Liz Rathbun Managing Editor<br />
Joseph L. Broderick Art Director<br />
Ferdinand H. Thomas II Sr. Staff Writer<br />
Toni Eugene<br />
Associate Editor<br />
Christopher Wright Production Artist<br />
Laura Stassi Assistant Managing Editor<br />
Thomas B. Spincic Assistant Editor<br />
Jennifer Benitz<br />
Staff Writer<br />
Contributing Editors<br />
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.;<br />
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.; Lt.<br />
Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret.; and<br />
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret.<br />
Contributing Writers<br />
Scott R. Gourley and Rebecca Alwine<br />
Lt. Gen. Jerry L. Sinn, USA Ret.<br />
Vice President, Finance and<br />
Administration, AUSA<br />
Desiree Hurlocker<br />
Advertising Production and<br />
Fulfillment Manager<br />
ARMY is a professional journal devoted to the advancement<br />
of the military arts and sciences and representing the in terests<br />
of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>. Copyright©2016, by the Association of<br />
the United States <strong>Army</strong>. ■ ARTICLES appearing in<br />
ARMY do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the officers or<br />
members of the Council of Trustees of AUSA, or its editors.<br />
Articles are expressions of personal opin ion and should not<br />
be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion of the Department<br />
of Defense nor of any branch, command, installation<br />
or agency of the Department of Defense. The magazine<br />
assumes no responsibility for any unsolicited material.<br />
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Association of the United States <strong>Army</strong>, makes any representations,<br />
warranties or endorsements as to the truth and accuracy<br />
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representations, warranties or endorsements should be implied<br />
or inferred from the appearance of the advertisements<br />
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for the contents of such advertisements. ■<br />
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February 2016 ■ ARMY 3
Seven Questions<br />
For Female Veterans in Texas, There’s H.O.P.E.<br />
Retired <strong>Army</strong> Lt. Col. Hope Jackson is the founder of H.O.P.E.<br />
Institute, a Texas-based nonprofit organization dedicated to helping<br />
homeless female veterans become self-sufficient and independent by<br />
offering housing, education and other services. The acronym stands<br />
for healing, optimizing, perfecting and empowering.<br />
1. Why did you create H.O.P.E. Institute?<br />
I was about 20 years into my career when I got to Fort Bliss in<br />
2006. I was ready to retire here. It struck<br />
my spirit—that here we are next to one of<br />
the largest and fastest-growing military<br />
installations in the world, and there’s<br />
nothing for [homeless] female veterans. I<br />
purchased a home to house homeless female<br />
veterans. That’s how H.O.P.E. Institute<br />
was born. We received 501(c)(3)<br />
status in June 2012.<br />
2. What is H.O.P.E. Institute’s mission?<br />
Our focus is homeless female veterans.<br />
Of the nearly 22 million veterans in this<br />
country, around 2.1 million are women.<br />
Of that population, almost 5 percent are<br />
homeless. What you have to keep in mind<br />
is, that only accounts for the female veterans<br />
who identify as homeless, because<br />
there are still some out there who we don’t<br />
know about yet.<br />
Something’s wrong with that picture.<br />
Retired Lt. Col. Hope Jackson<br />
That could have been any of us given different<br />
circumstances, maybe different<br />
choices, maybe different exposures. So the focus today is to<br />
serve those who gave of themselves so selflessly and now can’t<br />
find a place to call home. Those numbers, this situation, isn’t<br />
going to go away because women are still raising their right<br />
hand to serve and defend.<br />
3. What services does the institute provide?<br />
Every veteran’s needs will be different. When a woman<br />
comes in, she and I will sit down and put together what I call<br />
an individual development plan, which is really her road map<br />
for success. I want the resident to identify what she defines as<br />
success. When she tells me what she wants to do in the next<br />
phase of her life, then we will put together a road map to get<br />
her from where she is to where she deserves to be. It is a selfgoverning<br />
program.<br />
The first 30 days is an acclimation period. There are not going<br />
to be any passes. We are going to go through everything in<br />
terms of their finances, to see if they’re getting all of the benefits<br />
that they are entitled to. We have a job placement program in<br />
place. We’re partners with an organization that has an online<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Adam Garlington<br />
platform for higher education that caters to the military. Any<br />
woman coming into the program will get her education through<br />
this organization for free.<br />
<strong>On</strong>e thing that is critically important to understand is that<br />
this isn’t a place where these ladies can come in, go back out,<br />
and continue along the same path that they were on before they<br />
came in. This is a place that is about changing lives. They just<br />
lack the resources, the mentorship and the leadership to help<br />
them make that transition.<br />
4. Are there specific qualifications for<br />
these services?<br />
Yes. First, they must be a veteran. In order<br />
to prove that, I just need a DD-214<br />
[certificate of release or discharge from active<br />
duty] and a VA identification card. It<br />
doesn’t matter their discharge status because<br />
this is a no-judgment zone. We take<br />
you how you come. If you are willing to<br />
work hard to get back on your feet, to have<br />
a life you’ve chosen and your version of the<br />
American dream, we’re here to help.<br />
5. How is the institute funded?<br />
I give presentations around the city to<br />
social and civic organizations and as a result,<br />
many of those groups make donations<br />
to the institute. Citizens in the community<br />
sometimes make small donations, and the<br />
rest comes from me.<br />
6. What does H.O.P.E. Institute need<br />
to continue?<br />
Funding, funding, funding is what we need to run a facility like<br />
this. This is a home, just like you and I live in. My military training<br />
has taught me that the smaller the group, the larger the<br />
chance for success. This is a four-bedroom home that has been<br />
completely renovated. Each room houses two women, so we are<br />
working with groups of six to eight women. It takes resources to<br />
provide food, keep the lights on, pay the water bill. We’re looking<br />
at anywhere from $9,000 to $10,000 a month to keep the house<br />
operational. So that’s how people can help. They can go to our<br />
website at www.theinstituteofhope.org and make donations.<br />
7. What do you hope the institute will accomplish in the future?<br />
The flagpole is here in El Paso, Texas, but the needs of female<br />
veterans are expanding around the entire country. I see<br />
H.O.P.E. Institute being a household name over the next five to<br />
10 years. Anywhere that there’s a large population of female veterans<br />
combined with a military installation, H.O.P.E. Institute<br />
will have a footprint. We are here to change lives, one duty station<br />
at a time.<br />
—Jennifer Benitz<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 5
Washington Report<br />
Congress Urged to Approve More Base Closings<br />
An <strong>Army</strong> that has readiness as its top priority cannot afford<br />
to waste money maintaining excess infrastructure, a panel of<br />
<strong>Army</strong> installation officials has warned Congress.<br />
In a renewed plea for Congress to approve another round of<br />
base closings, Lt. Gen. David D. Halverson, commanding<br />
general, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Installation Management Command, and<br />
assistant chief of staff for installation management, said the<br />
estimated $480 million a year spent maintaining unneeded facilities<br />
would be better spent on training and readiness of<br />
troops or on addressing deferred maintenance and upkeep of<br />
facilities that are needed.<br />
“Fiscal realities are showing in the decline in our facilities,<br />
and it is affecting our future readiness,” Halverson told a<br />
House Armed Services Committee panel in early December.<br />
Having that half-billion dollars from excess bases for other<br />
purposes would help the <strong>Army</strong>, he said. “That would buy a<br />
lot of readiness, and it would also focus our efforts that we<br />
need for investment purposes.” He listed improvements in<br />
ranges as one of the top readiness priorities.<br />
“Persistent funding constraints and the cumulative rising<br />
costs of energy, construction, water and engineering services<br />
have forced the <strong>Army</strong> to take risks in installations to maintain<br />
the ready force,” Halverson said.<br />
The withdrawal of significant combat forces from overseas<br />
has an impact on domestic bases, he said. “We never had the<br />
full force at home station at the same time,” he said. Having<br />
everyone home and in need of postwar training to restore<br />
readiness has led to complications, such as scheduling time on<br />
ranges. With increased demand, planning is more complicated.<br />
With tight funding, training rotations are sometimes<br />
taking longer, making scheduling even more difficult, he said.<br />
Col. Andrew Cole Jr., garrison commander at Fort Riley,<br />
Kan., said <strong>Army</strong> posts are suffering from years of underfunding,<br />
having to pay for standard maintenance versus restoration<br />
and modernization. “We make choices, and we make some decisions,”<br />
he said. “Ultimately, if there is a catastrophic failure,<br />
then we have to end up allocating our funding against that.”<br />
An example, he said, was a leak in the heating and cooling<br />
system of a historic building that likely was the result of not<br />
spending money on adequate preventive checks. The leak<br />
caused significant damage over three floors of the building.<br />
Halverson said the <strong>Army</strong> is filled with other examples, like<br />
how problems with air conditioning in hot locations can lead<br />
to mold and health issues.<br />
Congress is not ready to accept additional base closings and<br />
has flatly denied spending any Pentagon money for planning<br />
closures. However, the 2016 National Defense Authorization<br />
Act includes a provision calling on DoD and the services to submit<br />
a 2017 comprehensive inventory of worldwide installations,<br />
looking at current and future needs. They want to see a 20-year<br />
force structure plan to avoid shutting down bases that might be<br />
excess today but could be needed in the future. Additionally, the<br />
Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of<br />
Congress, is working on a report about excess infrastructure,<br />
with the intention of assessing the value of keeping more posts<br />
and installations than needed to provide surge capacity.<br />
Funding Bill Includes $122 Billion for <strong>Army</strong><br />
The battle over the fiscal year 2016 budget concluded with<br />
an elusive compromise after President Barack Obama on<br />
Dec. 18 signed into law a $1.1 trillion spending bill that included<br />
$514 billion in basic defense spending plus $59 billion<br />
for overseas contingency operations, a $26 billion increase<br />
over the fiscal year 2015 budget.<br />
The Pentagon, White House and Congress will get to do<br />
the whole thing all over again for FY 2017, which begins Oct.<br />
1, 2016. Passing a 2017 budget will be even more complicated<br />
because it is a presidential election year, when politicians<br />
find it difficult to reach any compromise.<br />
The spending levels in the FY 2016 Omnibus Appropriations<br />
Act match a bipartisan agreement made in October. The<br />
measure, combining discretionary spending for all federal agencies<br />
into one bill, was the last significant piece of legislation<br />
Congress had to pass in 2015 before going home for the year.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong>’s share of the budget is about $122 billion, excluding<br />
money for contingency operations. The FY 2017<br />
<strong>Army</strong> budget is expected to be only 2.2 percent larger.<br />
The agreement includes $129 billion for military personnel,<br />
a $1.2 billion increase over FY 2015. Operations and<br />
maintenance spending increase by $5.8 billion, to $167.5 billion<br />
for FY 2016. There are large increases for procurement<br />
and research programs. Procurement spending is $110 billion<br />
for 2016, a $17 billion increase over the 2015 budget. Funding<br />
of research and development programs is $69.8 billion for<br />
FY 2016, a $6.1 billion increase.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong>’s share is $53.5 billion for active, National<br />
Guard and <strong>Army</strong> Reserve personnel; and $41.7 billion in the<br />
base budget for operations and maintenance. For procurement,<br />
the compromise gives the <strong>Army</strong> $5.9 billion for aircraft,<br />
$1.9 billion for tracked vehicles, $1.6 billion for missiles,<br />
$1.2 billion for ammunition, and $5.7 billion for other<br />
procurement. The <strong>Army</strong> also receives $7.5 billion for research,<br />
development, test and evaluation; and $1.5 billion for<br />
military construction and family housing.<br />
6 ARMY ■ February 2016
News Call<br />
Animal-Assisted Therapy Can Help With PTSD<br />
Animal-assisted therapy is offering<br />
an alternative or supplement to the<br />
cognitive processing and prolonged exposure<br />
therapies currently in use to<br />
help military veterans who suffer from<br />
nightmares, depression and other effects<br />
of post-traumatic stress disorder.<br />
The trauma-focused talk therapies have<br />
been known to help, but as a study recently<br />
published in the Journal of the<br />
American Medical Association notes, “nonresponse<br />
rates have been high.” Some<br />
PTSD patients, for example, find the<br />
therapy so upsetting that they drop out.<br />
Dogs have served soldiers for decades<br />
and have proven helpful in easing PTSD.<br />
Horses have helped, too. Brooke <strong>Army</strong><br />
Medical Center in San Antonio offers<br />
equine-assisted therapy. So do VA facilities<br />
in Bedford, Mass., and Albany,<br />
N.Y. In 2010, retired Lt. Col. Bridget<br />
Kroger founded her own organization.<br />
After equine therapy helped her recover<br />
from PTSD, the 24-year <strong>Army</strong> veteran,<br />
who served two tours in Iraq, established<br />
the Wounded Warrior Equestrian<br />
Program to help riding facilities<br />
and horse-rescue farms provide services<br />
to service members and veterans around<br />
the country.<br />
Patrick Bradley, a Vietnam veteran<br />
who suffered from PTSD, recognized<br />
the symptoms when his son Skyler left<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> after more than a decade in<br />
uniform and multiple tours in Iraq and<br />
Afghanistan. Bradley, director of the<br />
raptor program at a Florida nature park,<br />
persuaded his son to visit him at work.<br />
Skyler Bradley found peace among the<br />
wounded birds of prey and soon was<br />
spending a lot of time at the park. He<br />
also began training the birds.<br />
Together, the Bradleys established the<br />
Avian Veteran Alliance and have teamed<br />
with the local VA center where Skyler<br />
was once a patient. Veterans visit the<br />
park twice a week to work with wounded<br />
raptors, and Patrick Bradley takes the<br />
birds to the VA center each month.<br />
Matthew Simmons, who served in<br />
Operations Desert Storm and Desert<br />
Shield, directs operations at the Serenity<br />
Park Parrot Sanctuary on the West Los<br />
Angeles VA campus. His wife, clinical<br />
psychologist Lorin Lindner, founded the<br />
park in 2005. It adopts sick, wounded<br />
and abandoned parrots and lets wounded<br />
warriors care for and establish relationships<br />
with them.<br />
Simmons and Lindner also established<br />
the Lockwood Animal Rescue Center<br />
north of Los Angeles in 2011. It shelters<br />
and rehabilitates wolves and wolf dogs<br />
from around the U.S. and pairs them<br />
with veterans who suffer from PTSD.<br />
Research has shown that touching an<br />
animal can lower blood pressure, relieve<br />
stress and reduce anxiety. As veterans<br />
work with and care for the animals, they<br />
build confidence and self-esteem as well<br />
as accept responsibility.<br />
—Toni Eugene<br />
Staff Sgt. Cedric Richardson rides Gary the horse at the Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston<br />
Equestrian Center. Riding is part of the Soldier Adaptive Reconditioning Program at Brooke <strong>Army</strong><br />
Medical Center.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Warns: Be Vigilant Against <strong>On</strong>line Scams<br />
This Valentine’s Day, you might be<br />
someone’s sweetheart and not even know<br />
it. That’s because imposter accounts online<br />
have proliferated. No one is immune;<br />
as Gen. John F. Campbell, commander<br />
of Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-<br />
Afghanistan, posted on his official Facebook<br />
page about this time last year: “The<br />
intent of this page is to inform readers<br />
about activities here in Afghanistan. Unfortunately,<br />
there are individuals who<br />
copy the photos and comments from this<br />
page and create fake pages using my<br />
name to find romance and/or try to scam<br />
people out of money.”<br />
The post also noted that in the six<br />
months prior, more than 700 fake sites in<br />
Campbell’s name had been identified.<br />
The U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Criminal Investigation<br />
Command has already warned people<br />
involved in online dating to “proceed<br />
with caution when corresponding with<br />
persons claiming to be U.S. soldiers currently<br />
serving in Afghanistan or elsewhere.”<br />
In addition, the <strong>Army</strong> recently<br />
released a tip sheet for soldiers to reduce<br />
the chances that their names and images<br />
will be appropriated by scammers.<br />
“Imposter Accounts, Romance Scams,<br />
and Unofficial Sites” suggests soldiers<br />
take the following steps to reduce their<br />
vulnerability:<br />
■ Conduct routine searches on social<br />
media platforms for your name; public<br />
affairs professionals should also search<br />
for the names of senior leaders they rep-<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Lori Newman<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 7
esent. Be sure to search using similar<br />
spellings; imposters often use these to<br />
remain undetected.<br />
■ Set up a Google alert (www.google.<br />
com/alerts) for your name and the names<br />
of leaders you represent in an official capacity.<br />
This notification service sends<br />
emails when it finds new results—including<br />
web pages and blogs—that match<br />
the given search terms.<br />
■ Ensure privacy settings are set to<br />
the highest available for professional as<br />
well as personal accounts.<br />
The tip sheet warns that it can be difficult<br />
to remove fake accounts without<br />
proof of identity theft or scam. It also offers<br />
links for reporting imposters on Facebook,<br />
Twitter and Instagram: www.<br />
facebook.com/help/17421051939,<br />
https://support.twitter.com/forms/<br />
impersonation and https://help.instagram.<br />
com/contact/636276399721841.<br />
For more information about identifying<br />
and reporting fake accounts on social<br />
media or dating sites, go to www.army.mil/<br />
media/socialmedia.<br />
New Undersecretary Utilizing<br />
His Service in <strong>Army</strong>, Congress<br />
The new undersecretary of the <strong>Army</strong><br />
said he believes his experiences as an<br />
Iraq War veteran and member of Congress<br />
will help him in the job.<br />
Patrick Murphy, a former <strong>Army</strong> captain<br />
and staff judge advocate, spent eight<br />
years in uniform. He deployed to Bosnia<br />
in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, and also served<br />
as a constitutional law professor at the<br />
U.S. Military Academy. The 42-year-old<br />
served two terms in the U.S. House representing<br />
Pennsylvania’s 8th District.<br />
Murphy was confirmed by the Senate<br />
in a voice vote on Dec. 18, a few days after<br />
appearing before the Senate Armed<br />
Services Committee alongside the nominees<br />
for Air Force and Navy undersecretaries.<br />
Murphy told the committee<br />
that if he were confirmed for the post<br />
that makes him the <strong>Army</strong>’s chief management<br />
officer, he would engage in a<br />
top-to-bottom review looking for “efficiencies<br />
within the organization so we<br />
can refocus on those warfighters who are<br />
keeping our families safe.”<br />
“I will make sure that the <strong>Army</strong> is<br />
manned, trained and equipped to accomplish<br />
what [<strong>Army</strong> Chief of Staff]<br />
Gen. [Mark A.] Milley recently articu-<br />
SoldierSpeak<br />
<strong>On</strong> Helmets<br />
“Until I took this job, I had no idea what went into making this equipment, and it’s<br />
been eye-opening,” said Col. Dean M. Hoffman IV of Program Executive Office-<br />
Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Va. “Every helmet is tested probably 67 times. We take<br />
each lot that comes off the production line. We keep some, and we put them in extreme<br />
cold, hot; and constantly every year, we’re pulling them off the shelf and<br />
retesting them to make sure they’re the best.”<br />
<strong>On</strong> Clearing Drop Zones<br />
“The bittersweet is my personal archenemy,” said Ben Amos, Integrated Training<br />
Area Management coordinator at Fort Devens, Mass., about the Oriental Bittersweet,<br />
an invasive species. “It’s a very rapidly growing vine that chokes out trees. It<br />
spreads like wildfire. Not only are you going to begin losing trees, which impacts<br />
the habitat, but you have dead trees falling into landing zones, dead branches<br />
falling onto people trying to train, and just basic maneuver impacts.”<br />
<strong>On</strong> A Female Soldier’s Worth<br />
“Female military members’ remarkable service in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that<br />
no military can achieve its full potential without utilizing the talents and abilities of<br />
its female citizens,” said Maj. Gen. David S. Baldwin, adjutant general of the California<br />
<strong>Army</strong> National Guard, before meeting with state legislators and Guard<br />
leaders to discuss the opening of all military occupations to women. “Rescinding all<br />
combat restrictions was more than a move toward equality, but a tactical advancement<br />
as well.”<br />
<strong>On</strong> Fighting Spirit<br />
“If you can’t fight and win, then I don’t want you on the team,” said Sgt. 1st Class<br />
Matt Torres of Fort Bragg, N.C., during a leadership seminar at Fort Leavenworth,<br />
Kan. He worries some NCOs have become stagnant in their careers and are willing to<br />
“sit back and chill” while waiting for retirement.<br />
<strong>On</strong> Turkey Jerky<br />
“To see soldiers eat and like something that you have developed, and see that it<br />
improves their morale and helps them perform their mission better—I think that is<br />
the most fulfilling my job as a researcher can get,” said Dr. Tom Yang, a food<br />
technologist at the Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering<br />
Center’s Combat Feeding Directorate in Massachusetts. He helped develop<br />
turkey jerky and turkey bacon for soldiers, using inexpensive technology and creating<br />
food that “has much less salt and stays moist.”<br />
<strong>On</strong> Mama Bears<br />
“If you thought the enemy was bad in Afghanistan, wait until my mother finds out<br />
you’re sending me to Texas,” said medically retired Capt. Florent “Flo” Groberg,<br />
recalling when <strong>Army</strong> officials said they might send him to San Antonio Military<br />
Medical Center to recover from severe injuries after he thwarted a suicide bomber<br />
in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in 2012. Groberg, who earned the Medal of Honor<br />
for his actions, wound up at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, near his<br />
family’s home in Maryland. He spent almost three years recovering.<br />
<strong>On</strong> Giving Back<br />
“If we get wings, it’s an extra bonus,” said Staff Sgt. Micheal Tkachenko of the<br />
65th Military Police Company, Fort Bragg, N.C. “But it’s more or less about just<br />
being able to participate and give back.” Tkachenko waited in line about 26 hours<br />
to donate a toy and be first to win a chance to jump with a partner-nation jumpmaster<br />
and earn foreign jump wings, in the 18th annual Randy Oler Memorial Operation<br />
Toy Drop. Since inception, the toy drop has collected more than 100,000<br />
toys for underprivileged children.<br />
8 ARMY ■ February 2016
COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR and SERGEANTS MAJOR CHANGES*<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. J.A. Castillo<br />
from 19th ESC,<br />
Camp Henry, Korea,<br />
to ACC, RA, Ala.<br />
Sgt. Maj. R.J.<br />
Dore from USA<br />
Adjutant General<br />
Sgt. Maj., Fort<br />
Knox, Ky., to<br />
Forces Cmd. G-1,<br />
Fort Bragg, N.C.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. E.C. Dostie<br />
from USARJ and I<br />
Corps (Forward),<br />
Camp Zama, Japan,<br />
to ARCENT, Shaw<br />
AFB, S.C.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. C.A. Fagan<br />
from 101st Airborne<br />
Div. Artillery<br />
(Air Assault), Fort<br />
Campbell, Ky., to<br />
FCoE, Fort Sill, Okla.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. M.A. Ferrusi<br />
from 3rd Bde., 10th<br />
Mountain Div., Fort<br />
Polk, La., to USARAK,<br />
JB Elmendorf-<br />
Richardson, Alaska.<br />
Sgt. Maj. D. Gibbs<br />
from HQ, USASOC,<br />
Fort Bragg, to<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj., USAJFKSWCS,<br />
Fort Bragg.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. R.B. Manis<br />
from 205th Infantry<br />
Bde., Camp Atterbury,<br />
Ind., to First<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Division East,<br />
Fort Knox.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. D.L. Pinion<br />
from 3rd Squadron,<br />
1st U.S. Cavalry Rgt.,<br />
Fort Benning, Ga., to<br />
Sgt. Maj., USAREUR<br />
G-3, Wiesbaden,<br />
Germany.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. R.J. Rhoades<br />
from 21st TSC,<br />
Kaiserslautern,<br />
Germany, to<br />
Sgt. Maj., ACSIM,<br />
Washington, D.C.<br />
Command Sgt. Maj.<br />
A.T. Stoneburg<br />
from RRS to USAREC,<br />
Fort Knox.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. M.A. Torres<br />
from 1st MEB, Fort<br />
Polk, to 13th SC (E),<br />
Fort Hood, Texas.<br />
Command Sgt.<br />
Maj. R.F. Watson<br />
from Fort Belvoir<br />
Community<br />
Hospital, Fort<br />
Belvoir, Va., to<br />
PRMC, Honolulu.<br />
■ ACC—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Contracting Cmd.; ACSIM—<strong>Army</strong> Chief of Staff Installation Management Cmd.; AFB—Air Force Base; ARCENT—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central; Bde.—Brigade;<br />
ESC—Expeditionary Sustainment Cmd.; FCoE—Fires Center of Excellence; HQ—Headquarters; JB—Joint Base; MEB—Maneuver Enhancement Bde.; PRMC—Pacific Regional<br />
Medical Cmd.; RA—Redstone Arsenal; Rgt.—Regiment; RRS—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Recruiting and Retention School; SC (E)—Sustainment Cmd. (Expeditionary); TSC—Theater<br />
Sustainment Cmd.; USA—U.S. <strong>Army</strong>; USAJFKSWCS—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School; USARAK—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Alaska; USAREC—U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Recruiting Cmd.; USAREUR—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Europe; USARJ—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Japan; USASOC—U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Special Operations Cmd.<br />
*Command sergeants major and sergeants major positions assigned to general officer commands.<br />
U.S. House of Representatives<br />
Patrick Murphy<br />
lated as his fundamental task: to win in<br />
the unforgiving crucible of ground combat,”<br />
he said. “And I’ll make sure that<br />
our troops do not have a fair fight, that<br />
they have a tactical and technical advantage<br />
against our enemies.”<br />
Murphy told the committee that when<br />
he left Congress five years ago, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
had “45 brigade combat teams on active<br />
duty. We are now down to 31.”<br />
Resources are another concern, he<br />
said, noting the tradeoff the <strong>Army</strong> is<br />
making in slowing modernization to<br />
pay for readiness.<br />
Neera Tanden, president of the Center<br />
for American Progress, said “the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> and the nation are lucky” to have<br />
Murphy confirmed. The former senior<br />
fellow “contributed greatly to our work<br />
by leading on issues that affect 21st-century<br />
fighters, and he will no doubt do<br />
the same for the <strong>Army</strong>,” Tanden said.<br />
Briefs<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Takes Over as Chair of<br />
Conference of American Armies<br />
This month, the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> becomes<br />
chairman of the Conference of American<br />
Armies, a group of 20 member armies,<br />
five observer armies and two international<br />
military organizations from Central,<br />
South and North America that have<br />
met since 1960 to exchange defense ideas<br />
and plan conferences and exercises.<br />
The chairmanship rotates every two<br />
GENERAL<br />
OFFICER<br />
*CHANGES*<br />
Maj. Gen. J.<br />
Caravalho Jr. from<br />
Dep. Surgeon Gen.<br />
and Dep. CG (Spt.),<br />
MEDCOM, Falls<br />
Church, Va., to Jt.<br />
Staff Surgeon, Jt.<br />
Staff, Washington,<br />
D.C.<br />
Brigadier Generals: R.J. Place from Asst. Surgeon<br />
Gen. for Quality and Safety (P), OSG, and Dep. CoS,<br />
Quality and Safety (P), MEDCOM, Washington, D.C.,<br />
to CG, RHC-A (P), Fort Belvoir, Va.; R.D. Tenhet<br />
from CG, RHC-A (P), Fort Belvoir, to Dep. Surgeon<br />
Gen. and Dep. CG (Spt.), MEDCOM, Falls Church.<br />
■ CoS—Chief of Staff; Jt.—Joint; MEDCOM—U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Medical Cmd.; OSG—Office of the Surgeon<br />
General; (P)—Provisional; RHC-A—Regional Health<br />
Cmd.-Atlantic; Spt. —Support.<br />
*Assignments to general officer slots announced by<br />
the General Officer Management Office, Department<br />
of the <strong>Army</strong>. Some officers are listed at the<br />
grade to which they are nominated, promotable or<br />
eligible to be frocked. The reporting dates for some<br />
officers may not yet be determined.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 9
West Named <strong>Army</strong> Surgeon General<br />
Maj. Gen. Nadja West is sworn in as the <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
44th surgeon general and commanding general<br />
of U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Medical Command by acting<br />
Secretary of the <strong>Army</strong> Eric Fanning. As part of<br />
her new assignment, West will be promoted to<br />
lieutenant general, the first African-American<br />
woman in the <strong>Army</strong> to hold the rank. She succeeds<br />
Lt. Gen. Patricia D. Horoho, who retired.<br />
years; this is first time in 24 years that it<br />
has fallen to the U.S.<br />
“Our cooperation over the past 55<br />
years has promoted regional security and<br />
the democratic development of our<br />
member countries,” <strong>Army</strong> Chief of Staff<br />
Gen. Mark A. Milley said at the closing<br />
of the group’s 2015 conference in Colombia.<br />
It “provides our armies the opportunity<br />
to increase cooperation and<br />
integration … and, most importantly,<br />
identify the topics of mutual interest in<br />
defense-related matters to develop solutions<br />
that are beneficial to us all.”<br />
DoD: Security in Afghanistan<br />
Deteriorated Last Half of ’15<br />
DoD has acknowledged in a recent<br />
report, “Enhancing Security and Stability<br />
in Afghanistan,” that “the overall security<br />
situation in Afghanistan deteriorated”<br />
in the second half of 2015, “with<br />
an increase in effective insurgent attacks<br />
and higher ANDSF [Afghan National<br />
Defense and Security Forces] and Taliban<br />
casualties.” The report, the second<br />
mandated by Congress in the National<br />
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal<br />
Year 2015, covers the period from June<br />
1 through Nov. 30.<br />
“Fighting has been nearly continuous<br />
since February 2015,” the report says.<br />
SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE<br />
ANNOUNCEMENTS<br />
R. Kazimer, Tier 2, from<br />
Dir., Corporate Info., CIO,<br />
USACE, Washington, D.C.,<br />
to Dep. to the CG, CCoE,<br />
TRADOC, Fort Gordon, Ga.<br />
Tier 1: L. Swan to Dep. Dir., Rapid Capability<br />
Delivery, JIDA, Washington, D.C.<br />
■ CIO—Chief Information Officer; CCoE—<br />
Cyber Ctr. of Excellence; JIDA—Joint Improvised-<br />
Threat Defeat Agency; TRADOC—U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Training and Doctrine Cmd.; USACE—U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Corps of Engineers.<br />
The ANDSF are now capable of clearing<br />
areas of insurgents, but their ability<br />
“to hold areas after initial clearing operations<br />
is uneven [and] they remain<br />
reluctant to pursue the Taliban into<br />
their traditional safe havens.”<br />
In the six-month reporting period, 12<br />
U.S. service members were killed in<br />
Afghanistan, and 40 were wounded in<br />
action. Insider attacks are still a threat,<br />
although the number continues to decline.<br />
Terrorist and insurgent groups—<br />
particularly al-Qaida—and the possible<br />
expansion of extremist groups such as<br />
the Islamic State are threats to progress<br />
as well as security.<br />
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, now<br />
numbering nearly 10,000, are expected<br />
to remain through most of 2016.<br />
Summit Links Soldier<br />
Readiness To Sleep<br />
Fatigue can lead to mistakes, and the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> has begun to focus on the importance<br />
of adequate and quality sleep to<br />
soldiers’ performance.<br />
Staff Sgt. Jacob Miller, 2015 Drill<br />
Sergeant of the Year, told attendees at a<br />
sleep summit sponsored by the <strong>Army</strong><br />
Office of the Surgeon General that he<br />
recognized he had put himself and his<br />
soldiers at risk more than once due to<br />
exhaustion after serving long duty<br />
hours. Miller acknowledged that the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> has accorded more time for sleep<br />
since then, but he believes more enforcement<br />
of that guidance is needed.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> sleep specialists at the summit<br />
agreed that quality sleep is imperative to<br />
good safety and that more data is needed<br />
to show the link between fatigue and<br />
poor performance. Sleep, they noted, is<br />
a critical element in the <strong>Army</strong>’s Performance<br />
Triad, which also includes activity<br />
and nutrition. The Office of the Surgeon<br />
General is currently conducting<br />
Performance Triad pilot studies.<br />
Sky’s ‘Unraveling’ Earns Praise<br />
From Literary Critics in 2015<br />
Emma Sky, a noted Middle East<br />
expert and contributor to ARMY magazine,<br />
released her memoir, The Unraveling:<br />
High Hopes and Missed Opportunities<br />
in Iraq, last year—and the literary<br />
world took notice.<br />
Her book was named one of The New<br />
York Times’ 100 Notable Books of 2015<br />
and a Times Editors’ Choice, one of the<br />
Financial Times Books of the Year, a<br />
New Statesman [U.K.] Essential Book<br />
of the Year, a Times [U.K.] Book of the<br />
Year, and one of Military Times’ Top 10<br />
Books of the Year. The book was also<br />
shortlisted for the Samuel Johnson<br />
Prize for Nonfiction for 2015.<br />
Sky is the director of Yale University’s<br />
World Fellows program and a senior fellow<br />
at Yale’s Jackson Institute for Global<br />
Affairs. Although initially opposed to<br />
the war, she volunteered to help rebuild<br />
the Iraqi government after Saddam Hussein<br />
was overthrown in 2003.<br />
She served as the Coalition Provisional<br />
Authority’s governorate coordinator<br />
of Kirkuk, Iraq, from 2003 to 2004,<br />
and as Gen. Raymond T. Odierno’s political<br />
adviser from 2007 to 2010. ✭<br />
John Martinez<br />
10 ARMY ■ February 2016
Front & Center<br />
Readiness and Capability Are Intertwined<br />
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
There is no question about readiness<br />
being the prime responsibility of today’s<br />
<strong>Army</strong> leaders. Every public speaker,<br />
report, news column and magazine article<br />
stresses the requirement and commitment<br />
necessary to guarantee combatready<br />
forces to meet the demands of<br />
national security.<br />
I have no argument with that requirement,<br />
having lived with it in every command<br />
assignment from World War II<br />
through the Cold War. But during my<br />
years of senior command, if anyone<br />
asked for a one-word identification of<br />
my prime responsibility, I would have<br />
answered “capability.”<br />
Readiness is the responsibility of combat<br />
and combat support forces that may<br />
be committed immediately to a crisis situation—those<br />
closest to the crisis at the<br />
highest degree of readiness. Battalion and<br />
company commanders bear the brunt,<br />
but platoon and squad leaders are the<br />
front line of action. Squad leaders ensure<br />
each soldier knows his or her job and has<br />
the skills required by his or her MOS.<br />
They also create the confidence and team<br />
spirit essential for combat operations.<br />
Platoon leaders ensure that squad<br />
leaders have done their jobs, then mold<br />
the teams that must be ready to engage<br />
in the tactical tasks they are expected to<br />
perform. Company commanders supervise<br />
and validate readiness training; they<br />
also are responsible for the first rung of<br />
the capability ladder as they exercise the<br />
ability to call for and employ intelligence,<br />
fire support, logistics and coordination<br />
with other companies engaged in combat<br />
operations. They are the principal contributors<br />
to the development of the next<br />
war’s band of brothers.<br />
Battalion and brigade commanders<br />
also supervise readiness, but their primary<br />
concerns are adequate planning and then<br />
directing operations. Requiring their attention<br />
as battle action unfolds are communications<br />
that obtain fire support and<br />
resupply, maintain contact with adjacent<br />
units and higher and lower echelons, and<br />
control the activities of attached units.<br />
Division and corps commanders direct<br />
combat campaigns. They supervise readiness<br />
training during peacetime, but must<br />
presume readiness when ordered to combat.<br />
They direct combat activities, make<br />
decisions essential for sustaining operations,<br />
and ensure their staffs are sustaining<br />
the support requirements of their<br />
subordinate units. They are also responsible<br />
for recommending or requesting<br />
the additional support or resources that<br />
could expedite action or prevent failure.<br />
The highest commands in a theater of<br />
operations are almost completely concerned<br />
with capability. They must assume<br />
the readiness of the forces committed<br />
to them by the services as they plan<br />
their campaigns, guaranteeing mission<br />
success or explaining the risks involved<br />
and recommending steps to alleviate<br />
those risks.<br />
A perfect example of such a requirement<br />
was the request for an additional<br />
corps in the troop list for the Persian<br />
Gulf campaign in 1990–91. The same<br />
responsibility is borne by the Joint<br />
Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon, where<br />
the ultimate demands of combat operations<br />
must be satisfied.<br />
When a national crisis occurs, the<br />
president is concerned almost exclusively<br />
with capability. After approving the National<br />
Military Strategy and with assurances<br />
by the Joint Chiefs of the adequacy<br />
of forces to accomplish missions appropriate<br />
to that strategy, he or she can confidently<br />
make decisions to achieve political<br />
objectives. When that system works<br />
as designed, we have military operations<br />
like Just Cause in Panama and Desert<br />
Storm in the Persian Gulf. When the<br />
system is not operable, we have had<br />
World War II and three years of losses,<br />
the Bataan Death March and the Battle<br />
of Kasserine Pass while building the<br />
forces necessary to win in Europe and<br />
the Pacific; and we have had Korea and<br />
the infamous Task Force Smith tragedy.<br />
More recently, we have had unsatisfying<br />
results in Iraq and Afghanistan, where<br />
initial successes were squandered by inadequate<br />
or overcommitments and early<br />
withdrawals.<br />
Fulfilling such a national strategy today<br />
would require an <strong>Army</strong> closer to the<br />
780,000 strength of Just Cause and the<br />
Persian Gulf than the 450,000 currently<br />
programmed for the future. It would<br />
also require restoring the Navy and Air<br />
Force of the 1990s and a continuing<br />
modernization of our nuclear deterrent.<br />
We can hope that Congress and our<br />
presidential candidates are aware of<br />
such a need and will provide a budget<br />
that does not require the services to accommodate<br />
a too small number and a<br />
great risk.<br />
■<br />
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly<br />
served as vice chief of staff of the<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> and commander in chief of<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Europe. He is a senior fellow<br />
of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Rick Rzepka<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 11
Winning the War We’ve Got, Not the <strong>On</strong>e We Want<br />
By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
We need some hard thinking. We<br />
are not winning the war against<br />
al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in<br />
Iraq or Syria, or elsewhere across North<br />
and East Africa, the greater Middle<br />
East, South Asia and beyond. At best,<br />
one might argue that we are holding our<br />
own, but this is far from winning. The<br />
sooner we come to realize this, the more<br />
likely we are to identify a successful way<br />
forward. Calls for reassessment and new<br />
options with respect to the U.S. approach<br />
to this problem—especially in<br />
light of the attacks in San Bernardino,<br />
Calif., Paris and Lebanon, and the<br />
downing of the Russian civilian airliner<br />
in Sinai—have yielded little so far.<br />
The first step to any solution is to<br />
recognize the problem for what it is.<br />
The next is to recognize what has not<br />
worked. <strong>On</strong>ly then can the outlines of<br />
probable solutions emerge. Neither the<br />
“lash out, do something” approach nor<br />
the “stay the course; it’s a long war” approach<br />
will do.<br />
We are facing a global revolutionary<br />
war, with a narrative that resonates with<br />
many. Most strategists are familiar with<br />
revolutions within a state; the near-global<br />
dimension of this revolution makes it different<br />
and more complex. Our enemies<br />
are not mere criminals. They have conquered,<br />
controlled and now govern territory.<br />
As their own strategic documents<br />
describe, their intent is to eject Western<br />
influence from the region, depose apostate<br />
(in their view) governments and redraw<br />
boundaries—as they already have<br />
between Iraq and Syria, ultimately remaking<br />
the map and adjusting the international<br />
order by creating a caliphate<br />
along the lines of the former Ottoman<br />
Empire. This is part of the context<br />
within which to understand our enemies’<br />
ongoing operations and activities,<br />
whether in one of their regional theaters<br />
of operations or against those they consider<br />
the “far enemy”; that is, Europe,<br />
the U.S. and now, Russia.<br />
Other parts of this global revolution<br />
include several power struggles: one between<br />
the Arabs and Persians; another<br />
between Sunni and Shia. Further, this<br />
revolution is an intra-Sunni struggle between<br />
the very small percentage of radical<br />
and violent Sunni Muslims seeking to<br />
redefine the faith of the vast majority of<br />
other Sunni Muslims. While the broad<br />
dimensions of this power struggle are<br />
important to understand, as in any revolution,<br />
the microdynamics of how it<br />
unfolds in each particular area are perhaps<br />
more important. And again, like all<br />
revolutions, this one has not only political<br />
but also social and religious dimensions<br />
to it. The violence our enemies<br />
use is a means to further their revolutionary<br />
ends and prevail in the regional<br />
power struggles.<br />
Finally, the geographic scope of this<br />
revolution’s context makes it an international<br />
problem, not just a regional<br />
one. In fact, one aspect of this revolutionary<br />
movement is to undo the international<br />
order produced after World<br />
War II and sustained throughout the<br />
Cold War. The stability produced by<br />
this order was, in part, a result of nations<br />
primarily resorting to institutions<br />
rather than violence to resolve differences.<br />
Al-Qaida, the Islamic State and<br />
their like reject these institutions, preferring<br />
violence to establish the “order”<br />
they seek. All nations have a stake in<br />
the international system that is under<br />
attack, and those with a bigger stake<br />
have more responsibilities to preserve<br />
and adapt that system.<br />
Several conclusions derive from the<br />
type of war we’re in. First, success in this<br />
war will require a new Western-regional<br />
coalition, one that is committed to sufficiently<br />
common principles and goals and<br />
will follow a common civil-military strategy.<br />
Given the divergence of interests in<br />
the region, no “grand alliance” seems<br />
likely. But a lesser coalition, perhaps<br />
even several bilateral arrangements, may<br />
be possible. Under these conditions, no<br />
rigid universal strategy will work; a more<br />
flexible, general one may.<br />
A precisely defined “end state” may be<br />
the wrong construct to use in this war.<br />
Rather, the strategy will have to be a<br />
combination of creating local successes<br />
that build toward the future the coalition<br />
seeks. And this war cannot be won without<br />
more participation from our Arab allies.<br />
We need to study carefully, learn<br />
from and adapt to the reasons why they<br />
have been hesitant.<br />
Second, ideas and narratives are the<br />
fuel of revolutions, so the main effort of<br />
whatever counterstrategy is adopted<br />
must attack the enemies’ narrative both<br />
by coalition domestic and international<br />
actions. A counternarrative campaign is<br />
not a “spin campaign.” Rather, it stitches<br />
together domestic and international actions<br />
concerning governance, economic,<br />
social and religious policies in ways that<br />
prove our enemies’ narratives wrong, reinforce<br />
the coalition narrative, and show<br />
our enemies for what they really are.<br />
All security actions must support this<br />
main effort. Our current counternarrative<br />
campaign remains weak because<br />
our actions are disjointed and unconnected<br />
to a vision of a future different<br />
from and more compelling than that of<br />
our enemies.<br />
Third, the “tissue” that connects our<br />
enemies is as important as our enemies<br />
themselves. This connective tissue consists<br />
of the means our enemies use to recruit,<br />
radicalize, plan, prepare, execute, finance<br />
and sustain their activities. This<br />
tissue lies in the open space of normal<br />
civil and economic communications flow,<br />
a space controlled by sovereign states and<br />
their security services. We have taken<br />
some action against this “tissue” but after<br />
14 years of war, our actions clearly have<br />
not been sufficiently robust, coordinated<br />
or timely. Whatever coalition is formed<br />
will have to develop domestic and<br />
transnational norms and methods to deal<br />
with this connective tissue.<br />
Fourth, while the “solutions” to this<br />
revolution are clearly local, local governance,<br />
economic, social and religious<br />
policies are as much causative to the rise<br />
of the revolution as are the policies and<br />
actions of “external” powers. So our reassessment<br />
must address the domestic<br />
policies of coalition members that our<br />
enemies are using to their advantage.<br />
Last, the security aspects of whatever<br />
strategy the coalition adopts must include<br />
both military forces and domestic<br />
as well as transnational police forces.<br />
Our enemies operate in the space be-<br />
12 ARMY ■ February 2016
tween crime and war, and between<br />
peace and war. The coalition must close<br />
these spaces.<br />
We have allowed the revolution to<br />
spread. Like the cancer it is, the ground<br />
that this revolutionary enemy controls<br />
and the networks they have established<br />
must be reduced; how and when are the<br />
only questions. Our current efforts to reduce<br />
this threat have been insufficient. In<br />
fact, in the face of our efforts, both enemy-held<br />
territory and their networks<br />
have expanded.<br />
We are fighting a war of attrition, acting<br />
as if time is on our side. It is not.<br />
The main effort—the counterideology<br />
campaign and its governance, economic,<br />
social and religious components—will<br />
not succeed in the current security environment.<br />
So while it is a supporting effort,<br />
successful military and police security<br />
operations are essential. Here, the<br />
coalition faces one of its many hard<br />
choices: Reduce our enemies’ control<br />
and influence—in at least some of the<br />
areas in which our enemies have<br />
grown—using coalition air, ground and<br />
special operations forces in conjunction<br />
with local forces; or pace reduction<br />
upon local security force capacity. The<br />
former option will accelerate the pace of<br />
our current operations but incur one<br />
kind of risk. The latter drags out an already<br />
too-long war, which incurs other<br />
kinds of risks.<br />
This global revolution has been clear<br />
to some for years. Also clear is that the<br />
U.S. strategic approaches used since the<br />
Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have not<br />
been sufficiently successful. Our enemies<br />
have occasionally been disrupted, parts<br />
have been dismantled; but they have not<br />
been defeated and certainly are not destroyed.<br />
In fact, they have morphed and expanded—despite<br />
14 years of war and billions<br />
of dollars spent, hundreds of “highvalue<br />
targets” and thousands of others<br />
killed, thousands of our own casualties,<br />
tens of thousands civilians dead or<br />
wounded, and hundreds of thousands of<br />
refugees spread throughout the world.<br />
Simply put: While we have had some<br />
successes, neither the expansive, nearunilateral<br />
strategy of the former Bush<br />
administration nor the minimalist, gradualist,<br />
surrogate approach of the Obama<br />
administration has worked. <strong>On</strong>e might<br />
even say that both strategies have used<br />
approaches that have strengthened the<br />
enemies’ narrative and ideology rather<br />
than diminished it. The same can be said<br />
of some of the domestic policies adopted<br />
by nations in as well as out of the region.<br />
Both administrations have treated<br />
coalition members as “contributing<br />
nations,” where contributions are sometimes<br />
combat, advisory or support troops;<br />
and other times funds, equipment, or<br />
other military or nonmilitary capabilities.<br />
This approach can create the illusion of a<br />
multinational effort, but it does not reflect<br />
a serious attempt to align nations<br />
around similar interests and common<br />
goals. Nor does it reflect an attempt to<br />
have coalition partners, together, ascribe<br />
to common principles and develop common<br />
goals and a common strategic approach<br />
to attaining those goals. A more<br />
traditional approach to coalitions would<br />
add legitimacy to the international actions<br />
that are required in waging and<br />
fighting the war against our global revolutionary<br />
enemies.<br />
With rare exception, neither administration<br />
has been able to develop and execute<br />
a set of coherent civil-military strategies,<br />
policies and campaigns. Whether<br />
viewed domestically or internationally, if<br />
the approach so far were a musical score,<br />
it would be described more as cacophony<br />
than harmony. Going forward, we need<br />
not only a better coalition and strategy,<br />
but also better collaborative bodies and<br />
processes to make decisions, take coordinated<br />
action, and adapt faster than our<br />
enemies. We have been, consistently, too<br />
slow.<br />
Where do we go from here? Most important<br />
is to rethink what we’ve been doing.<br />
Intellectual change must precede<br />
any changes in approach. Too much of<br />
our post-9/11 collective action has been<br />
taken in the haste to “do something” or<br />
to demonstrate strength. Too much has<br />
been reactive to the crisis of the day or<br />
has been discrete actions unconnected to<br />
a coherent campaign that, if successful,<br />
will attain strategic aims. And too much<br />
has been done sequentially, not simultaneously.<br />
Further, our reassessment must acknowledge<br />
that in the kind of war we’re<br />
in, “defeat” and “destruction” cannot be<br />
defined in strictly military terms. Bombs,<br />
raids and any other kind of kinetic actions<br />
are necessary, but they are not sufficient<br />
to defeat a revolutionary enemy.<br />
Destruction of a revolution requires<br />
more. Revolutions ignite moral indignation<br />
about one power arrangement,<br />
then maneuver to replace that arrangement<br />
with another promulgated as better.<br />
Bombs and raids do not take the<br />
wind out of the sail of moral indignation.<br />
As long as we act as if defeat or<br />
destruction is a military task, success<br />
will continue to elude us. We need a coherent<br />
set of civil and military strategies,<br />
policies and campaigns, in service<br />
to a broader goal.<br />
Any reassessment worthy of the name,<br />
therefore, must start by answering this<br />
question: What kind of durable political<br />
outcome will actually produce a better<br />
peace? So far, we have heard little in answer<br />
to this question. Members of whatever<br />
coalition that forms must agree at<br />
least to the principles that will guide<br />
them to a satisfactory answer.<br />
The answer to this question is fundamental<br />
because in war, strategies, policies<br />
and campaigns, whether military or nonmilitary,<br />
are merely instruments. Their<br />
value is relative; their worth can be<br />
judged only relative to their capacity to<br />
achieve the end or ends sought. What<br />
are we seeking beyond destruction of our<br />
enemies? The answer to that question<br />
must be compelling and to sustain domestic<br />
and coalition support, our actions<br />
must clearly demonstrate that we are<br />
making progress toward that end.<br />
We cannot define the war to fit our<br />
own biases. Nor can we “spin” it to fit<br />
what we want to do rather than what has<br />
to be done. The worth of whatever<br />
strategies the coalition finally chooses<br />
will be a function of how well those<br />
strategies fit the realities of the war,<br />
whether they attain the common goals at<br />
reasonable costs and time, and how easily<br />
the coalition can adapt as the war unfolds.<br />
We may not like the war we’ve<br />
got, and we may wish things were otherwise,<br />
but success in war results from<br />
dealing with reality as it is. ■<br />
Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.,<br />
Ph.D., is a former commander of Multi-<br />
National Security Transition Command-<br />
Iraq and a senior fellow of AUSA’s Institute<br />
of Land Warfare.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 13
Yep, Those Were the Good Old <strong>Army</strong> Days<br />
By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
With the <strong>Army</strong> in a time of change,<br />
it is good to look back at the “good<br />
old days.” The <strong>Army</strong> between the two<br />
world wars is the best remembered “Old<br />
<strong>Army</strong>.” The Old <strong>Army</strong> has been called<br />
an athletic club, a school, a home for<br />
wayward youth and a boys’ camp, all<br />
rolled into one.<br />
The Old <strong>Army</strong> was predominately<br />
horse-drawn and very traditional.<br />
When mechanization arrived in<br />
the 1930s and the horses left the<br />
stables, it was more traumatic<br />
than just trading in brown boots<br />
for black ones and campaign<br />
hats for overseas caps. Individual<br />
squad drill was replaced by<br />
massed battalion marching formations;<br />
the M1 Garand rifle<br />
replaced the legendary Springfield<br />
with its Mauser bolt action.<br />
When it came to getting out<br />
of personal debt, there was a<br />
saying in the rural parts of the<br />
country: Don’t sell the farm. It<br />
was understood that if families<br />
could afford to hold on to their<br />
farms, they’d never starve. Also,<br />
government-subsidized life insurance<br />
for soldiers in 1917 was<br />
$10,000—about the same amount as the<br />
average farm mortgage. Thus, when a<br />
soldier was killed, the death payment to<br />
his family “bought the farm.”<br />
Another good old saying at the turn of<br />
the century was by author Hilaire Belloc:<br />
“Whatever happens, we have got the<br />
Maxim gun and they have not.” It was<br />
the Maxim gun and its follow-on derivatives<br />
that allowed English-speaking<br />
countries and France to rule most of the<br />
discovered world. But that lasted only as<br />
long as “we” had it and “they” did not.<br />
With the demise of the Old <strong>Army</strong><br />
went wrap leggings, hand-powered telephones<br />
and signal flags, washpan helmets,<br />
and afternoons off for athletics.<br />
The mood of the <strong>Army</strong> changed as the<br />
War Plans, locked in the orderly room<br />
safe, changed from repelling an invasion<br />
of Texas from Mexico to defending<br />
overseas areas from the threat of global<br />
war brought on by Asian and European<br />
enemies.<br />
Long-service regulars were the trademark<br />
of the Old <strong>Army</strong> as soldiers gathered<br />
around the company bulletin board<br />
to see who made private first class after<br />
six years of service, compared with about<br />
six months today. Ordinary privates<br />
earned $21 per month; privates first<br />
class, $30; and corporals, $42. A second<br />
lieutenant started out at $125 per month,<br />
a dollar less than a master sergeant.<br />
This illustration accompanied an October 1948 article in Infantry<br />
Journal (a predecessor to ARMY magazine) about “the old <strong>Army</strong>.”<br />
Apparently, it was not the pay that<br />
kept men in the Old <strong>Army</strong>. Instead, it<br />
was something called “The Outfit”—the<br />
self-contained company, troop or battery<br />
that took care of the soldiers’ mess, supply<br />
and personnel management. It provided<br />
everything a man needed: food,<br />
clothing, shelter, and security from the<br />
civilian world where no one was in<br />
charge. This was especially true of the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> during the Great Depression.<br />
First sergeants were next to God in<br />
units. No one spoke to “Top” without<br />
permission except the “Old Man.” This<br />
was the commanding officer—an experienced<br />
captain or first lieutenant—who<br />
relied on the first sergeant to keep things<br />
running like a well-oiled machine. Buck<br />
sergeants and corporals were barracks’<br />
barons who could “field-strip” a deadbeat<br />
recruit without breaking stride while<br />
walking across a barracks quadrangle.<br />
NCOs held their rank only as long as<br />
they stayed in the unit that promoted<br />
them. For an NCO to transfer with his<br />
stripes intact, he was required to arrange<br />
a trade with another NCO of equal rank<br />
and speciality in another unit.<br />
Gen. John J. Pershing wanted soldiers<br />
who could “shoot and salute.” That was<br />
good enough for the Old <strong>Army</strong>. The Old<br />
<strong>Army</strong> did not do as much as the <strong>Army</strong><br />
does today, but what it did do was done<br />
very well indeed. Enlisted men hardly ever<br />
saw an officer because NCOs<br />
were perfectly capable of running<br />
things. There was no need, as<br />
there is today, to first examine<br />
insignia closely before saluting.<br />
An officer’s uniform was distinctive.<br />
It was usually Class A, never<br />
fatigues, with “pink” trousers or<br />
riding breeches and boots, and a<br />
Sam Browne belt. In the Old<br />
<strong>Army</strong>, it was a pleasure for soldiers<br />
to lay a salute on an officer<br />
from 100 yards away.<br />
Most soldiers lived in the<br />
barracks and took their fun<br />
where they could find it in<br />
bars, dance halls with nice or<br />
not-so-nice women, or at games<br />
of chance as long as their pay<br />
lasted. When a soldier’s pay<br />
ran out, he stayed on post, went to the<br />
movies on credit, played pool in the<br />
dayroom, or fired small-caliber weapons<br />
on the unit’s indoor range. Some even<br />
read books. When a soldier tired of<br />
stateside duty, he could pull a hitch of<br />
foreign service in one of several overseas<br />
regiments in such exotic places as<br />
Panama, Puerto Rico, China, Alaska<br />
and Hawaii.<br />
Duty with the 15th Infantry Regiment<br />
in Tientsin, China, was especially prized.<br />
It had the highest alcoholism and venereal<br />
disease rate in the <strong>Army</strong>, but it always<br />
came out on top in inspections.<br />
Each year, the War Department inspector<br />
general went out to inspect the “Can<br />
Do” regiment there. It finished first because<br />
soldiers hired Chinese peasants to<br />
do their menial duties. Kitchen and stable<br />
police jobs were performed by Chinese<br />
coolies at a trivial cost per man. Every<br />
soldier had a Chinese striker who shined<br />
his boots, polished his brass, and kept his<br />
14 ARMY ■ February 2016
part of the barracks spic and span.<br />
In Panama, crossing the Isthmus on<br />
horseback was considered very adventuresome<br />
and a test of soldierly skill. The<br />
<strong>Army</strong> believed it had a tremendous stake<br />
in the Caribbean Basin as well as the<br />
Pacific Rim. Puerto Rico and Cuba<br />
guarded the approaches to the new<br />
Panama Canal, the defense of which was<br />
of paramount importance. <strong>Army</strong> garrisons<br />
in the Philippines were a hedge<br />
against further Japanese expansion in the<br />
Pacific after the Russo-Japanese War,<br />
and Japan’s takeover of Germany’s Pacific<br />
possessions during World War I.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> garrisons in Hawaii were<br />
considered a source of great assurance to<br />
the security of the American West Coast<br />
and trade routes in the Pacific.<br />
Athletics were king and constituted a<br />
large part of the soldiers’ daily program.<br />
It could be fairly claimed that World<br />
War II was won on the playing fields of<br />
<strong>Army</strong> posts between the two world wars.<br />
The quality of athletics was high, and<br />
competition between individuals and<br />
units was keen. Most soldiers played<br />
baseball, but football and boxing were<br />
also popular. Jogging had not caught on<br />
yet; a man out running was probably a<br />
boxer doing a little “road work.”<br />
Officers played golf, tennis and polo to<br />
improve their hand and eye coordination,<br />
and to be considered gentlemen.<br />
During periods when units were in garrison,<br />
athletic activities were scheduled almost<br />
every afternoon. Off-duty soldiers<br />
participated or rooted for their favorites.<br />
Field duty consisted of long road<br />
marches at 2 and a half miles an hour.<br />
There was little motor traffic on the dusty<br />
roads around military posts in those days.<br />
At night, soldiers pitched two-man pup<br />
tents and camped along the roadside.<br />
Maneuvers in such places as Texas were<br />
no more than chasing jackrabbits through<br />
the cactus and mesquite. In the tropics, it<br />
meant chasing monkeys through the trees<br />
and avoiding jungle reptiles.<br />
Field duty acquainted soldiers with<br />
tactical operations, field communications,<br />
supply procedures, and the experience of<br />
hardship living in the open. But it did<br />
not teach soldiers what it was like to face<br />
a well-armed and determined enemy.<br />
Gen. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell was known<br />
for his ability to walk long distances and<br />
live in a Spartan field environment.<br />
These qualities came in handy when he<br />
had to lead his corps command group<br />
out of Burma and back to India on foot<br />
after the Japanese defeated his Chinese<br />
forces in 1942.<br />
The Old <strong>Army</strong> gave way to the New<br />
<strong>Army</strong> with the Selective Training and<br />
Service Act of 1940. Another big milestone<br />
for the <strong>Army</strong> was when the draft<br />
was suspended in January 1973, and the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> went back to being a long-service,<br />
professional force. Did Old <strong>Army</strong> practices<br />
creep back into the current <strong>Army</strong>?<br />
Did we sell the farm or not? ■<br />
Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA Ret.,<br />
is a West Point graduate who served in<br />
field artillery, Special Forces, civil affairs,<br />
community/public affairs and force<br />
development. He also worked as a civilian<br />
contractor for the Battle Command<br />
Training Program until retiring in<br />
2002. He is the recording secretary/photographer<br />
of the Society for Military<br />
History.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 15
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He’s the <strong>Army</strong><br />
Surgeon Will Serve ‘As Long as I Can’<br />
Dr. Frederick Lough had been out of uniform for more<br />
than a decade at the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist<br />
attacks. The former <strong>Army</strong> lieutenant<br />
colonel had served for 17 years before<br />
separating to pursue a civilian career<br />
as a heart surgeon. Still, in the weeks<br />
and months following 9/11, he felt the<br />
urge to do more for his country.<br />
So he did just that. Lough joined<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> Reserve in 2007; two years<br />
later, he was promoted to colonel. And<br />
in 2013, at the age of 64, Lough returned<br />
to active duty.<br />
“When I looked at my life, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
had been everything to me,” Lough<br />
said. “They educated me through college,<br />
through being a surgeon. … With<br />
the fights going on in Iraq and Afghanistan<br />
and the casualties coming, I<br />
felt that I just could not stand on the<br />
sidelines.”<br />
Lough grew up in a military family;<br />
his father was a career <strong>Army</strong> officer<br />
who served for four decades. The family<br />
moved frequently until finally settling<br />
down near the U.S. Military<br />
Col. (Dr.) Frederick Lough<br />
Academy. Naturally, Lough said, a military career seemed like<br />
a perfect fit.<br />
Lough graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served<br />
as an engineer officer with the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Corps of Engineers.<br />
A few years later, he turned his attention to medical school.<br />
Although the Uniformed Services University of the Health<br />
Sciences (USUHS) did not exist at the time, there was a<br />
scholarship program for <strong>Army</strong> officers to attend civilian medical<br />
schools. Lough was accepted into the program and went<br />
on to graduate from George Washington University’s School<br />
of Medicine and Health Sciences in Washington, D.C.<br />
After completing residencies in general surgery and thoracic<br />
and cardiovascular surgery at what’s now Walter Reed National<br />
Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Md., Lough remained<br />
at Walter Reed as a general surgeon. As time went on,<br />
he served in Korea and came back to continue his training at<br />
Walter Reed.<br />
As Lough approached 17 years of service, he received a call<br />
from a former military surgeon asking him to join a practice in<br />
Pennsylvania. Lough separated from the <strong>Army</strong> and as a civilian<br />
surgeon, continued perfecting his craft, performing thousands<br />
of surgeries.<br />
By the early 2000s, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq going<br />
full force, Lough felt an obligation to get back to the <strong>Army</strong><br />
and be involved again. He worked with medical recruiters and<br />
about six years after 9/11, joined the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Reserve. In 2010, he was deployed<br />
for three months to far western<br />
Afghanistan, where he led a group of<br />
U.S. doctors working alongside Bulgarian<br />
surgeons at a Spanish-run NATO<br />
hospital.<br />
“We were the first American group<br />
of physicians to be in this non-Englishspeaking<br />
NATO hospital,” Lough said.<br />
Despite the language barrier and different<br />
styles of medical care, Lough and<br />
his colleagues made it work. “It was a<br />
great challenge, but it was also very<br />
stimulating; fun, in a certain way,” he<br />
said. “Every day was a new, ‘OK, how<br />
do we do this?’ and at the same time,<br />
we’re getting combat casualties in who<br />
are, in some cases, severely wounded<br />
and you have to negotiate with other<br />
people how to do things. It required a<br />
lot of mental agility.”<br />
Lough deployed in 2012 to another<br />
area in Afghanistan, where he faced a<br />
much higher volume of combat casualties.<br />
“I felt like I was dealing with situations that were why I became<br />
a doctor in the first place,” he said. “Someone would be<br />
hurt and the only question was, what was wrong and could<br />
you help them and could you make them better.”<br />
“It was great that the people that I worked with were totally<br />
dedicated to trying to make this soldier better,” he said. “It<br />
didn’t matter whether the soldier was an American soldier, an<br />
Afghan soldier or a Spanish soldier—or whatever nationality.<br />
Everybody did everything they could. So it really was, from a<br />
physician standpoint, just spectacular because you really were<br />
doing your craft. You were really working as a surgeon to take<br />
care of things.”<br />
After returning home from his second deployment, Lough<br />
requested to return to active duty full time and in 2013, he was<br />
officially welcomed to the surgery department at USUHS in<br />
Bethesda. Today, he continues his work as a surgeon, professor<br />
and mentor.<br />
“The privilege and the opportunity to serve is so precious<br />
that every day is a gift,” Lough said. “I am really benefited by<br />
working at the great medical school here … and with great<br />
people. It is no question that I’ll keep going as long as I can.”<br />
—Jennifer Benitz<br />
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences/Sharon Holland<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 17
<strong>Army</strong> Women:<br />
Highlights<br />
1781–83<br />
1864<br />
With Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s announcement<br />
lifting gender restrictions on all military jobs, we take<br />
a look at the role of female soldiers throughout U.S.<br />
history. Here are some highlights.<br />
1941–45<br />
Library of Congress<br />
Deborah Sampson of Massachusetts enlists as a<br />
Continental <strong>Army</strong> soldier under the name Robert<br />
Shurtliff and serves in the Revolutionary War.<br />
1942<br />
Library of Congress<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
More than 200,000<br />
women serve in the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> during U.S. involvement<br />
in World<br />
War II; 16 are killed in<br />
action. Among those<br />
captured by the<br />
Japanese in the<br />
Philippines in 1942<br />
and held as POWs are<br />
67 <strong>Army</strong> nurses; they<br />
are released in 1945.<br />
National Archives<br />
Congress creates<br />
Women’s<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Auxiliary<br />
Corps, or WAAC,<br />
later renamed<br />
WAC (Women’s<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Corps).<br />
June 11, 1970<br />
1972<br />
Anna Mae Hays,<br />
left, <strong>Army</strong> Nurse<br />
Corps, and WAC<br />
director Elizabeth<br />
P. Hoisington,<br />
right, are promoted<br />
to rank of<br />
brigadier general.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> ROTC<br />
opens to<br />
women.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
1976 1978<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Women matriculate<br />
into<br />
U.S. Military<br />
Academy and<br />
other service<br />
academies.<br />
Bernard H. Schopper<br />
Congress abolishes<br />
WACs,<br />
leading to direct<br />
assignment<br />
of female<br />
soldiers to noncombat<br />
branches of the<br />
<strong>Army</strong>.<br />
18 ARMY ■ February 2016
1901 1917–18<br />
Dr. Mary Walker is<br />
captured by the<br />
Confederates<br />
while volunteering<br />
as a surgeon on<br />
the front lines of<br />
the Civil War. She<br />
is awarded the<br />
Medal of Honor at<br />
war’s end.<br />
More than 21,000<br />
<strong>Army</strong> nurses serve in<br />
military hospitals at<br />
home and abroad<br />
during U.S. involvement<br />
in World War I;<br />
several are wounded<br />
in the line of duty.<br />
DoD<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
<strong>Army</strong> Nurse Corps is established.<br />
1948 1950–53 1964–1973<br />
President Harry Truman signs into law the<br />
Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, imposing<br />
a 2 percent ceiling on the number of women,<br />
excluding nurses, allowed in the military.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Almost 12,000 WACs serve in the Korean War.<br />
1973 June 4, 1974<br />
Draft ends; establishment<br />
of<br />
an all-volunteer<br />
force opens the<br />
door for expanding<br />
servicewomen’s<br />
roles<br />
and numbers.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
About 13,000<br />
WACs serve in<br />
Southeast Asia<br />
during the Vietnam<br />
War years,<br />
most of them<br />
nurses.<br />
Second Lt. Sally Murphy<br />
is the <strong>Army</strong>’s first female<br />
helicopter pilot.<br />
Dec. 20, 1989 1990–91<br />
UNCG University Libraries<br />
Capt. Linda L. Bray<br />
becomes the first<br />
woman to command<br />
American soldiers in<br />
battle, during the invasion<br />
of Panama.<br />
About 770 women<br />
deploy to Panama in<br />
Operation Just Cause;<br />
two command <strong>Army</strong><br />
companies.<br />
National Archives<br />
About 26,000 <strong>Army</strong><br />
women deploy during<br />
Operations Desert<br />
Shield and Desert<br />
Storm; five are killed<br />
in the operations.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 19
1993<br />
2002<br />
2004<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Staff Sgt. Jill Henderson is named <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
first female “Drill Sergeant of the Year.”<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Michele S. Jones is sworn in as command<br />
sergeant major of U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Reserve, the<br />
first female NCO to serve in the top enlisted<br />
position in any military component.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
By year’s end, 19<br />
female soldiers are<br />
killed in the Iraq War,<br />
the most servicewomen<br />
to die as a result<br />
of hostile action<br />
in any U.S. war. U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Capt. Kimberly<br />
Hampton is the first<br />
female pilot in U.S.<br />
history to be shot<br />
down and killed by<br />
an enemy.<br />
2005<br />
2008 Jan. 24, 2014<br />
<strong>Army</strong> National<br />
Guard Sgt.<br />
Leigh Ann<br />
Hester is<br />
awarded the<br />
Silver Star<br />
Medal for gallantry<br />
in close<br />
combat.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Dennis Steele<br />
Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody pins on her fourth<br />
star, the first woman in uniformed service<br />
history to achieve the rank.<br />
Australian <strong>Army</strong><br />
About 33,000 <strong>Army</strong> positions previously<br />
closed to women will integrate by April.<br />
August 2015<br />
December 2015<br />
Defense Secretary<br />
Ash Carter declares<br />
all military<br />
combat specialties<br />
open to<br />
women.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Capt. Kristen Griest, left, and 1st Lt. Shaye Haver, right, graduate from U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Ranger School.<br />
U.S. Air Force<br />
20 ARMY ■ February 2016
Cyber Capabilities Key<br />
By Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon<br />
<strong>On</strong>e of the stunning trends since 2001 is the tactical<br />
dominance of the American military, especially<br />
ground combat units. This success was not gained<br />
by accident or chance; it resulted from hard training<br />
and the ability of units to harness combat power down to<br />
the tactical edge. The historically unprecedented tactical<br />
prowess of our ground forces is enabled by a network, with<br />
systems and data, connected globally in ways that deliver<br />
power to the edge.<br />
This level of connectivity, however, has created expectations<br />
within our formations that may no longer be realistic as<br />
cyberspace is increasingly contested. This is why mission assurance<br />
is so critical. Small ground units connected in ways to<br />
harness the power of the U.S. military have a much higher<br />
probability of mission success, and in many ways provide an<br />
overmatch that is second to none. At the same time, cyber itself,<br />
either alone or through its use to change the physical<br />
world or human understanding, has evolved to the point that<br />
it can lead to lethal kinetic effects, given the increasing connectivity<br />
in the world. Our adversaries also recognize this po-<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Bill Roche<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Capt. Meredith Mathis<br />
22 ARMY ■ February 2016
to Future Dominance<br />
tential and will surely employ these capabilities to challenge<br />
our formations the same way.<br />
Unlike the land, sea, air and space domains, cyberspace is<br />
continuously evolving and adapting along with each entrepreneur,<br />
inventor and actor that uses it. There is an ever-changing<br />
convergence and divergence of people, technologies and<br />
processes characterized by disruptive technologies and applications.<br />
Time is an important component. Software can change at<br />
the speed of code; hardware at the speed of chips; and the people<br />
change this domain at the speed of human thought, creativity<br />
and learning. This distinctiveness translates to a domain that<br />
is uniquely contested and competitive; and one that is passive<br />
and active, hyperanimated and inanimate, all at the same time.<br />
The growth of cyber capabilities has been exponential and is<br />
not limited to the U.S. military. We have peer competitors, and<br />
the struggle is for both competitive advantage and dominance.<br />
To help bring clarity to the U.S. military’s approach to cyberspace,<br />
U.S. Cyber Command recently published its vision, titled<br />
“Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace.”<br />
Most importantly, this vision recognizes that cyber will change<br />
both military science and military art, requiring changes in joint<br />
and service doctrine, capabilities and operations.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> and its headquarters with primary responsibility<br />
for cyberspace operations, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Cyber Command (AR-<br />
CYBER), are organized to support this vision by focusing on<br />
priorities to strengthen both joint and <strong>Army</strong> cyber capabilities<br />
to support operations, including capabilities to enable ground<br />
forces to continue their dominance in the land domain.<br />
Mutually Supporting Priorities<br />
Shortly after becoming <strong>Army</strong> chief of staff, Gen. Mark A.<br />
Milley stressed the priority of readiness for the <strong>Army</strong> to fulfill<br />
its primary mission to win in ground combat. ARCYBER<br />
and Second <strong>Army</strong> embraced this priority by pursuing three<br />
mutually supporting priorities: operationalize cyberspace operations<br />
to support combatant and <strong>Army</strong> commands at echelon;<br />
pursue a more defensible network; and organize, staff,<br />
train and equip ready cyber forces.<br />
The first priority—operationalize cyberspace operations to<br />
support combatant and <strong>Army</strong> commanders—is evident in the<br />
establishment of ARCYBER’s Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber<br />
at Fort Gordon, Ga. It employs joint cyber forces and<br />
conducts cyberspace operations to achieve cyberspace effects<br />
in support of combatant commanders, and continues to grow<br />
in both breadth and depth of capabilities.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Staff Sgt. George Davis<br />
Clockwise from top: Soldiers participate in a cyber exercise at Joint Base<br />
Lewis-McChord, Wash.; members of the Ohio National Guard Computer<br />
Network Defense Team train at Camp Atterbury, Ind.; soldiers from the<br />
25th Infantry Division develop cyber capabilities at the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Cyber<br />
Center of Excellence, Fort Gordon, Ga.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 23
Sgt. 1st Class Richard<br />
Miller, left, and Chief<br />
Warrant Officer 2<br />
Larry Elrod, U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Cyber Protection<br />
Brigade, discuss the<br />
response to a simulated<br />
cyberattack at<br />
the Joint Readiness<br />
Training Center, Fort<br />
Polk, La.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Bill Roche<br />
To support the <strong>Army</strong>’s tactical forces, we have made delivering<br />
cyberspace operations capabilities to <strong>Army</strong> corps and<br />
below a major focus. Last year, the <strong>Army</strong>’s chief of staff challenged<br />
us to demonstrate tactical cyber integration at the<br />
brigade combat team level in home-station training and at<br />
the combat training centers. Lessons learned from these pilots<br />
continue to inform the <strong>Army</strong>’s employment and integration<br />
of cyberspace capabilities and the convergence with information<br />
operations and electronic warfare.<br />
Our second priority—pursue a more defensible network—<br />
is another critical component of our abilities to execute operations<br />
across highly networked forces operating in all domains.<br />
The integration of networks, systems and data has delivered<br />
unprecedented awareness and warfighting capability to the<br />
tactical edge, to the point it is now a dependency that, by extension,<br />
makes it a vulnerability that must be protected. The<br />
<strong>Army</strong> continues to improve and protect its networked information<br />
technology capabilities and the cybersecurity of networks,<br />
systems and data through modernization efforts and<br />
cyberspace operations.<br />
Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon, commanding general of U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Cyber Command and Second <strong>Army</strong>, has commanded at every<br />
level from company through division. He holds a bachelor’s degree<br />
from the U.S. Military Academy, and master’s degrees in<br />
national security and strategic studies from the National War<br />
College and the U.S. Naval Command and Staff College. Portions<br />
of this article appeared in Joint Force Quarterly.<br />
Creating a more defensible network will also improve our<br />
situational awareness in cyberspace. <strong>Army</strong> Cyber Command<br />
is pursuing foundational cyber analytics capabilities to gather<br />
unprecedented quantities of data across cyberspace, giving us<br />
a clearer picture of our networks, systems and data. Coupled<br />
with architecture modernization, this effort is critical to protect<br />
the future force and our ability to fight and win.<br />
Our third priority—organize, staff, train and equip ready<br />
cyber forces—is a joint effort that has produced significant<br />
change across the <strong>Army</strong>. Over the past two years, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
has started aligning command and control by assigning the<br />
Network Enterprise Technology Command to <strong>Army</strong> Cyber<br />
Command and building our active component cyber mission<br />
force, with the goal of having all 41 <strong>Army</strong> cyber mission force<br />
teams operating by the end of fiscal year 2016.<br />
Reserve component forces are also an essential part of the<br />
<strong>Army</strong>’s cyberspace force. <strong>Army</strong> Cyber Command is a multicomponent<br />
organization of active and reserve soldiers. The<br />
<strong>Army</strong> is building 21 additional cyber protection teams: 11 in<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> National Guard, and 10 in the <strong>Army</strong> Reserve.<br />
These teams expand the depth of talent and capability of our<br />
overall force and are critical partners in this domain.<br />
‘The Ultimate Enablers’<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> will use exercises this year to inform the concepts,<br />
organizations and capabilities needed to support ground<br />
forces. It is increasingly clear there is a convergence of cyber,<br />
tactical intelligence, signal, electronic warfare, information op-<br />
24 ARMY ■ February 2016
erations and, at times, space capabilities in conducting cyberspace<br />
operations.<br />
People are the ultimate enablers of the joint cyber force.<br />
Nothing is more important and vital to the growth of our cyber<br />
forces and our cyberspace capabilities than our ability to<br />
attract and retain the best people. To help meet the <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
demand for cyberspace talent, last September the <strong>Army</strong> created<br />
its first new combat arms branch in nearly 30 years: the<br />
Cyber Branch and Career Management Field. Its mission is<br />
to centrally manage cyber talent for the <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
In addition to the joint cyber components and the National<br />
Mission Force at U.S. Cyber Command, the <strong>Army</strong>’s cyber<br />
community includes two critical partners. The Cyber Center<br />
of Excellence at Fort Gordon is our institutional cyber component<br />
and is currently developing its structure, curriculum<br />
and methods to meet future challenges and mission requirements.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> Cyber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy<br />
is the primary cyber innovation agent and bridge builder.<br />
It’s responsible for developing partnerships between the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> and academia, government and industry while providing<br />
insight into future cyber challenges through interdisciplinary<br />
analysis on strategic cyber initiatives and programs.<br />
While the <strong>Army</strong>’s cyber force and capabilities have grown<br />
significantly over the last five years, several opportunities and<br />
challenges will define how well the <strong>Army</strong> and the joint force can<br />
provide cyber capability for the nation’s future defense. Partnerships,<br />
talent management, acquisition agility and an innovative<br />
culture are some of the factors that will have an impact.<br />
Partnerships Are Critical<br />
Partnerships with industry, academia and government agencies<br />
are critical to our ability to respond and anticipate cyber<br />
threats and maintain the joint force’s competitive advantage.<br />
Because the cyber domain is a combination of public, private,<br />
governmental, commercial and military activity, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
does not enjoy a monopoly on cyber capability, talent or innovation.<br />
To succeed in the cyber domain, our partnerships with<br />
the brightest minds and most innovative organizations must<br />
be cultivated and retained to ensure our ability to operate on<br />
the leading edge and succeed in this dynamic domain.<br />
The demand for cyber talent in both the public and private<br />
sectors has renewed calls to adapt <strong>Army</strong> and joint personnel<br />
and acquisition policies. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has<br />
encouraged DoD to challenge its most sacrosanct personnel<br />
policies and practices to become and remain competitive for<br />
talent. He has also called on DoD to refine acquisition structures<br />
and processes to deliver timely and cost-effective material<br />
solutions. Without these reforms, our current processes<br />
will continue to struggle to keep pace with the changing demands<br />
of the cyber domain.<br />
Finally, despite our dependence on technology, wars will<br />
continue to be decided by people. So we must also create a<br />
cultural shift in which we value the innovators, experimenters<br />
and creative thinkers despite drawdowns and resource<br />
constraints. Our military structure must find ways to<br />
accommodate these skills within our cyber forces, including<br />
the ability to think in new and innovative ways. We will<br />
push to maintain these values of innovation in all our soldiers<br />
and leaders.<br />
U.S. Cyber Command’s vision is extremely timely and provides<br />
a broad, unified approach on the way forward as we<br />
continue to adapt, innovate and transform for the future. Operationalizing<br />
cyber, either alone or with other capabilities, to<br />
support joint and <strong>Army</strong> commanders is essential. A more defensible<br />
network for mission assurance is imperative. Harnessing<br />
the power of talented people will enable us to stay<br />
ahead and to win in this domain through the American traits<br />
of innovation, adaptability, resilience and creativity. Now,<br />
more than ever, we will look to our soldiers and civilians for<br />
solutions in this contested space. Both today and as we look<br />
to the future, the <strong>Army</strong> will remain operationally focused and<br />
ready. Our nation’s security depends upon it. ✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Bill Roche<br />
At U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Cyber<br />
Command headquarters,<br />
Fort Belvoir, Va.,<br />
ARCYBER leaders listen<br />
as Marc A. Zissman,<br />
standing, associate<br />
head of the Cyber Security<br />
and Information<br />
Sciences Division at<br />
the Massachusetts Institute<br />
of Technology’s<br />
Lincoln Laboratory,<br />
describes developing<br />
cyber technology.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 25
Joint force soldiers brace against a Chinook’s rotor wash in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, in 2009.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Spc. Walter Reeves<br />
Instead of formal battles on traditional battlefields, the<br />
<strong>Army</strong>’s conventional forces need to be prepared to fight in<br />
what’s come to be known as the gray zone. <strong>Army</strong> Gen.<br />
Joseph L. Votel, commander of U.S. Special Operations<br />
Command, used the term last March during budget-review<br />
testimony to Congress. He described the gray zone as the state<br />
of existence between “normal international competition and<br />
open conflict,” and said the gray zone is where “we see our very<br />
best opportunities to help shape the future environment.” The<br />
term has since gained traction in the special operations forces<br />
community and is migrating to other parts of the <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
To have the requisite capability to successfully respond to<br />
gray zone conflicts, conventional forces must alter their training<br />
mentality and methodology. Preparing for gray zone conflicts<br />
requires <strong>Army</strong> commanders to prioritize regionally<br />
aligned forces training, take advantage of home-station training<br />
opportunities, increase training cooperation with special<br />
operations forces, and become more expeditionary in nature.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> Operating Concept discusses gray zone-type environments<br />
as the “prevent and shape” phases on the spectrum<br />
of conflict. However, unlike the “win” phase, the prevent and<br />
shape phases require a much longer time horizon. Regionally<br />
aligned forces (RAF) are the <strong>Army</strong>’s designated units where<br />
prioritizing training for competing in the gray zone must take<br />
precedence.<br />
An example of RAF training includes what’s known as<br />
CREL—cultural, regional expertise and language—training.<br />
This type of training enables <strong>Army</strong> units to gain specific<br />
knowledge so they understand how to fight for dominance and<br />
relevancy in gray zone conflicts. Part of the challenge in training<br />
for these types of conflicts is that the end state may not be<br />
a decisive win like in a large battle or campaign (sometimes<br />
replicated at combat training centers). <strong>Army</strong> leaders must be<br />
comfortable with accomplishing missions with inconclusive<br />
outcomes, and understand that investment in CREL training<br />
may take a long time.<br />
Home-Station Training<br />
Conflicts in the gray zone are complex. They combine the<br />
dynamics of culture, history, economics and interpersonal rela-<br />
26 ARMY ■ February 2016
By Maj. David B. Rowland<br />
tionships and have a long time horizon. This complexity is<br />
difficult to simulate at a combined training center in a one- or<br />
two-week scenario.<br />
Instead, units must develop home-station training scenarios<br />
that can simulate this mix of complexity. Home-station training<br />
is more cost-effective than deploying units to combined<br />
training centers and can provide a variety of scenarios to leaders.<br />
Many installations have the facilities to use the live, virtual,<br />
integrating architecture to build the multilayered intricacies<br />
needed for gray zone conflict training.<br />
Training at home station puts less pressure to cram the complexities<br />
into an intense training center scenario. It also allows<br />
units to develop information, gain understanding and refine intelligence<br />
over a longer time horizon, just like conflicts in the<br />
gray zone. Therefore, combined training centers can remain focused<br />
on decisive action scenarios for which they are well-resourced<br />
and -suited.<br />
Home-station training allows continued repetitions and<br />
builds on previous training exercises as units mature and learn<br />
new skills, tactics, techniques and procedures to operate in<br />
gray zone conflicts. Exercise Gryphon Tomahawk, conducted<br />
in February 2014 by the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade<br />
at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., serves as a good example.<br />
Training at home station must include all aspects of gray<br />
zone conflict including working with special operations forces,<br />
which typically operate in gray zone areas before conventional<br />
forces arrive.<br />
Uniquely Trained, Equipped<br />
The <strong>Army</strong>’s special operations forces (ARSOF) are uniquely<br />
trained and equipped to operate in the gray zone. However,<br />
there are not enough Special Forces, civil affairs and psychological<br />
operations soldiers available to deploy to every area<br />
where the nation is in gray zone competition. ARSOF makes<br />
up less than 5 percent of the active and reserve components and<br />
cannot meet all the needs of combatant commanders.<br />
Conventional forces must be ready to fill this capacity gap<br />
with the regionally aligned forces. RAF units, which are oriented<br />
on different parts of the world, give the <strong>Army</strong> opportunities<br />
to coordinate operations and build habitual relationships<br />
between special operations and conventional forces.<br />
Exercises such as Combined Resolve V, at the Joint Multinational<br />
Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany; and the Joint<br />
Forcible Entry Exercise, at the National Training Center at<br />
Fort Irwin, Calif., are good examples that demonstrate special<br />
operations-conventional force interoperability. These training<br />
exercises can also be scaled and replicated at many installations.<br />
While <strong>Army</strong> RAF units learn from ARSOF units and integrate<br />
best practices, they firmly remain conventional units.<br />
Maintaining the mastery of combined arms maneuver, certainly<br />
at the platoon and company level, keeps conventional<br />
forces prepared for the entire spectrum of conflict. Pre-eminence<br />
on the high-end battlefield remains a deterrence to our<br />
nation’s enemies. <strong>Army</strong> conventional units will still be able to<br />
learn valuable lessons from the ARSOF cultural and language<br />
experts. Training with ARSOF, then, must begin at home<br />
station or the combined training centers, well before a unit arrives<br />
at the host nation or in unfriendly territory.<br />
Become More Expeditionary<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> must become more expeditionary so it can deploy<br />
to theaters with gray zone conflicts. The days of shipping multiple<br />
containers by air and sea—like the <strong>Army</strong> has done in<br />
Afghanistan and Iraq—are over. This is no longer affordable for<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> nor acceptable for the customer, whether it is a combatant<br />
commander or the State Department. Deploying large,<br />
brigade-size units is not always an option in smaller countries,<br />
as seen when partnering with our allies in the Pacific or Africa.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Lt. Col. Sonise Lumbaca<br />
Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, train<br />
in a mock tunnel system at Fort Bliss, Texas.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 27
Right: Soldiers of the<br />
1st Armored Brigade,<br />
3rd Infantry Division,<br />
conduct a convoy<br />
brief during Combined<br />
Resolve V in Hohenfels,<br />
Germany; below right:<br />
Another soldier provides<br />
security during<br />
exercise cordon-andsearch<br />
operations.<br />
Foremost, smaller, more agile sustainment footprints allow<br />
<strong>Army</strong> units to gain access to and compete in these conflict areas.<br />
Multisource logistics combining a reach-back to the continental<br />
U.S. and locally procured service and support allow <strong>Army</strong> units<br />
to reduce the overall “tooth-to-tail” ratio. Operationalizing the<br />
Reinvigorating Sustainment Home Station Training initiative is<br />
an excellent concept to help achieve this goal.<br />
Additionally, as deployment numbers are scrutinized, units<br />
will need to capitalize on the communication network backbone<br />
by using significant reach-back capability. This may include<br />
having a robust intelligence section or running the network<br />
support package from home station. For example, as<br />
troop levels in Afghanistan started to decline in 2013, the 4th<br />
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, started<br />
redeploying intelligence soldiers back to Joint Base Lewis-<br />
McChord before the unit’s deployment ended. Upon return to<br />
home station, intelligence soldiers continued to provide analytical<br />
support to the forward-deployed soldiers.<br />
Communications, intelligence and sustainment elements of<br />
the command will perform essential functions as the forces deploy<br />
forward while keeping the deployed numbers to an acceptable<br />
level. Engaged leaders can make this expeditionary<br />
use of enablers effective.<br />
Lessons Gleaned<br />
History may not exactly repeat itself, as the old adage says,<br />
but we can glean some important lessons following our experiences<br />
in Iraq and Afghanistan as the <strong>Army</strong> is forced to reduce<br />
in size and prepare for future conflicts. Current events in the<br />
Maj. David B. Rowland, an infantry officer, served most recently<br />
at U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Special Operations Command. He has served on<br />
combat deployments with Ranger, airborne and Stryker units.<br />
He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy<br />
and a master’s degree from Georgetown University.<br />
Middle East and Africa demonstrate that we are not entering<br />
an era of perpetual peace; neither are we likely entering an era<br />
of direct conflict with a near-peer competitor—or at least, we<br />
hope not. The <strong>Army</strong> will more likely find itself supporting national<br />
objectives fighting in the gray zone, that undefined and<br />
complex environment between war and peace. Preparing for<br />
this type of conflict requires deliberate decisions by <strong>Army</strong><br />
leaders to focus on a specific training path. Sometimes, it’s the<br />
road less traveled.<br />
✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Spc. Shardesia Washington U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Ian Schell<br />
28 ARMY ■ February 2016
It’s Time to Establish<br />
Ethics-Related Metrics<br />
By Col. Charles D. Allen, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
In July 2006, DoD initiated the “Check It” campaign as<br />
part of its internal management controls program and coopted<br />
the military aphorism “what gets checked gets<br />
done.” To check that something is being done correctly<br />
requires measurement and metrics.<br />
During the past decade, DoD has sought to measure the effectiveness<br />
of its counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan<br />
and Iraq. It also sought to measure the effect of fiscal year<br />
2013 sequestration using varied metrics for readiness, modernization<br />
and force structure of the armed services. DoD is still<br />
struggling to find appropriate metrics to assess the efficacy of<br />
the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.<br />
The difficulties in measuring these areas of strategic concern<br />
do not bode well for DoD as it strives to check the character of<br />
its leaders and ethics within the profession of arms to ensure<br />
that we are “getting it right.”<br />
The White House and Congress have paid a great deal of attention<br />
to the ethical missteps and misbehavior of DoD leaders<br />
in the early years of the 21st century. In response, the secretary<br />
of defense in 2014 appointed a senior advisor for military professionalism<br />
to focus its efforts for military ethics, character and<br />
leadership development. In a report in September 2015, however,<br />
the Government Accountability Office found that DoD<br />
“has not fully implemented two key tools for identifying and<br />
assessing ethics and professionalism issues, and it has not developed<br />
performance metrics to measure its progress in addressing<br />
ethics-related issues.” In the years since the renewed<br />
focus, ethical issues have continued in operational and institutional<br />
settings throughout the <strong>Army</strong> as well as in other services.<br />
Too Many Failings<br />
News accounts of officer, enlisted and civilian personnel<br />
misconduct are, unfortunately, not infrequent and are generally<br />
met with cynicism. The perceived lack of accountability<br />
for senior leaders is aptly captured by author Tom Ricks’ quip,<br />
“different spanks for different ranks.” While the 2011 <strong>Army</strong><br />
Profession Campaign and study sought to revive trust in the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> as an institution, there are still too many incidents of<br />
ethical failings within the ranks.<br />
In early 2015, my U.S. <strong>Army</strong> War College colleagues, research<br />
professor of military strategy Leonard Wong and professor<br />
of behavioral sciences Stephen J. Gerras, revealed in<br />
“Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the <strong>Army</strong> Profession” a<br />
pervasive culture of false reporting resulting from overwhelm-<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Staff Sgt. Adam C. Keith<br />
Lt. Gen. Stephen R.<br />
Lanza, I Corps commanding<br />
general,<br />
welcomes Joint Base<br />
Lewis-McChord,<br />
Wash., soldiers to a<br />
Junior Leader <strong>Army</strong><br />
Profession Symposium<br />
designed to<br />
gather feedback on<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> ethic.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 29
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. 1st Class John D. Brown<br />
Leaders from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, discuss ethically challenging<br />
situations during a professional development program at Fort Campbell, Ky.<br />
ing and burdensome requirements, and the accepted norm of<br />
telling higher headquarters what they want to hear.<br />
Wong and Gerras are known to be provocative in asking<br />
tough questions and publishing research findings that are uncomfortable<br />
for military members. Ultimately, they challenge<br />
the self-image and professional identity of <strong>Army</strong> officers as well<br />
as the <strong>Army</strong> profession itself. Self-image and identity contribute<br />
to the frame of reference developed through career imprinting<br />
from the first unit assignment.<br />
Monica C. Higgins, a professor in education leadership at<br />
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, offers that career<br />
imprinting is a “form of learning that encompasses the professional<br />
impression left on individuals by an organization.”<br />
Given that career imprinting influences individual leader<br />
choices and behavior in an organizational context, then it<br />
would also affect the ethical climate of a unit set by its leaders.<br />
In an article last spring for the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> War College quarterly<br />
Parameters, I asserted that the <strong>Army</strong>’s recent focus has<br />
been on the lack of character of individual leaders and of their<br />
supporting staff to confront and mitigate unethical behavior. A<br />
missing component is an appreciation for a unit climate that<br />
discourages ethical behavior. Importantly, organizational scholars<br />
Linda K. Trevino, Gary R. Weaver and Scott J. Reynolds<br />
offer that ethical climate is “a shared perception among organization<br />
members regarding the criteria … of ethical reasoning<br />
within an organization.” This perception is formed through the<br />
day-to-day experience of unit members of what is acceptable,<br />
and by observing the interactions of leaders and subordinates.<br />
Lack of Survey Instrument<br />
Unfortunately, neither the <strong>Army</strong> nor DoD employs a validated<br />
survey instrument to assess ethical climates within units.<br />
The Government Accountability Office noted that the senior<br />
advisor for military professionalism office<br />
was completing an inventory of climate,<br />
professional development and psychometric<br />
tools that are used across the department<br />
to enhance interdepartmental<br />
visibility of these tools and promote best<br />
practices, and that the office staff “stated<br />
that while these tools could be used to<br />
assess ethics-related issues, none of the<br />
tools were designed exclusively for that<br />
purpose.”<br />
It is puzzling that DoD would consider<br />
using survey instruments inappropriate<br />
to assess something as important<br />
as ethical climate. Rather than rely on<br />
anecdotal evidence or the gut feel of senior<br />
leaders far removed from units, it<br />
would be prudent for the <strong>Army</strong> to either<br />
develop a survey instrument or adapt an<br />
existing tool specifically designed to assess<br />
ethical climate. <strong>On</strong>e such available<br />
tool is the Ethical Climate Questionnaire, a valid assessment<br />
instrument that measures five dimensions of climate developed<br />
from scholarly research.<br />
My sense of that aspect of a unit climate was not based on<br />
formal survey but from my own career imprinting with an assignment<br />
to a field artillery battalion in a mechanized division<br />
during the height of the Cold War. Imagine being a young<br />
lieutenant or junior NCO in Germany in the late 1970s, when<br />
<strong>Army</strong> units were stationed on overcrowded kasernes and<br />
subinstallations; units shared headquarters buildings, barracks,<br />
maintenance bays and motor pools. Our artillery battalion collocated<br />
its vehicle parking area with the division cavalry<br />
squadron and an engineer company.<br />
With the shared parking, there were concurrent nightly<br />
guard mounts, ostensibly to protect the equipment from offpost<br />
outsiders. In reality, the unit guards were protecting their<br />
vehicles and equipment from “midnight requisitions” by other<br />
units. Many of us remember painting the bumper numbers on<br />
the canvas doors of our vehicles—jeeps, Gama Goats and<br />
GOERs—only to be dismayed when those items still disappeared<br />
overnight.<br />
For proper supply accountability, <strong>Army</strong> regulations required<br />
hand receipts for property, and periodic inventory. Shortage<br />
annexes documented missing items and components for vehicles,<br />
sets, kits and outfits. It was common practice to update<br />
hand receipts after maneuver exercises, and record “field<br />
losses” on shortage annexes. Part of command supply discipline<br />
was to engrave unit designation on the components of<br />
the various tool kits. While the practice may have aided accountability<br />
during inventory, it was more likely to facilitate<br />
recovery from those who had “borrowed” the tool. I remember<br />
the absurdity as the maintenance sergeant attempted to engrave<br />
a set of Allen wrenches.<br />
Col. Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., is professor of leadership and cultural<br />
studies in the Department of Command, Leadership and<br />
Management at the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> War College.<br />
‘Get It Done’<br />
A critical event for each leader was the unit’s annual general<br />
inspection. With its numerous checklists and metrics, the in-<br />
30 ARMY ■ February 2016
spection and the <strong>Army</strong> training and evaluation program were<br />
the objective measures of performance—for success and failure—and<br />
inevitably recorded on officer and NCO evaluation<br />
reports. In a zero-defect <strong>Army</strong>, failure had implications. “Can<br />
do” attitude morphed into “get it done.”<br />
During the inspection week, there were the perpetually dispatched<br />
vehicles unavailable for inspection, relocation of storage<br />
containers holding excess parts and equipment, and the<br />
mysterious storage site outside the unit area. In a time of uncertainty<br />
and turbulence for the big <strong>Army</strong>, the impact at the<br />
unit level was the necessity to look good even when the resources<br />
were not available to be good. Hence, the “shared perception<br />
among organizational members” of ethical behavior<br />
was not consistent with the espoused professional ethics. While<br />
these recountings are anecdotal, they provide an indication of<br />
an ethical climate even without a formal survey instrument.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> historians have documented the challenges and resultant<br />
shortfall in funding for training hours and miles (referred<br />
to as operating tempo), ammunition and fuel during the post-<br />
Vietnam War era. Perhaps the greatest shortfall was in the professionalism<br />
of the <strong>Army</strong>. This coincided with the end of a major<br />
conflict and the implementation of the all-volunteer force,<br />
with the attendant growing pains of the volunteer <strong>Army</strong>. As<br />
the nation tried to leave Vietnam behind, it also sought a peace<br />
dividend to assist in the recovery from the U.S. recession of<br />
1973–75 and lessen the impact of the 1973 OPEC embargo<br />
that resulted in a fourfold increase in oil prices.<br />
Accordingly, with the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam,<br />
by 1974 the <strong>Army</strong> faced a 40 percent budget cut and a<br />
50 percent reduction in force structure from the Vietnam-era<br />
peak of 1.57 million soldiers in 1969 to 785,000.<br />
The strain on the <strong>Army</strong> was palpable and confirmed in the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> chief of staff-directed <strong>Army</strong> War College “Study on Military<br />
Professionalism” in 1970. <strong>On</strong>e of the study’s key findings<br />
was that junior officers were “deeply aware of professional standards,<br />
keenly interested in discussions about the subject, and intolerant<br />
of those—either peers or seniors—who they believe are<br />
substandard in ethical or moral behavior or in technical competence.”<br />
The study also related a “preoccupation with ‘measurable<br />
trivia’ … devised by senior leaders” that contributed to “inaccurate<br />
reporting—rampant throughout the <strong>Army</strong> and perceived<br />
by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7.” Fortyfive<br />
years later, the conditions reported by Wong and Gerras in<br />
“Lying to Ourselves” have either re-emerged or persistently endured<br />
in spite of efforts to maintain a professional <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Struggles for Relevance<br />
In our current circumstance, the <strong>Army</strong> is once again struggling<br />
to establish its relevance in an uncertain and turbulent<br />
national security environment. The nation seeks to shift its<br />
balance to the Asia-Pacific region and away from the ground<br />
combat-centric operations in the Middle East. The scale of<br />
deployments for the <strong>Army</strong> has been greatly reduced, and another<br />
peace dividend is sought from DoD and the <strong>Army</strong> as the<br />
nation seeks to deal with its federal debt. Like in the 1970s,<br />
the decade-plus cost of operations for the war on terrorism<br />
and the 2007–09 recession have contributed to our financial<br />
concerns. As the <strong>Army</strong> reduces force structure from its activeduty<br />
peak of 570,000 to 450,000 soldiers by the end of fiscal<br />
year 2018, the competition for promotion and retention of talented<br />
personnel will increase.<br />
With fiscal austerity comes greater scrutiny, along with calls<br />
for accountability and efficiency. As the <strong>Army</strong> goes back to<br />
basics, greater emphasis will be placed on fiscal responsibility,<br />
training management and command supply discipline. Each<br />
of these areas begs for metrics and drives the call for data and<br />
reports to higher headquarters. What can be measured will be<br />
reported with potentially little regard for the efficacy of the reporting.<br />
And increased accountability will drive the need for<br />
more compliance inspections, with the potential for zero-defect<br />
mentality to emerge across the force.<br />
Such an institutional culture will have a direct impact on<br />
units and their people at the lowest level—for the lieutenants<br />
and sergeants who are the direct leaders of our <strong>Army</strong>. The career<br />
imprints for this generation of junior leaders with be based<br />
on their experiences and the ethical climates within their units.<br />
Accordingly, the perceptions of <strong>Army</strong><br />
personnel should be assessed and monitored<br />
as leading indicators of unethical<br />
behavior in their quest to accomplish assigned<br />
tasks and missions.<br />
Whether in the operating or generating<br />
force, as important as what gets done<br />
must be how it gets done. <strong>On</strong>e would expect<br />
that unit leaders will dutifully communicate<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> Values, but behaving<br />
in accordance with those values will be<br />
based on the perception of what is really<br />
important in the organization. ✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Tara L. Cook<br />
Command Sgt. Maj. David L. Stewart of the<br />
Center for the <strong>Army</strong> Profession and Ethic, West<br />
Point, N.Y., delivers a message about trust at<br />
Fort Stewart, Ga.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 31
Creativity<br />
Could Boost<br />
Regionally Aligned<br />
Forces Concept<br />
By Col. Allen J. Pepper<br />
A 12th Combat Aviation Brigade AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter flies over Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Gertrud Zach<br />
<strong>Army</strong> leadership’s vision involves a force that is globally<br />
responsive and regionally engaged. An important<br />
aspect of turning this vision into reality is the concept<br />
of regionally aligned forces. This concept, which the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> has been executing since early 2013, provided U.S. Africa<br />
Command with trained and available forces for a range of missions;<br />
supported U.S. Pacific Command in the pivot to the Pacific;<br />
and enabled a rapid response by U.S. European Command<br />
and NATO to Russian aggression in Ukraine.<br />
Despite these early successes and other recent accomplishments,<br />
the concept of regionally aligned forces (RAF) leaves<br />
room for improvement to foster the development of soldiers<br />
and leaders for future <strong>Army</strong> readiness and thereby support geographic<br />
combatant commands. In particular, the <strong>Army</strong> must<br />
work creatively to find opportunities to deploy these units into<br />
their theaters, improve continuity between RAF rotations, include<br />
regional affiliation in officer and NCO assignment decisions,<br />
and select promising junior and midlevel leaders for regular<br />
small-unit missions within the RAF construct.<br />
The concept of regionally aligned forces involves aligning<br />
select units from both the active and reserve components of<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> to the geographic combatant commands. As highlighted<br />
in a September 2014 briefing from the <strong>Army</strong> Staff,<br />
these units and soldiers should develop enhanced situational<br />
understanding of their designated region and increase their<br />
readiness for serving through on-the-job training and active<br />
engagement. Improved situational awareness will help make<br />
them better partners for both the U.S. interagency and allies.<br />
RAF units are primarily involved in activities to shape the operational<br />
environment, with an emphasis on building relationships<br />
as well as partner capacity. However, the deployment of<br />
part of an infantry company to protect the U.S. Embassy in<br />
South Sudan for five months in 2013–14 showed that RAF units<br />
are not strictly limited to shaping the operational environment.<br />
Start With Decisive Action Training<br />
The training pipeline for the brigade combat team around<br />
which each geographic combatant command’s RAF is built<br />
starts with decisive action training, including a combat training<br />
center rotation, resources permitting. This is augmented with<br />
geographic combatant command-specific training requirements<br />
and cultural, regional expertise and language training.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> intends for the RAF concept to provide benefits<br />
to combatant commanders, soldiers and units. U.S. Africa<br />
Command, the test-bed geographic combatant command for<br />
regionally aligned forces, saw stark improvements in the availability<br />
of trained troops for security cooperation activities with<br />
the implementation of the RAF concept. The European Command<br />
has also benefited from the assured availability of <strong>Army</strong><br />
forces, as the U.S. has provided a portion of a brigade combat<br />
team to the NATO Response Force for the first time since that<br />
force’s inception in 2003. That same brigade combat team—<br />
the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division—also participated in the<br />
NATO exercise Combined Resolve II, and assured regional<br />
partners with U.S. presence in Poland and the Baltics as part of<br />
the NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.<br />
32 ARMY ■ February 2016
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Gemma Iglesias<br />
Above: Soldiers from African nations visit the<br />
Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,<br />
Germany; left: Soldiers from the 173rd<br />
Airborne Brigade demonstrate room-clearing<br />
techniques to Ukrainian troops in Ukraine.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Spc. Joshua Leonard<br />
For <strong>Army</strong> units involved in RAF, the devotion to a particular<br />
region helps provide purpose for home-station training, ensuring<br />
that they focus on what combatant commanders want. With<br />
“engagement” now listed as one of the <strong>Army</strong>’s warfighting functions<br />
and “shaping the security environment” counted among<br />
the core competencies of the <strong>Army</strong>, the security cooperation nature<br />
of many RAF-executed deployments demonstrates that a<br />
unit’s participation in RAF can directly contribute to its preparedness<br />
to execute some of the <strong>Army</strong>’s core missions.<br />
Prepare for Domination<br />
Several RAF activities to build partner capacity were conducted<br />
alongside special operations forces with long experience<br />
in the region, with general purpose and special operations forces<br />
complementing each other’s capabilities. All of this prepares<br />
units to dominate the human domain, as ground forces are<br />
called upon to do. Small-unit, geographically distributed expeditionary<br />
missions also provide excellent leadership and command<br />
opportunities, and force the exercise<br />
of Mission Command at a time<br />
when situational awareness tools seem to<br />
allow this prerogative of effective operations<br />
to be a popular theme that is often<br />
ignored in practice.<br />
Despite these clear successes, criticisms<br />
of the RAF concept remain, and some of<br />
them are valid. The concern that implementation<br />
would be too costly to the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> has been shown to be largely unfounded,<br />
as many RAF-executed activities<br />
are financed with Title 22 (Department<br />
of State) funding for activities<br />
related to building partner capacity, or through exercise-related<br />
funds. This money would be spent anyway, regardless of which<br />
unit participated in the exercise.<br />
There is, however, an opportunity cost for a unit involved in<br />
RAF. For example, time spent on learning to use a foreign<br />
weapon for an activity related to building partner capacity is<br />
time that is not spent conducting battle drills. Some 20 years<br />
ago, soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia<br />
developed the small-unit leadership skills and attributes that<br />
proved to be essential in operations in Afghanistan over the<br />
last 15 years. We should expect similar intangible benefits and<br />
training offset from soldiers conducting activities that are new<br />
to them in regions they do not know well today.<br />
Some of the more common criticisms of the RAF concept are<br />
related to its definition and why it’s important. Since its inception,<br />
RAF has meant different things to different people: a new<br />
focus on building partner capacity, to some soldiers; predictable<br />
availability of troops, to geographic combatant commands; per-<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 33
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Alexandra Hulett<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Pfc. Craig Philbrick<br />
Above: Soldiers from the 1st Armored Division<br />
and Spanish Legionnaires during African Readiness<br />
Training 15 in Spain; right: An 82nd Airborne<br />
Division soldier helps a Polish soldier during an<br />
exercise of NATO nations in Hohenfels, Germany.<br />
haps additional help for security cooperation,<br />
to the Department of State; and a<br />
new tool to keep American troops out of<br />
major foreign operations, to isolationists.<br />
These different interpretations point to a<br />
problem with the messaging associated<br />
with the concept of regionally aligned<br />
forces. This messaging problem leaves<br />
room for the criticism that the RAF concept<br />
is nothing substantially new but instead,<br />
a gimmick to defend force structure<br />
in a period of sequestration.<br />
Improve Concept<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> can, however, improve the<br />
RAF concept and its implementation and<br />
thus, reduce the risk of such an interpretation.<br />
Four concrete measures can help<br />
ensure that the RAF concept endures and provides better<br />
trained and available forces to the joint force while also contributing<br />
to the development of future leaders.<br />
First, the <strong>Army</strong>’s service component commands must search<br />
for opportunities for RAF units and soldiers to operate in<br />
their area of responsibility. The service component commands<br />
should work with partner nations to develop combined<br />
training activities, and also with the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Forces<br />
Col. Allen J. Pepper is an infantry and Sub-Saharan Africa foreign<br />
area officer currently serving as the senior defense official/defense<br />
attache in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo. He holds<br />
a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s<br />
degree from the University of Strasbourg, France.<br />
Command to provide the funding for RAF units to deploy<br />
and participate in this training. Section 1203 of the National<br />
Defense Authorization Act for 2014 authorizes expenditures<br />
for this kind of training, allowing the service component<br />
command to present attractive proposals to partner nations.<br />
In a time of reduced training money, the service component<br />
commands likely will face considerable resistance for such expenses.<br />
But the chief of staff’s prerogative for the <strong>Army</strong> to be<br />
the leader in the human domain makes such deployments important<br />
tools for <strong>Army</strong> readiness and relevance.<br />
In addition, the service component commands must work<br />
with geographic combatant commands to develop proposals<br />
for security assistance programs and cases, with the training<br />
aspects executed by RAF tactical units and soldiers from the<br />
34 ARMY ■ February 2016
institutional <strong>Army</strong>. These activities to build partner capacity<br />
will assist the State Department and geographic combatant<br />
commands in accomplishing their objectives while also providing<br />
soldiers with exceptional training opportunities.<br />
Second, the <strong>Army</strong> should rethink its rotation of units. The<br />
current force-generation plan has the core brigade of the RAF<br />
shifting from one division and post to another, with units not<br />
having recurring RAF duty within a single region. With RAF<br />
responsibility shifting this way, “battle hand-off” and continuity<br />
between one RAF rotation and the next has been lacking,<br />
with new units often receiving few insights from their predecessors<br />
and not participating in planning iterations for events<br />
to be executed during their period of responsibility.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> should adjust the timing of the combat training<br />
center rotation for a brigade combat team scheduled to serve<br />
as the core of the RAF. That would allow the combat training<br />
center rotation to be completed in time for the unit to participate<br />
and focus on key planning events for exercises, security<br />
cooperation and operational activities in the month or two before<br />
assuming RAF responsibility.<br />
Keep Regional Alignment in Mind<br />
Third, the <strong>Army</strong> needs to begin taking regional alignment<br />
into account in assignment decisions for officers and NCOs.<br />
The brief segment of cultural, regional expertise and language<br />
training in the pre-execution phase and awareness training<br />
throughout the year at home station can help orient soldiers to<br />
the region in which they will operate. However, this limited<br />
training will not transform a soldier into a foreign area officer<br />
or a special operations forces soldier—far from it.<br />
While it is helpful for organizational planning reasons to<br />
habitually align units with the same geographic combatant<br />
command, an additional benefit would come from habitually<br />
assigning officers and NCOs to units that will be picking up<br />
RAF rotations during their assignment. This will allow them<br />
to build a knowledge and experience base somewhat similar to<br />
what soldiers with repeated assignments to Germany or Korea<br />
over the past decades had.<br />
The benefits of such familiarity with a region can extend to<br />
all phases of military operations. This additional assignment<br />
consideration will put a new burden on U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Human<br />
Resources Command, and it is unrealistic to expect a leader’s<br />
entire career to be focused on one region. However, this effort<br />
should start now. The <strong>Army</strong> will reap the benefits of such an<br />
approach in the decades to come.<br />
Fourth, commanders of RAF units must select their best officers<br />
and NCOs for repeated deployments to their region of<br />
interest. As U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Africa strategists recognized when<br />
they looked back on early rounds of RAF, the concept can<br />
play an important role in shaping the <strong>Army</strong> of the future.<br />
Twenty years from now, will the <strong>Army</strong> want as a brigade commander<br />
an officer who has had a series of combat training center<br />
rotations as his formative leadership experiences, or an officer<br />
who has had perhaps half as many training center rotations<br />
but also a series of deployments into complex operational areas?<br />
If commanders believe it is the latter, then they should<br />
contribute to developing those future senior leaders now by selecting<br />
them to lead soldiers in expeditionary missions, and<br />
granting them repeated opportunities to adapt and excel.<br />
The concept of regionally aligned forces has already proven<br />
valuable. By working creatively to deploy these units more often,<br />
and then supporting regional alignment at the institutional<br />
level via personnel assignment decisions, the <strong>Army</strong> can<br />
use the concept to more effectively develop future senior leaders<br />
and provide enhanced support to the geographic combatant<br />
commands.<br />
✭<br />
U.S. and Zambian observers monitor soldiers during a live-fire exercise in Zambia.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Staff Sgt. Michael A. Simmons<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 35
Muscle for an Uncertain<br />
Performance, Payload and Comfy Seats<br />
Stories By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer<br />
With a smoother ride, roomier and more comfortable<br />
cab, and performance that is off the<br />
charts, the latest generation of <strong>Army</strong> trucks has<br />
moved well beyond the traditional role of tactical<br />
wheeled vehicles and into the realm of what can only be<br />
seen as “muscle trucks.”<br />
A classic example can be found in the new Joint Light Tactical<br />
Vehicle (JLTV), which was developed under an <strong>Army</strong>led<br />
joint acquisition with the U.S. Marine Corps. Following a<br />
successful Defense Acquisition Board and subsequent approval<br />
by the defense acquisition executive, the U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
awarded Oshkosh Corp. a firm-fixed-price production contract<br />
for the JLTV in late August 2015.<br />
Scott Davis, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> program executive officer for combat<br />
support and combat service support, said current light tactical<br />
fleet capabilities mean combat commanders “often have<br />
to choose between payload, performance and protection.”<br />
“It is often said that in terms of the JLTV, there were no<br />
significantly stretching technologies,” he said, “but the magic<br />
was in balancing those three things to come up with an optimal<br />
solution.”<br />
Davis also said JLTV will provide protection similar to the<br />
MATV, or MRAP all-terrain vehicle, but at about 2/3 the<br />
weight. The protection will be substantially greater than that<br />
of the Humvee, he said.<br />
<strong>On</strong>e design element that separates U.S. <strong>Army</strong> muscle trucks<br />
from most other wheeled vehicles involves the need for armor<br />
protection.<br />
“It’s amazing what we learned from 14 years of war,” said<br />
Kevin Fahey, who recently retired as director of the assistant<br />
secretary of the <strong>Army</strong> (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)<br />
System of Systems Engineering and Integration Directorate,<br />
following earlier service as program executive officer for<br />
combat support and combat service support.<br />
“The survivability we can give to a tactical wheeled vehicle<br />
now would have been unheard of 15 years ago,” Fahey said.<br />
“The things we learned about shaping, space, how you strap<br />
people in seats, resulted in a ‘4X’ increase in survivability for<br />
MRAPs.”<br />
The JLTV family of vehicles is comprised of two-seat and<br />
four-seat variants as well as a companion trailer (JLTV-T). The<br />
two-seat variant has one base vehicle platform, the Utility<br />
36 ARMY ■ February 2016
World<br />
Photos by Oshkosh Corp.<br />
All photos on this and facing page:<br />
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is shown<br />
from different angles.<br />
(JLTV-UTL). The four-seat variant has two base vehicle platforms:<br />
the General Purpose (JLTV-GP) and the Close Combat<br />
Weapons Carrier (JLTV-CCWC).<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> anticipates the acquisition of 49,099 new platforms,<br />
with the Marine Corps set to acquire 5,500. The<br />
late August contract award will provide the first 16,901 vehicles<br />
toward those totals.<br />
Oshkosh won the contract for the initial production order<br />
over AM General and Lockheed Martin. Lockheed appealed<br />
to the Government Accountability Office, putting a temporary<br />
freeze on the program that was lifted Dec. 15. Lockheed<br />
has now sued. The <strong>Army</strong> has given Oshkosh the go-ahead to<br />
begin work and has until Feb. 16 to respond to the suit.<br />
The new JLTVs will replace a<br />
slice of the <strong>Army</strong>’s current Humvee<br />
fleet that—well, let’s face it:<br />
There’s nothing in the Kelley<br />
Blue Book that talks about a vehicle<br />
that’s been up-armored, shot<br />
at and seriously overburdened<br />
while being driven across some of<br />
the toughest terrain on the planet.<br />
So whether the <strong>Army</strong> drives, tows<br />
or pushes that trade-in fleet slice<br />
into the dealer, the anticipation is<br />
definitely focused on signing a<br />
DD250 Material Inspection and<br />
Receiving Report and driving the<br />
new ride off the lot.<br />
“JLTV is probably one of the<br />
best acquisition programs, where it went through a real program<br />
of record, that we have ever managed,” Fahey said. A<br />
lot of the success was because of partnerships with the U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Training and Doctrine Command “on things like cost,<br />
schedule and performance tradeoff analysis. And there’s no<br />
doubt that when everything is resolved with JLTV, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
will get a great truck.”<br />
When soldiers do finally get into their truck, they will notice<br />
lots of differences from the old ride. To begin with, the<br />
Oshkosh TAK-4i intelligent independent suspension system,<br />
incorporated with 20 inches of usable wheel travel, will provide<br />
unprecedented levels of off-road performance across the<br />
world’s toughest terrains.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 37
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is small enough to be carried on many military transports.<br />
The new ride is speedy, too, with the manufacturer<br />
pointing to “70 percent faster offroad<br />
speeds” than <strong>Army</strong> tactical wheeled vehicles<br />
like Oshkosh’s own MATV.<br />
JLTV’s digitally controlled engine provides<br />
an optimized engine power-to-weight<br />
ratio with superior acceleration, mobility and<br />
“speed on grade” capabilities, as well as improved<br />
fuel economy in both idle and operational<br />
modes.<br />
When it does come time to stop, a highperformance<br />
disc brake solution provides exceptional<br />
stopping and grade-holding capabilities.<br />
And when it’s time to put the vehicle<br />
onto a longer-range transport platform, interior<br />
controls enable an adaptable suspension<br />
to be raised and lowered to meet those transportability<br />
requirements.<br />
Soldiers shouldn’t complain about a<br />
bumpy ride, either. Floating seat designs are<br />
not only comfortable but, combined with re-<br />
Retired Colonel Was Expert on Armoring Trucks<br />
While advances in tactical wheeled vehicle armoring<br />
have accelerated during the past 15 years, they were<br />
actually built on a foundation of more than three decades<br />
of experience. And when it comes to armoring <strong>Army</strong><br />
trucks, few individuals have the rich background knowledge<br />
and experience that were possessed by retired <strong>Army</strong><br />
Col. John Stoddart. He spoke with ARMY magazine on<br />
the topic shortly before he died in December.<br />
Long before Stoddart served as a former U.S. <strong>Army</strong> program<br />
manager for heavy tactical vehicles and program executive<br />
officer for tactical wheeled vehicles, he developed a<br />
personal history with U.S. <strong>Army</strong> truck armoring that traces<br />
to the command of a company that ran convoys from Da<br />
Nang up to what was then Vietnam’s Demilitarized Zone.<br />
“What you had back then was a ‘thin-skinned’ vehicle,”<br />
he said. “The Viet Cong would put out a mine, which was<br />
a precursor to a ground attack. So the guys started making<br />
what they called ‘gun trucks.’ But the <strong>Army</strong> came back<br />
and said, ‘No, we’re not armoring wheeled vehicles. We’re<br />
going to keep trucks as payload carriers, not to fight. And<br />
the more you put on them, the better.’”<br />
Stoddart pointed to several major <strong>Army</strong> systems that were<br />
in development around that time, including the Apache helicopter,<br />
Bradley fighting vehicle, Humvee and the Heavy<br />
Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). “The Humvee<br />
and HEMTT gained prominence due to the fact that<br />
the logistical burden they had to carry was significant,”<br />
Stoddart said. “But they still had canvas for protection.”<br />
Citing the contributions of influential vehicle designers<br />
and testers during that period, Stoddart identified a renewed<br />
interest in both armoring and equipping the platforms<br />
with more rugged tires “to give them a capability to<br />
go places where they couldn’t go before.”<br />
“That was during the early ’80s, and we started getting<br />
feedback from around the world that people were taking<br />
out trucks very easily,” he said. <strong>On</strong>e result was that he led<br />
a team to El Salvador in his role as commander of the Detroit<br />
Arsenal Tank Plant. Stoddart and his team helped to<br />
armor a 5/4 ton truck.<br />
“We took that truck down and tried to turn it into a<br />
quasi-fighting vehicle,” he said. “The problem was that<br />
they really weren’t engineers. They just put a bunch of<br />
iron on there to stop them from shooting through. Great<br />
intentions, but it’s not that easy.”<br />
Stoddart said some in the <strong>Army</strong> expressed interest in armoring<br />
Humvees, “but no good deed goes unpunished. …<br />
You can’t put weight on a vehicle without paying a penalty.”<br />
The net result was a return to the philosophy of trucks as<br />
cargo carriers.<br />
“That’s good until the fight breaks out,” he said. “And<br />
either you can’t go or you add armor, and you are suddenly<br />
destroying your vehicles.”<br />
<strong>On</strong>ce again, folks started with the best intentions, Stoddart<br />
said. However, “they were doing the same darn<br />
things—just sticking more metal on it.”<br />
He described the “rock and a hard place” situation as<br />
“the genesis for the move into MRAP vehicles, because we<br />
then started running into an enemy whose mines were not<br />
a precursor to the fight. Instead, the mines were the fight.”<br />
“But it all evolved to [what] we have today,” Stoddart<br />
said, “which are effective logistics vehicles [that are] very<br />
effective at protecting the soldier.”<br />
38 ARMY ■ February 2016
straints and a stowage system, help save lives and protect soldiers<br />
against injuries in case of accidents or other incidents.<br />
Vehicle survivability is like an onion, however, and the enemy<br />
has to get through several layers before the seats even<br />
come into play. The outer layer of the onion is the previously<br />
cited mobility that means JLTVs will have the performance to<br />
avoid high-threat situations in the first place. Then, if there is<br />
an attack, the JLTV features an advanced hull design to protect<br />
against both blast and ballistic effects.<br />
Several Protective Layers<br />
Peel off those outer layers and you get to the survivable seat<br />
designs—and more. The entire integrated system is designed<br />
to absorb and deflect blast energy. There are also automatic<br />
fire-suppression systems.<br />
JLTV has a new integrated electronic digital backplane as<br />
part of its original design. “The only truck today that has a<br />
digital backplane in it is MRAP and … it didn’t come that<br />
way,” Fahey said, adding that it was made part of the engineering<br />
change proposal package and completed “over time<br />
because we knew it had to carry the network when we were<br />
doing Capability Set 13.”<br />
“But JLTV is basically the first ground vehicle to be VIC-<br />
TORY compliant,” he said. VICTORY is an acronym for vehicular<br />
integration for command, control, communication,<br />
computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance/electronic<br />
warfare interoperability.<br />
“We put chat standard in the previous” engineering and manufacturing<br />
development phase, he said, “and we will update it<br />
consistent with the VICTORY standard being upgraded.”<br />
JLTV’s VICTORY-compliant backbone is “integrationready”<br />
for a wide range of warfare, including subsystems and<br />
capabilities such as weapon systems, exportable power, IED<br />
defeat devices, enhanced situational awareness and improved<br />
navigation. Moreover, forget simple backup cameras. Think<br />
about expanded options for backup, forward and side cameras,<br />
and shot detectors.<br />
In addition to providing warfighters with the perfect muscle<br />
truck for an uncertain world, the success of JLTV may pave<br />
the way for the <strong>Army</strong>’s next generation of truck models.<br />
“The next trucks that will be targeted for modernization will<br />
be the medium and heavy” tactical wheeled vehicles, Fahey<br />
said. Cautioning that he is “biased” and emphasizing that he<br />
“is certainly no longer in charge” of the <strong>Army</strong>’s wheeled vehicles<br />
portfolio, he said, “I know they are already going down<br />
the path of how to sort of follow the JLTV path.”<br />
“How do I do a hefty tech demonstration—the <strong>Army</strong> and<br />
the Marine Corps—and how do I actually look at the truck<br />
missions from medium to heavy and maybe come up with a<br />
more modular design, perhaps a modular truck that can do<br />
medium or heavy types of things?”<br />
“And my personal opinion is that it may follow the same type<br />
of path,” Fahey said. “We’ll do a tech demonstration of what’s<br />
achievable. Then we’ll do a demonstration of industry delivering<br />
trucks to us. We’ll go right into [engineering and manufacturing<br />
development] based on cost/schedule/performance doable.<br />
“And then we’ll go right into production,” Fahey said, adding<br />
that he thinks the JLTV model “has proven to be a good one.<br />
And I think the next-generation truck will follow the same<br />
path.”<br />
✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
JLTV systems are<br />
tested at the Communications-Electronics<br />
Research, Development<br />
and Engineering<br />
Center at Aberdeen<br />
Providing Ground, Md.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 39
Deep Roots of the <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
Before 1901, the <strong>Army</strong> didn’t pay much attention<br />
to soldiers’ teeth. In order to serve<br />
during the Civil War, <strong>Army</strong> recruits simply<br />
had to have six opposing upper and lower<br />
teeth to bite off the tough paper powder cartridges<br />
that were used in muzzle-loading rifles. By 1900,<br />
those wishing to serve in the <strong>Army</strong> had to have only<br />
four teeth—the minimum number required to chew<br />
food. Ironically, the nation’s first commanding general,<br />
George Washington, had only one real tooth<br />
when he was sworn in as president.<br />
Despite repeated pleas dating from the Civil War<br />
for <strong>Army</strong> dentists, the idea was largely ignored.<br />
Congress was finally forced to enact legislation creating<br />
an <strong>Army</strong> Dental Corps in 1901 as a result of<br />
the Spanish-American War. American soldiers campaigning<br />
in Spain’s tropical colonies such as Cuba,<br />
the Dominican Republic and the Philippines were<br />
confronted with extraordinary dental problems.<br />
According to Dr. John Sayre Marshall, the <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
first dental surgeon, soldiers who served in these<br />
tropical environments experienced climate conditions<br />
and “changes in the habits of life” that were<br />
“enervating and debilitating to the general system.”<br />
Marshall noted that as a result, the soldiers’ resistance<br />
to disease was “greatly lessened,” consequently<br />
predisposing them to dental diseases.<br />
$150 per Month<br />
Initially, Congress authorized 30 dental positions<br />
that paid $150 per month as well as free housing.<br />
About 1,000 civilian dentists applied. The legislation<br />
provided that the dentists would not be actual soldiers<br />
but “contract dentists,” with a pay grade equivalent to<br />
a first lieutenant. The reason for this was that many in Congress<br />
were skeptical about the need for dentists at all. The compromise<br />
that was reached was an experiment to determine if a dental<br />
corps was a useful adjunct to the <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
Those chosen were obligated to work seven hours a day for<br />
the <strong>Army</strong>. After that, they could work up to two additional<br />
hours to treat soldiers’ families and civilian employees, charging<br />
the regular fee. Military dependents were not covered under<br />
the legislation.<br />
Marshall assigned the successful candidates to various posts<br />
around the nation and overseas from his headquarters at the<br />
Presidio of San Francisco. Newspapers reported that each<br />
dentist was provided with a “kit of operating machinery …<br />
costing in the neighborhood of $300.” The operating machinery<br />
and other dental paraphernalia were the same as what was<br />
found in offices of the “highest class of dentists in civil life,”<br />
with the exception of the dental chair. The dentist’s chair was<br />
“a folding article of furniture and therefore portable.” Marshall<br />
bragged they were so light that they could be carried on the<br />
Tooth extraction in 1898 during the Spanish-American War<br />
backs of two mules. (In 1901, the <strong>Army</strong> was not mechanized.)<br />
By 1903, in the Annual Reports of the War Department for the<br />
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, Marshall was able to report a<br />
remarkable success story: “The services of the Dental Corps<br />
have been highly appreciated by officers and enlisted men of<br />
the Regular and Volunteer Armies,” he wrote, adding that the<br />
dental corps relieved “a great amount of acute suffering” and<br />
was able to “conserve a large number of teeth and restore them<br />
to a healthy condition, thus almost immediately returning to<br />
duty many cases that were previously carried for several days<br />
upon the company sick report … greatly reducing the loss of<br />
valuable time to the service, incident to diseases of the mouth,<br />
teeth and jaws.”<br />
Officer Dentists Authorized<br />
From the moment he took office, Marshall fought for the<br />
inclusion of dentists within the officers’ ranks. He finally attained<br />
his dream in 1911, when Congress authorized a dental<br />
corps made up of officers. He was the first dentist commis-<br />
Library of Congress<br />
40 ARMY ■ February 2016
Dental Corps By<br />
Daniel J. Demers<br />
sioned as a first lieutenant, but the almost<br />
65-year-old was forced to retire<br />
shortly after accepting his commission<br />
because of mandatory age restrictions.<br />
However, Marshall was advanced to the<br />
grade of captain with the inclusion of his<br />
Civil War service for pension purposes—likely<br />
a pat on the back for a job<br />
well done.<br />
When America entered World War I<br />
in April 1917, newspapers reported that<br />
the corps had grown to 58 dentists,<br />
though <strong>Army</strong> historical documents<br />
claim 86. As draftees gathered at various<br />
<strong>Army</strong> camps, it became apparent that<br />
<strong>Army</strong> dentists were quickly becoming<br />
overwhelmed. The law provided one<br />
dentist for every 1,000 men. But as conscripts<br />
swelled the ranks, the dental<br />
corps couldn’t keep up with the demand<br />
even though more dentists were added.<br />
American civilian dentists filled the<br />
void, mobilizing their efforts nationwide<br />
through an ad hoc Preparedness League<br />
of American Dentists.<br />
Throughout the nation, local dentists<br />
volunteered upward of two hours every<br />
day “to give free dental treatment to all<br />
men accepted for the national army.” An<br />
article in the Arizona Republican helped<br />
exemplify the league’s patriotic work by<br />
explaining that Arizona dentists agreed<br />
to place “the molars of Arizona boys in<br />
such condition that they may at least<br />
masticate their food and be free from<br />
toothaches.” A Chattanooga [Tenn.] News<br />
article explained the specialty was to “remove<br />
abscessed teeth and old roots, to<br />
clean the teeth and thus to remove causes<br />
of focal infection.”<br />
Within a year after entering World<br />
War I, the dental corps’ work was widely<br />
lauded. For example, the Ashland [Ore.]<br />
Tidings in March 1918 noted: “Men<br />
who were formerly sent home on sick<br />
leave, whose only trouble was their molars,<br />
are now kept at the front. … A division<br />
and a half have thus been spared<br />
to the army. [It is also recognized] that a<br />
wounded man with bad teeth makes<br />
slow recovery. … The man with poor<br />
teeth ‘bolts’ his food and loses strength<br />
and endurance.”<br />
Above: Dr. John Sayre Marshall was the first dental surgeon when the <strong>Army</strong> Dental Corps was established<br />
in 1901; below: A dental ambulance served the soldiers at Camp Meade, Md., in 1918.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
National Archives<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 41
Acknowledging the dental corps’ benefits to combat, by<br />
mid-1918 the War Department decided to increase the dentist-to-serviceman<br />
ratio from one dentist to two for every thousand<br />
servicemen.<br />
Office on Wheels<br />
By 1918, “dental ambulances” were introduced. According<br />
to an article in the Ogden [Utah] Standard, they were “an entirely<br />
new thing in warfare. It is a dentist’s office on wheels—<br />
an automobile specially built to contain such an outfit.” These<br />
ambulances were actually built and funded by local dental civic<br />
groups that contributed them to the war effort. The first completed<br />
and delivered dental ambulance came from the dentists<br />
of Cleveland, while a second was donated by the Red Cross.<br />
The vehicles were “a marvel of compact completeness,” the<br />
Standard article said, noting that the ambulances included “a<br />
wall-case with many drawers for instruments, tanks of ‘laughing-gas,’<br />
acetylene lamps for illumination, an oil stove, hot and<br />
cold water, a water tank … and all the other necessaries.”<br />
They were “better equipped than nine out of ten ordinary<br />
dental offices.” The cars had an attached canvas roll on each<br />
side that could be extended “into pen-roofed wall tents, each<br />
of them equal in size to the quarters available inside the automobile<br />
body.” <strong>On</strong>e side was “to afford sleeping accommodations<br />
for the dentist and his assistant,” and the other was<br />
“available as a supplementary dental operating<br />
room.” The cars were leveled<br />
with “one or two ‘jacks’ under [their]<br />
corners.”<br />
By July 1918, the number of dentists in<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> had grown to 4,620, according<br />
to <strong>Army</strong> historical documents—a number,<br />
reported the Flagstaff, Ariz., newspaper<br />
Coconino Sun, to care for 5 million<br />
men. The War Department announced it<br />
would make no further additions.<br />
Dental Heroes<br />
There were a number of dental heroes<br />
during the war. <strong>On</strong>e who stands out is<br />
Dr. Sophie Nevin, a Brooklyn dentist.<br />
She was the only female American dentist<br />
in the French Medical Corps, and then only by necessity<br />
and happenstance. The U.S. <strong>Army</strong> was still a mostly male bastion.<br />
Nevin had gone to France as a volunteer for four months<br />
to help refugees until the regular dentist returned. After her<br />
dental duties were over, she pitched in as a nurse when Spanish<br />
influenza hit the Western Front. She “aided 11,000 U.S. soldiers,”<br />
according to the Evening World.<br />
During World War I, the dental corps performed over 2 million<br />
procedures. Besides the approximately 5,000 <strong>Army</strong> dentists<br />
at war’s end, it was estimated another 15,000 “agreed to give<br />
Daniel J. Demers, who served in the Nevada National Guard in the<br />
1970s, researches and writes about 19th- and 20th-century events<br />
and personalities. He also owns and operates a sports bar in<br />
Guerneville, Calif. He holds a bachelor’s degree from George<br />
Washington University and an MBA from Chapman University.<br />
Above: A dental surgeon, with his assistant, operates on a patient in France<br />
during World War I; below: Dentists of the 92nd Division in France in 1918.<br />
gratuitous service in examining the teeth of the enlisted soldiers,<br />
and several hundred thousand operations” had been performed.<br />
Seven dentists and seven dental assistants were killed in action,<br />
eight dentists died of disease, and 36 were wounded, according<br />
to the Office of the Chief of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Dental<br />
Corps. As the <strong>Army</strong> was reduced to 137,000, the number of<br />
retained dentists leveled at 158—twice that of the prewar contingent.<br />
Additionally, the <strong>Army</strong> established its own dental<br />
school and also initiated an ROTC dental program.<br />
As the war came to a close in November 1918, it was obvious<br />
the efforts of the nation’s dentists and the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
expanded dental care had transformed dentistry forever. Before<br />
the war, dentistry as we know it today was in its infancy.<br />
During the war, 4 million soldiers were educated in dental<br />
care and hygiene—lessons they brought back home and extolled<br />
in civilian life.<br />
✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
42 ARMY ■ February 2016
Creative Answers for<br />
Sagging Morale By Capt. Robert C. Sprague<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. William A. Parsons<br />
A 1st Cavalry Division platoon during a training exercise in Grafenwoehr, Germany<br />
The way of today’s <strong>Army</strong> is to “do more with less.”<br />
This phrase is a foolish oxymoron; the concept of<br />
completing more tasks does not call for stretching the<br />
existing process beyond its means but instead for innovative<br />
ideas and strategies. To embrace such creativity allows<br />
for a true transition in thought.<br />
Applying this thinking to an aviation maintenance company<br />
offers opportunities for more efficient completion of its<br />
multifaceted mission. As an aviation maintenance company<br />
(AMC) maintenance platoon leader, I witnessed firsthand the<br />
impact of attempting to do more with less. From my perspective,<br />
this mentality was toxic to the unit’s morale, esprit de<br />
corps, and faith in the chain of command.<br />
The modified table of organization and equipment describes<br />
the standard structure of an AMC. The company is broken<br />
into three standard platoons—headquarters, maintenance and<br />
shops—that have their own individual command structures<br />
and sections. These independent platoons must work constantly<br />
to accomplish the two demands of their job: maintenance<br />
and training.<br />
To complete maintenance tasks, all three platoons must work<br />
in harmony. This sounds simple enough but the required training,<br />
additional tasks and personal soldier appointments all increase<br />
the complexity of the situation tenfold. To balance all the<br />
demands, leaders attempt to keep the ratio of time, tasks and<br />
available troops coordinated with one another. More likely than<br />
not, either training or maintenance suffers on behalf of the other.<br />
Constant Unpredictability<br />
For my unit, this caused longer workdays with constant unpredictability<br />
as to what the top priority of the unit truly was.<br />
The consequence of this method of operation caused a severe<br />
drop in the unit’s morale; many soldiers questioned the intentions<br />
and competence of their leadership.<br />
As with any issue, the procedure to find a solution must begin<br />
with identifying the problem. Often, however, many in the<br />
chain of command are unable to see the underlying problem<br />
and instead, focus on the symptoms. In my unit, the symptoms<br />
included low morale, slower turnaround for maintenance tasks,<br />
and more training tasks completed with the bare minimum<br />
level of success obtained. The implementation of many control<br />
measures had a minimal effect on rectifying the symptoms.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 43
Members of the 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment,<br />
work on a helicopter in New Mexico.<br />
Establishing a designated release time<br />
was an effort to solve the soldiers’ morale<br />
issues. The solution to the slow maintenance<br />
process was to increase work hours<br />
so all tasks could be met. The way to become<br />
better at training was to require 100<br />
percent participation in all training activities.<br />
These solutions, while effective for<br />
their individual symptoms, totally contradicted<br />
each other.<br />
It is important to examine the sum of<br />
all the symptoms—which, in this case,<br />
led us to discover that the conventional<br />
modified table of organization and equipment<br />
organization structure was not<br />
compatible with current demands placed on the AMC.<br />
Address Tasks<br />
With the problem identified, applying an innovative solution<br />
should increase efficiency and morale within the unit.<br />
Given that the AMC has two primary constraints—maintenance<br />
and training—tailoring the solution to address these<br />
tasks is critical. The logical resolution would incorporate<br />
transforming the classic three-platoon concept into a twoforce<br />
configuration.<br />
The two forces would mirror one another and be on a rotational<br />
schedule; for the sake of this article, a week will be the<br />
arbitrary time. <strong>On</strong>e force would be on maintenance for a week<br />
while the other force focused on training, additional tasks and<br />
soldiers’ personal appointments.<br />
Certain portions of the company would be exempt from the<br />
organizational restructuring. These include the command section<br />
(commander, first sergeant and orderly); the production<br />
control, quality control, supply section and tech supply officers<br />
in charge/NCOs in charge; and phase teams. These sections<br />
would operate independently of the new structure to meet the<br />
demands of their positions.<br />
The two forces would operate on separate schedules in an<br />
effort to maximize productivity. The maintenance force would<br />
work from 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.; soldiers within the maintenance<br />
force would be given segmented meal times that match the<br />
operating hours of the dining facilities. The emphasis during<br />
meal periods would be to separate the dining schedule so all<br />
Capt. Robert C. Sprague is a student management officer and Basic<br />
Officer Leader Course instructor for Company D, 1st Battalion,<br />
145th Aviation Regiment, at Fort Rucker, Ala. Sprague attended<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Flight School at Fort Rucker and qualified as a<br />
UH-60M pilot. He served as an assistant S3 as part of a future<br />
operations cell at Fort Drum, N.Y., and deployed to Afghanistan<br />
from April 2013 to January 2014 with Fort Drum’s 2nd Battalion,<br />
10th Combat Aviation Brigade. He returned to Fort Rucker<br />
and completed the Aviation Maintenance Officers Course and<br />
Aviation Captains Career Course.<br />
soldiers could eat without letting maintenance ever come to a<br />
complete stop. Physical training would be from 4 to 5 p.m.<br />
Maintenance is the only focus of this force. Protection for<br />
the members of this force keeps them from performing other<br />
duties. In addition, personnel within this force may schedule<br />
personal appointments only on a case-by-case basis. During<br />
slower maintenance times, members of this force focus on<br />
MOS training. This schedule and protected status allow the<br />
AMC to solve the higher unit’s maintenance problems by providing<br />
a ready and guaranteed maintenance force.<br />
Areas of Focus<br />
In contrast to the maintenance force, the training force<br />
would have multiple areas of focus including required training,<br />
inspection preparation, motor pool activities, personal appointments,<br />
and additional tasks and duties. This week would<br />
provide leaders the flexibility to design a training schedule that<br />
would not hurt the unit’s maintenance tempo.<br />
The daily schedule for the training force would be from 9<br />
a.m. to 5 p.m. (standard meal periods in effect), with physical<br />
training from 6 to 7:15 a.m. It would be at the leader’s discretion<br />
to decide how fluid or rigid the training force’s schedule<br />
would be.<br />
The ideas presented here are merely a snapshot of the overall<br />
multiple-step process to usher in a fresh era in the evolution<br />
of the AMC. A quick examination of this idea demonstrates<br />
how proper problem diagnosis gives birth to a solution that<br />
would remedy all symptoms. Changing the organizational<br />
structure of an AMC would increase productivity and stability<br />
within the unit. Morale would increase as a result of soldiers’<br />
value stability and predictability in their schedules. With a<br />
dedicated maintenance force, the time it takes to complete<br />
tasks would decrease, and the higher unit’s maintenance program<br />
would improve.<br />
With a force as well as a routine block of time devoted to all<br />
things training, the quality of the training and completion rates<br />
vastly increase. Of all the ideas to foster within an organization,<br />
one of the most critical is to never discourage innovation. Without<br />
it, you are doomed to repeat the same error indefinitely. ✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Staff Sgt. Candice Harrison<br />
44 ARMY ■ February 2016
The Evolving Art of<br />
Training Management<br />
By Col. David M. Hodne and Maj. Joe Byerly<br />
Photos: U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. William Howard<br />
Col. David M. Hodne, then-commander<br />
of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat<br />
Team, 4th Infantry Division, addresses<br />
soldiers before a rotation at the National<br />
Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.<br />
In the decade following Operation Desert Storm, the <strong>Army</strong><br />
maintained a firm foundation in training but arguably<br />
lacked significant experience in direct combat. Episodic<br />
and infrequent direct engagements occurred in relatively<br />
short durations.<br />
This changed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since<br />
they found themselves turning to and from combat deployments<br />
at a rapid pace, soldiers and leaders possessed significant<br />
combat experience but were not always afforded the opportunity<br />
to train collectively beyond the platoon level. Qualifications to<br />
deploy hinged largely on mastering the “40 Warrior Tasks” and<br />
individual skills in a counterinsurgency environment. Ironically,<br />
over a decade later, some judge this cohort of young leaders as<br />
accustomed to fighting but not to training properly.<br />
The transition from a training-centric force to a combat-centric<br />
force affected an entire generation of <strong>Army</strong> leaders. Those<br />
who were junior leaders in the early years of operations in<br />
Afghanistan and Iraq are now first sergeants, sergeants major and<br />
battalion commanders. Over the course of more than a decade at<br />
war, these leaders became comfortable operating within a<br />
“brigade combat team-centric” deployment system known as<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Force Generation, or ARFORGEN, to rotate and, in<br />
some cases, build units frequently to meet demands overseas.<br />
In executing this process, leaders across the <strong>Army</strong> were<br />
forced to accept risks in the conduct and management of<br />
training. Training management transitioned from decentralized<br />
commander-led efforts to centralized mission-rehearsal<br />
exercises. As Gen. Robert W. Cone, former commanding<br />
general of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Training and Doctrine Command,<br />
pointed out in a January 2013 Military Review article, “Commanders<br />
lost ownership of their training—the warrior’s art<br />
during times of peace.” As a result of this centralized approach<br />
to training, many have argued in military education classrooms,<br />
social media and professional journal articles that the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> lost the art of training management.<br />
We disagree with the notion that leaders are struggling with<br />
retaking ownership of training management, and contend that<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> hasn’t lost the art or understanding of managing<br />
training. Rather, contemporary leaders evolved this important<br />
process. This evolution in training management, which is reflected<br />
in current <strong>Army</strong> doctrine, is fueled by the hard-earned<br />
combat experience of leaders across the <strong>Army</strong>, new digital<br />
training tools, and an institutional resurgence in what today’s<br />
doctrine calls Mission Command.<br />
We have also had the opportunity to observe this in practice<br />
in reorganizing the <strong>Army</strong>’s newest Stryker brigade—the 1st<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 45
Company commanders<br />
exit a CH-47 during<br />
a leader-development<br />
exercise.<br />
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division—within<br />
an accelerated timeline. This task required building two infantry<br />
battalions and an artillery battery; turning in equipment<br />
such as Bradley and Paladin tanks; receiving new Strykers and<br />
over 1,000 soldiers; and building a new culture that includes respecting<br />
the art of training. Over the course of 18 months, all<br />
members of the brigade participated a logical and decentralized<br />
progression in collective training from the squad through the<br />
brigade level at home station, and validated these efforts with a<br />
successful rotation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,<br />
Calif.<br />
Col. David M. Hodne was recently commander of the 1st Stryker<br />
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson,<br />
Colo. He also commanded the 3rd Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry,<br />
in Iraq, and the 2nd Ranger Battalion in Afghanistan. He<br />
received a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy<br />
and a master’s degree from American Military University.<br />
Maj. Joe Byerly is an armor officer and the operations officer for<br />
the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade<br />
Combat Team. He also has commanded a cavalry troop and a<br />
headquarters company at Fort Stewart, Ga. He holds a bachelor’s<br />
degree from North Georgia College and State University and a<br />
master’s degree from the U.S. Naval War College. He frequently<br />
writes about leadership and leader development on his website,<br />
www.FromTheGreenNotebook.com.<br />
Training, Operations Linked<br />
Our training doctrine, which is the guiding document for<br />
how we prepare as an <strong>Army</strong>, reflects an evolution in how the institution<br />
views training. The combat experience earned by the<br />
formation over the last 14 years has taught the <strong>Army</strong> the importance<br />
of developing leaders who are able to quickly transition<br />
from training to operations. <strong>Army</strong> Doctrine Reference Publication<br />
7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders points out that<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> once viewed the training management process as separate<br />
and distinct from the operations process.<br />
Now, the two are inextricably linked. Commanders must<br />
apply the operations process to how they train their formations<br />
through planning, preparing, executing and assessing<br />
training as well as drive the process by understanding, visualizing,<br />
describing, directing and leading. The doctrine is clear, so<br />
it’s up to commanders to implement.<br />
Because units leveraged experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan,<br />
the transition from conducting operations to planning<br />
and managing training is not as significant for leaders at the<br />
battalion level and above, as some believe. They are able to operationalize<br />
their intent and vision for unit-level training and<br />
recapture the art of training management.<br />
Additionally, leadership from the brigade level down to the<br />
squad understands the realities and requirements of combat;<br />
thus, they hold themselves accountable for individual and collective<br />
tasks and know how to set the right conditions for training.<br />
Many of today’s young leaders know the cost of complacency.<br />
NCOs and company grade officers create tough and<br />
realistic training conditions and push themselves toward a<br />
higher level of readiness because many have seen the price paid<br />
by units who hand-waved their training and failed their soldiers<br />
on the streets of Iraq or in the mountains of Afghanistan.<br />
The evolution in training management is further aided by<br />
the creation of digital training tools that are at the fingertips of<br />
company and battalion-level leaders. The combined arms<br />
training strategies and Digital Training Management System,<br />
along with websites such as the <strong>Army</strong> Training Network, were<br />
developed in the middle of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation<br />
Enduring Freedom. These documents serve the same<br />
purpose of the mission training plans they have replaced. As always,<br />
it remains the responsibility of leaders to develop tailored<br />
46 ARMY ■ February 2016
“crawl-walk-run” training methodologies;<br />
however, the new suite of digital<br />
tools makes this process easier.<br />
Based on the collective tasks that<br />
commanders select from the Digital<br />
Training Management System, leaders<br />
can more precisely focus evaluations<br />
based on environment or the level of<br />
training and readiness of the formation.<br />
As the <strong>Army</strong> moves away from the AR-<br />
FORGEN model to the Sustainable<br />
Readiness Model, tactical-level leaders<br />
will not have to worry about building<br />
training plans on outdated materials, as<br />
was the case when mission training<br />
plans were used.<br />
Strykers from the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team<br />
at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.<br />
Leverage <strong>On</strong>line Resources<br />
Combined Arms Center-Training at<br />
Fort Leavenworth, Kan., is already working<br />
on updates to these digital tools. As<br />
commanders focus more of their efforts<br />
on home-station training, they need to<br />
understand that effective training management<br />
lies in leveraging these online resources.<br />
All of this, of course, requires emphasis by brigade and battalion<br />
level commanders familiar with both the legacy training<br />
management tools and the rigors of combat. Senior leaders<br />
have two choices. They can either reinforce the refrain that<br />
young leaders do not know how to train, or they can proactively<br />
educate and, in some cases, simply introduce young<br />
leaders to the basic tools of training management. A culture of<br />
accountability in training will be built by integrating a multiechelon<br />
training approach with a multiechelon leader development<br />
effort using leader professional development sessions,<br />
developing standard operating procedures and communicating<br />
clear intent.<br />
For example, in addition to ensuring safe execution of training<br />
during the “range walk,” this event conducted as a tactical<br />
exercise without troops also affords an incredible opportunity<br />
to develop and educate leaders. Young leaders must accept<br />
that there is a difference between simply understanding all as-<br />
A sniper-observer<br />
team from the 1st<br />
Stryker Brigade Combat<br />
Team conducts<br />
live-fire training at<br />
the National Training<br />
Center, Fort Irwin,<br />
Calif.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 47
pects of fire control and fire distribution (many young leaders<br />
have first-person experience in this), and developing a live-fire<br />
training event that allows for decisionmaking to achieve desired<br />
effects of their weapon systems. Young leaders arguably<br />
do not have experience in designing the training that tests the<br />
full range of capabilities; however, they certainly possess the<br />
context to understand why this is important. Coaching them<br />
through the “art” will achieve and maximize learning.<br />
Finally, there has been resurgence in the philosophy of<br />
Mission Command that has shaped the way in which leaders<br />
at all levels train their formations. While <strong>Army</strong> Doctrine<br />
Publication 6-0 Mission Command is a relatively new member<br />
to the doctrine family, the idea has been around for a while.<br />
The 1941 edition of Field Manual 100-5 Field Service Regulations,<br />
Operations, states, “Every individual must be trained<br />
to exploit a situation with energy and boldness, and must be<br />
imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his initiative<br />
and action.”<br />
Over five decades later, in a 1992 issue of Military Review,<br />
then-Lt. Col. James M. Dubik argued that for units to operate<br />
decentralized in battle, commanders need to develop the culture<br />
in garrison. (Dubik retired as a lieutenant general and is a<br />
contributing editor for ARMY magazine.) Some could argue<br />
that aspects of the larger <strong>Army</strong> culture in the late ’90s reflected<br />
the opposite of the two examples cited. Training became more<br />
centralized, with the end state being effective training management<br />
and not a preparedness to operate decentralized in battle.<br />
The tactical lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan taught leaders<br />
that developing and nurturing the philosophy of Mission<br />
Command in training was critical to success in combat. Even<br />
though units are no longer on the constant rotation, this culture<br />
has transferred to home-station training. Dubik’s 1992 vision<br />
for a decentralized command is no longer the exception<br />
to the rule.<br />
Incorporate Mission Command<br />
Commanders, from the company through the brigade, understand<br />
that the principles of Mission Command must be incorporated<br />
into all aspects of training. Battalion and brigade<br />
commanders develop multiechelon training to build cohesive<br />
teams through mutual trust. Company commanders and first<br />
sergeants plan training in conjunction with their squad leaders<br />
to create shared understanding. Disciplined initiative and prudent<br />
risks must be valued over adherence to an <strong>Army</strong> training<br />
and evaluation program.<br />
A new generation is already emerging in the ranks of our<br />
<strong>Army</strong>. The squad, platoon and even company host leaders and<br />
soldiers who do not have experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />
This should not be a source of concern. In fact, this very condition<br />
requires combat-seasoned leaders to reflect on how they<br />
can effectively train their subordinates for the rigors of combat<br />
without relying on “how we did it overseas.” Ultimately, effective<br />
training meets published standards, tests the full range of<br />
our capabilities, challenges decisionmaking skills, builds cohesive<br />
teams, and instills confidence in soldiers and leaders. As it<br />
was following Operation Desert Storm, it remains the responsibility<br />
of all leaders to teach subordinates how to fight and<br />
how to train. Assume nothing. By teaching your subordinates<br />
how to train correctly, you have a direct effect on ensuring that<br />
tomorrow’s <strong>Army</strong> stays as good as today’s. ✭<br />
Soldiers check vehicles at Fort Carson, Colo.<br />
48 ARMY ■ February 2016
Curtain’s Always Rising<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Master Sgt. Mike Lavigne<br />
For Theater <strong>Army</strong><br />
By Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
Command Sgt. Maj. Christopher K. Greca of U.S. Central Command, second from left, uses an interpreter to discuss training with an Iraqi soldier.<br />
The following statement from <strong>Army</strong> Doctrine Publication<br />
1, The <strong>Army</strong>, is important enough to be repeated in<br />
the introduction to Field Manual 3-94, Theater <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
Corps, and Division Operations: “The land domain is the<br />
most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity—<br />
its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics.” Looking across<br />
the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility highlights the<br />
critical role that <strong>Army</strong> forces—the main land power component<br />
of the joint force—continue to play in the Middle East and<br />
Central and South Asia, from Egypt to Pakistan. Recent events<br />
provide a vehicle for exploring the versatility of the theater <strong>Army</strong><br />
in a manner far more dynamic than its equally important role as<br />
an <strong>Army</strong> service component command.<br />
The only constant in this volatile region is change—rapid<br />
change. This sometimes manifests itself as violence that places<br />
at immediate risk U.S. citizens and vital national interests of<br />
the U.S. as well as those of our allies and partners. Properly<br />
postured forces with established regional relationships provide<br />
combatant commanders the tools for immediate employment<br />
during emerging crises and contingencies.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> service component command, or theater <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
represents the land capability and Mission Command of land<br />
forces immediately available to combatant commanders. In<br />
addition to their inherent Title 10 responsibilities for all <strong>Army</strong><br />
forces in a combatant commander’s area of responsibility, they<br />
also provide <strong>Army</strong> support to other services and <strong>Army</strong> executive<br />
agent responsibilities. Additionally, <strong>Army</strong> service component<br />
commands provide immediate situational understanding<br />
as a crisis begins to emerge, a byproduct of years of experience<br />
in a given area of responsibility.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central has operated in the U.S. Central Command<br />
area of responsibility for 32 years and has an in-depth<br />
knowledge of its political, social, religious, economic and cultural<br />
environments. The command has gained an appreciation<br />
for the battlefield geometry of the area of responsibility, has<br />
fostered relationships through persistent partnerships and theater<br />
security cooperation activities, and understands the requirements<br />
it must provide for combatant commanders to<br />
conduct joint operations. In this context, assigned theater-enabling<br />
commands are indispensable.<br />
Unique Capabilities<br />
Theater-enabling commands—including sustainment, signal,<br />
medical, military intelligence and, based on contingency<br />
requirements, civil affairs—provide capabilities unique in scope<br />
to the theater <strong>Army</strong>. The theater sustainment command, for<br />
example, has the capacity to train multifunctional sustainment<br />
organizations; conduct theater security cooperation activities<br />
with partner sustainment forces; set and reset the theater<br />
through distribution and redistribution of materiel across the<br />
area of responsibility; conduct theater opening activities and<br />
joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration;<br />
and set the sustainment architecture for specific contingencies.<br />
The theater signal command provides the tools for Mission<br />
Command that include strategic and tactical networks<br />
necessary to support combined and joint collaboration in the<br />
electronic environment. The permanent presence of this network<br />
in the area of responsibility serves as the base from<br />
which expansion occurs when emerging missions require<br />
more capabilities.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 49
Spc. Justin Yarnell,<br />
3rd Brigade Combat<br />
Team, 82nd Airborne<br />
Division, helps an<br />
Iraqi soldier during<br />
weapons qualification.<br />
U.S. Air Force/Senior Airman James Richardson<br />
The theater medical command, organized for deployment<br />
support, provides command and control to rapidly deploying<br />
medical assets and significant oversight for Title 10 medical<br />
functions. These include maintaining oversight of medical<br />
materiel, preventive medicine, behavioral health, and veterinary<br />
and personnel treatment requirements.<br />
Meeting Combatant Commander’s Needs<br />
The <strong>Army</strong>, with recommendations provided by the theater<br />
<strong>Army</strong>, tailors rotational forces to meet the requirements of the<br />
combatant commander. Continued analysis of the security<br />
posture, theater security cooperation requirements, and readiness<br />
to execute combatant commander plans resulted in several<br />
adjustments to these capabilities in the U.S. Central<br />
Command area of responsibility between the end of Operation<br />
New Dawn and mid-2014.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central land force capabilities, excluding the<br />
aforementioned theater <strong>Army</strong> enabling commands, included an<br />
armored brigade combat team, a theater aviation brigade with<br />
airfield operations capability, and a force field artillery headquarters<br />
with long-range surface-to-surface fires. Other forces<br />
included an air defense artillery brigade with its air defense<br />
warning, and persistent Mission Command for Patriot firing<br />
batteries distributed around the Arabian Peninsula. Not widely<br />
Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, USA Ret., commanded U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central,<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> service component of U.S. Central Command<br />
based at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., from June 2013 to November<br />
2015. He was dual-hatted as the combined joint task force<br />
commander responsible for Operation Inherent Resolve. He previously<br />
served as commander of the International Security Assistance<br />
Force Joint Command and deputy commanding general,<br />
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and commanding general, U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
V Corps.<br />
understood, a military engagement team created from the senior<br />
leadership of a brigade headquarters joined the mix of forces<br />
that remained forward on an enduring basis. Maneuver support<br />
capabilities including vertical and horizontal construction engineers,<br />
military police, and chemical reconnaissance and decontamination<br />
units rounded out the additional <strong>Army</strong> forces available<br />
to U.S. Central Command around the clock.<br />
A review of U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central’s posture in the months and<br />
years prior to June 2014 enables a better understanding of the<br />
path the command took as it once again expanded its role<br />
from that of a theater <strong>Army</strong> to a joint and combined force<br />
headquarters. Lessons learned from recent operations supporting<br />
Operation Inherent Resolve highlight additional capabilities<br />
that proved critical for combatant commanders.<br />
Spartan Shield Maintained Land Presence<br />
In December 2011, the last U.S. forces crossed from Iraq<br />
into Kuwait, ending Operation New Dawn. Simultaneously,<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central was completing a plan that operationalized<br />
a new regional security construct that accounted for the additional<br />
forces previously described. These forces, under the umbrella<br />
of Operation Spartan Shield, provided the means to<br />
maintain land presence in the Arabian Peninsula and Levant<br />
at the conclusion of the direct U.S. role in Iraq. These forces<br />
supported the theater campaign plan by conducting theater security<br />
cooperation activities while at the same time providing<br />
the base forces for a series of U.S. Central Command bilateral<br />
and multilateral contingency plans.<br />
Well-postured in the region, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central turned its<br />
attention to the development of the Regional Land Power<br />
Network in 2013. This concept included the development of a<br />
coalition land operations center to fill a crucial gap. To gain the<br />
most from the regional partnerships being developed through<br />
theater security cooperation, there had to be a place, purpose-<br />
50 ARMY ■ February 2016
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Sgt. Cheryl Cox<br />
built, to allow for immediate and collaborative Mission Command<br />
with Gulf Cooperation countries and long-standing allies<br />
such as Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Australia<br />
and France. This concept proved prescient in late spring 2014.<br />
When the situation in Iraq reached crisis status in June<br />
2014, the national command authority directed U.S. Central<br />
Command to commence military operations against the Islamic<br />
State group, known throughout the region as Daesh.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central was designated the joint force land component<br />
commander for operations in Iraq. Having matured<br />
since the inception of the regional security plan in late 2011,<br />
forces immediately available, including the robust theater architecture<br />
established by the enabling commands, allowed for<br />
rapid transition from Phase 0 focused activities.<br />
The joint force provided its own contributions, including a<br />
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, U.S. Naval<br />
Forces Central Command’s Fleet Anti-Terrorism Response<br />
Team and a special operations forces crisis-response element.<br />
This combination of capabilities allowed the joint force land<br />
component commander to move rapidly into Iraq with the appropriate<br />
Mission Command, security and sustainment capabilities<br />
to make initial assessments and provide assistance to<br />
Iraqi security forces. The joint force land component commander<br />
also had reach-back capability that included longrange<br />
fires and myriad sustainment functions.<br />
Challenges Expanded<br />
As allies and partner nations communicated their desires to<br />
contribute capabilities, U.S. Central Command designated the<br />
joint force land component commander as the combined force<br />
land component command on Sept. 17, 2014. This expanded<br />
the number of challenges facing the headquarters as it had to<br />
integrate coalition capabilities while simultaneously establishing<br />
Mission Command system networks to support multinational<br />
collaboration.<br />
Recognizing that operations against Daesh required full<br />
joint integration, U.S. Central Command further designated<br />
the combined force land component command as a combined<br />
joint task force (CJTF) on Oct. 17, 2014, and eventually settled<br />
on the designation “CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve.”<br />
To staff the CJTF, the combined force land component command<br />
staff developed and submitted completed joint staffing<br />
documents.<br />
The time frame from document submission until capability<br />
was in place was anticipated at secretary of defense approval<br />
plus 120 days. To mitigate this gap, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central was<br />
able to work with the other U.S. Central Command service<br />
components in theater—another <strong>Army</strong> service component<br />
command standing relationship that proved vital—to assist<br />
with joint fills until the respective service headquarters could<br />
assess and fulfill their requirements. U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central also<br />
requested and received augmentation from the Joint Enabling<br />
Capabilities Command and the Joint Intelligence Support Element,<br />
which provided significant assistance with joint functions<br />
and capabilities oversight.<br />
Today, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central retains the designation of combined<br />
force land component command for operations in the<br />
joint operations area, while a corps headquarters serves as the<br />
CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve headquarters. From the<br />
start of operations against Daesh until the deployment of III<br />
Corps, 15 months had passed in which U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central<br />
served dual-hatted as a combined force land component command<br />
and CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve, while continuing<br />
to accomplish its missions as an <strong>Army</strong> service component<br />
command on behalf of the secretary of<br />
the <strong>Army</strong>. No other command echelon<br />
has the depth and versatility to simultaneously<br />
perform these functions.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Central has served as the<br />
land component command providing<br />
Mission Command for land operations<br />
in the U.S. Central Command area of<br />
responsibility three times since 2001.<br />
Based on this historical precedent as well<br />
as lessons learned in recent contingency<br />
operations in Iraq, the combatant commander<br />
needs an immediately available<br />
joint and coalition capability and the<br />
theater-enabling capability inherent in<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> service component command<br />
to mitigate delays in responding to crises<br />
and contingencies. The <strong>Army</strong> service<br />
component command or theater <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
embedded in the theater and with persistent<br />
presence and enduring partnerships,<br />
provides that capability. ✭<br />
Pfc. Morgan Calebrese, an engineer with the<br />
244th Engineer Battalion, teaches Iraqi soldiers<br />
about the armored bulldozer.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 51
Birth Era<br />
May Factor<br />
In Risk<br />
Of Suicide<br />
By Col. James Griffith, <strong>Army</strong> National Guard retired,<br />
and Craig Bryan<br />
The U.S. military has seen a marked increase in the<br />
number of suicides among personnel. For example,<br />
the suicide rate rose from 10.3 suicides per 100,000<br />
service members in 2001 to 15.8 suicides per 100,000<br />
service members in 2008. This 50 percent increase across all<br />
the armed services was largely due to the suicide rate in the<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>, which doubled during the same time period.<br />
Because the <strong>Army</strong> contributed substantially to ground<br />
forces in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom,<br />
many have speculated that the increased prevalence of suicide<br />
was related to military personnel who were deployed, participated<br />
in combat, or experienced an overall high operating<br />
tempo. We argue that these factors do not necessarily explain<br />
the rise in suicides in the U.S. military. Rather, the increase<br />
indicates a broader trend of increased vulnerability among<br />
more recent generations of young adults.<br />
We elaborated on this argument in a paper we wrote for the<br />
journal Armed Services and Society, and we presented it last fall<br />
to the Inter-University on Armed Forces and Society, an international<br />
organization that studies social and behavioral issues<br />
involving the military. The following is a summary of our<br />
findings.<br />
Birth Cohort and Suicide<br />
Sociologists Jean Stockard and Robert O’Brien suggested in<br />
a 2002 article for the peer-reviewed academic journal Social<br />
Forces that increased suicide rates among young adults in the<br />
general population reflected generational declines in social integration<br />
and behavioral regulation. Social integration entails<br />
having access to predictable, stable and enduring social ties<br />
that can provide support and relief to individuals during times<br />
of stress. Behavioral regulation refers to the strength of norms<br />
that determine the acceptability of certain behaviors. These<br />
two processes formed the cornerstone of Emile Durkheim’s<br />
analyses of suicides among Protestants and Catholics in Europe<br />
during the late 19th century, documented in his 1897<br />
treatise, Le Suicide.<br />
Both social integration and behavioral regulation are influenced<br />
by demographic trends. Increases in birth rates and single<br />
parenthood may strain social institutions that promote social<br />
integration and behavioral norms such as families, schools,<br />
recreational clubs and religious organizations. There are more<br />
children to care for, but fewer adults are involved. Children in<br />
these generations have less attention and supervision while<br />
growing up, and social integration and behavioral regulation<br />
may be lessened.<br />
Stockard and O’Brien found that people from generations<br />
with these characteristics had relatively higher suicide rates<br />
throughout their lives. Their first finding was that among more<br />
recent birth cohorts, suicide rates in the U.S. population have<br />
increased among teenagers and young adults. They studied the<br />
distribution of suicides for age intervals in three time periods:<br />
1930, 1965 and 2000. In 1930, the total U.S. population<br />
showed progressively increased suicide rates from younger to<br />
older age intervals. In 1960, a similar pattern of rates occurred<br />
until ages 55 to 59, where the increase was less evident. In<br />
2000, this pattern of increase was even less apparent.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Pfc. William Hatton<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 53
Per 100,000<br />
45<br />
40<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
Suicide by Age in Three Generations<br />
10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74<br />
Age Groups<br />
Additionally, suicide rates rose dramatically among ages 10<br />
to 14 through ages 20 to 24, reaching a peak at ages 40 to 44.<br />
This peak was not exceeded until ages 75 to 79. Their second<br />
finding was that suicide rates of age intervals at a given time<br />
period have been reliably predicted by size of the birth cohort<br />
and the percentage of nonmarital births—again, demographic<br />
characteristics likely impacting social integration and behavioral<br />
regulation.<br />
Vulnerable Generations<br />
We examined evidence related to increased vulnerability<br />
among members of more recent generations of U.S. high<br />
school and college-aged students in several studies. Analyses of<br />
large-scale data sets across time have shown increased emotional<br />
and behavioral problems among younger generations of<br />
high school and college students, as well as generational shifts<br />
in their values.<br />
Of particular note, more recent generations of high school<br />
and college students report that they value fame and wealth<br />
Col. James Griffith, ARNG Ret., is a research fellow at the National<br />
Center for Veterans Studies at the University of Utah. He<br />
served 35 years in the <strong>Army</strong> active and reserve components and,<br />
most recently, as an <strong>Army</strong> research psychologist assigned to the<br />
National Guard Bureau. He received his Ph.D. from the Claremont<br />
Colleges and is a graduate of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> War College.<br />
Craig Bryan is a former Air Force captain whose service included<br />
a 2009 deployment to Iraq. He is a clinical psychologist<br />
and executive director of the National Center for Veterans Studies.<br />
He is also an assistant professor of psychology at the University<br />
of Utah.<br />
1930<br />
1965<br />
2000<br />
J. Stockard<br />
more than earlier generations; they<br />
value community relations, interest in<br />
social problems and civic engagement<br />
less. These changes have been especially<br />
pronounced during the transition from<br />
Generation Xers—those born in 1962<br />
through 1981—to the millennials—<br />
those born in 1982 through the early<br />
2000s.<br />
Findings from several military studies<br />
are consistent with these larger<br />
trends in U.S. society. For example,<br />
military studies have reported more<br />
psychological disorders among personnel<br />
using medical treatment facilities,<br />
and more waivers for those enlisting.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> Study To Assess Risk and<br />
Resilience in Servicemembers research<br />
team further indicates that mental health<br />
conditions that exist before joining the<br />
military play an important role in later<br />
suicidal behaviors.<br />
Evident in Military<br />
Consequences of these trends are<br />
likely more evident in the U.S. military<br />
due to its circumscribed population.<br />
First, the <strong>Army</strong> has proportionally more personnel who are at<br />
greatest risk for suicide: young, male and white. Young age,<br />
male gender and white racial identity have been identified in<br />
both civilian and military research studies as risk factors for<br />
suicide.<br />
In addition, the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> has seen over time an increase<br />
in the proportion of white soldiers and a decrease in the proportion<br />
of racial minority soldiers. These changes in demographics<br />
have particular relevance when considering that<br />
O’Brien and Stockard found increased suicide risk across birth<br />
cohorts greater for young white men than others. In other<br />
words, the subpopulation for whom generational vulnerability<br />
has increased the most is the same subpopulation that has proportionally<br />
increased the most within the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
Second, recent studies also suggest that those who now<br />
volunteer for military service are distinctly different from<br />
non-volunteers of the same age. Recruits disproportionally<br />
come from single-family households and households of adverse<br />
childhood experiences, both of which are associated<br />
with suicide risk. Using large-scale longitudinal data, Naomi<br />
J. Spence, Kathryn A. Henderson and Glen H. Elder Jr. observed<br />
that youth living in single-parent households had increased<br />
odds of military enlistment independent of socioeconomic<br />
status, characteristics of parent-child relationships, or<br />
feelings of social isolation. Findings were reported in a 2013<br />
article for Journal of Family Issues.<br />
Third, increased vulnerability of soldiers in recent years<br />
might also be explained in part by a considerable change in the<br />
pool of applicants who are eligible for military service. Since<br />
the implementation of the all-volunteer force, the number of<br />
volunteers has diminished. Of this pool, nearly half are ac-<br />
54 ARMY ■ February 2016
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Spc. Caitlyn Byrne<br />
cepted into military service. This situation<br />
contrasts with the last prolonged major conflict,<br />
the Vietnam War era, during which<br />
nearly all 18-year-old men were eligible for<br />
conscripted service, though only a fraction<br />
was inducted. In more recent times, larger<br />
proportions of recruits have more waivers for<br />
health conditions or behavior problems.<br />
In sum, trends in vulnerability among the<br />
more recent generations are more likely to be<br />
evident in the military due to characteristics<br />
of its changing population: few volunteers,<br />
many of whom are young and male; and proportionally<br />
more who are inducted. Evidence<br />
also suggests that more recruits come from<br />
nontraditional family structures, which often<br />
are associated with less social integration and<br />
higher suicide risk. These factors make increased<br />
vulnerability more evident among<br />
U.S. military service members than among<br />
the general population.<br />
Steps Toward Prevention<br />
We have identified several possible directions<br />
for the prevention of suicide in the U.S.<br />
military. First, if increased prevalence in suicide is, indeed, related<br />
to cohort vulnerability, with more recent birth cohorts<br />
more susceptible, then the problem of suicide risk is much<br />
broader than previously thought. That is, increased suicide<br />
risk encompasses all members of specific cohorts within society,<br />
not just military members. Second, for the military it<br />
means more effective screening of prospective recruits, and for<br />
those already in the military, more effective periodic assessments<br />
for suicide risk.<br />
Current assessments require soldiers to respond to specific<br />
questions regarding suicide thoughts, plans and attempts. Although<br />
positive responses to these questions are generally considered<br />
by suicide experts to be among the most important<br />
Capt. Pamela Alderman, a health officer with the 1st Infantry Division, counsels a soldier<br />
suffering from depression while deployed in Kuwait.<br />
warning signs or short-term indicators of imminent risk for<br />
suicide, research suggests that more than half of those who die<br />
by suicide actually deny suicidal ideation and/or intent during<br />
their most recent screening. There may be an underlying,<br />
chronic vulnerability that is not evident using existing screeners.<br />
The question, though, is the specific content that enables<br />
effective detection of these underlying risk factors.<br />
Finally, the content of preventive strategies should be<br />
aimed more directly at domains related to the desire for social<br />
integration, such as training and experiences associated with<br />
group identity and solidarity, leadership and group norms<br />
that develop individual-to-group ties, providing social connections<br />
and control of individual-level behaviors. Such<br />
processes strengthen bonds among<br />
group members through the physical<br />
and social environments that promote<br />
proximity and communication; behaviors<br />
that are interdependent, satisfying<br />
individual and group needs; shared feelings;<br />
and having commonly identified<br />
personal characteristics.<br />
Re-examining the <strong>Army</strong>’s current and<br />
past practices, in particular those associated<br />
with soldier bonding and cohesive<br />
ties among unit members, would not<br />
only benefit readiness but also soldiers’<br />
identification with others, the unit and<br />
the <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
✭<br />
Sgt. 1st Class Jermaine Carter, standing, with<br />
the 82nd Civil Affairs Battalion, teaches resilience<br />
training to deployed soldiers in Liberia.<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Staff Sgt. Bernhard Lashleyleidner<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 55
The Outpost<br />
Fighting It Out at Chipyong-ni<br />
By Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
Retreat is not a word American soldiers like to use. You<br />
won’t find the term in <strong>Army</strong> field manuals. There are<br />
paragraphs on retrograde operations, to include delaying actions,<br />
withdrawals and retirements. But retreat? Well, that’s a<br />
ceremony at sunset when they lower the post flag. It sure isn’t<br />
a recommended battle tactic.<br />
Of course, doctrine is one thing while reality is another.<br />
Even a cursory review of U.S. <strong>Army</strong> history reflects several<br />
notable “retrograde” events: Gen. George Washington’s<br />
bedraggled Continentals fleeing British redcoats in New York<br />
and New Jersey in 1776; panicked Union troops legging it<br />
north after the Confederates had their way at the First Battle<br />
of Bull Run in 1861; and frantic G.I. backpedaling in the face<br />
of German panzers at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in 1943.<br />
There are other examples, from Brandywine to Bataan. Few<br />
turned out well.<br />
But when it comes to retrogrades, or retreats, those of the<br />
first six months of the Korean War formed a particularly humiliating<br />
category all their own. First, in the hot summer of<br />
1950, the North Koreans ran the Americans south. Then,<br />
once the U.S. Eighth <strong>Army</strong> recovered and pushed north in the<br />
snows of an early winter, the Communist Chinese intervened,<br />
triggering a series of disastrous one-sided clashes, thousands<br />
of casualties and a wholesale rush south. U.S. <strong>Army</strong> trucks<br />
eventually outran Chinese foot soldiers. But the ignominious<br />
pullback generated a conviction up and down the ranks that<br />
something was seriously wrong with American morale, discipline<br />
and leadership—especially that last one. The troops who<br />
had won World War II couldn’t hold a hill in the face of peasant<br />
Chinese Communists with hand weapons.<br />
Senior officers did not use the “R” word. They mumbled<br />
into their wool winter shirts and hoped things would turn<br />
around. Maybe it was time to pull off this godforsaken Korean<br />
Peninsula. Or maybe it was time to drop the Big <strong>On</strong>e, the<br />
atomic bomb. But going at it man-to-man? There wasn’t much<br />
interest in that. Better to just leave—the ultimate retrograde.<br />
The troops also didn’t talk of retreat but they sang about it,<br />
to the tune of a popular Hank Snow hit:<br />
When the mortars started falling ’round the CP tent<br />
Everybody wondered where the high brass went<br />
They were buggin’ out—<br />
Just movin’ on…<br />
The generals and colonels tried to ban “Bugout Boogie.”<br />
But the soldiers kept singing it. Worse, they kept doing it.<br />
It’s hard to say where “Bugout Boogie” originated. Most<br />
thought it came from the embittered privates of the 2nd Infantry<br />
Division. That famous old outfit had been savaged trying<br />
to break contact with Chinese regiments at Kunu-ri dur-<br />
First Cavalry Division soldiers move north of<br />
Chipyong-ni, South Korea, in late February 1951.<br />
National Archives<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 57
Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of Eighth <strong>Army</strong>, inspects<br />
front-line positions in March 1951.<br />
Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., was the commander of<br />
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and<br />
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Previously, he served<br />
as the deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, and as the commanding<br />
general, 1st Cavalry Division/commanding general, Multinational<br />
Division-Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds<br />
a doctorate in Russian history from the University of Chicago<br />
and has published a number of books on military subjects. He is<br />
a senior fellow of the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare.<br />
ing a horrific running gunfight on Nov. 30, 1950. A lot of<br />
them made it out, but they left behind 65 blackened cannons;<br />
dozens of shot-up trucks; and far more disturbing, hundreds<br />
of men dead, wounded and lost. The rear guard, the doomed<br />
2nd Engineer Battalion, lost 711 of the 977 soldiers assigned.<br />
In a final act of desperation, the exhausted engineers burned<br />
their colors rather than have them end up as trophies in some<br />
Chinese dayroom. The bugout had been total and bloody.<br />
Yet not all had gone wrong. By careful reconnaissance, securing<br />
the high ground and marching rapidly, the 23rd Infantry<br />
Regimental Combat Team (RCT) avoided the Chinese gauntlet<br />
of fire at Kunu-ri. Tall, thoughtful Col. Paul L. Freeman Jr.<br />
(who would later become a four-star general) had been an adviser<br />
to Chinese forces in World War II. Because he spoke Chinese,<br />
he often questioned prisoners himself. Freeman understood<br />
that the Chinese planned well and executed violently. But<br />
they did not adapt well to the unexpected. Rather than take the<br />
obvious road south, Freeman’s team made it out of the Chinese<br />
trap by going west over a scratch route. It was a smart call.<br />
Afew levels up in the hierarchy, the new Eighth <strong>Army</strong><br />
commander noticed. Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway<br />
learned how to fight as a paratrooper in World War II.<br />
He had also served in China in 1925–26 and thus, knew<br />
something about the opposing side in Korea. They were good,<br />
but they weren’t 10 feet tall. Ridgway believed that American<br />
soldiers could beat the Chinese if they were well-led. He had<br />
no intention of backing up. “There will be no more discussion<br />
of retreat,” he growled. He meant it. And he kept his eye on<br />
this man Freeman and the 23rd Infantry RCT.<br />
Fifty miles south of the 38th Parallel, the prewar border,<br />
Ridgway’s shaky Eighth <strong>Army</strong> stopped pulling back. Chinese<br />
Communist forces hovered a few ridgelines to the north,<br />
largely out of contact, no doubt getting ready for another offensive.<br />
Taking advantage of the break in the action, undeterred<br />
by the howling wind and snow squalls, Ridgway<br />
roamed the front. He didn’t talk to just corps and division<br />
commanders but spent a lot of time at regimental, battalion<br />
and company level, spreading the new gospel: “Find them! Fix<br />
them! Fight them! Finish them!” He then insisted on training<br />
to reinforce that message. Training in combat? Some of the<br />
officers were amazed. But the tough old sergeants got it immediately.<br />
Training for close combat, for killing Chinese, became<br />
the norm. Bugout was not in the cards anymore.<br />
When the Chinese attacked again in February 1951, Ridgway’s<br />
Eighth <strong>Army</strong> was ready. American artillery and airpower<br />
wreaked havoc on Chinese columns exposed on the<br />
slopes of treeless, snow-covered valleys. Some U.S. units bent.<br />
None broke. But when the Chinese paused to resupply, Freeman’s<br />
tough, veteran 23rd Infantry RCT was isolated well forward<br />
in a perimeter defense, a rough oval about a mile or so<br />
across, anchored on a set of low hills around a dot on the map<br />
called Chipyong-ni. When the division and corps commander<br />
suggested pulling back, Ridgway made it clear that wasn’t going<br />
to happen. Those days were over. Freeman told his subordinates<br />
the deal: “We’re going to stay here and fight it out.”<br />
Freeman’s soldiers dug in, chipping away at the frozen dirt.<br />
They sighted machine guns along mazes of barbed-wire entanglements.<br />
Hundreds of mines were buried as well as 55-<br />
gallon drums of fougasse: fire bombs ready to be triggered on<br />
command. Artillery and mortars registered on key targets,<br />
from distant hills to spots right on the wire. Freeman’s three<br />
battalions held the north, east and south. An attached French<br />
battalion—an all-star team led by a lieutenant general serving<br />
under the nom de guerre of Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar—defended<br />
to the west. Freeman’s 5,400 troops faced five understrength<br />
Chinese divisions, about 30,000 men or so. To even<br />
the odds, Ridgway promised plenty of supporting airstrikes,<br />
aerial resupply drops, and a relieving force to break through<br />
once the Chinese attacked. Well, maybe, but that depended<br />
on the reinforced 23rd Infantry RCT holding its ground.<br />
For 10 days, Freeman’s soldiers dug and kept watch. Early<br />
on Feb. 13, patrols brought word that the Chinese were massing<br />
their forces in the next valley over. As the weak winter sun<br />
set, the Americans and French buttoned up their perimeter.<br />
The French laughed and joked, passing around wine bottles.<br />
After dark, the Chinese probed from the west. They had<br />
found the French. Maybe the enemy thought the language<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
58 ARMY ■ February 2016
arrier created a weakness. In any event,<br />
both sides exchanged fire in the darkness.<br />
About midnight, the Chinese<br />
showered the defenses with 82 mm and<br />
120 mm mortar rounds and a mix of<br />
Russian 76 mm and American-made 75<br />
mm pack howitzer shells. The barrage<br />
ignited an American truck, and the Chinese<br />
used the blaze as illumination to<br />
guide additional shelling and the approaching<br />
hostile infantry.<br />
Out of the darkness came the tinny<br />
bleat of bugles and shrill whistles, Chinese<br />
signals that also served to unnerve<br />
the defenders. The French immediately<br />
cranked up a siren, and old Monclar directed<br />
his forward platoons to fix bayonets.<br />
As the first wave of Chinese ran<br />
into the French wire, a squad of Monclar’s<br />
men appeared on their flank, firing<br />
rifles and tossing grenades. Stunned, the<br />
Chinese backed off.<br />
An hour or so later, the entire perimeter<br />
erupted. Big 155 mm howitzers<br />
of Battery B, 503rd Field Artillery, an<br />
African-American unit, alternated shooting<br />
up parachute flares with delivering<br />
lethal bursts of high explosives. The defenders’ 105 mm artillery<br />
fired round after round as the Chinese milled in front of the<br />
barbed wire. Machine gunners ran through belt after belt.<br />
Tanks maneuvered to pre-chosen firing steps, cranking off main<br />
gun shots and steady machine-gun fire. Staff officers recorded<br />
four major enemy thrusts but to the soldiers engaged, it was all<br />
one long, awful night. But when dawn came, the Chinese<br />
Communists pulled off.<br />
Daylight brought the U.S. Air Force, and they did not hold<br />
back. Heavy bombs and napalm canisters rained down. The<br />
suffering Chinese replied by firing their mortars into the U.S.<br />
positions. <strong>On</strong>e lucky shot hit just outside the regimental command<br />
post, killing one officer and wounding two others. <strong>On</strong>e<br />
Then-Col. Paul L. Freeman Jr., center, of the 23rd Infantry Regimental Combat Team, and then-Maj.<br />
Gen. Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander, right, confer with other officers during the Battle of<br />
Chipyong-ni, South Korea.<br />
was Freeman. His left calf was ripped open, his shinbone<br />
cracked. The colonel was in agony, but he refused evacuation<br />
when aircraft landed to retrieve the wounded.<br />
The Chinese tried again that night. They got close—too<br />
close, in some spots. But the enemy never broke the RCT’s line.<br />
Nor did the Chinese break the spirit of the American and<br />
French defenders. Just before sunset on Feb. 15, a tank column<br />
from the 1st Cavalry Division broke through. The siege was<br />
over. The casualty toll was 51 killed, 42 missing and 259<br />
wounded. The Chinese left behind almost a thousand dead.<br />
What did it all mean? A historian of China’s People’s Liberation<br />
<strong>Army</strong> understood. As Chen Jian put it: “Chipyong-ni<br />
changed everything.” The Chinese had thought the Americans<br />
wouldn’t stand and fight. Now, they<br />
knew otherwise. There would be other<br />
battles, and a lot more killing. There<br />
would be no more mass bugouts. The<br />
soldiers of the 23rd Infantry Regimental<br />
Combat Team did not win the Korean<br />
War. Neither side did. But the American<br />
and French defenders ensured their<br />
side wouldn’t lose. Sixty-five years ago<br />
in Korea, that was enough. ✭<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, left, and<br />
Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond salute during the<br />
presentation of a battle streamer to an attached<br />
French battalion for service in the Battle of<br />
Chipyong-ni, South Korea.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 59
AUSA Sustaining Member Profile<br />
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60 ARMY ■ February 2016
Soldier Armed<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Gets Precision Fires Upgrades<br />
By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer<br />
In parallel with ongoing procurement<br />
involving guided cannon munitions<br />
and precision guidance kits for artillery<br />
projectiles, other recent activity across<br />
<strong>Army</strong> rocket, missile and launcher platforms<br />
promises to reopen dormant production<br />
lines and further expand the<br />
<strong>Army</strong>’s precision fires capabilities over<br />
the next few years.<br />
<strong>On</strong>e evolving slice of the launcher and<br />
munitions systems was outlined during<br />
the recent Association of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Annual Meeting and Exposition by Ken<br />
Musculus, Lockheed Martin vice president<br />
for tactical missiles, and Col. James<br />
“Chris” Mills, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> program manager for precision fires.<br />
“If you look at history going back to the M270 and M26 unguided<br />
rocket, there has been a constant evolution of both the<br />
launchers and the missiles,” Musculus said, adding that the<br />
M270A1 tracked Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)<br />
launcher is being modernized “to bring the electronics essentially<br />
into the 21st century. We’re putting new hardware in it;<br />
redesigning the electronics in it; putting a new processor in it;<br />
getting rid of obsolescence.”<br />
Along with the electronics upgrades, Lockheed Martin has<br />
also developed a new armored cab for the M270A1. It is more<br />
spacious inside and has improved levels of protection.<br />
“We increased the crew protection levels by redesigning the<br />
armor,” Musculus said. “It’s really an entirely new cab: You<br />
take the old cab off; you put the new cab on. You also put a lot<br />
of the existing electronics back in it. But one of the things it<br />
now does is put the commander in the center seat position,<br />
making it common” with how the M142 high-mobility artillery<br />
rocket system, or HIMARS, operates.<br />
“We’ve done extensive testing on the new cab design,” he<br />
said. “We have fired many, many rockets off this system at the<br />
test range. It works perfectly. We’ve also proven out its ballistic<br />
capabilities, and they have fired munitions at it.”<br />
Three Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems on display<br />
Cab No Longer Cramped<br />
Pointing to a side-by-side picture of the old and new cab designs,<br />
he showed where the new design picked up “about a foot”<br />
of space. “It doesn’t look like much, but that difference of about<br />
a foot makes a big difference inside the cab,” he said. “Plus, you<br />
can see that it’s a little bit higher. So from a crew standpoint, the<br />
old M270 is kind of cramped, but the new one feels spacious.”<br />
Six prototypes of the new armored cab have been built for<br />
testing, with some of those dedicated to blast trials. Production<br />
plans for the new cabs currently project a rate of approximately<br />
30 cabs per year beginning in fiscal year 2019.<br />
Musculus said some company effort is also being directed<br />
toward the M142 HIMARS wheeled launcher, focused on<br />
possible exploration of a “next-generation launcher.” While<br />
Musculus predicted it would be in the budget for FY 2017 or<br />
’18, Mills was more cautious about the timeframe for a possible<br />
HIMARS launcher replacement.<br />
“The funding is a little bit further out for the next-gen<br />
launcher,” he said. “But they are looking at that.”<br />
When the <strong>Army</strong> was asked for clarification, Dan O’Boyle,<br />
spokesman for the <strong>Army</strong>’s precision fires program management<br />
office, said, “The <strong>Army</strong> understands the long-term potential<br />
need for a new launcher platform,” so the next-generation<br />
launcher development “is expected to begin in the near future.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> is currently studying future technologies that may<br />
be leveraged to meet the future capability requirements.”<br />
In parallel with the platform enhancements, other precision<br />
fires activities are being directed toward both the guided multiple<br />
launch rocket system rocket and <strong>Army</strong> tactical missile system<br />
missile. Much of the effort focuses on replacing the cluster<br />
munition designs in those systems. For the guided multiple<br />
launch rocket system, that involves the dual-purpose improved<br />
conventional munitions; for the tactical missile system, it involves<br />
the anti-personnel and anti-materiel submunitions.<br />
According to Mills, a 2008 DoD policy directs the <strong>Army</strong> to<br />
meet the intent of the 2018 cluster munitions ban, which<br />
means that by January 2019, “we have to meet less than a 1<br />
percent dud rate on any weapon.”<br />
With dual-purpose improved conventional munitions,<br />
“there were a bunch of bomblets, with each one having its own<br />
fuze,” Musculus said. “The issue is, depending on how the<br />
bomblets hit, they don’t always detonate. So now you have un-<br />
Scott R. Gourley<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 61
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/John Hamilton<br />
During testing at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., clockwise from top inset: An M270A1 MLRS fires a training rocket; an improved armored cab affords<br />
more crew protection; the redesigned cab puts the commander in the center.<br />
exploded ordnance … and with the different ways a bomblet<br />
can hit, there’s almost no way you can guarantee a less than 1<br />
percent dud rate.”<br />
The solution came in the form of the alternative warhead program.<br />
Lockheed Martin worked with Orbital ATK to develop a<br />
new warhead for the guided multiple launch rocket system that<br />
features a high-explosive core surrounded by tungsten balls.<br />
“We’re talking about 186,000” medium- and small-caliber<br />
balls, Musculus said, so when the rocket detonates, the smallcaliber<br />
balls are “going everywhere. It’s used for imprecisely located<br />
targets and also for soft targets.”<br />
The engineering and manufacturing development program<br />
for the new warhead program began in March 2012, Musculus<br />
said. Testing at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., resulted<br />
in “100 percent mission success,” with detonations providing<br />
“good effects on targets.”<br />
Tactical Missile Modernization<br />
Other efforts are directed toward old <strong>Army</strong> tactical missiles<br />
containing anti-personnel and anti-materiel (APAM) submunitions.<br />
“The government has a lot” of the Block I tactical missions<br />
in inventory, he said. “These are the old ones with the APAM<br />
warhead,” which will not be usable starting in 2018 because of<br />
the cluster munition ban.<br />
“So what we are doing is taking those old Block Is, bringing<br />
them in, downloading and de-mating them from the pod,<br />
salvaging a lot of the metal parts including the solid rocket<br />
motor, which we’re washing out and refilling the propellant<br />
so it’s like a brand-new motor,” he said. “We’re also building<br />
new navigation electronics and upgrading the processors; replacing<br />
the obsolete parts; doing the same replacement of obsolete<br />
parts for the mission computer and putting a new<br />
processor in there.”<br />
Musculus said new builds of the inertial measurement unit<br />
and control actuation system are also being added. As a result,<br />
what had once been seen as a service life-extension program<br />
is now dubbed modernization for the <strong>Army</strong>’s tactical<br />
missile system.<br />
“The systems are not stagnating,” Musculus said. “We are<br />
continuing to upgrade the electronics in them. We are putting<br />
new processors in. We are replacing the obsolete parts. We are<br />
developing new warheads that are compliant with policies and<br />
accords. We’re also putting new electronics in the launchers<br />
and have developed a new armored cab to protect the soldiers<br />
better. These are evolving products that are going to go on for<br />
many more years.”<br />
Musculus also said the restarted tactical missile system and<br />
HIMARS lines are attracting foreign interest. “Countries are<br />
now coming and saying, ‘Hey, we want to get in on that now.’<br />
So that’s a good story,” he said. “And where it’s really a great<br />
story is, as the foreign governments come in and buy these<br />
munitions, it obviously helps out our U.S. customer with better<br />
pricing.”<br />
✭<br />
62 ARMY ■ February 2016
Historically Speaking<br />
Verdun at 100 By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
Feb. 21 marks the 100th anniversary of the German assault<br />
on Verdun, France. It launched the savage, 10-month<br />
World War I battle that has become a metaphor for bloodshed<br />
and indecisiveness. Soldiers on both sides endured incredible<br />
hardships, providing their generation a vision of hell on Earth.<br />
It was an experience no army wanted to repeat, fueling ardent<br />
searches for ways to break the deadlock on the Western Front<br />
other than by the means employed in this battle.<br />
Our own <strong>Army</strong> became a benefactor of the resultant doctrinal<br />
ferment. Our generations-long emphasis on decisive maneuver<br />
warfare stands in stark contrast to the brutal attrition<br />
the fighting for Verdun became.<br />
In early 1916, Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the<br />
German General Staff, faced a two-front war: in Russia and<br />
on the Western Front. This had ground on for a year and a<br />
half, with huge losses and no decision. Falkenhayn recognized<br />
that Germany did not have the resources to conquer and occupy<br />
either Russia or France while heavily engaged with the<br />
other. He believed an attack on Verdun, surrounded on three<br />
sides by the Germans and psychologically and physically vital<br />
to the defense of France, would draw the French army into a<br />
battle wherein it could be “bled white.”<br />
Artillery fire had proven to be far and away the greatest killer<br />
in World War I, and observed artillery fire was far more effective<br />
than unobserved. A massive yet tightly controlled offensive<br />
could quickly seize the high ground surrounding Verdun, giving<br />
the Germans fields of view the French would lack. The<br />
French would be forced to counterattack or to endure unrelenting<br />
exposure to devastating observed artillery fire. French return<br />
fire would be largely unobserved and thus, far less effective.<br />
French counterattacks in the face of entrenched defenders,<br />
machine guns and artillery would inevitably be costly.<br />
The German Fifth <strong>Army</strong> assumed the mission of attacking<br />
Verdun, and gathered over a million men and 1,200 guns to<br />
do so. Of the guns, two-thirds were heavy. The Germans built<br />
10 new rail spurs off their main line running just 15 miles<br />
north of Verdun, and scheduled about 33 munitions trains per<br />
day. They stockpiled enough artillery ammunition to fire 2<br />
million rounds in the first six days, and another 2 million<br />
rounds in the next 12.<br />
The Germans planned on swarming in aircraft sufficient to<br />
deny the French use of the air, depriving them of this other<br />
potential source for observed artillery fire. The French had<br />
stripped Verdun’s defenses of artillery to meet needs elsewhere.<br />
However, alerted by their intelligence services at the<br />
11th hour, the French rushed in artillery reinforcements sufficient<br />
to give them 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns prior to<br />
the German attack.<br />
The German attack, preceded by a 12-hour bombardment,<br />
U.S. soldiers line the trenches near Verdun, France.<br />
advanced methodically and well during the first several days. It<br />
penetrated the first and second trench lines in the attack zone.<br />
The weight of the German attack was to the east of the Marne<br />
River and here, they seized the key terrain of Fort Douaumont<br />
by Feb. 25. This was about 4 miles from their start point. A<br />
day later, the attack began to sputter. Snow, a thaw, ground<br />
pulverized by artillery, and heavy traffic combined to turn the<br />
terrain it was moving through into a muddy morass.<br />
German artillery, in particular, had difficulty moving, soon<br />
finding itself out of range of critical targets. French reinforcements<br />
rushed in. Some French generals, under pressure, recommended<br />
withdrawing from the east bank of the Meuse<br />
River. Gen. Joseph J. Joffre, the French commander in chief,<br />
promised to court-martial any general who retreated. He appointed<br />
Gen. Philippe Petain to direct the defense. The<br />
ragged and sawtooth French lines held.<br />
Most notably, the French held on to enough of the high<br />
ground east of the Meuse to see into the German rear. They<br />
brought masses of observed artillery fire onto the Germans,<br />
even as the Germans were bringing masses of observed artillery<br />
fire onto them. Losses on both sides mounted. The<br />
Germans ascertained that the French artillery was concentrated<br />
on the high ground west of the Meuse, and resolved to<br />
broaden their attack to the west to neutralize this threat.<br />
A renewed attack beginning March 6 made some progress,<br />
but not enough to seriously degrade the French artillery. By<br />
April 9, the Germans had advanced perhaps 3 miles along the<br />
west bank of the Meuse. They advanced in the east as well and<br />
seized Vaux, but the French still held on to critical perches<br />
east of the Meuse. The Germans had reached within 5 miles<br />
of Verdun itself, but seemed to have forgotten that Verdun<br />
was supposed to be bait rather than an objective in itself.<br />
Library of Congress<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 63
The French army trucked supplies and troops along the “Sacred Way”<br />
during the Battle of Verdun.<br />
Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history<br />
at the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Center of Military History from December<br />
1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion,<br />
66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned<br />
to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry<br />
Division, in 1995. Author of Kevlar Legions: The<br />
Transformation of the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>, 1989–2005, he has a doctorate<br />
in history from Indiana University.<br />
Ironically, the Germans found themselves caught in the same<br />
kind of trap they had intended to inflict on the French. They<br />
were subject to deluges of observed artillery fire, and these<br />
could be relieved only if they seized the high ground from<br />
which French artillerymen were directing their fires. This led<br />
them into recurrent attacks—under fire. German commanders<br />
believed their viable options were to go forward or to withdraw,<br />
not to stay put.<br />
Falkenhayn had envisioned a lopsided battle in which the<br />
Germans held the high ground and hammered away at the<br />
French while the French, blinded by the topographical relief,<br />
were ineffectual in their response. Instead, he got a messy battlefield<br />
where both sides had high ground enough to bring<br />
their artillery into play. Rather than admit defeat and withdraw<br />
into less exposed positions, the Germans deluded themselves<br />
time and again that one more push would be sufficient to dislodge<br />
and blind the French. Attacks proved costly. The French<br />
were not the only ones who found it psychologically impossible<br />
to withdraw from the blood-soaked ground of Verdun.<br />
Assailed on all three sides of the Verdun salient, the French<br />
mustered vehicles from across France to sustain La Voie Sacree,<br />
the “Sacred Way,” trucking in supplies and reinforcements in<br />
a continuous stream over this perilous road. They massed artillery<br />
and counterattacked fiercely to sustain their line. Tactical<br />
innovations did occur. The Germans introduced flamethrowers.<br />
The French arrayed their defenses in depth. The<br />
Germans led attacks with infiltration parties of infantry, engineers<br />
and other arms eventually famous as Stosstruppen. The<br />
French perfected a system for rotating units through Verdun<br />
from all over France.<br />
Both sides were ever more aggressive and creative in their<br />
use of air power. Artillery tactics became more sophisticated as<br />
well, particularly with respect to the proliferation and integration<br />
of chemical munitions. None of this forced a decision or<br />
reduced the carnage. The battle bubbled on in a seemingly<br />
endless series of attacks and counterattacks large and small.<br />
<strong>On</strong> June 4, the Russians launched their massive Brusilov<br />
Offensive and on June 24, the British launched a similarly<br />
massive assault along the Somme River. These offensives also<br />
turned out to be indecisive bloodbaths, but they did divert<br />
German attention and resources away from Verdun. Falkenhayn<br />
was relieved in August, replaced by Field Marshal Paul<br />
von Hindenburg. The Germans went over to the defensive<br />
around Verdun. The French launched a major counteroffensive<br />
in the fall and by mid-December had regained much of<br />
the ground they had lost.<br />
At Verdun, the French are reported to have suffered<br />
542,000 casualties; the Germans, 434,000. The attempt to<br />
bleed France white bled the Germans almost as badly. Losses<br />
were so great, artillery so prolific and fighting so chaotic that it<br />
proved impossible to identify most of the dead. The famous<br />
Douaumont Ossuary contains the bones of over 130,000<br />
unidentified dead, French mingled with German. Views into<br />
the crypt through small windows offer as graphic an image as<br />
one can imagine of the cost of war. Remains in the ossuary are<br />
in addition to those of more than 16,000 Frenchmen who<br />
were identified and individually buried in the nearby Douaumont<br />
Cemetery.<br />
The intractable problem presented at Verdun was that no<br />
penetration was deep enough to prove decisive. Infantry advances<br />
reached culminating points when they outdistanced<br />
their artillery support, which is difficult to move forward<br />
across shattered ground. Communications failed as well. Defenses<br />
in depth could contain shallow penetrations while reinforcements<br />
rushed in by road and rail. Observed artillery fire<br />
hammered away at anything that moved. Maneuver turned<br />
into attrition.<br />
This phenomenon repeated itself on other battlefields;<br />
Americans experienced it during the first bloody month in the<br />
Meuse-Argonne. The situation begged for a technological resolution<br />
to break the impasse. This came to fruition in a later<br />
war with combined arms teams of tanks, planes, artillery,<br />
mechanized infantry and engineers knit together by radio communications.<br />
Verdun was the incentive to find another way. ✭<br />
Additional Reading<br />
Esposito, Vincent J., The West Point Atlas of American<br />
Wars, Volume II: 1900–1953 (New York: Frederick A.<br />
Praeger, 1959)<br />
Horne, Alistair, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London:<br />
Penguin Books, 1994)<br />
Jankowski, Paul, Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great<br />
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)<br />
Library of Congress<br />
64 ARMY ■ February 2016
Reviews<br />
The Definitive History of America’s Top Warriors<br />
Relentless Strike: The Secret History<br />
of Joint Special Operations Command.<br />
Sean Naylor. St. Martin’s Press.<br />
560 pages. $29.99.<br />
By Col. Steven P. Bucci<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
For anyone who wants to understand<br />
how Joint Special Operations Command<br />
came into being and how the force<br />
does its job, this is the book to read. Several<br />
years in the making, the research is<br />
exhaustive and accurate, the writing topnotch,<br />
and the story compelling.<br />
I discussed the book with author Sean<br />
Naylor, a former <strong>Army</strong> Times reporter<br />
who’s now with Foreign Policy. He said<br />
he initially wanted to write only about<br />
the command’s post-9/11 exploits but<br />
quickly realized he could not do the subject<br />
justice without first laying some historical<br />
groundwork. To Naylor’s credit,<br />
this was a wise decision that adds greatly<br />
to the value of the book for historical researchers,<br />
and to the ability of the layman<br />
to understand the gravity of the<br />
unit’s progress and accomplishments.<br />
In the first seven chapters comprising<br />
Part I, Naylor looks at the precipitating<br />
events leading to the formation of Joint<br />
Special Operations Command (JSOC),<br />
and the numerous early alerts for counterterrorism<br />
missions that never got the<br />
“go” command. It is finally during the<br />
Panama invasion in 1989, led by Gen.<br />
Carl Stiner, that JSOC hits its first real<br />
strides. Following rapidly with the First<br />
Gulf War, Somalia and the Balkans, the<br />
breadth of the command’s mission set<br />
continues to grow. Having witnessed all<br />
of these events from the “white special<br />
operations forces” side of the fence, I<br />
found this a fascinating read, and this<br />
was just the beginning. Part I’s title,<br />
“The Ferrari in the Garage,” is apt, as<br />
this wonderful asset was underutilized.<br />
Part II, “A New Era Dawns,” begins<br />
the chronicle of the real growth of<br />
JSOC’s capability and reputation with<br />
its wider government customers. The<br />
exceptionally difficult and classified<br />
missions that the organization began to<br />
take on were remarkable. The chapter<br />
“Rumsfeld Falls for JSOC” was especially<br />
interesting to me, as I accompanied<br />
the former secretary of defense on his<br />
trip to Fort Bragg, N.C., and most of the<br />
JSOC briefs he received. JSOC was responding<br />
to the needs of the nation, and<br />
this shows how they were doing it.<br />
The seven chapters in “Building the<br />
Machine,” Part III, will likely draw lots<br />
of attention. This section maps the command’s<br />
exploits in Iraq, and fills in the<br />
gaps between a great many legends with<br />
facts. Naylor really did his homework<br />
here. The remarkable heroes that most<br />
people think of when they hear “JSOC”<br />
come of age.<br />
The fourth and final section, “A<br />
Global Campaign,” allows readers to<br />
see what JSOC has become and what it<br />
is truly capable of doing for America. It<br />
also shows why our enemies are in no<br />
hurry to face JSOC, no matter how<br />
much bravado they may spout. The mystique<br />
of America’s elite has been solidified,<br />
and the mystique is real.<br />
Naylor has done exhaustive research.<br />
He spent time with the men and women<br />
of JSOC, and it shows. He is a reporter<br />
who understands the military but is still<br />
able to remain objective. He remains respectful<br />
but applies a penetrating eye. In<br />
short, he gets it right. His prose is lively<br />
and enjoyable.<br />
When the book was first released,<br />
there was one point of controversy that I<br />
personally addressed with Naylor. He attributes<br />
a set of actions to a particular<br />
JSOC operator. That individual says he<br />
declined to speak with Naylor, who got<br />
the information from a different JSOC<br />
member, and that the information is incorrect.<br />
Naylor told me the individual<br />
was given a chance to give him the information<br />
or tell him the information was<br />
incorrect, but declined. So Naylor went<br />
with the source he had.<br />
I also looked into the individual’s assertion<br />
that Naylor had “outed” him as a<br />
JSOC member and found the individual<br />
prominently makes the JSOC connection<br />
himself on a personal website.<br />
Final assessment of Relentless Strike is<br />
that this will be the definitive book on<br />
JSOC for the foreseeable future. It deserves<br />
a spot in any professional library<br />
worth the name, and goes a long way in<br />
filling in the blanks many have in understanding<br />
a unit that has sacrificed more<br />
than most. They are the quiet professionals.<br />
Even with this infusion of illuminated<br />
information, they remain so.<br />
Col. Steven P. Bucci, USA Ret., is the director<br />
of the Allison Center for Foreign and National<br />
Security Policy Studies at the Heritage<br />
Foundation. He is also a senior fellow<br />
at the foundation for all issues involving<br />
homeland security and defense. He served<br />
as military assistant to Secretary of Defense<br />
Donald H. Rumsfeld, and deputy assistant<br />
secretary of defense, homeland defense, and<br />
defense support to civil authorities.<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 65
Dunwoody Set Above-Average Bars to Earn Stars<br />
A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies<br />
from America’s First Female<br />
Four-Star General. Gen. Ann Dunwoody,<br />
USA Ret., with Tomago Collins.<br />
Da Capo Press. 286 pages. $25.99.<br />
By Kelly S. Kennedy<br />
Gen. Ann Dunwoody, the first female<br />
four-star general in the <strong>Army</strong>, spent<br />
her entire career being treated differently<br />
because she was a woman, but succeeding<br />
because she was a soldier.<br />
She possessed many of the typical<br />
traits of good soldierhood: She could run<br />
fast for long distances. She could suck it<br />
up and show the almost irritating excitement<br />
about driving on that’s found in<br />
general officers. (Five a.m. battalion inspection?<br />
Whoopee!) And rather than<br />
get caught up in bureaucracy, she picked<br />
some battles, made her opinions known,<br />
and even blew past her chain of command<br />
when she believed it was necessary.<br />
Dunwoody details her management<br />
style—find good advocates, and ignore<br />
and defy those who would hold one<br />
back—in her book, A Higher Standard.<br />
She writes about some of her early failures,<br />
and uses them as examples of the<br />
importance of preparation. They include<br />
freezing up while reading an award citation<br />
in front of her peers in 1977; and<br />
failing to qualify on a firing range with a<br />
9 mm pistol as the first female field<br />
grade officer in the 82nd Airborne Division<br />
in 1988.<br />
Those lessons continued throughout<br />
her career. She writes that she often felt<br />
“that there was more expected of me in<br />
order to gain acceptance and respect in<br />
this man’s <strong>Army</strong>.”<br />
When Dunwoody joined, following<br />
several general officer family members,<br />
her only option was the Women’s <strong>Army</strong><br />
Corps. Her first PT uniform consisted<br />
of light-green culottes and a light-green<br />
blouse with white Keds, an outfit she<br />
called “ludicrous.”<br />
She met with resistance throughout<br />
her career, from her first jump to reporting<br />
to Fort Bragg, N.C. Men received<br />
positions ahead of her that they hadn’t<br />
earned, she writes, leaving her sidelined<br />
until other opportunities arrived. But<br />
those opportunities always appeared.<br />
She was one of the first women to attend<br />
Airborne School for female officers.<br />
“Without that opportunity, my career<br />
would have been dramatically different,<br />
and I certainly would not have earned a<br />
seat at the retired four-star conference,”<br />
she writes, hinting at the potential future<br />
of the three women who recently graduated<br />
from <strong>Army</strong> Ranger School.<br />
<strong>On</strong> her first jump, one of the instructors<br />
“smacked me hard on my rump with<br />
what came to be known as the five-finger<br />
tattoo,” although she writes that she never<br />
saw that happen to anyone else. The instructors<br />
had her jump first so the men<br />
would be too embarrassed to “chicken<br />
out.” She was one of four honor grads.<br />
As a new officer in the 82nd, she went<br />
through a ritual called prop blasting. She<br />
was jolted by wires connected to a battery,<br />
doused in ice water, smacked with<br />
tree branches and told two filthy jokes.<br />
She then had to tell a dirty joke of her<br />
own to avoid going through it all again.<br />
“Today it would be all over YouTube,<br />
and heads would roll,” she writes. But she<br />
saw the hazing as another way of showing<br />
she could “hang tough with the boys.”<br />
Some of the discrimination followed<br />
more subtle paths. During Operation<br />
Desert Storm, she became the 82nd’s<br />
parachute officer, but she didn’t deploy<br />
with the advance party. When she realized<br />
it was because she was a woman,<br />
she hopped a flight to Saudi Arabia<br />
without orders—her only deployment.<br />
As she waited for her angry commander,<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> announced she’d made lieutenant<br />
colonel—a year earlier than her<br />
peer group.<br />
Much of the book is about the men<br />
who tried to hold her back, in contrast to<br />
the advocates who recognized her abilities.<br />
She writes about her first division<br />
commander, who wouldn’t let women<br />
jump out of an aircraft he was in. Others<br />
believed she was promoted only because<br />
she was a woman.<br />
And yet, incredibly, she writes that she<br />
was surprised about the assaults on<br />
women at Aberdeen Proving Ground,<br />
Md., in the 1990s.<br />
“At the time, I did not believe that sexual<br />
assaults were part of the <strong>Army</strong> culture,<br />
but instead that this bad behavior at<br />
Aberdeen had been tolerated in an organization<br />
with a subculture that clashed<br />
with <strong>Army</strong> values,” she writes. And later,<br />
“I had been in the service for 21 years and<br />
had never encountered any direct form of<br />
sexual harassment or assault.”<br />
Dunwoody defends—no, champions<br />
—the importance of women, and diversity<br />
in general, in the ranks. It’s not a<br />
matter of competition, as so often happens<br />
in the military, so much as apparent<br />
obliviousness about sexual harassment.<br />
Should women be in combat? They<br />
already are, she writes. And sexual harassment?<br />
“<strong>On</strong>e incident of sexual assault<br />
is too many,” she writes. She had teams<br />
entirely made up of women she chose<br />
because of their merits and, in fact,<br />
sought a male candidate at one point to<br />
bring diversity to her team.<br />
“Can a woman meet the same standard<br />
required of her male counterparts?<br />
If she can, then there is no reason why<br />
women shouldn’t be able to do the job.”<br />
Dunwoody certainly could do the job.<br />
Kelly S. Kennedy served as an <strong>Army</strong> communications<br />
specialist during Operation<br />
Desert Storm and is the author of They<br />
Fought for Each Other: The Triumph<br />
and Tragedy of the Hardest Hit Unit<br />
in Iraq.<br />
66 ARMY ■ February 2016
Solomon Islands, which caused them to<br />
change their strategy to one of containment.<br />
Midway was indeed the turning<br />
point in the war, Myers writes, because<br />
it put an end to Japanese offensive<br />
operations to the east. He again reminds<br />
his readers that Japanese loss was not inevitable,<br />
and that viewing it through the<br />
lens of inevitability robs the situation of<br />
its complexity and strategic richness.<br />
This interpretation also lessens the accomplishment<br />
of the American military<br />
and strategists in defeating Japan.<br />
In Chapter 3, Myers takes on Alan D.<br />
Zimm, author of Attack on Pearl Harbor:<br />
Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, who<br />
argued that the Japanese attack on Pearl<br />
Harbor was actually a strategic defeat because<br />
it drew the U.S. into the war,<br />
which it eventually would win. Zimm,<br />
Myers writes, also operates under the assumption<br />
that U.S. victory was assured<br />
from the beginning, which is a logical<br />
fallacy. This assumption taints any further<br />
conclusions. As an example of the<br />
contingent nature of the war, Myers<br />
writes that neither side expected to be<br />
fighting decisive battles in the Solomon<br />
Islands or in a series of naval meeting engagements.<br />
Nor did they envision a war<br />
of attrition being fought out island by island.<br />
The war was a “matter of complex<br />
linkages between plans and operations,”<br />
Myers writes.<br />
The Allied strategic and economic<br />
plans are described in Chapters 4 and 5.<br />
Myers describes the competing philosophies<br />
in the American high command<br />
between a focus on Germany or Japan.<br />
While President Franklin D. Roosevelt<br />
wanted the military’s primary focus to be<br />
on Europe, Gen. Douglas MacArthur<br />
wanted to take advantage of the situation<br />
in the Pacific to achieve a swift victory.<br />
The back-and-forth in American strategy<br />
led to a gradual buildup of forces in<br />
the Pacific. Had more forces been dedicated<br />
to Europe, Myers argues, then the<br />
Japanese might have been able to develop<br />
a stronger defense that would have<br />
caused the war to go on longer.<br />
Similarly, had American economists<br />
not developed a long-term financial plan<br />
for financing the war, the U.S. might<br />
have run out of money for its war machine<br />
by the time it rumbled into the Pacific<br />
Theater. Both the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> and<br />
Navy had separate plans for victory in<br />
the Pacific that were pursued along different<br />
lines, while the Joint Chiefs of<br />
Staff produced an evolving strategy for<br />
the war. Allied strategy was hardly cut<br />
and dried, Myers points out, and victory<br />
was never taken as a given.<br />
That the U.S. victory was an accomplishment<br />
allows for appreciating what<br />
the U.S. military did to win in a difficult<br />
environment, Myers writes, adding<br />
that the Navy responded exceptionally<br />
well through innovation: task-organizing<br />
ships in combat; a greater proliferation<br />
of purpose-built amphibious ships;<br />
the development and use of radar; and<br />
the perfection of mobile logistics. These<br />
helped the Navy overcome some of its<br />
marked issues such as flawed torpedoes<br />
that did not detonate on impact, and<br />
smokeless powder that had such a bright<br />
flash that it blinded the naval gunners.<br />
This book is a valuable resource for<br />
World War II students of strategy who<br />
appreciate how strategy can evolve<br />
through contingencies. It offers a solid<br />
counterargument to the inevitability theses<br />
and reads quickly, with 150 pages of<br />
text. Based off both primary and secondary<br />
sources from the Japanese and<br />
Allied sides, this work gives a balanced<br />
perspective on the conduct of the war.<br />
1st Lt. Jonathan D. Bratten is an engineer<br />
officer and command historian in the<br />
Maine <strong>Army</strong> National Guard. He has<br />
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history.<br />
African-American Unit Defied Stereotypes<br />
Soldiers in the <strong>Army</strong> of Freedom: The<br />
1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War’s<br />
First African American Combat<br />
Unit. Ian Michael Spurgeon. University<br />
of Oklahoma Press. 454 pages. $29.95.<br />
By Command Sgt. Maj.<br />
Jimmie W. Spencer<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
The sight of armed African-American<br />
soldiers wearing blue uniforms was<br />
disturbing for some at the outset of the<br />
Civil War. For the Southerners in gray,<br />
it was more than just disturbing; it was a<br />
threat to the Southern way of life.<br />
Soldiers in the <strong>Army</strong> of Freedom, by Ian<br />
Michael Spurgeon, is an inspiring account<br />
of one of the many black units<br />
that wore blue uniforms during the Civil<br />
War: the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry<br />
Regiment. This largely forgotten regiment<br />
played an important role in the<br />
Union victory in the Trans-Mississippi<br />
Theater of the Civil War.<br />
The 1st Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment<br />
has the distinction of being the<br />
first black regiment raised in a Northern<br />
state, and the first black unit to see combat<br />
during the Civil War. Its battles were<br />
small when compared to the fighting in<br />
the East, but it was bloody combat<br />
nonetheless.<br />
The War Department mustered the<br />
regiment into federal service in January<br />
1863. It was the fourth black regiment<br />
to be accepted into the Union <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
William D. Matthews, a free black man<br />
in Kansas in 1862, helped raise a company<br />
of volunteers for the 1st Kansas<br />
Colored Infantry and became one of the<br />
regiment’s two black officers. The War<br />
68 ARMY ■ February 2016
Department also authorized Matthews’<br />
commission, which would have made<br />
him the first black officer in the U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong>. Unfortunately, his orders were<br />
lost and never reached the regiment or<br />
Matthews.<br />
Spurgeon takes the reader through<br />
the recruitment of the volunteers, the<br />
process of mustering the unit into federal<br />
service, and the desperate battles on the<br />
war’s killing fields. He also addresses<br />
how the regiment helped shape the<br />
evolving attitudes of politicians and the<br />
American people—Northerners and<br />
Southerners alike—about African-American<br />
combatants.<br />
This is their story, told by a master<br />
storyteller as accurately and fairly as possible.<br />
Spurgeon makes use of war<br />
records, soldiers’ letters and official reports<br />
to help tell the soldiers’ stories. The<br />
good, the bad, the emotional highs and<br />
the disappointing lows are all included.<br />
Soldiers in the <strong>Army</strong> of Freedom is the<br />
story of the important contributions of<br />
the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment<br />
to the war, and to the end of slavery<br />
in America. It is a welcome addition<br />
to the growing body of our knowledge<br />
and understanding of the role of black<br />
units during the Civil War—and it helps<br />
to rescue this important regiment from<br />
the dustbin of American history.<br />
Command Sgt. Maj. Jimmie W. Spencer,<br />
USA Ret., is the former director of<br />
AUSA’s Noncommissioned Officer and<br />
Soldier Programs and is now an AUSA<br />
Senior Fellow. During his 32 years of<br />
active military service, he had a variety<br />
of assignments with infantry, Special<br />
Forces and Ranger units.<br />
Expeditionary Forces in WWI: Untrained, Ill-Led<br />
Thunder and Flames: Americans in<br />
the Crucible of Combat, 1917–1918.<br />
Edward G. Lengel. University Press of<br />
Kansas. 470 pages. $39.95.<br />
By Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong> retired<br />
In this excellent book, Edward G.<br />
Lengel covers the combat operations<br />
and development of the American Expeditionary<br />
Forces from the 1st Division’s<br />
first combat, in November 1917;<br />
to the end of the Second Battle of the<br />
Marne and the reduction of the Marne<br />
salient, in August 1918, by U.S. divisions<br />
operating under French command.<br />
This is the period before the creation<br />
of the separate American <strong>Army</strong> in<br />
Europe that would fight at St. Mihiel<br />
and in the Meuse-Argonne.<br />
Lengel, a University of Virginia professor<br />
and editor-in-chief of the Papers<br />
of George Washington, strips away 100<br />
years of myth and exposes the ill-led,<br />
raw, untrained and unprepared American<br />
<strong>Army</strong> that arrived in France spoiling<br />
for a fight with a superiority complex visa-vis<br />
its French and British co-belligerents.<br />
This complex led to the <strong>Army</strong>’s<br />
willful disregard of the hard-won lessons<br />
the French and British learned fighting<br />
Germany before the U.S. entered the<br />
war, and resulted in thousands of needless<br />
casualties.<br />
The book’s greatest strength is the author’s<br />
use of French and German records<br />
to provide a much more objective view of<br />
the combat actions. Lengel makes many<br />
excellent points as he examines the<br />
American Expeditionary Forces’ various<br />
battles, units and commanders. He successfully<br />
debunks numerous misconceptions,<br />
showing the French army was actually<br />
better and more combat-effective<br />
than contemporary American accounts<br />
would lead one to believe. He demonstrates<br />
that the German army was not<br />
uniformly elite, had units with low<br />
morale and diminished combat efficiency,<br />
and made mistakes. He clarifies<br />
that the German High Command’s offensives<br />
in 1918 were not intended to<br />
reach Paris but instead to pull French<br />
operational reserves from Flanders to enable<br />
a German breakthrough there.<br />
Reading this book, I was struck by<br />
how often U.S. commanders and troops<br />
claimed credit for fighting achievements<br />
that should have gone to the French,<br />
who were fighting to the Americans’<br />
front and flanks. A prime example is the<br />
U.S. Marines’ battle in Belleau Wood.<br />
French units decisively reduced German<br />
combat power and enabled the final<br />
clearance of Belleau Wood by the 2nd<br />
Division. Further, the Americans’ lack of<br />
understanding at the brigade and division<br />
levels of French doctrine led to the<br />
frequent opening of U.S. flanks by withdrawing<br />
French units.<br />
Described in contemporary U.S. accounts<br />
as bugouts, many withdrawals<br />
were preplanned to minimize the effects<br />
of Germany artillery fire and maximize<br />
February 2016 ■ ARMY 69
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terrain for effective fields of fire. Understanding<br />
this, the reader should regard<br />
the 3rd Division’s stand on the Marne<br />
River on July 15, 1918, differently, at<br />
least in terms of the criticisms leveled at<br />
French units on the division’s flanks.<br />
Lengel ably shows how U.S. commanders<br />
exaggerated the importance of almost<br />
every battle, claiming their units<br />
fought at the point of main enemy effort,<br />
against overwhelming odds and elite<br />
German units, and without the considerable<br />
support of their Allies, among other<br />
factors. Again, the Champagne-Marne<br />
defensive serves as a great example.<br />
For 100 years, the 3rd Marne Division<br />
proudly claimed to have saved Paris. It<br />
didn’t. Lengel clearly documents that the<br />
German attack on the Marne was a supporting<br />
effort in a secondary area with no<br />
intention of reaching Paris. This does not<br />
denigrate the valor and sacrifice of the<br />
brave men positioned along the Marne in<br />
the middle of July, but it does place the<br />
battle’s importance in proper perspective.<br />
Lengel lays the responsibility for thousands<br />
of needless deaths at the feet of inexperienced<br />
and incompetent commanders<br />
at all levels who failed to prevent<br />
junior leaders and soldiers from using<br />
outdated and fatal linear tactics in the<br />
face of machine guns and massed artillery.<br />
He discusses the age-old problem of<br />
where on the battlefield commanders<br />
should be to decisively affect the fight—<br />
he takes the chain of command of the<br />
2nd Division to task for this failure in<br />
the battle for Belleau Wood, where commanders<br />
made the wrong decision with<br />
incomplete information while far removed<br />
from the fight.<br />
He also excoriates the 2nd Brigade,<br />
1st Division’s commander, Brig. Gen.<br />
Beaumont Buck, for “whizzing about the<br />
battlefields, with no obvious purpose<br />
other than to see what a real war looked<br />
like” while his brigade was being decimated<br />
in the attack south of Soissons,<br />
July 18–22, 1918.<br />
Lengel takes commanders at all levels<br />
to task for not passing on their units’<br />
lessons learned from early combat actions,<br />
with new units repeating the mistakes<br />
made by the “experienced” divisions<br />
because they did not know better.<br />
Brig. Gen. James Harbord, commanding<br />
the 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, appears<br />
to be criminally negligent in his failure to<br />
pass on lessons learned by the Marines in<br />
Belleau Wood to the 7th Infantry Regiment<br />
that replaced them, condemning<br />
that unit to failure and resulting in hundreds<br />
of needless deaths.<br />
This book contains many more critical<br />
observations and new interpretations<br />
that will challenge readers’ understanding<br />
of the American Expeditionary<br />
Forces’ performance in World War I.<br />
Each point is well-argued and well-supported.<br />
Commanders and units are exposed<br />
to criticism, with some looking<br />
better and some looking worse once seen<br />
through Lengel’s lens.<br />
Despite the many critical assessments<br />
made in this book, the American soldiers<br />
and Marines who fought in difficult conditions<br />
under often-incompetent commanders<br />
and with terrible logistic support<br />
are judged to be brave men who<br />
performed their duty as best they knew<br />
how, and with an aggressive spirit and<br />
abiding faith in the superiority of the<br />
American way.<br />
The French poilu and French colonial<br />
troops are given the due they have<br />
been denied by American historians for<br />
nearly a century. The German landser is<br />
shown to be no Superman, but is still<br />
depicted as a brave and determined foe<br />
who continued to fight with discipline<br />
and cunning even as the cause appeared<br />
to be lost.<br />
I heartily recommend Lengel’s excellent<br />
book to anyone interested in the<br />
American Expeditionary Forces in World<br />
War I, and the development of the U.S.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> into a professional fighting force.<br />
Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy, USA Ret., is the<br />
historian for the 15th Infantry Regiment<br />
Association and the Society of the 3rd Infantry<br />
Division.<br />
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70 ARMY ■ February 2016
Final Shot<br />
U.S. <strong>Army</strong>/Staff Sgt. Warren W. Wright Jr.<br />
Spc. Cara Corley of the 173rd Airborne Brigade competes<br />
in the European Best Warrior Competition at Germany’s<br />
Grafenwoehr Training Area with a dummy not weighed<br />
down by options such as clothing.<br />
72 ARMY ■ February 2016
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