Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of Eighth Army, inspects
front-line positions in March 1951.
Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., was the commander of
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Previously, he served
as the deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, and as the commanding
general, 1st Cavalry Division/commanding general, Multinational
Division-Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds
a doctorate in Russian history from the University of Chicago
and has published a number of books on military subjects. He is
a senior fellow of the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare.
ing a horrific running gunfight on Nov. 30, 1950. A lot of
them made it out, but they left behind 65 blackened cannons;
dozens of shot-up trucks; and far more disturbing, hundreds
of men dead, wounded and lost. The rear guard, the doomed
2nd Engineer Battalion, lost 711 of the 977 soldiers assigned.
In a final act of desperation, the exhausted engineers burned
their colors rather than have them end up as trophies in some
Chinese dayroom. The bugout had been total and bloody.
Yet not all had gone wrong. By careful reconnaissance, securing
the high ground and marching rapidly, the 23rd Infantry
Regimental Combat Team (RCT) avoided the Chinese gauntlet
of fire at Kunu-ri. Tall, thoughtful Col. Paul L. Freeman Jr.
(who would later become a four-star general) had been an adviser
to Chinese forces in World War II. Because he spoke Chinese,
he often questioned prisoners himself. Freeman understood
that the Chinese planned well and executed violently. But
they did not adapt well to the unexpected. Rather than take the
obvious road south, Freeman’s team made it out of the Chinese
trap by going west over a scratch route. It was a smart call.
Afew levels up in the hierarchy, the new Eighth Army
commander noticed. Then-Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
learned how to fight as a paratrooper in World War II.
He had also served in China in 1925–26 and thus, knew
something about the opposing side in Korea. They were good,
but they weren’t 10 feet tall. Ridgway believed that American
soldiers could beat the Chinese if they were well-led. He had
no intention of backing up. “There will be no more discussion
of retreat,” he growled. He meant it. And he kept his eye on
this man Freeman and the 23rd Infantry RCT.
Fifty miles south of the 38th Parallel, the prewar border,
Ridgway’s shaky Eighth Army stopped pulling back. Chinese
Communist forces hovered a few ridgelines to the north,
largely out of contact, no doubt getting ready for another offensive.
Taking advantage of the break in the action, undeterred
by the howling wind and snow squalls, Ridgway
roamed the front. He didn’t talk to just corps and division
commanders but spent a lot of time at regimental, battalion
and company level, spreading the new gospel: “Find them! Fix
them! Fight them! Finish them!” He then insisted on training
to reinforce that message. Training in combat? Some of the
officers were amazed. But the tough old sergeants got it immediately.
Training for close combat, for killing Chinese, became
the norm. Bugout was not in the cards anymore.
When the Chinese attacked again in February 1951, Ridgway’s
Eighth Army was ready. American artillery and airpower
wreaked havoc on Chinese columns exposed on the
slopes of treeless, snow-covered valleys. Some U.S. units bent.
None broke. But when the Chinese paused to resupply, Freeman’s
tough, veteran 23rd Infantry RCT was isolated well forward
in a perimeter defense, a rough oval about a mile or so
across, anchored on a set of low hills around a dot on the map
called Chipyong-ni. When the division and corps commander
suggested pulling back, Ridgway made it clear that wasn’t going
to happen. Those days were over. Freeman told his subordinates
the deal: “We’re going to stay here and fight it out.”
Freeman’s soldiers dug in, chipping away at the frozen dirt.
They sighted machine guns along mazes of barbed-wire entanglements.
Hundreds of mines were buried as well as 55-
gallon drums of fougasse: fire bombs ready to be triggered on
command. Artillery and mortars registered on key targets,
from distant hills to spots right on the wire. Freeman’s three
battalions held the north, east and south. An attached French
battalion—an all-star team led by a lieutenant general serving
under the nom de guerre of Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar—defended
to the west. Freeman’s 5,400 troops faced five understrength
Chinese divisions, about 30,000 men or so. To even
the odds, Ridgway promised plenty of supporting airstrikes,
aerial resupply drops, and a relieving force to break through
once the Chinese attacked. Well, maybe, but that depended
on the reinforced 23rd Infantry RCT holding its ground.
For 10 days, Freeman’s soldiers dug and kept watch. Early
on Feb. 13, patrols brought word that the Chinese were massing
their forces in the next valley over. As the weak winter sun
set, the Americans and French buttoned up their perimeter.
The French laughed and joked, passing around wine bottles.
After dark, the Chinese probed from the west. They had
found the French. Maybe the enemy thought the language
U.S. Army
58 ARMY ■ February 2016