Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

Front & Center
Readiness and Capability Are Intertwined
By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired
There is no question about readiness
being the prime responsibility of today’s
Army leaders. Every public speaker,
report, news column and magazine article
stresses the requirement and commitment
necessary to guarantee combatready
forces to meet the demands of
national security.
I have no argument with that requirement,
having lived with it in every command
assignment from World War II
through the Cold War. But during my
years of senior command, if anyone
asked for a one-word identification of
my prime responsibility, I would have
answered “capability.”
Readiness is the responsibility of combat
and combat support forces that may
be committed immediately to a crisis situation—those
closest to the crisis at the
highest degree of readiness. Battalion and
company commanders bear the brunt,
but platoon and squad leaders are the
front line of action. Squad leaders ensure
each soldier knows his or her job and has
the skills required by his or her MOS.
They also create the confidence and team
spirit essential for combat operations.
Platoon leaders ensure that squad
leaders have done their jobs, then mold
the teams that must be ready to engage
in the tactical tasks they are expected to
perform. Company commanders supervise
and validate readiness training; they
also are responsible for the first rung of
the capability ladder as they exercise the
ability to call for and employ intelligence,
fire support, logistics and coordination
with other companies engaged in combat
operations. They are the principal contributors
to the development of the next
war’s band of brothers.
Battalion and brigade commanders
also supervise readiness, but their primary
concerns are adequate planning and then
directing operations. Requiring their attention
as battle action unfolds are communications
that obtain fire support and
resupply, maintain contact with adjacent
units and higher and lower echelons, and
control the activities of attached units.
Division and corps commanders direct
combat campaigns. They supervise readiness
training during peacetime, but must
presume readiness when ordered to combat.
They direct combat activities, make
decisions essential for sustaining operations,
and ensure their staffs are sustaining
the support requirements of their
subordinate units. They are also responsible
for recommending or requesting
the additional support or resources that
could expedite action or prevent failure.
The highest commands in a theater of
operations are almost completely concerned
with capability. They must assume
the readiness of the forces committed
to them by the services as they plan
their campaigns, guaranteeing mission
success or explaining the risks involved
and recommending steps to alleviate
those risks.
A perfect example of such a requirement
was the request for an additional
corps in the troop list for the Persian
Gulf campaign in 1990–91. The same
responsibility is borne by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon, where
the ultimate demands of combat operations
must be satisfied.
When a national crisis occurs, the
president is concerned almost exclusively
with capability. After approving the National
Military Strategy and with assurances
by the Joint Chiefs of the adequacy
of forces to accomplish missions appropriate
to that strategy, he or she can confidently
make decisions to achieve political
objectives. When that system works
as designed, we have military operations
like Just Cause in Panama and Desert
Storm in the Persian Gulf. When the
system is not operable, we have had
World War II and three years of losses,
the Bataan Death March and the Battle
of Kasserine Pass while building the
forces necessary to win in Europe and
the Pacific; and we have had Korea and
the infamous Task Force Smith tragedy.
More recently, we have had unsatisfying
results in Iraq and Afghanistan, where
initial successes were squandered by inadequate
or overcommitments and early
withdrawals.
Fulfilling such a national strategy today
would require an Army closer to the
780,000 strength of Just Cause and the
Persian Gulf than the 450,000 currently
programmed for the future. It would
also require restoring the Navy and Air
Force of the 1990s and a continuing
modernization of our nuclear deterrent.
We can hope that Congress and our
presidential candidates are aware of
such a need and will provide a budget
that does not require the services to accommodate
a too small number and a
great risk.
■
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly
served as vice chief of staff of the
U.S. Army and commander in chief of
U.S. Army Europe. He is a senior fellow
of AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare.
U.S. Army/Rick Rzepka
February 2016 ■ ARMY 11