Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

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Members of the 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, work on a helicopter in New Mexico. Establishing a designated release time was an effort to solve the soldiers’ morale issues. The solution to the slow maintenance process was to increase work hours so all tasks could be met. The way to become better at training was to require 100 percent participation in all training activities. These solutions, while effective for their individual symptoms, totally contradicted each other. It is important to examine the sum of all the symptoms—which, in this case, led us to discover that the conventional modified table of organization and equipment organization structure was not compatible with current demands placed on the AMC. Address Tasks With the problem identified, applying an innovative solution should increase efficiency and morale within the unit. Given that the AMC has two primary constraints—maintenance and training—tailoring the solution to address these tasks is critical. The logical resolution would incorporate transforming the classic three-platoon concept into a twoforce configuration. The two forces would mirror one another and be on a rotational schedule; for the sake of this article, a week will be the arbitrary time. One force would be on maintenance for a week while the other force focused on training, additional tasks and soldiers’ personal appointments. Certain portions of the company would be exempt from the organizational restructuring. These include the command section (commander, first sergeant and orderly); the production control, quality control, supply section and tech supply officers in charge/NCOs in charge; and phase teams. These sections would operate independently of the new structure to meet the demands of their positions. The two forces would operate on separate schedules in an effort to maximize productivity. The maintenance force would work from 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.; soldiers within the maintenance force would be given segmented meal times that match the operating hours of the dining facilities. The emphasis during meal periods would be to separate the dining schedule so all Capt. Robert C. Sprague is a student management officer and Basic Officer Leader Course instructor for Company D, 1st Battalion, 145th Aviation Regiment, at Fort Rucker, Ala. Sprague attended U.S. Army Flight School at Fort Rucker and qualified as a UH-60M pilot. He served as an assistant S3 as part of a future operations cell at Fort Drum, N.Y., and deployed to Afghanistan from April 2013 to January 2014 with Fort Drum’s 2nd Battalion, 10th Combat Aviation Brigade. He returned to Fort Rucker and completed the Aviation Maintenance Officers Course and Aviation Captains Career Course. soldiers could eat without letting maintenance ever come to a complete stop. Physical training would be from 4 to 5 p.m. Maintenance is the only focus of this force. Protection for the members of this force keeps them from performing other duties. In addition, personnel within this force may schedule personal appointments only on a case-by-case basis. During slower maintenance times, members of this force focus on MOS training. This schedule and protected status allow the AMC to solve the higher unit’s maintenance problems by providing a ready and guaranteed maintenance force. Areas of Focus In contrast to the maintenance force, the training force would have multiple areas of focus including required training, inspection preparation, motor pool activities, personal appointments, and additional tasks and duties. This week would provide leaders the flexibility to design a training schedule that would not hurt the unit’s maintenance tempo. The daily schedule for the training force would be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. (standard meal periods in effect), with physical training from 6 to 7:15 a.m. It would be at the leader’s discretion to decide how fluid or rigid the training force’s schedule would be. The ideas presented here are merely a snapshot of the overall multiple-step process to usher in a fresh era in the evolution of the AMC. A quick examination of this idea demonstrates how proper problem diagnosis gives birth to a solution that would remedy all symptoms. Changing the organizational structure of an AMC would increase productivity and stability within the unit. Morale would increase as a result of soldiers’ value stability and predictability in their schedules. With a dedicated maintenance force, the time it takes to complete tasks would decrease, and the higher unit’s maintenance program would improve. With a force as well as a routine block of time devoted to all things training, the quality of the training and completion rates vastly increase. Of all the ideas to foster within an organization, one of the most critical is to never discourage innovation. Without it, you are doomed to repeat the same error indefinitely. ✭ U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Candice Harrison 44 ARMY ■ February 2016
The Evolving Art of Training Management By Col. David M. Hodne and Maj. Joe Byerly Photos: U.S. Army/Sgt. William Howard Col. David M. Hodne, then-commander of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, addresses soldiers before a rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. In the decade following Operation Desert Storm, the Army maintained a firm foundation in training but arguably lacked significant experience in direct combat. Episodic and infrequent direct engagements occurred in relatively short durations. This changed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since they found themselves turning to and from combat deployments at a rapid pace, soldiers and leaders possessed significant combat experience but were not always afforded the opportunity to train collectively beyond the platoon level. Qualifications to deploy hinged largely on mastering the “40 Warrior Tasks” and individual skills in a counterinsurgency environment. Ironically, over a decade later, some judge this cohort of young leaders as accustomed to fighting but not to training properly. The transition from a training-centric force to a combat-centric force affected an entire generation of Army leaders. Those who were junior leaders in the early years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are now first sergeants, sergeants major and battalion commanders. Over the course of more than a decade at war, these leaders became comfortable operating within a “brigade combat team-centric” deployment system known as Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN, to rotate and, in some cases, build units frequently to meet demands overseas. In executing this process, leaders across the Army were forced to accept risks in the conduct and management of training. Training management transitioned from decentralized commander-led efforts to centralized mission-rehearsal exercises. As Gen. Robert W. Cone, former commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, pointed out in a January 2013 Military Review article, “Commanders lost ownership of their training—the warrior’s art during times of peace.” As a result of this centralized approach to training, many have argued in military education classrooms, social media and professional journal articles that the Army lost the art of training management. We disagree with the notion that leaders are struggling with retaking ownership of training management, and contend that the Army hasn’t lost the art or understanding of managing training. Rather, contemporary leaders evolved this important process. This evolution in training management, which is reflected in current Army doctrine, is fueled by the hard-earned combat experience of leaders across the Army, new digital training tools, and an institutional resurgence in what today’s doctrine calls Mission Command. We have also had the opportunity to observe this in practice in reorganizing the Army’s newest Stryker brigade—the 1st February 2016 ■ ARMY 45
Page 1: The Magazine of the Association of
Page 4 and 5: Fighting for Relevancy in the Gray
Page 7 and 8: Seven Questions For Female Veterans
Page 9 and 10: News Call Animal-Assisted Therapy C
Page 11 and 12: COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR and SERGEAN
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Page 19 and 20: He’s the Army Surgeon Will Serve
Page 21 and 22: 1901 1917-18 Dr. Mary Walker is cap
Page 24 and 25: Cyber Capabilities Key By Lt. Gen.
Page 26 and 27: Sgt. 1st Class Richard Miller, left
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Page 30 and 31: Right: Soldiers of the 1st Armored
Page 32 and 33: U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class John D. Br
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Page 36 and 37: U.S. Army/Sgt. Alexandra Hulett U.S
Page 38 and 39: Muscle for an Uncertain Performance
Page 40 and 41: The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is
Page 42 and 43: Deep Roots of the Army’s Before 1
Page 44 and 45: Acknowledging the dental corps’ b
Page 48 and 49: Company commanders exit a CH-47 dur
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Page 52 and 53: Spc. Justin Yarnell, 3rd Brigade Co
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Page 57: U.S. Army/Spc. Caitlyn Byrne cepted
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Page 62 and 63: AUSA Sustaining Member Profile DHL
Page 64 and 65: U.S. Army/John Hamilton During test
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Page 71 and 72: Department also authorized Matthews
Page 74 and 75: Final Shot U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. War
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