Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

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U.S. Army/John Hamilton During testing at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., clockwise from top inset: An M270A1 MLRS fires a training rocket; an improved armored cab affords more crew protection; the redesigned cab puts the commander in the center. exploded ordnance … and with the different ways a bomblet can hit, there’s almost no way you can guarantee a less than 1 percent dud rate.” The solution came in the form of the alternative warhead program. Lockheed Martin worked with Orbital ATK to develop a new warhead for the guided multiple launch rocket system that features a high-explosive core surrounded by tungsten balls. “We’re talking about 186,000” medium- and small-caliber balls, Musculus said, so when the rocket detonates, the smallcaliber balls are “going everywhere. It’s used for imprecisely located targets and also for soft targets.” The engineering and manufacturing development program for the new warhead program began in March 2012, Musculus said. Testing at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., resulted in “100 percent mission success,” with detonations providing “good effects on targets.” Tactical Missile Modernization Other efforts are directed toward old Army tactical missiles containing anti-personnel and anti-materiel (APAM) submunitions. “The government has a lot” of the Block I tactical missions in inventory, he said. “These are the old ones with the APAM warhead,” which will not be usable starting in 2018 because of the cluster munition ban. “So what we are doing is taking those old Block Is, bringing them in, downloading and de-mating them from the pod, salvaging a lot of the metal parts including the solid rocket motor, which we’re washing out and refilling the propellant so it’s like a brand-new motor,” he said. “We’re also building new navigation electronics and upgrading the processors; replacing the obsolete parts; doing the same replacement of obsolete parts for the mission computer and putting a new processor in there.” Musculus said new builds of the inertial measurement unit and control actuation system are also being added. As a result, what had once been seen as a service life-extension program is now dubbed modernization for the Army’s tactical missile system. “The systems are not stagnating,” Musculus said. “We are continuing to upgrade the electronics in them. We are putting new processors in. We are replacing the obsolete parts. We are developing new warheads that are compliant with policies and accords. We’re also putting new electronics in the launchers and have developed a new armored cab to protect the soldiers better. These are evolving products that are going to go on for many more years.” Musculus also said the restarted tactical missile system and HIMARS lines are attracting foreign interest. “Countries are now coming and saying, ‘Hey, we want to get in on that now.’ So that’s a good story,” he said. “And where it’s really a great story is, as the foreign governments come in and buy these munitions, it obviously helps out our U.S. customer with better pricing.” ✭ 62 ARMY ■ February 2016
Historically Speaking Verdun at 100 By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired Feb. 21 marks the 100th anniversary of the German assault on Verdun, France. It launched the savage, 10-month World War I battle that has become a metaphor for bloodshed and indecisiveness. Soldiers on both sides endured incredible hardships, providing their generation a vision of hell on Earth. It was an experience no army wanted to repeat, fueling ardent searches for ways to break the deadlock on the Western Front other than by the means employed in this battle. Our own Army became a benefactor of the resultant doctrinal ferment. Our generations-long emphasis on decisive maneuver warfare stands in stark contrast to the brutal attrition the fighting for Verdun became. In early 1916, Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the German General Staff, faced a two-front war: in Russia and on the Western Front. This had ground on for a year and a half, with huge losses and no decision. Falkenhayn recognized that Germany did not have the resources to conquer and occupy either Russia or France while heavily engaged with the other. He believed an attack on Verdun, surrounded on three sides by the Germans and psychologically and physically vital to the defense of France, would draw the French army into a battle wherein it could be “bled white.” Artillery fire had proven to be far and away the greatest killer in World War I, and observed artillery fire was far more effective than unobserved. A massive yet tightly controlled offensive could quickly seize the high ground surrounding Verdun, giving the Germans fields of view the French would lack. The French would be forced to counterattack or to endure unrelenting exposure to devastating observed artillery fire. French return fire would be largely unobserved and thus, far less effective. French counterattacks in the face of entrenched defenders, machine guns and artillery would inevitably be costly. The German Fifth Army assumed the mission of attacking Verdun, and gathered over a million men and 1,200 guns to do so. Of the guns, two-thirds were heavy. The Germans built 10 new rail spurs off their main line running just 15 miles north of Verdun, and scheduled about 33 munitions trains per day. They stockpiled enough artillery ammunition to fire 2 million rounds in the first six days, and another 2 million rounds in the next 12. The Germans planned on swarming in aircraft sufficient to deny the French use of the air, depriving them of this other potential source for observed artillery fire. The French had stripped Verdun’s defenses of artillery to meet needs elsewhere. However, alerted by their intelligence services at the 11th hour, the French rushed in artillery reinforcements sufficient to give them 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns prior to the German attack. The German attack, preceded by a 12-hour bombardment, U.S. soldiers line the trenches near Verdun, France. advanced methodically and well during the first several days. It penetrated the first and second trench lines in the attack zone. The weight of the German attack was to the east of the Marne River and here, they seized the key terrain of Fort Douaumont by Feb. 25. This was about 4 miles from their start point. A day later, the attack began to sputter. Snow, a thaw, ground pulverized by artillery, and heavy traffic combined to turn the terrain it was moving through into a muddy morass. German artillery, in particular, had difficulty moving, soon finding itself out of range of critical targets. French reinforcements rushed in. Some French generals, under pressure, recommended withdrawing from the east bank of the Meuse River. Gen. Joseph J. Joffre, the French commander in chief, promised to court-martial any general who retreated. He appointed Gen. Philippe Petain to direct the defense. The ragged and sawtooth French lines held. Most notably, the French held on to enough of the high ground east of the Meuse to see into the German rear. They brought masses of observed artillery fire onto the Germans, even as the Germans were bringing masses of observed artillery fire onto them. Losses on both sides mounted. The Germans ascertained that the French artillery was concentrated on the high ground west of the Meuse, and resolved to broaden their attack to the west to neutralize this threat. A renewed attack beginning March 6 made some progress, but not enough to seriously degrade the French artillery. By April 9, the Germans had advanced perhaps 3 miles along the west bank of the Meuse. They advanced in the east as well and seized Vaux, but the French still held on to critical perches east of the Meuse. The Germans had reached within 5 miles of Verdun itself, but seemed to have forgotten that Verdun was supposed to be bait rather than an objective in itself. Library of Congress February 2016 ■ ARMY 63
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The Magazine of the Association of
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Fighting for Relevancy in the Gray
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Seven Questions For Female Veterans
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News Call Animal-Assisted Therapy C
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COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR and SERGEAN
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Page 15 and 16: tween crime and war, and between pe
Page 17 and 18: part of the barracks spic and span.
Page 19 and 20: He’s the Army Surgeon Will Serve
Page 21 and 22: 1901 1917-18 Dr. Mary Walker is cap
Page 24 and 25: Cyber Capabilities Key By Lt. Gen.
Page 26 and 27: Sgt. 1st Class Richard Miller, left
Page 28 and 29: Joint force soldiers brace against
Page 30 and 31: Right: Soldiers of the 1st Armored
Page 32 and 33: U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class John D. Br
Page 34 and 35: Creativity Could Boost Regionally A
Page 36 and 37: U.S. Army/Sgt. Alexandra Hulett U.S
Page 38 and 39: Muscle for an Uncertain Performance
Page 40 and 41: The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is
Page 42 and 43: Deep Roots of the Army’s Before 1
Page 44 and 45: Acknowledging the dental corps’ b
Page 46 and 47: Members of the 6th Squadron, 6th Ca
Page 48 and 49: Company commanders exit a CH-47 dur
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Page 52 and 53: Spc. Justin Yarnell, 3rd Brigade Co
Page 55 and 56: Birth Era May Factor In Risk Of Sui
Page 57: U.S. Army/Spc. Caitlyn Byrne cepted
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Page 62 and 63: AUSA Sustaining Member Profile DHL
Page 66 and 67: The French army trucked supplies an
Page 68: Dunwoody Set Above-Average Bars to
Page 71 and 72: Department also authorized Matthews
Page 74 and 75: Final Shot U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. War
Page 76: JLTV EXPERTISE. Your payload is max
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Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

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