Army - Kicking Tires On Jltv

Historically Speaking
Verdun at 100 By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired
Feb. 21 marks the 100th anniversary of the German assault
on Verdun, France. It launched the savage, 10-month
World War I battle that has become a metaphor for bloodshed
and indecisiveness. Soldiers on both sides endured incredible
hardships, providing their generation a vision of hell on Earth.
It was an experience no army wanted to repeat, fueling ardent
searches for ways to break the deadlock on the Western Front
other than by the means employed in this battle.
Our own Army became a benefactor of the resultant doctrinal
ferment. Our generations-long emphasis on decisive maneuver
warfare stands in stark contrast to the brutal attrition
the fighting for Verdun became.
In early 1916, Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the
German General Staff, faced a two-front war: in Russia and
on the Western Front. This had ground on for a year and a
half, with huge losses and no decision. Falkenhayn recognized
that Germany did not have the resources to conquer and occupy
either Russia or France while heavily engaged with the
other. He believed an attack on Verdun, surrounded on three
sides by the Germans and psychologically and physically vital
to the defense of France, would draw the French army into a
battle wherein it could be “bled white.”
Artillery fire had proven to be far and away the greatest killer
in World War I, and observed artillery fire was far more effective
than unobserved. A massive yet tightly controlled offensive
could quickly seize the high ground surrounding Verdun, giving
the Germans fields of view the French would lack. The
French would be forced to counterattack or to endure unrelenting
exposure to devastating observed artillery fire. French return
fire would be largely unobserved and thus, far less effective.
French counterattacks in the face of entrenched defenders,
machine guns and artillery would inevitably be costly.
The German Fifth Army assumed the mission of attacking
Verdun, and gathered over a million men and 1,200 guns to
do so. Of the guns, two-thirds were heavy. The Germans built
10 new rail spurs off their main line running just 15 miles
north of Verdun, and scheduled about 33 munitions trains per
day. They stockpiled enough artillery ammunition to fire 2
million rounds in the first six days, and another 2 million
rounds in the next 12.
The Germans planned on swarming in aircraft sufficient to
deny the French use of the air, depriving them of this other
potential source for observed artillery fire. The French had
stripped Verdun’s defenses of artillery to meet needs elsewhere.
However, alerted by their intelligence services at the
11th hour, the French rushed in artillery reinforcements sufficient
to give them 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns prior to
the German attack.
The German attack, preceded by a 12-hour bombardment,
U.S. soldiers line the trenches near Verdun, France.
advanced methodically and well during the first several days. It
penetrated the first and second trench lines in the attack zone.
The weight of the German attack was to the east of the Marne
River and here, they seized the key terrain of Fort Douaumont
by Feb. 25. This was about 4 miles from their start point. A
day later, the attack began to sputter. Snow, a thaw, ground
pulverized by artillery, and heavy traffic combined to turn the
terrain it was moving through into a muddy morass.
German artillery, in particular, had difficulty moving, soon
finding itself out of range of critical targets. French reinforcements
rushed in. Some French generals, under pressure, recommended
withdrawing from the east bank of the Meuse
River. Gen. Joseph J. Joffre, the French commander in chief,
promised to court-martial any general who retreated. He appointed
Gen. Philippe Petain to direct the defense. The
ragged and sawtooth French lines held.
Most notably, the French held on to enough of the high
ground east of the Meuse to see into the German rear. They
brought masses of observed artillery fire onto the Germans,
even as the Germans were bringing masses of observed artillery
fire onto them. Losses on both sides mounted. The
Germans ascertained that the French artillery was concentrated
on the high ground west of the Meuse, and resolved to
broaden their attack to the west to neutralize this threat.
A renewed attack beginning March 6 made some progress,
but not enough to seriously degrade the French artillery. By
April 9, the Germans had advanced perhaps 3 miles along the
west bank of the Meuse. They advanced in the east as well and
seized Vaux, but the French still held on to critical perches
east of the Meuse. The Germans had reached within 5 miles
of Verdun itself, but seemed to have forgotten that Verdun
was supposed to be bait rather than an objective in itself.
Library of Congress
February 2016 ■ ARMY 63