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Early Warning: The nature of the Russian threat to the sovereignty of the Baltic Nations goes beyond a hybrid ethnic uprising. There is also a formidable Russian conventional capability literally on the border of each state. The Kremlin has demonstrated this capability through aggressive activities by its air, sea, and ground forces. However, the most provocative of its actions are so-called “snap exercises.” These unannounced training events have increased in scope and scale over the past year and demonstrate that NATO would have virtually no early warning to prepare for the unthinkable. The reality of the changing strategic environment demonstrates the need for NATO to take concerted action to reduce the element of surprise. This can be done by stationing forward a modest early warning intelligence capability. This should include a linguist element, equipped with electronic warfare intercept capability, UAVs, and other intelligence assets to monitor military activity in both Russia and Belarus. NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC) should provide the oversight and synchronization of this forward Baltic Intelligence Center (BIC), which would reduce duplicative and costly “national” capabilities. The focus of the collection and analysis would be on the regional Russian military activities of the Western Military District. Although the idea of employing so-called “reach-back” capability from headquarters in Western Europe is popular, nothing can surpass having a forward presence, where analysts will be able to both see and feel the Russian threat. There must be a forward and robust intelligence and early warning capability in the Baltic region. The Baltic Intelligence Center (BIC) should be commanded by a U.S. Army Colonel with extensive intelligence and NATO experience. All too often, senior U.S. officers with little to no experience working with NATO are assigned to key positions in the Alliance, which puts them and the Alliance at a distinct disadvantage. This U.S. Army Colonel will also serve as the senior intelligence officer (G2) in the forward U.S./NATO division headquarters assigned to the region (discussed later). The focus and mission of the G2’s task is to provide both real world analysis and long range reporting on the disposition, capabilities, and assessment of Russian forces in the region. This G2 will need to provide more than near-term intelligence, but also longrange forecasting that understands and predicts the application of both its conventional and hybrid capabilities. The bottom line is that that Baltic Intelligence Center will be NATO’s expert on Russia’s emerging doctrine and approach to war. Build Capacity - increase the size, survivability, mobility, and lethality of the Baltic armed forces: Although all three of the Baltic States have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Crimea and its subsequent war in Ukraine. Estonia is making great strides to improve the size, mobility, survivability, and lethality of their forces; Latvia has also increased its defense spending; and Lithuania has taken the bold decision to reintroduce conscription. However, all three of these nations must have a robust force capable of responding to both conventional and unconventional threats to create strategic depth. The greatest disadvantage of the Baltics is geography. The place to begin is here to create time, space, and depth is a larger, 132
survivable, and mobile force. Such a force must be capable of contending with an “ethnic uprising,” while also being able to secure vital infrastructure (air/sea ports, major roads, etc.) from conventional threats. Defense spending is a place to start to measure a nation’s commitment to building capacity. However, of the Baltic nations, only Estonia is exceeding the agreed upon 2% of its GDP on defense. The increase in national defense is of key importance in that it provides tangible evidence of the Baltic Nation’s commitment to their own defense. Additionally, it will enable them to expand their military infrastructure to support the modest increase of forward stationed forces and assets. Key to this is building partner capacity. The U.S. could provide the nations in the Baltic Region surplus U.S. Military equipment sitting in depots in North America. These can be provided at cost and used to improve the lethality, survivability, and mobility of their indigenous forces. However, maintaining and employing these assets comes with a cost, something that the increase in national defense spending could compensate. Special Forces Capability: The nature of the emerging Russian use of hybrid warfare makes a purely conventional capability ill-suited. In addition to building a robust conventional force, the Baltic States must also have a complimentary Special Forces capacity. This should be an adaptive element that works effectively with local security forces (that local security forces includes civilian law enforcement and national counterintelligence services), other NATO Special Forces, and is interoperable with NATO conventional units. Additionally, this force should build relationships in the ethnic Russian zones of their respective countries and thus be positioned to detect an exported Moscow inspired ethnic Russian separatist movement. NATO should also establish a permanent forward multi-national NATO Special Forces presence in the region. These can support the training and development of a local SF capability, while also building relationships that can be leveraged in a crisis. Additionally, these forward assets should be tied into local security units, and can provide an early warning should Putin set his gaze upon the region in the form of some sort of Moscow directed exported “ethnic” uprising. Finally, if deterrence fails, Baltic Special Forces could form the core of an unconventional warfare capability that would keep occupying Russian forces off-balance and insecure until NATO can mount a conventional effort to liberate its Baltic allies. Forward NATO Presence: Although the U.S. and several other nations are rotating small military units through the region, there should be a decision by NATO to create a permanent forward presence of ground forces. There is no greater deterrence than for NATO nations to commit a modest force forward in the Baltics. This would dramatically alter the strategic calculus for Vladimir Putin, so that if he should ever seek to assert influence over the Baltics, the price would perhaps be too high. Any Russian adventurism would have to contend with the reality of having NATO troops already forward, and an attack on them would guarantee a response. This permanent forward force would have far reaching ramifications beyond deterrence and would also serve as the nucleus for follow-on NATO forces to build and expand. 133
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THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (USAWC) CONTR
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK vi
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Page Chapter 7: Adapting Policy to
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The Great Northern War lasted until
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land, sea, cyber and space, and the
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under one supreme leader. It took f
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NATO Image The fighting in 2006 was
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“We know that peace is the condit
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since before the Bolshevik Revoluti
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increase in scale and tempo of Russ
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where the environment was more favo
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y Tokyo, but also a buffer zone to
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PUTIN’S COMPLEX APPLICATION OF RU
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complex. However, it is unlikely th
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presence of Russian troops and infl
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24
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EUROPEAN SECURITY, RUSSIAN EXPANSIO
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Ukraine poses several strategic con
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II. UKRAINE CRISIS: TESTING THE SEC
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Ukrainian Marines with a BTR-80 Arm
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IV. THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: ITS IM
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to the annexation of Crimea, the UA
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NATO membership is a long-term aspi
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PUTIN’S / RUSSIA’S OBJECTIVES I
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The Russian National Security strat
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territories, which former Tsarist R
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political initiatives, and infuses
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Latvia exists - one that Latvia’s
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BALTIC BASTION!? by Lieutenant Colo
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Land Forces consist of an “Iron W
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or leasing options. And, even if ob
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NATO: UNDERSTANDING AND SUSTAINING
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presence globally. This enables the
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This not only validates the necessi
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Conceptually and practically, in th
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capabilities. 212 This enables info
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multilaterally toward common politi
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proactively addresses the challenge
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NATO’s Cooperative Security pilla
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“essential glue that holds [NATO
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VIII. U.S. and Lithuanian armored f
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esult, NATO implemented immediate a
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the U.S. and Europe. Think tanks in
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Page 178 and 179: 389 Ibid., 4. 390 Wales Summit Decl
Page 180 and 181: 428 Barack Obama, National Security
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