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“We know that peace is the condition under which mankind was meant to flourish. Yet peace does not exist of its own will. It depends on us, on our courage to build it and guard it and pass it on to future generations. George Washington's words may seem hard and cold today, but history has proven him right again and again. "To be prepared for war,'' he said, "is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.'' NATO is a bulwark of strength to avert war only as long as the commitment of its members to honor Article 5 exists. Weakness invites war. 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY by Colonel Douglas Mastriano, PhD, U.S. Army War College, and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Setser, West Virginia Army National Guard In early 2015, the U.S. Army War College, at the request of the former Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, published Project 1704, a study that discussed the changing strategic environment in Europe spawned by Russian aggression against Ukraine. The chief questions addressed by Project 1704 included (1) What is the Russian strategy in the region? (2) What is the appropriate NATO and U.S. response? (3) What are the implications for NATO and U.S. landpower? The positive reception of Project 1704 across NATO and the U.S. has made it one of those rare assessments used to inform and shape strategy. Although much of Project 1704 is still relevant in its view of the emerging Russian strategy towards NATO, the U.S. and the European Union, the geo-strategic environment has changed significantly. Since the publication of Project 1704, Vladimir Putin announced the modernization of the Russian armed forces and deployed forces to Syria, Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft after it violated its airspace, Russian aircraft aggressively buzzed a U.S. Navy vessel in the Baltic Sea, and Putin’s political proxies threatened NATO members with nuclear war. This report, Project 1721, takes up where 1704 left off. The geo-strategic situation continues to change. Although many trends are disconcerting, there are points of light in the darkness. Chief among these is that Putin’s aggressive tone and approach is forging a greater unity among NATO members hitherto not seen since the 1980s. Although many in NATO are facing divergent dangers (i.e. immigration/refugee influx), Moscow poses an existential threat to much of Europe. However, NATO is far from ready to meet this threat. Using defense spending as a measure of resolve, only 5 of the 28 NATO members are spending the pledged 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. The majority of NATO nations have a long way to go in “paying their fair share.” Despite the slow response in material action by NATO members, there are trends working against Putin’s expansionist designs. One of the startling developments is in Finland and Sweden, two traditionally neutral nations in the Baltic Region. Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine and in the Baltic Sea is pushing these two nations closer to NATO and the U.S. A realignment of one or both of these countries into the NATO camp would dramatically alter the strategic environment and give the West considerable leverage to prevent Russian aggression. Another by-product of Putin’s aggressive and hostile strategy is evident in Ukraine. Ukraine has a rich history, with much in common with Russia economically, culturally, and religiously. Yet, Putin’s war against a once stalwart friend is working against him. A truly Ukrainian identity is emerging from this, something not evident 7
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Page 4 and 5: THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Page 6 and 7: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (USAWC) CONTR
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Page 10 and 11: Page Chapter 7: Adapting Policy to
Page 12 and 13: The Great Northern War lasted until
Page 14 and 15: land, sea, cyber and space, and the
Page 16 and 17: under one supreme leader. It took f
Page 18 and 19: NATO Image The fighting in 2006 was
Page 22 and 23: since before the Bolshevik Revoluti
Page 24 and 25: increase in scale and tempo of Russ
Page 26 and 27: where the environment was more favo
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Page 32 and 33: PUTIN’S COMPLEX APPLICATION OF RU
Page 34 and 35: complex. However, it is unlikely th
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Page 40 and 41: EUROPEAN SECURITY, RUSSIAN EXPANSIO
Page 42 and 43: Ukraine poses several strategic con
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Page 46 and 47: II. UKRAINE CRISIS: TESTING THE SEC
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Page 54 and 55: NATO membership is a long-term aspi
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or leasing options. And, even if ob
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NATO: UNDERSTANDING AND SUSTAINING
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presence globally. This enables the
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This not only validates the necessi
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Conceptually and practically, in th
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capabilities. 212 This enables info
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multilaterally toward common politi
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proactively addresses the challenge
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NATO’s Cooperative Security pilla
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“essential glue that holds [NATO
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VIII. U.S. and Lithuanian armored f
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esult, NATO implemented immediate a
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the U.S. and Europe. Think tanks in
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X. CAN CYBER TRIGGER ARTICLE 5 OF T
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Russia, if NATO responded quid pro
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DETERRENCE, PROVOCATION, OR ASSURAN
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VJTF is the lead brigade in one of
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NATO leadership - a demonstration o
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defense in the event of armed attac
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ight of individual or collective se
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Russia's military transformation. 4
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK 98
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ADAPTING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE NE
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(Army Chief of Staff) asserted, “
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a little more explanation is how al
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[2015], imports have declined by 39
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conducting a visible counter action
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VANQUISHING THE SPHINX: ANSWERING T
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Russian military parade during the
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Anti-access/area Denial (A2/AD) Rus
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Kremlin Photo Strategy NATO’s Str
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have been focused to the southern p
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must be able to prevent a fait acco
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trained together will not be capabl
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FIVE SMOOTH STONES: HOW NATO CAN DE
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enefit first from this modernizatio
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Early Warning: The nature of the Ru
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Soldiers of the Danish 1st Tank Squ
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interoperability, an annual DEFORTI
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The saying that freedom requires et
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We'll preserve for our children thi
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17 Go to the following for the comp
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49 Ibid. 50 Michael Birnbaum, “A
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80 Signature of a roadmap on NATO-U
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110 Ibid. 111 Anonymous, “Notable
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State Defense Concept 2012,” http
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179 Office of the Secretary of Defe
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216 Graves, “Seek, Develop and Sh
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253 Kamp, “From Wales to Warsaw:
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o17QacYUtYcHdAYP_Uf0YXHilWYqq5jQjJZ
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312 BRICS is a acronym based on the
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346 Ibid., 4. 347 Stoltenberg, “N
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389 Ibid., 4. 390 Wales Summit Decl
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428 Barack Obama, National Security
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464 Barack Obama, 2014. Remarks by
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