The Iranian Revolution at 30

Ramazani...
be followed by the imposition of greater sanctions.
While Iran’s reaction to the Geneva meeting, which included the United States for the first time, was generally positive,
Iranian leaders said enough to demonstrate that they expect respect and reject threats. In addressing the Iranian people
on the critical nuclear issue on July 17, 2008, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, rejected threats
from the United States, saying that “[t]he Iranian people do not like threats. We will not respond to threats in any way.”
Yet he specifically praised the European powers because “they respect the Iranian people. They stress that they respect
the rights of the Iranian people.”
Following Khamene’i, on July 28, 2008 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the anchor
of NBC Nightly News, “You know full well that nobody can threaten the Iranian
people and pose [a] deadline they expect us to meet.” He rejected the August 2 deadline
on the same day and said on August 3, “Iran has always been willing to solve the longstanding
crisis over its disputed nuclear program through negotiations.” Reportedly,
Iran would make its own proposal in its own time, perhaps on August 5.
Second, Iran’s interlocutors would benefit significantly if they also understood Iran’s
negotiating style. Created, molded, and honed by long diplomatic experience, Iranian
diplomats combine a range of tactics in dealing with their counterparts: testing, probing,
procrastinating, exaggerating, bluffing, ad-hocing, and counter-threatening when
threatened.
Third, foreign powers such as the United States should recognize the fierce sense of independence and resistance of
the Iranian people, regardless of political and ideological differences, to direct or indirect pressure, dictation, and the
explicit or implied threat of force. With these points in mind, American leaders can still draw creatively on the historic
reservoir of Iranian goodwill toward the United States to craft initiatives that will be well received in Iran.
THE WAy FoRWARD FoR THE UNITED STATES
Created, molded,
and honed by long
diplomatic experience,
Iranian diplomats
combine
a range of tactics
in dealing with
their counterparts:
testing, probing,
procrastinating,
exaggerating, bluffing,
ad-hocing, and
counter-threatening
when threatened.
The United States should recognize the legitimacy of the Iranian Revolution unequivocally. The United States should
also assess realistically Iran’s projection of power in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, where Iran seeks
acknowledgment of its role as a major player. Thirdly, the US administration should reconsider its reliance on more
than three decades of containment and sanctions, which have not weakened the regime, but have grievously harmed the
Iranian people, whom America claims to support. Finally, the United States should also talk to Iran unconditionally. On
the nuclear issue in particular, the United States should take up Iran on its explicit commitment to uranium enrichment
solely for peaceful purposes, and President Ahmadinejad’s statement that “Iran has always been willing to resolve the
nuclear dispute through negotiations.”
14 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org