The Iranian Revolution at 30

Kurzman...
Republic has survived this official downgrading of its commitment to Islamic principles.
It also has survived the failure of its promotion of popular piety. A 1975 survey found that 56% of Iranians attended
communal prayers at least once a week; by 2000, the rate had declined to 40% (among young adults born after the revolution,
the rate was 31%). The same poll in 2000 found that less than half of the sample felt that the religious establishment
gives answers to social problems — one of the lowest ratios in any of the 14 Muslim societies polled by the World
Values Survey over the past decade. This survey and others show that Iranians are generally devout, but their devotion
seems to be more personal than political, contrary to the efforts of the Islamic Republic.
In sum, Iran has become just another partly-industrialized, partly-democratic, partlycorrupt
Third World country that has unusually tense relations with the United States
and Europe. Its Islamic Republic has survived in part because regimes often survive for
decades after their initial mandate and ideals have disappeared. When offered an alternative,
such as the reform movement that held such promise in the late 1990s, a large
majority of Iranians displayed an eagerness for political change. Even then, Iranians
were hardly revolutionary — in 2000, the Iranian sample for the World Values Survey
rated their own political system relatively positively, averaging 5.84 on a scale of 1 to 10.
Among young adults, the average for the survey was virtually the same (5.76).
Iran has become
just another partlyindustrialized,partly-democratic,partly-corrupt
Third
World country that
has unusually tense
relations with the
United States and
Europe.
I published a book several years ago arguing that the Iranian Revolution had been inherently
unpredictable. There are no prerequisites for revolution that would allow us to anticipate its occurrence — it
can happen at any time, whenever dissatisfied people come to believe that their compatriots will join them in protest.
Soon after the book was published, a colleague asked me whether I would help make a new revolution in Iran. You never
know when an entrenched dictator might be overthrown, he told me excitedly, citing my book as evidence. Khamene’i
could go the way of Romania’s Ceausescu, who was abandoned and executed in a matter of weeks after a relatively minor
event triggered a massive uprising. Apart from the ethical problems of the proposition — who am I to get involved
in Iranian politics? — I drew a different conclusion. Revolutions may occur at any moment, but they are very rare. Betting
on a regime’s survival is almost always a safer wager than betting on it being overthrown. And if my bet is wrong,
and the regime is overthrown, then that only confirms my analysis that revolutions are unpredictable.
34 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org