The Iranian Revolution at 30

Farhi...
against Iran.
Regional developments — including the removal of Saddam Husayn and the Taliban, challenges facing the United
States in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the increased clout of Hizbullah in its domestic environment — have improved the
chances of finding natural allies in the region and, as such, have led to enhanced Iranian confidence. Yet Iran continues
to wear its independence or non-alignment uneasily. Rather, Iran’s leaders insist on telling their domestic audience and
proclaiming to the world repeatedly that Iran is indeed a sovereign nation and a poke in the eye of the powerful. Almost
30 years after the proclaimed “victory” of the Islamic Revolution, the need to reiterate that, “the only path to victory is
through resistance and steadfastness” persists. 2
Why this is so certainly has much to do with the external pressures that continue to
be exerted on Iran in order to contain its regional influence. It is true that the United
States has never been able to come to terms with the loss of one of its most important
pillars of support in the region, and US policies since the revolution have aimlessly
and not very effectively vacillated between containment and regime change, with occasional
minor and unsuccessful forays into engagement. But the reality is that Iran
also remains conflicted internally over the direction of the country because, along with
its anti-Americanism, the revolution also brought into existence a polity based on contestation
and pluralism, regulated through a system of controlled and yet competitive
elections.
To be sure, Iran continues to demonstrate amply that the presence of meaningful intra-elite struggles for power is not
sufficient to make democracy sustainable, even if transfers of power occur through elections. The absence of rule of law
and corruption among the elite have in fact turned political contestation into instruments that undermine democratic
institutions such as elections, which are transformed into mechanisms of intra-elite competition rather than an expression
or projection of popular will. Nevertheless it is significant that this political competition continues to keep the
aspirations of the revolution alive and part of Iran’s contemporary political discourse.
Thirty years after the revolution, Iran is not a consolidated democratic state as the revolution promised. Neither is it a
consolidated authoritarian one. And in this unconsolidated authoritarian environment, the search for national sovereignty
and independence is a revolutionary legacy that cannot be simply wished away. This is so not merely because the
idea still occupies the minds of a good segment of the Iranian elite. It is more so because it is a frame that can be utilized
as a driving force for a more assertive security-oriented and nationalistic disposition that is then used as a means to
silence or sideline domestic rivals by accusing them of being members of a fifth column or soft on enemies.
It should be noted, however, that in Iran’s contested political environment, this security orientation is merely a policy al-
2. Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, speech given to Iranian officials on July 30, 2008.
Almost 30 years after
the proclaimed
“victory” of the
Islamic Revolution,
the need to reiterate
that, “the only
path to victory is
through resistance
and steadfastness”
persists.
30 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org