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European Clean Energy Investment Guide 2012

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ThoughT leadership<br />

not entitled to claim treaty relief under the double tax treaty<br />

between Russia and Cyprus (beneficial ownership approach).<br />

Since the double CyprusCo structure involves CyprusCo I<br />

receiving a loan which is then pushed down to CyprusCo<br />

II as equity and Cyprus Co II, in turn, then grants a loan to<br />

the Russian project company, the Russian tax authorities<br />

should find it difficult to apply the beneficial ownership<br />

approach to this structure, since CyprusCo II will indeed<br />

receive interest income but may legitimately claim that it<br />

has no matching interest expense, since CyprusCo II pays<br />

dividends, but no interest, to CyprusCo I.<br />

It should also be noted that the currency employed<br />

throughout the whole investment structure should be the<br />

same, i.e. Russian roubles. There are two reasons for this.<br />

Firstly, it is likely that any feed-in tariffs or subsidies will be<br />

fixed in roubles. Secondly, the tax-deductibility of interest<br />

payments on rouble-denominated loans is potentially more<br />

generous than for that on loans in other currencies.<br />

Unfortunately, this is not tax efficient for all types of<br />

investors. German and Austrian investors, in particular,<br />

would potentially face the risk of so-called CFC taxation.<br />

The German controlled foreign company rules (CFC rules)<br />

could prohibit ordinary corporate investors and private<br />

individuals from claiming beneficial tax rates on the<br />

income generated. Moreover, those rules would probably<br />

have a negative impact on insurers’ liquidity positions.<br />

To allow such investors to participate in the fund in an<br />

optimal manner we recommend that a separate share<br />

class be created for them. Special structures should be<br />

incorporated into this share class in order to obviate<br />

these risks.<br />

Option 2<br />

6<br />

Corporate<br />

Trust<br />

equity<br />

Project originators<br />

(Russia)<br />

joussiance right<br />

voting<br />

shares<br />

LuxCo<br />

green = equity investment<br />

blue = debt investment<br />

red = income<br />

Life Insurers Private Tax exempt<br />

equity<br />

dividend<br />

income<br />

SICAV SIF Fund Advisor<br />

100%<br />

equity<br />

PPL<br />

CyprusCo I<br />

Russian<br />

target<br />

100% equity<br />

income from<br />

joussiance right<br />

interest<br />

income<br />

from debt<br />

CyprusCo II<br />

100%<br />

debt<br />

voting<br />

rights<br />

dividend<br />

income<br />

interest<br />

income<br />

from debt<br />

The first alternative (Option 2) uses a trust arrangement.<br />

This approach also adds a Luxembourg SPV (LuxCo) to<br />

the structure. In this set up, the fund grants a jouissance<br />

right to the LuxCo, which, as a classical hybrid instrument,<br />

qualifies as equity for German tax purposes but as debt for<br />

Luxembourg tax purposes. The voting shares of the LuxCo<br />

initially held by the SICAV SIF are transferred – legally and<br />

economically – to a charitable trust before the end of the<br />

business year. These steps should support the position that<br />

the income earned at the fund level constitutes active income<br />

- dividend income from shares rather than interest income<br />

from debt - and should therefore not trigger CFC taxation.<br />

A look-through at the LuxCo level should also not be<br />

possible for CFC tax purposes since the jouissance right<br />

should not qualify as a participation right under the CFC<br />

rules. In essence, the jouissance right issued by the fund<br />

will be treated as debt from a Luxembourg perspective,<br />

but as equity from a German point of view. It should also<br />

be pointed out that the debt instrument used to fund<br />

CyprusCo I derives interest income which is generally<br />

taxable at the LuxCo level. However, the interest payment<br />

with respect to the jouissance right should compensate for<br />

the taxable income at the LuxCo level. It should also be<br />

noted that, since the LuxCo will effectively be performing<br />

an intra-group on-lending financing activity with regard<br />

to the jouissance right and the shareholder loan, this will<br />

fall within the scope of the Luxembourg transfer pricing<br />

rules. This means that an arm’s length margin will have<br />

to be realised by the LuxCo on its financing activities. In<br />

addition, the LuxCo will also need to comply with certain<br />

substance and equity requirements.<br />

Option 3<br />

Corporate<br />

convertible loan<br />

Project originators<br />

(Russia)<br />

green = equity investment<br />

blue = debt investment<br />

red = income<br />

Life Insurers Private Tax exempt<br />

equity<br />

dividend<br />

income<br />

SICAV SIF Fund Advisor<br />

PPL<br />

interest<br />

income voting<br />

from debt rights<br />

CyprusCo I<br />

100%<br />

equity<br />

Russian<br />

target<br />

pricewaterhouseCoopers ag<br />

100% equity<br />

CyprusCo II<br />

100%<br />

debt<br />

dividend<br />

income<br />

interest<br />

income<br />

from debt<br />

However, current discussions in Germany may result<br />

in a change in the law which could in turn trigger a<br />

change in the treatment of hybrid instruments. Already<br />

today the structure outlined in Option 2 is not entirely<br />

compatible with Austrian CFC legislation. We have thus<br />

created a third option to address this. In this structure, the<br />

fund would create a compartment for investors requiring<br />

this facility which would allow for participation via<br />

convertibles. In aggregate, this option should mitigate<br />

the CFC risk. In addition, this set-up should ensure tax<br />

deductibility of losses in the event that the investment<br />

does not perform, and it should also enable investors<br />

to claim participation exemption on capital gains if the<br />

investment performs well. This structure should also<br />

improve the tax deductibility of refinancing expenses.<br />

Finally, we believe that this set-up could potentially be<br />

attractive to insurance companies from a regulatory point<br />

of view under Solvency II.

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