1 (1) Pythagoras of Samos instructed the region of Italy once called ...

(13) For what is the point of this word in ‘the stone is a being,’ which is ‘that thing which
is’? What do the words ‘that which is’ represent since ‘the stone is a thing’ is more
explicit, unencumbered and to be preferred? When I have silver, I no longer want slag. I
do not want the trace of grain that exists in a heap, especially since this expression seems
absurd: namely, ‘the stone is that thing which is’ or ‘the stone is a thing which is,’ as if,
strictly speaking, there were nothing but the stone by itself, or whatever there would be of
which we might say that it is ‘a thing which is,’ an expression belonging to God alone.
(14) On this basis, the Apocalypse says ‘the Lord God who is,’ ho ôn, in the masculine
gender, and ho ôn is used in Genesis as well, ‘He who is sent me,’ the reason being that
only God is in the strict sense, whereas other things compared to God are not, truly and
strictly speaking. 35
In the neuter gender the expression is also used properly of God: ‘God is being,’ meaning
‘that …’ or ‘that thing which is.’ For all theologians acknowledge that God too is a
thing, which the Greeks were right to describe as ‘ontôs,’ ‘really’ or ‘unqualifiedly,’ and
as ‘tô onti,’ ‘in fact’ or ‘actually.’ Therefore, when a thing other than God is said to be a
‘being,’ the statement is absurd. Nor is it without reason or point that the greatest Latin
authors rejected this term, (15) which Aristotle makes more absurd by adding to it, saying
‘to on hê on,’ ‘being as being,’ as if what is were able not to be. 36 This second ‘being’ is
actually a participle, and here too is a common mistake when some say ‘the stone is’ or
‘the person is’ and therefore ‘being is.’ ‘Being’ here is not a noun but a participle, if only
these people would admit that a verb may be analyzed into its participle and a substantive
verb, as the next book will argue.
(16) Let us put an end to this question, then, and cause no further delay for the many
peoples and nations eagerly awaiting their king (as I have already noted). And as the
power of planning and God’s will rather than a servant’s cunning caused the horse of our
Darius to whinny, 37 let there be no more debate about the kingdom. Like the five
Persians, let the other five terms – ‘something,’ ‘being,’ ‘one,’ ‘true,’ ‘good’ – climb
down from their horses. Let them fall down and worship ‘thing,’ which is the only true
king among the six, as the five Persians worshipped Darius once they had understood that
he was their king. (17) This is why Ulpian says that “the praetor chose ‘thing’ because it
is a comprehensive word.” 38 He did not say ‘being’ or ‘true’ or ‘good’ or even
‘something,’ whose meaning is nearly the same as ‘thing,’ as I have said. Accordingly,
we also use this word in a comprehensive sense wherever we like, as in ‘things’ about
marriage or farming or navies or armies, and as in ‘I come to the thing.’ And for a
comprehensive interrogative, which I will deal with later, we have ‘what?’ or ‘what
thing?’ But ‘what thing’ applies to all the predicaments because each of them is a thing.
35
Rev. 1:8; cf. 4:8; Exod. 3:14 (Vulg.) – not Genesis, as Zippel points out.
36
Arist. Meta. 1003a21, 1005a3, 13, 28.
37
Herodotus (3.86) tells the story of an omen that clinched the choice of a Darius as king. His servant had
arranged things so that his stallion would whinny impressively when brought near a particular mare.
38
Valla, an expert on law, cites Ulpian, a great authority on ancient Roman law, from a famous passage in
the Digest of Justinian (12.1.1) where the topic is contracts. In formulating the law in question, the praetor
(a Roman magistrate) wanted to use the most comprehsensive term available.
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