1 (1) Pythagoras of Samos instructed the region of Italy once called ...

the soul is, in its very nature, separable.’ And then: ‘If sense, then both imagination and
desire. For wherever there is sense, both distress and pleasure also are, and where these
are, of necessity there is also strong desire. But it is not yet clear about mind and the
power of contemplation. This seems to be a different kind of soul, however, and it
happens to be separated, as the eternal is from the corruptible. But other parts of the soul
are not separable, as some say they are, which is clear from the foregoing argument.
Obviously, however, the parts are rationally distinct.’ 154
(12) And why would he not suppose that perishing part of the soul, since it is corruptible
and almost bestial, to be separate from the eternal and divine? In the books On the
Generation of Animals, he wants it to come to be from the body itself, stating: ‘The body
comes from the female, the soul from the male, for the soul is the usia of a particular
body.’ And also: ‘… then if the male is the maker of this sort of soul.’ (13) And in the
books On the Soul: ‘Since usia is used in three ways, as we have said, one of these being
“form,” another “matter,” and a third “what comes from both,” then, of these three,
matter is potency and form is entelechy. Because what comes from them is the ensouled,
the body is not the entelechy of the soul, but the soul itself is the entelechy of some body.
Hence they have the correct view who see the soul as neither being without body nor
being any body, for in fact it is not a body but something of a body.’ 155
(14) And elsewhere: ‘But of things that are, we say that usia is one kind. Of this,
furthermore, we call matter what in itself is not a this of any sort; while form and species
is just that according to which we call something a this; and the third is what comes from
both. But matter is potency, form is entelechy, and entelechy is twofold: one kind is like
expertise, for example, another like contemplating. Now usiae are regarded as bodies
especially, particularly natural bodies since these are principles of other bodies. Among
natural bodies, however, some have life, and some do not have it. We say that life is selfnourishing,
also growth and decay. (15) Therefore, every natural body that shares in life
is an usia, but usia understood in this way as composite. Since a body of this kind – one
having life – also exists, the soul will not be a body, for a body is a subject and matter
rather than what accords with a subject. Necessarily, the soul is usia as the form of a
natural body with the potency to have life.’ And a little further on: ‘Accordingly, it
makes no sense to ask if the soul and body are one, nor likewise wax and its shape, nor,
in general, the matter of any thing and that of which it is the matter.’ 156
(16) Given these twists of words and meanings, who does not see that Aristotle’s
understanding of the soul was quite inept? The souls of the dead that made themselves
manifest to various people (as Homer and all the magicians agree) could have reminded
him that they neither perish nor come from the body nor lack feelings, or else they were
compounded of two parts and natures, like an animal whose body is the container of the
soul. But one part of the soul cannot be called the container of another part of the soul,
unless perhaps he wants it to be the covering of a bodily container. Moreover, on
154 Zippel cites Arist. An. 413 a 4-5, b 22-9.
155 Zippel cites Arist. Gen. An. 738 b 25-6, 41 a 13-14; An. 414 a 14-21.
156 Zippel cites Arist. An. 412 a 6-21, b 6-8.
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