1 (1) Pythagoras of Samos instructed the region of Italy once called ...

judged ‘by a fair and good [standard].’ 75 ‘Fair’ itself is also the same as ‘fairness,’ and
‘upright’ is the same as ‘uprightness,’ as when ‘there are a number of aspects of an
upright [character]’ and ‘there are a number of aspects of uprightness.’
(18) ‘Eternal’ is the same as ‘eternity,’ and there are many examples, as in ‘the works of
many people last into eternal [time]’ and ‘works are written by many people for eternity.’
‘Evil’ is the same as ‘wickedness’ (as I have said) or ‘depravity,’ ‘useful’ the same as
‘utility,’ ‘suitable’ as ‘suitability,’ ‘proper’ as ‘property,’ ‘contrary’ as ‘contrariety’ and
so on. 76
Hence, the notion of concrete terms is neither general nor random, but it is nearly empty
and groundless. 77 (19) I would rather they had put these terms in the masculine and
feminine genders than in the neuter. For adjectives are substantivated in the masculine
gender and the feminine, and they signify a thing with the quality, but the things
themselves are only a man and a woman, as in ‘the swarthy is hotter by nature than the
fair,’ ‘the light is more beautiful by nature than the swarthy and the dark,’ ‘many are the
ill,’ and ‘rare are the chaste.’ You have such thoughts about no animal other than the
human and indeed about no other thing. ‘The angry [one] has no plan,’ ‘the greedy [one]
does nothing right except at death,’ ‘the [one who is] submissive to the husband is hardly
ever beaten’: the reference is not to a lion, dog, eagle or dove but to a man and a woman.
(20) Likewise with ‘some,’ ‘a certain,’ ‘a particular,’ ‘anyone who,’ ‘another,’ ‘none,’
‘this,’ and ‘that’ [in the masculine and feminine], so that it makes no difference whether
or not one adds ‘man’ or ‘woman’: ‘no man is here,’ ‘no woman is silent’; ‘none is here,’
‘none is silent’ or ‘no one is here,’ ‘no one is silent.’ 78 But whoever said ‘nothing is
silent’? Whether simple or composite, this term has no neuter substantive like those
mentioned above – ‘something,’ ‘a certain thing,’ and ‘anything.’
(21) This also holds for the general interrogative word, ‘who’ or ‘which,’ as in ‘who is
present?’ and ‘which is dead?’ where it is certainly a man and a woman. Those Greeks
whom Priscian followed were wrong, therefore, in leading to him to say ‘Who invented
letters? A man. Who is useful for the plow? An ox. Who swims in the sea? A fish.’ 79
For when one asks ‘Who invented writing?’ it is exactly the same as asking ‘Which
person?’ How clumsy it would be if your answer were ‘a dog’ when I asked ‘who is
waiting for me?’ If a dog and not a person were waiting, the answer should have been
‘no one is waiting for you, just a dog.’
(22) It is clear that I was asking about a person, in fact, since otherwise I would not have
said ‘who’ but ‘what is waiting for me?’ as in other cases. For one should not ask ‘who is
useful for the plow?’ and ‘who swims in the sea?’ but ‘what?’. If someone were to ask
75
Cic. Rhet. Her. 2.20; Caec. 65; Dig. 17.1.12.9, 40.4.22.pr.; Ter. Adelph. 987.
76
Above, 2.24.
77
Above, 3.3.
78
Since these words are gendered in Latin, it is not necessary, for example, to add mulier (‘woman’) to
distinguish a feminine ‘that’ (illa) from a masculine (ille) or a neuter (illud).
79
Zippel cites Priscian, Gramm. 17.6.43
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