1 (1) Pythagoras of Samos instructed the region of Italy once called ...

form, the soul is drawn out into a cone as it floats down, just as a line comes from a point
and extends into a length from an undivided source; and then from its point, which is a
monad, the soul comes here into the dyad, which is the first extension; and this is the
essence that Plato called undivided and likewise divided in the Timaeus, when speaking
about the structure of the world-soul.’ Again: ‘Therefore, if we will admit that trees are
indeed moved, but with a movement suited to them, why would we deny this to the soul –
that it is moved with a motion appropriate to its essence?’ 123
(13) Look at all the words we use up in order to know which word to use – ‘substance’ or
‘essence’ – because of the perversity of certain people! What shall we do, then? If we
prefer ‘substance,’ we seem to stray farther from the correct Greek and also to banish
‘essence’ as a word which is empty and useless (and good riddance). But if we prefer
‘essence,’ we shall depart from usage already accepted (to which some concession must
be made). And whichever way we choose, we shall still stumble upon the confusions of
language that I have pointed out. (14) Therefore, in order to allow both truth and usage
each to play its part, so that we may speak more distinctly and more clearly as well, we
must, in my view, say ‘substance’ when speaking about a thing composed of those two
principles (as Aristotle would say). When speaking about what he calls ‘matter,’ we
should call it ‘essence’; and if we ever need to cite some Greek author, we will make use
of the Greek word in the way that we have done. ‘Form,’ however, we understand to be
quality. 124
These are issues that we must discuss in what follows. This being so, the first category
(as Boethius liked) should be called ‘substance.’ 125 For a body is composed of matter and
form, or of essence and quality, and it must be aknowledged that soul is likewise
composed, although we will have something to say about this as well.
7 THE CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE: AGAINST PORPHYRY AND OTHERS
Porphyry – a man of great authority and very learned, if we believe Boethius – did what
most people did and classified ‘substance’ into ‘bodily’ and ‘bodiless.’ Since it is a
category, ‘substance’ is treated as the highest genus, while ‘bodily’ and ‘bodiless’ are
said to be differences, always arranged in pairs. When these differences are reduced to
substantives, they make species, as when ‘body’ is made out of ‘bodily.’ But ‘bodiless’
did not get a substantive of its own in their scheme, though by my reckoning it will be
‘spirit’ or ‘soul.’ (2) ‘Body’ is nothing but ‘bodily substance,’ however, and ‘spirit’ or
‘soul’ is ‘bodiless substance.’ When ‘body,’ which is a species of ‘substance,’ is
123
Zippel cites Macrob. Somn. 1.12.5-6; 2.15.9, 12, 16.17.
124
For substance in Aristotle as a composite of two principles, matter and form, see above, 6.7; the Greek
word of which Valla will make use is ousia, transliterated as usia.
125
Zippel cites Boethius, In Porphyrium dialogi a Victorino translati, 1 (PLM 64.41-2); In Porphyrium a se
translatum commentariorum libri, 3 (PLM 64.102-4), noting that V’s target here is Boethius (as propagated
by Peter of Spain, Summul. 2.2 [Cologne: 1499, bii-iii]; Paul of Venice, Summul. 1.3 [Venice: 1488, a4];
and Paul of Pergola, Logica [Venice: 1501, aii], who would have been read at Padua when V taught there)
more than Porphyry.
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