Accountability

person is morally responsible for their actions, even if they were determined (that is,
people also give compatibilist answers).
The neuroscience of free will investigates various experiments that might shed light on
free will.
Collective
When people attribute moral responsibility, they usually attribute it to individual moral
agents. However, Joel Feinberg, among others, has argued that corporations and other
groups of people can have what is called ‘collective moral responsibility’ for a state of
affairs. For example, when South Africa had an apartheid regime, the country's
government might have been said to have had collective moral responsibility for the
violation of the rights of non-European South Africans.
Lack of Sense of Responsibility of Psychopaths
One of the attributes defined for psychopathy is "failure to accept responsibility for own
actions".
Artificial Systems
The emergence of automation, robotics and related technologies prompted the
question, 'Can an artificial system be morally responsible?' [37][38][39] The question has a
closely related variant, 'When (if ever) does moral responsibility transfer from its human
creator(s) to the system?'.
The questions arguably adjoin with but are distinct from machine ethics, which is
concerned with the moral behavior of artificial systems. Whether an artificial system's
behavior qualifies it to be morally responsible has been a key focus of debate.
Arguments That Artificial Systems Cannot Be Morally Responsible
Batya Friedman and Peter Kahn Jr posited that intentionality is a necessary condition
for moral responsibility, and that computer systems as conceivable in 1992 in material
and structure could not have intentionality.
Arthur Kuflik asserted that humans must bear the ultimate moral responsibility for a
computer's decisions, as it is humans who design the computers and write their
programs. He further proposed that humans can never relinquish oversight of
computers.
Frances Grodzinsky et al. considered artificial systems that could be modelled as finite
state machines. They posited that if the machine had a fixed state transition table, then
it could not be morally responsible. If the machine could modify its table, then the
machine's designer still retained some moral responsibility.
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