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cost of living, etc.” (Yesh Atid n.d). Moreover, it states that the party aims to “bring about a diplomatic agreement between Israel and the Arab world” (Yesh Atid n.d.). According to the Security Doctrine manifesto of Yesh Atid, the party aims to do this by “possessing overwhelming strength” (Yesh Atid n.d.). Similarly; the Hosen L’Yisrael party aims to do the same thing, which is the main reason why the two parties merged. The agreement between the two parties states that “the deal struck between the two party leaders means that Gantz would be prime minister for two and a half years, with Lapid becoming prime minister after that, if they form the next government” (Levinson and Lis 2019). Additionally; the merger was a response to the merging of the Jewish Home Party with the Otzma Yehudit Party. The agreement to merge the two parties cost Netanyahu two ministerial seats for the next coalition government, should he win. It also appears that the Otzma Yehudit Party is not the only party that has been absorbed by, or merged with, with the Jewish Home. An article in The Times of Israel states that it has also merged with the “far-right National Union” Party and is in the process of merging with “Eli Yishai’s Yachad” Party. These mergers are an attempt to ensure that Netanyahu has enough seats and influence to form a new coalition, should he win the election. Conclusion Despite the corruption allegations and the slim majority hold over Knesset seats, Prime Minister Netanyahu resisted the call for early elections until late December 2018. The analysis seems to indicate that he faces a potentially difficult election on April 9. However; it is essential to point out that Netanyahu has faced worse odds in the past and still won. The most relevant example of this is when he was running for Prime Minister in 1996. He came back and won after being down by 31 points due to the attacks on the Jaffa Road bus bombings, allegedly by Hamas suicide bombers, which killed 45 people. The belief that Israel’s national security was more important than a peace agreement with the Palestinians won over the voters and made him prime minister. This message still resonates very strongly with many in Israel and despite the Blue and White Ticket sharing similar beliefs it is estimated with moderate to high confidence that Netanyahu will win in his re-election bid on April 9, 2019, unless he is indicted by the pending corruption allegations against him before that date. 35
References Cited Anonymous (2012) “Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid”, , accessed on 23 February 2019. Anonymous (2018a) “Benjamin Netanyahu Rejects Calls for Election and Takes Defence Portfolio”, The Guardian, 18 November, , accessed on 3 December 2018. Anonymous (2018b) “Israel Defence Minister Lieberman Resigns Over Gaza Ceasefire”, BBC, London, 14 November, , accessed on 3 December 2018. Anonymous (n.d.) “Israeli Politics: Prime Ministers (1948-present)”, Jewish Virtual Library, , accessed on 3 December 2018. Fulbright, A. (2019) “Netanyahu Promises Jewish Home 2 Ministries to Join With Extremist Party”, The Times of Israel, 20 February, , accessed on 23 February 2019. Holmes, O. (2018) “Israeli Education Minister Vows not to Resign in Reprieve for Netanyahu”, The Guardian, 19 November, , accessed on 3 December 2018 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) “Israeli Democracy: How Does It Work”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) “The State: Political Structure”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel, , accessed on 3 December 2018. Kirk, M. (2016) “Netanyahu’s War”, Public Broadcasting Service, Arlington, Virginia, first broadcast on 5 January. Levinson, C., and Lis, J. (2019) “Political Bombshell as Gantz, Lapid Join Forces to Replace Netanyahu”, The Guardian, 21 February,
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