The_Innovators_Dilemma__Clayton

products can be interactively developed and refined with customers. Generally, the entrée to the
customer was provided by the salesperson who sold the firm’s established product lines. This helped
the firm develop new products for established markets, but not identify new applications for its new
technology. See Robert Burgelman and Leonard Sayles, Inside Corporate Innovation (New York: The
Free Press, 1986) 76–80. Professor Rebecca Henderson pointed out to me that this tendency always to
take new technologies to mainstream customers reflects a rather narrow marketing competence—that
although many scholars tend to frame the issue as one of technological competence, such inability to
find new markets for new technologies may be a firm’s most serious handicap in innovation.
17. Voice coil motors were more expensive than the stepper motors that Seagate had previously used.
While not new to the market, they were new to Seagate.
18. This is consistent with the findings reported by Arnold Cooper and Dan Schendel in “Strategic
Responses to Technological Threats,” Business Horizons (19), February, 1976, 61–69.
19. Ultimately, nearly all North American disk drive manufacturers can trace their founders’ genealogy
to IBM’s San Jose division, which developed and manufactured its magnetic recording products. See
Clayton M. Christensen, “The Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial and Technological
Turbulence,” Business History Review (67), Winter, 1993, 531–588.
20. In general, these component technologies were developed within the largest of the established firms
that dominated the established markets above these entrants. This is because new components generally
(but not always) have a sustaining impact on technology trajectories. These high-end, established firms
typically were engaged in the hottest pursuit of sustaining innovations.
21. The research of Eric von Hippel, frequently cited as evidence of the value of listening to customers,
indicates that customers originate a large majority of new product ideas (see Eric von Hippel, The
Sources of Innovation [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]). One fruitful avenue for future
research would be to revisit von Hippel’s data in light of the framework presented here. The value
network framework would predict that the innovations toward which the customers in von Hippel’s
study led their suppliers would have been sustaining innovations. We would expect disruptive
innovations to have come from other sources.
22. Henderson saw similar potential danger for being misled by customers in her study of
photolithographic aligner equipment manufacturers. See Rebecca M. Henderson, “Keeping Too Close
to Your Customers,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management working
paper, 1993.
23. Many industry observers have noted that there seems to be a floor on the cost of making a disk
drive, somewhere around $120 per device, below which even the best manufacturers cannot plunge.
This is the basic cost of designing, producing, and assembling the requisite components. Drive makers
keep reducing costs per megabyte by continuously increasing the number of megabytes available in
that basic $120 box. The effect of this floor on the competition between disk drives and flash cards may
be profound. It means that in low-capacity applications, as the price of flash memory falls, flash will
become cost-competitive with disk memory. The frontier above which magnetic disk drives have lower
costs per megabyte than flash will keep moving upmarket, in a manner perfectly analogous to the
upmarket movement of larger disk drive architectures. Experts predicted, in fact, that by 1997, a 40 MB
flash card would be priced comparably to a 40 MB disk drive.
24. Lewis H. Young, “Samsung Banks on Tiny Flash Cell,” Electronic Business Buyer (21), July,
1995, 28.
25. Richard Tedlow, New and Improved: A History of Mass Marketing in America (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1994).
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