Teague - Supreme Court of Texas

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other requirements exist. The court of appeals corpectty nrled that Teagm had satisfied these mpkements. In the case before the CourE, Teague rewived a copy of the W decision of the City on December 17,2005. (CR at 69). On January 12,2006, Teague filed a verified petition aweding Order No. D-0445 of the City of Jacksboro. (CR at 2). Teague's verified petition was filed well within the 30 days required by the statute. Fdemore3 T-e's petition appealed the City's hoIition order on memus pmds including the iflegality of the order (for lack of due process) as well as the uncomtitutiond application of the mdkmce to his prom. (CR at 3-5,8). On this basis, the court of appeals camdy determined that Teague had met the statutory mpimnents of Chapter 214 and thus properly invoked the trial. court's subject matter jurisdiction. The City and State clh that the court of appeals judicially rewrote the apped process created by the Legislature. Yet, it is the interpretation of the City and State which wdd actually eradicate and render me^^ the clear and unambiguous language of the Legislature. Both the City and State rely on sdm 21 4.00 12(b) for their assertion that Teague must fie a ?Petion for Writ of Certiorari" in order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court Tbis position dhdy conflicts with a clear reading of the statute. It is not necessary to resort to rules of comhuctio~. or extrinsic aids, such as legislative histaris, to constme a statute which is clear mcl unambiguous on its face.
St. Luke 's Episcopal Hap. V. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503,505 (Tex. 1997). The statute at issue here actual& states that on the W g of the petition, the court issue a writ of certiorari directed to the municipality to review the order of the municipsrlity. TEX. LOC. W'T CODE 5 2 14.001 2(b). The City claims in its brief that courts of appeal have varied in deEermining whether a district court's grant of certiorari is disdmq or not. See City's Brief on the Merits at 19. This is, however, simply not the case. Courts have consistently held that the power of the district court to issue a writ of certiorari is discretianmy as stated in the statute. This same opinion is adopted by the court of appeals in the case cited by the City as alleged evidence of the existence of a split of authority. Hagood v. Ctty of Howton Zbrihzg Bd. of A@wfme~, 982 S.W.2d 17,18 (Tex. App.-Housh [I* WI1998, no writ) (explaining &ct court's gmt of writ of dorari as discretionary). No such split of authority exists. Both the City and State have improperly seized on this discretionary language and argued that it imposes some additid jusisdictiond duties upon Teap. This d o n of the statate is clearly discretionary and applies to . . the htrrct corn and certainly does not impose mry additional duty upon Teague, as the litigant, as a jurisdictional perquisite. m. LOC. @V'T CODE 5 214.00 12(b). Nothing contained in the statute states that a request for ismace of writ ofcer&id nust be hcIuded in the Htion or that such a request must be fled within 30 clays of the receipt of the municipal order. id. lt is also important to note that the city ordhnce itself also only requites the filing of a v ded
Page 2 and 3: NO. 06-0389 CITY OF JACKSBORO, TEXA
Page 4 and 5: Petitioner: CITY OF JACKSBORO Petit
Page 6 and 7: The opinion of the court of wppeals
Page 8 and 9: Keyishim v . Board of Regents. 385
Page 10 and 11: Nature of the Case: Trial Court: Tr
Page 12 and 13: STA'IXmNT OF THE FACTS At the outse
Page 14 and 15: Restraining &&r on January 12,.2UU6
Page 16 and 17: SUMMARY OF T'iiE ARGUMENT The City
Page 18 and 19: in this case, despite the State's c
Page 22 and 23: petition to challenge the City's or
Page 24 and 25: is merely the method by which the c
Page 26 and 27: included within the opinion is not
Page 28 and 29: accordance with the contentions of
Page 30 and 31: assertions =garding the statutmy pr
Page 32 and 33: k in . suits to rnlOlg4 violations
Page 34 and 35: Tap's challenges to the d tutiodty
Page 36 and 37: statutory framework and/or ordinanc
Page 38 and 39: he sought to appeal the City's demo
Page 40 and 41: that the ordinance ad statute faiI
Page 42: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby cer
Page 46: : d dtclsion of 1 Sunday, the Ind L
Page 50: h y utw, litnhdtkr: or mta~gagce ~r

Teague - Supreme Court of Texas

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