Teague - Supreme Court of Texas

The City attempts to distinguish the Scott case on the bmis that it involved issues of
standing, rather thanjurisdiction. This is a dkhctiotl without relevance. The importance
of the Smft opinion is that it is instructive and illustrative of how the Court has previously
construed pldhgs of pdes under similar cimmstances. Moreover, standing is
implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. Wm I. S.D. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d
849,850 (Tex 2000). Jurisdiction, therefore, was an inherent part of the Scott decision.
Next, the City attempts to charactah be Scu~ decision as a "jprudenW
artifact'' relying on fieeman v. City of Dallas. 242 F.3d 642,649 (5" Cir. 2001) (en
bmc). This is clearly a desperate effort on behalf of the City to try to discredit this
Court's well-reasoned previous decision that a suit for injunction may be considered, in
effect, an appeal by writ of ceded. The City would prefer to allow form to prevail
over substance. htmdngly enough, the Fte- opinim contains no reference to the
Scott opinion and relies heavily upon other cases decided within the same decade as Sm#.
Id. It is ckeau, upon even a cursory look at the Fmnsart opinion, that when the court
referred to "jurispulmtid dikts" it was referencing cases from the 1700's, not the
1960's. Id.
gerious due mows concetrxs.
As stated previously, to construe that Section 214.0012 requires, as a jurisdictional
prerequisite, that a party must file a request for writ of certiorari within a defined period
would be in direct contradiction to the statute itself. To so interpret the statute in
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