Teague - Supreme Court of Texas

statutory framework and/or ordinance which he asserts is unc~titdod. Where a
quasi-judicial body's order is chdlenged in the trial court on the ground that the
underlying statute is tmconstitutiod, that body lacks the authority to decide that issue.
Central Power & Light Co. v. Shp, 960 S.W2d 617,618 vex. 1997). As in the present
case, this Court dealt with questions of jurisdiction in Cen&ul Power. The Court noted
that a proper motion for rehearing was genera@ a jurisdictional prerequisite for judicial
review of an agency's find order. Id. The plaintiff in Cenkal Power had MIed to assert
constitutional clorims in its motion for rehearing. Id. However, the Court, citing Texm
State Boardstated h t, 'Mere the agency is powerless to re- the emor claimed, there
is no sound reason fim forcing a litigant through the administrative ~ess." Id.
The City attempts to rely upon caselaw out of the Ninth Circuit as authority that
Teague's due process cIaims have somehow been waived. mis~Aia v. Pir, 60 F.3d 626
(gm Cir. 1995). This me, however, is easily distinguishable from the present case and is
particularly kt specific. In Mskchiu, the plaintiff was complaining that the agency
failed to follow me of its own rules, thereby denying his due process. Id. at 629. The
agency had previously determined that it did follow its own rules. Id. The plaintiff did
not exhaust his admhkhtive remedies but fled suit in court m h g the exact same
factual allegations. Id. Specifically, plain= claimed that the agency did not hUow its
own rules. Id. The plaintiff in Mhhchla never, as Teagm does here, challenge the
underlying rule itself or the statute authorizing it. Id. The court comedy reasoned that if