semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in cuzco quechua

102 CHAPTER 3. EVIDENTIALITY AND EPISTEMIC MODALITY
Kratzer provides the following definitions for a proposition to be necessarily or
possibly true with respect to a modal base and an ordering source:
A proposition is a necessity if and only if it is true in all accessible worlds which
come closest to the ideal established by the ordering source. 9
A proposition p is a possibility in a world w with respect to a modal base f and
an ordering source g iff ¬p is not a necessity in w with respect to f and g.
For example, the sentence John must be the murderer is true if and only if in all
worlds that are compatible with what the speaker knows—and which are the most
“normal” ones—it is the case that John is the murderer. It would be false, if there is
at least one such world in which John is not the murderer. Similarly, John might be
the murderer is true if and only if there is at least one world that is compatible with
what the speaker knows, and which is among the most normal ones, in which John
is the murderer, and false if there is no such world.
Izvorski (1997) analyzes the so-called perfect of evidentiality (pe) inanumberof
different languages within this framework. The following examples illustrate the two
relevant meanings of the pe10 for Turkish, (72a), repeated from (28), section 2.2.1,
and Bulgarian, (72b).
(72) a. Ahmet gel- mi¸s.
Ahmet come mI¸s
‘Ahmet came / must have come.’
(i) inference: The speaker sees Ahmet’s coat hanging in the front hall, but
has not yet seen Ahmet.
(ii) hearsay: The speaker has been told that Ahmet has arrived, but has
not yet seen Ahmet. (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986:159)
b. Ivan izpil vsičkoto vino včera.
Ivan drunk-pe all-the wine yesterday
‘Ivan apparently drank all the wine yesterday.’
(i) inference, (ii) reportative (Izvorski 1997:7)
9Kratzer (1987) does not explain how closest is defined formally.
10pe’s can often also convey a mirative meaning, but Izvorski (1997) does not discuss this aspect
at all.