communities. The suggestion would be the celebration of the National Day around a historical event that would reflect the interests of the two groups, Romanian and Hungarians. Two alternative options were put forward: the celebration of the anti-totalitarian revolution in 1989, date when Romania became a member of the European Union. 73
Conclusion Romanian national identity can be explored well beyond the surface by looking at the history of the institutions that led to the assignation of certain features that are now defining what is Romanian and what not. Drawing on the political discourse built around state formation since the mid-19 th century, the WP1 report argues that despite incentives to dismiss a possible association, Romania is beyond any doubt Balkan. Historical evidence is used to support the theory of the legacy of social and political (Ottoman and Byzantine) institutions. Romania is not Western. The mid-19 th century political discourse of Romanian elites, which rejected the idea of transplanting Western forms of development onto profoundly Oriental societies such as those in the Romanian kingdoms, marked the Romanian national discourse for the next 150 years. In fact, the idea of “modernization as rape” resurfaced in the interwar and post – 1990 national discourses. Moreover, the Oriental was exceptionally defined by the religious legacy of the Byzantine Empire that made Christian Orthodoxy deeply embedded into the idea of “ being Romanian”. This deemed to create a series of challenges to the creation of a plural post-communist Romanian society, especially in relation to the state’s separation from church in the past 20 years. Romania is European. Like in all countries in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin wall was seen as Romania’s long awaited opportunity to return to Europe. The alleged mismatch between the expectations that new EU member states had from Europe and those that the EU had from them, which caused nationalist backlashes in some of the Central European countries, was felt only in the very small circles of the Romanian elites. In fact, the promise of the European Union influenced the public discourse to such extent that no anti-European political discourse would find its place in the national public debate. After reviewing the main national identity components, as determined by Romania’s geographical location, institutional heritage, cultural identification and its new EU membership status, the WP1 report continued to identifying the main challenges to cultural diversity relevant for the current situation in Romania and taking an in depth look at the main challenges posed by the discourse towards the largest ethnic minorities in Romania – Hungarian and Roma. Since immigration does not present relevant challenges for Romania up until now, the focus is placed on historical minorities. The Hungarian and the Roma minorities stand out, representing significant proportions of the Romanian population, and having brought their issues on the public agenda in the past 20 years, in comparison to other minority groups. Starting with the interwar national discourse, and moving on to the political solutions that the postcommunist Romanian government found for accommodating ethnic minorities’ demands, a series of questions that have significant policy implications are raised. Was the consociationist governance solution a lasting one in the case of the Hungarian minority? What are the challenges posed by the large Roma minority in Romania and what was the evolution of the tolerance discourse towards them? What are the implications of the Orthodox cultural heritage and why is the separation of the State from the Church so difficult to achieve? The Hungarian minority. Beyond any doubt, the Hungarian minority, currently representing 6,6% of Romanian nationals (Census 2002), was the main target of post-communist nationalism. It is interesting to analyze the power struggles within the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) – the main party representing this minority – and the way that they reflected onto the public position adopted by the Alliance on certain government policies, as well as the nationalist outbursts on both sides – Romanian and Hungarian. The WP1 report finds that three main categories of nationalists can be encounter in both groups – professional nationalists, crusaders and conformists. The DAHR 74
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TOLERANCE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY DI
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© 2012 Romanian Academic Society T
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Table of Contents Executive Summary
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When considering religious or ethni
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Introduction The main diversity cha
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Most of the interwar discourse that
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political life than more hypocrisy.
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now EU. If the new Europe is to be
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organizations, their issues have no
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Hungarian minority Despite some sti
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Since DAHR became a member of the g
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The Roma: the ignored challenge Hav
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as a recently interviewed mayor ans
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