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Sinziana-Elena Poiana Ioana Lupea Irina-Madalina Doroftei Alina ...

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detriment of public interest) and the public role that it presumably fulfills. The rights of other religious<br />

minorities to study in an environment that enables their free development and choice of religious<br />

identification soon became marginal.<br />

Immediately after the fall of communism, Religion became a mandatory subject to be taught in<br />

primary and secondary schools. Religion was considered a promoter of the moral values that<br />

communism had destroyed. In most of the cases this was taught by Christian Orthodox priests, while<br />

the content was limited to Orthodox dogma and philosophy. In practice, some leeway did exist and<br />

communities that had a non-Orthodox majority were able to decide on the content of the class.<br />

However, even though the topic of teaching Orthodoxy in schools surfaced the public debate during<br />

the ‘90s, it was only in 2001 that Religion became an optional subject. Today, the class headmasters<br />

are required to inform parents and students on the optional character of Religion. However, a study<br />

conducted in 2006 showed that only 7.8% of Romanian students knew that they can opt out of the<br />

Religion class, 104 reflecting the general pro-Religion trend of the public discourse.<br />

The interwar discourse on Orthodoxy as a fundamental element of the Romanian self resurfaced in the<br />

public discourse in the mid ‘90s, mostly in connection to the fight against the communist atheism.<br />

Despite the presumed separation between state and church, excepting the select few, the main<br />

discourse has been in favor of the state’s actions to support the Romanian Orthodox Church, in the<br />

virtue of the absolute Orthodox majority of the Romanian population and the public function that the<br />

Church is thought to fulfill. Even though the debate on teaching religion in schools had been ongoing<br />

since it became a mandatory subject in January 1990, talking about displays of Christian<br />

representations in school seemed a rather progressive debate topic. However, in 2006 Mr. Emil Moise,<br />

a philosophy professor, filed a complaint with the National Council for Combating Discrimination<br />

(CNCD) claiming that paintings of Christian figures that hanged on the school’s walls were a breach<br />

of the non-orthodox students’ right to free choice of confession and impeded the free development of<br />

the spirit of the rest of the students. After the case reached the public agenda, Mr. Moise was literally<br />

harassed by media, politicians and the Orthodox Church. His civil lawsuit against the Romanian<br />

Government had reached the High Court of Cassation and Justice two years ago. But it became clear<br />

that there is a newly established tradition pushed to the public agenda by representatives of the<br />

Orthodox church to great success, and that the state policy supports the promotion of Orthodox values<br />

in schools to the detriment of other confessions.<br />

Tolerance and Diversity Challenges in Political Life<br />

The victory in November 1996 elections of the centrist coalition in Romania – the only alternative to<br />

the post-communist and nationalist alliance which had ruled since 1990 – brought an area premiere<br />

that remained if not unnoticed then little analyzed. As a consequence of the victory the ally - since<br />

1991 - of the winner Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR), the Hungarian alliance (DAHR)<br />

joined the new-formed government. The event has a twofold importance: in broader European terms,<br />

since DAHR was at the time the largest ethnic party in Europe, representing the 1.7 million<br />

Hungarians and enjoying almost 7 % of the total seats in the Romanian Parliament, and in the Balkan<br />

area, where such collaboration was rarer and rarer.<br />

One would have expected such a move to appease nationalists in both camps. However, the presence<br />

of DAHR in the government proved to be a daily struggle, of the government with the media and a<br />

rebellious Parliament, of the DAHR leaders with various discontent wings of their party, of the<br />

Romanian coalition leaders with their MP and followers. Although the major improvements in the<br />

Hungarians’ self-government promoted by the government (such as appointment of Hungarian<br />

prefects in Hungarian dominated-areas of Transylvania) brought no popular discontent, the debate on<br />

what the status of the Hungarian community in Romania should be, was only reopened. The major<br />

104 http://www.proeuropa.ro/norme_si_practici.html<br />

78

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