alfred 2 - University of Winchester

Given the character of the Bush administration’s rhetoric
it appears that neoconservatism provided the intellectual
framework and political rhetoric that served as a guideline for
American foreign policy toward Iraq after 9/11. However, the
idea that the decision to use military intervention in the case
of Iraq was purely the product of neoconservative ideology
glosses over a much more complex reality.
Iraq - a war of national interest
This paper argues that what emerged was a re-invigorated
conservative nationalism which was a reaction to the attack
on the American homeland. Its primary aim was to reassert
American supremacy, and while the administration used
the neo-conservative language of pre-emption, defending
freedom, promoting democracy and American values, this
was because that language, rather than the ideas behind it,
resonated with conservative nationalist Americans.
The limits of the neoconservative influence can be evaluated
in several ways. None of the Bush administration’s top tier
were known as neoconservatives (David, 2005 p. 614-641;
Fukuyama, 2006 p. 1-12), and both Dick Cheney and Donald
Rumsfeld (both signatories to the PNAC’s 1997 Statement
of Principles) are more often portrayed as Jacksonian
conservative nationalists, tending to take a security-related
view of American national interests, distrusting multilateralism
and, in their most extreme form, inclining toward nativism
and isolationism (Lindsay, 2003; Mead, 2002 p. 241-336).
The conservative nationalist imperative to ensure America’s
security is fundamentally different to the neoconservative
grand vision of a democratic Middle East, and defining
the administration’s character has been the subject of
much intense debate (see Kingdon, 2003; Lieven, 2005;
Mearsheimer, 2003). The Jacksonian nationalist approach to
international relations is a form of realism, which purports
that states are the key actors in international politics and they
operate in an anarchic system (Grieco, 1988 p. 485-507; Waltz,
1979 p. 330-331). The security of America demands, foremost,
the defeat of its enemies and the elimination of the threats
they pose. Therefore, Jacksonian nationalists argue that the
American military’s mission should be purely defensive and
should not be used for the expansion of liberal democracy
(Mead, 2002 p. 247; Nau, 2002 p. 46-48).
However, post-9/11, Cheney became one the chief advocates
of the potential for democracy in the Middle East, “Regime
change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to
the region” including, “A chance to promote the values that
can bring lasting peace” (Cheney, 2002). The logic of the
US government was that in order to permanently remove
the terrorist networks operating in the Middle East, it had
to preemptively fight rogue regimes that were susceptible
of harbouring and supporting these unlawful groups. As
this suggests, the argument for preemptive warfare is not a
neoconservative invention. The concept has been frequently
advanced in American foreign policy (e.g. the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823 and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary) and
demonstrates the sense of vulnerability that emerged among
Jacksonian nationalists as a result of 9/11. Preemptive warfare
breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will
itself be the target of a military attack in the short term. The
essence of preemption, then, is that it is motivated by fear, not
by greed.
9/11 changed the sense of America’s vulnerability. The hardline
defensive reaction of the administration’s nationalists
and the imperative to avoid the worst case struck a chord
with the language neoconservatives had been using since
the end of the Cold War. The assertive nationalists and the
neoconservatives, though different in their willingness to
forcefully promote democracy and engage in nation-building
missions, shared a common concern about Iraq. The rhetoric
for war was therefore shaped by an automatic defensive
realist reaction that was combined with the neoconservative
utopian argument for democracy. While nationalists
and neoconservatives both agreed on regime change in
Baghdad, they did so for different reasons, and ultimately,
the ideological precepts of neoconservatism were decidedly
secondary.
Conclusion
Neoconservatism has too often been labelled as a secret cabal
trying to hijack American foreign policy in order to advance
its assertive agenda for a Pax Americana. It has become linked
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