SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON NRC PROPOSED RULE ...

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egulations was integrated with these alternatives to generate a set of preliminary reference designs, For each of these designs, a llm- ited analysis of safeguards effectiveness and impacts was performed. This portion of the program constitutes Phase I as defined in the program plan. 12 I: Phase I1 of the program was structured to select a few designs for more complete definition and analysis based on the results from Phase I. Current recommendations for Phase I1 as a result of Phase I are discussed later. Design Study Technical Support Group Because the program objective called for a wide-ranging examina- tion of plant design practices and operating philosophy, it was de- cided that including a cross section of industrial expertise in the program would be prudent. Therefore, a Design Study Technical Support Group (DSTSG) was established to assist in the development and evaluation of design concepts for sabotage protection. The DSTSG included representatives from the reactor vendors, operating utilities, and architect-engineer firms. The DSTSG had two basic, interrelated functions. First, the DSTSG attended several meetings at which the members reviewed and com- mented collectively on a series of design concepts developed by Sandia and its subcontractors. Second, individual members of the DSTSG in- vestigated or evaluated specific concepts or questions and reported their result6 to Sandia, generally in letter format. In fulfilling their respon6ibilities, the DSTSG members did not act independently but am an integral part of the overall program. Therefore, the results of their involvement are reflected throughout the study and report, and a meparate record on DSTSG inputs was not prepared. Fur- thermore, the DSTSG was neither structured nor intended to provide a conmensum viewpoint. Therefore, this report should not be interpreted a@ an unqualified endorsement of the concepts discussed by the DSTSG or its individual members. Additional details on the DSTSG are included in Appendix C.
Baseline Plant Characterizatlon The first task characterized a basellne plant which typlfles current LWR standardized deslgn practice. For this study, the Stan- dardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS) was selected as the baseline plant. The characterrzation serves as a starting point for the evaluation of safeguards measures and includes 1 Vital systems descriptions that provide function and compo- nent details, 2. Sabotage fault trees (plant specifrc but derived from generic fault trees) which define the events which must occur for radiological sabotage to be successful, and 3. Vital area analysis which deflnes the physical locations in the baseline plant which must be reached to accomplish sabotage leading to a release of radioactive materials. The charactriication procedure is described more fully in Section 3 and Appendix H. Plant Design Options This task identified possible plant design alternatives intended to meet the design objectives outlined in Section 1. The design measures that have been suggested by industry personnel, the NRG staff, and earlier Sandia studies have been categorized into four broad groups : 1. Hardening critical systems or locations, 2. Plant layout modifications, 3. System design changes, and 4. Addition of systems. These four categories include measures ranging from those which require little or no change in plant layout through those which might require the addition of complete new operational systems. Table 2-1 rummarizes the four categories, briefly describes the nature of the changes included in each category, and then provides some examples of deaign changes that were suggested. The recommendations of Table 2-1
Page 1 and 2: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary U.S.
Page 3 and 4: No. (3) Comment aircraft impact, wi
Page 5 and 6: No. (5) Comment December 14, 2007 P
Page 7 and 8: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
Page 9 and 10: ABSTRACT . Using a modern design fo
Page 11 and 12: CONTENTS (Continued) Traditional Co
Page 13 and 14: ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued ) Figure 7
Page 15 and 16: Table TABLES (Continued) 8-2 Probab
Page 17 and 18: RCS RHRS RPS RSS RTS RWST SAFE SIS
Page 19 and 20: : A sahotaqe t-hreat nay arise from
Page 21 and 22: I Public risk clue to sabotage is,'
Page 23 and 24: Somewhat contrary to the physical s
Page 25: I General Program Flow and Scope 2.
Page 29 and 30: * Damage Control Options - In this
Page 31 and 32: Evaluation of Preliminary Reference
Page 33 and 34: :iabotaye . Vault '~'rcc for Plant
Page 36 and 37: Prom a fault tree, an equlvdlent ii
Page 38 and 39: 4. Reactor protrrt ion syster (PI'S
Page 41 and 42: loss-of-coolant accident (LoCA) rit
Page 43 and 44: mitigate or prevent damage to the c
Page 45 and 46: Vital - Area Analysis The primary e
Page 47 and 48: When the complement of the location
Page 49 and 50: . , 3 ..: 1. Hardening critical sys
Page 51 and 52: I Addition of Systems -- The final
Page 53 and 54: Table 4-1 Categorization of Design
Page 55 and 56: Although the attributes described a
Page 57 and 58: A summary of the initial findings o
Page 59 and 60: observation can be made for isolati
Page 61 and 62: Several options (i.4, 11.6, and 11.
Page 63 and 64: Table 4-5 Categorization of Design
Page 65 and 66: , . .,. . . - . . . . ~ Findings on
Page 67 and 68: For example, additional remote indi
Page 69 and 70: would be to use the plant fire prot
Page 71 and 72: with such events and because the co
Page 73 and 74: initial condition, the time availab
Page 75 and 76: ' All reactor control rods are assu
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Option Function Table 5-3 Evaluatio
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the fifth option, which has only mi
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the problem, ( 3) assess the diffic
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other difficulties that were beginn
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Table 6-1 Cost Estimate Summary of
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of 4 to 13 minutes based upon data
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excavation, a base mat, and tank. T
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0 J @ a CONTAINMENT ELM;. PENETRATI
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RECIRC. O OVERHEAD CDNTAlMNT LCY-HE
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opq BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS .
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.. . 2 (ft I . . .'._ . ,, . ., ' .
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were considered, but their inclusio
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Table 6-4 Cost ~stimates for. Equip
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modified plant (see Appendix G) and
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qp PRESSURIZER
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DHRS, startup of the diesel generat
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The compressor also supplies contro
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Table 6-6 Cost Estimates for Harden
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Table 6-8 Piping Connections to Rea
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I The normal letdown piping, being
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7. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEH The p
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Secure central alarm station, Locks
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I is doors between the turbine hall
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Figure 7-4. Locations of Locked and
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,,.' Table 7-1 Characteristics of E
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with the baseline plant, there is a
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KEY 'ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE WATE
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KEY 0 STAnDARD DOOR: CARD READER/AL
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KEY fl STANOAR0 DOOR: KEY Figure 7-
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Table 7-4 Characteristics of Interi
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2. Increase the number of individua
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last barrier to vital equipment is
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Vital Area mergmncy cwling piping/v
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are generally comparable with the b
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caution is appropriate. For example
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Table 8-3 Typical Permanent Staffin
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Plant Ares Control rom PYR containm
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. , access to both trains as part o
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CHARGE PUMP Figure 8-3. CHARGE PUMP
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Effectiveness of Hardened Decay Hea
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the future to examine impacts or co
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compartments are adjacent or access
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If total plant costs are assumed to
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event that manual [peration is nece
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!X torque limiters on selected letd
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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APPENDIX A Glossary of Terms Used i
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system vulnerability) or to better
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APPENDIX B Public Riek Due to Sabot
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where The risk due to sequence j le
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of damage control or consequence mi
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4 3. Physically separate vital comp
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APPENDIX C The Design Study Technic
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Name Alan R. Kasper Tobias W. T. Bu
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'5. W. Hickman, "Systems Analysis,
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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
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TAKING ADVANTAGE or NATURAL PROTECT
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4.11 SEI'AIU'PION OF SAFETY IICIATE
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. . . , ' . . . . . . , ., , , , .
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,.. . ,. Providing enhaxed protecti
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2 1 . 3 Desirable Attr~tutes of Can
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TABLE 1-1 (can't) 'The column head~
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. . ... . l I I. SYSTEM DES IG3 CHA
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CATECORlZATlOll OF DESICI~I ALT - ,
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GENE RAL 3. DESCRIPTIOtG AND CISCUS
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of war. The ring tunnel containment
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3.3 MARDENED CONTAINMENT BUILDING,
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. ' :, mcnt entry. These factors op
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3.4.5 Summary - - - of DSTSG - Inpu
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. . . , It was also pointed out dur
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3.6.5 Summary of DSTSG Input There
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. . . . . , , mcntator felt that co
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3.8.1 Disadvantages. If ,this conce
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systems and houzing them in separat
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. , in some G.S. ~lsnts. At San Cno
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well as location of the spent fuel
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3d3.2 -. Sources This concept h.3::
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There were no side benefits idcntif
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3.14.4 - Disadvantages t The main d
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3.15.3 Advantages .. . The sabotage
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3.16.2 ---- Sources Physically sepa
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Indqpcndencc is considered low for
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3.18.2 Advantages The counter-sabot
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Depending on the means of implement
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power jumper cables, etc., to facil
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epairs under satotace emergency con
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3.21.3 Advantages The alternate con
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The counter-sabotayc aspects of und
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3.22.4 Disadvantages > The disadvan
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3.23.4 . . Disadvantages This conce
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3.24.6 Discussion The discussion pr
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' There was no clear indication of
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Thc DSTSG considered inpacts for th
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3.27.6 Discussion This concept ellm
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The concept of a RHR system designe
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Appendix C contains a description o
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. System capacty is limited in time
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The DSTSS has raised questions on t
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controls and hardened enclosures, t
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. Summary Comparison of Ee$t Europe
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Applying Gernan Safety Philosophy a
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4.16 ALTERXhl'E CONTROL ROOF! ARRAN
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. Design of Kr;Z' Lh'R Safety Syste
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. Standby and Esergency Power Suppl
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This Addcndun cuntai ns sununar ies
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I CATEGORY: 1.2 HARDENED CONTAINMEN
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CATEGORY: 1.4 HARDENED ENCLOSURE OF
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CATEGORY: 1.6 HARDENED ULTIMATE HEA
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CATEGORY: 1.8 HARDENED ENCLOSURE FO
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CATEGORY: 11.2 SEPARATION OF PIPZNG
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CATEGORY: 11.4 SPENT FUEL STORED RE
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CATEGORY: 11.6 SEPARATE ROOMS OR AR
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CATEGORY: 11.8 ECCS COMPONENTS WITH
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CATEGOPY : I I I. 1 ISOIAT ION OF L
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CATEGORY: 111.3 ALTERNATE CONTAINKE
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CATEGORY: 111.5 ADDITIOSAL PROTECTE
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CATEGORY: 111.7 TURBINE RUNBACK NUI
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PEASIUILI'fY STATE OF TIIE AIVI' PR
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CATEGORY: IV.l HARDENED CECAY HEAT
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Systt:m st~ou~d rlnt bc rt,str ictc
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System Description Independent Safe
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. , 2. A sinqle system: : 3. A sing
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I period of 10 hours without operat
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the initial phase of shutdown cooli
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Actuation of the ISSS results in th
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prcsurizer relief valves. Gradually
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Some of these fluid lines arc pro-~
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. ~ ,. : " The turbine is driven by
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. . coolant pressure that can be ob
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Feedwater Storaye Tank Each feedwat
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ISSS A:mosphcr1c D G T ~ Val.io?, ?
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A conceptudl arrdngement 1s st,~wn
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systems would he employed in thc BW
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As long as the time for ISSS opcrat
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., ! 4 I 3 1 2 - . ! I,. ,.Y- .,.I'
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Potential Safcguar
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SECTION 3.5 Reactor Vessel Head Ven
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FIGURE 2-12 : 2-13 5,: . .. . 2-14
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P;IR Systems AC Power 1.7 Reactor C
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DESIGN CHANGE Table 1.1. AC Power S
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DESIGN CHANGE Increase battery capa
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I I Replace I I (1) Table 1.5. Gene
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Table 1.7. PWA AC Power Syst DESIGN
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I I I I Table 1.9. PWR Auxtttary Fe
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i Tahle 1.10. Emergency Core Coolin
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1.. DESIGN CHANGE Table 1.12.BWRRes
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DAMAGE CONTROL ACTIVITY Jrovide a s
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Figure 2-1. AC Power System Design
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2.2 SWITCHGEAR AN0 K CATEGORY I I1
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are discussed in mre detail in a la
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2.5 UICSEL ft4CINE REV:SED COOLING
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Figure 2-3. Diesel Cooling and Lubr
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2.6.5 Discussion An emergency diese
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equipnent. !%tor. controllers and d
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Table 2-1. Safety-Related DC Loads
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fnstrunrntation channel powered fro
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2.11.5 Oi scussion The concern over
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2.12.2 Source This concept was iden
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equipment during routine plant surv
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insider sabotage and the dlfflcul t
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2.16.3 Advantages The advantage of
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2.17.1 Concept Thls concept 1nvolve
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2.18 COFPONEKT COOLING MOOIFICATION
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to accomplish both functions with o
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2.19.4 . Disadvantages The lujor di
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VALVE C00113B WATER ISOLATION VALVE
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....,.. c., Frol Other Loads To Ult
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g u Outslde Alr / I Roof or Ida11 a
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, . accessibility to the diesel and
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. . .,,. . .. . .,. ,, ..* . . .. ,
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3.3.4 Disadvantages No disadvantage
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jI..'$ . $ 5 $!, .. . .:.;,: . ., I
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Vmt Path A Figure 3-1. Reactor Vess
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3.7.2 Source Thls concept was tdent
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Pressurl zer c + hxlllrry Elect. /
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3.9 INCREASED EMERGEtiCY FEEOWATER
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pmvfded. In the case of a narltiple
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3.11.3 Advantages The advantage of
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For operating plants which utilize
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3.14.5 Discussion As mentioned in S
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3.16.4 Dl sadvantages The disadvant
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utfll ttd f n the RHR suction 1 lne
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0 The heat exchanger shell provides
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of two tube bundles imacrsed in a l
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0 Provide an offsite reserve supply
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condtttons, is a straightforward ma
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REFERENCES '''power Plant Insulatto
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Introduction EVALUATION AND SUMMARY
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Table A-1 (Continued) Cdtryorlzntio
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. , 2.4 MULTIPLE UNIT V;lAL kC LRUS
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3.1 CLASS 1E AUXILIARY STEAM TCRBIN
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envirorments. with the presence of
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Table of Contents List of Tables Li
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Fiq n-1 Fig C2-1 Fig C2-2 Fig C2-3
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1.3 PURPOSE The purpose of this wor
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2.1 DA.NAGE CONTROL ACTIONS The dam
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ased on a variety of events (e.y..,
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2.2.4 Reactor Vessel Decay Neat Rem
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2.2.5 Spent Fuel Pool L I If sabota
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5. Keeping damage control storage l
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V., ,"". van lour
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COMMENTS : . This may add another s
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ENGINEERING CONCERNS: The proper NP
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COMMENTS : I . . . . Hydraulic Limi
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ITEM: EVALUATION NO. 5 (PWR) Manual
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EVALUATION NO. 7 ITEM: (BWR) Substi
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, ; . ,. . ITEM : FUNCTION : EVALUA
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EVALUATION N e ITEM: (BWR) Provide
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ITEM: FUNCTION : EVALUATION NO. 12
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EVALUATION NO. 13 ITEM: (BWR 6 PWR)
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COMMENTS : . Any condensate used mu
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COMMENTS : Regulatoey concerns abou
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ENGINEERING CONCERNS: Some componen
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EVALUATION NO. 18 ITEM: (PWR) Steam
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ENGINEERING CONCERNS: A desiqn effo
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ITEM : FUNCTION : EVALUATION NO. 21
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EVALUATION NO. 22 ITEM: (BWR & PWR)
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F-G 0 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERAT1:ONS :
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ITEM: EVALUATION NO. 25 (PWR & BWR)
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1 A 1: AVAllAR1.E TISE CASE SEI.ECT
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Case number: 2 Description: A charg
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Case number: 3 . . ~escription: The
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Case number: 5 Description: The res
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Case number: 6 Description: Loss of
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TO Calculate the heat required for
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Results: Assuming the initial condi
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Case number: 10 Description: RHR pi
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Case number: 12 Description: Drain
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case Huther Table 8-22 AVAILAb1.E T
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The heat required for each p h~se i
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lr~ss-01 -cwlant yceater than charg
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APPENDIX B: INITIAL APPROACH TO DAM
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I i i i ~ClncheI :c .%r:a-;cw: ' w
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however, not all systems listed by
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Acquire Damage Assuming there are s
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6. Establishing the Limits of Trans
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TABLE 0-3: SABOTAGE TIME LINE RESUL
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Hllog in fuel ull inuck LC
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LC TIME MWIW ULSIW -ntsk:- l!*uf"l
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3 lnqlne starts or rrtanpcs Ea star
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2 Enqtce s:ops. wall nor car=/ load
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" ., . Initratfan 0 sabotaqa event
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0 enq-he starts or at:empts t3 Star
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SXBCTACE XODE: 5tar:l-q alr tank de
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inirration 0 Albms and indications
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SYSTS..: Relidudl Heat Ramova?. jys
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Initilz~on 0 Demand tar X. syeern.
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Iaitiacion 0 Demand :sr Afi4 yYtel.
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34-i~2 min. Note: Riarnq stem '~alv
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SYSTZX: Auxa;;ar( Peedwe-er System
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C~n=:?l Room Response u :ntar!al fo
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:2itlrtion 0 Sabocaqe event occurs.
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112-1147 min. IAsswrnq sp1ic:nq. no
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Xiamo and :ndrcatrans 9-13 nm. Cont
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SYSTPV: 48OV Class :E Electrical 3i
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For each model (BWR and PWR), the f
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FUNCTIONS - Primary Coolant Invento
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Chemical and Volume Control System
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electric power is interrupted, the
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." ,.,- 4160 VAC (vital) 125 VDC TA
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does not have an extensive power hi
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TABLE C2-5 PAlN FEEDWATER SYSTEM i
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ESW pumps are on standby with cooli
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features (ESF) transformer. Table C
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FIGURE C2-7 DC Electric Distributio
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FIGURE CZ-8 Coinponent Coolli~g h'a
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. ESW'S~S~~~. The ESW system could
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C3. BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) APP
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I - -1- -- .
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via the main steam safety/relief va
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250 VDC FUNCTIONS TABLE C3-3 HIGH P
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125 VDC 4160 VAC (vital) Condensate
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41 hU VAC 125 VIK' TABLE C3-5 CORE
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I*.',. -.- taw Residual Iledt Remov
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eactor vessel by manually dumping s
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Service Water System
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cooling on an individual basis. Suc
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Emergency Service Water System FUNC
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FIGURE C3-7 DC Electric Distributio
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Therefore, onl: valves accessible f
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, : %..- ~ DC 1. Reactor Water Leve
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APPENDIX D: COMPUTER CALCULATIONS F
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69 F i yur c 1)- 1 : HEACI'OR MOIIE
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680.0 660.0 640.0 620.0 600.0 JBO.0
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- - - - - - - - - STATION BLACKOUT
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TIHE (SECONDS) XI0 j - 7 PHESSUHI Z
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. LMTAI: 050141 [ 2Zon.tt I -1. I .
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'-. - - - . - - - -- . . . HEAT S i
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APPENDIX E: INDUSTRY SUR'JEYS At th
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2. In the cases of the oil refineri
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Concept De~e~lopment and Cost Estim
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- PAGE ' 4.5 Cost Estimates for Iso
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!;cl~crn;~tic Arrangemcrnt of ESF h
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descriptions or descriptions of ope
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2. SUWlARY Cost estimates for const
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3. CONCEPT DEVELOPFIENT .3.1' .HARD
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..: +". .. . . : ,. \,.L . . , .: f
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., %W ; : ;,' : .? vent system cons
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2 ft 6 in. 3 ft\ \ - N SLOPE SLOPE
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Tank Capacity, Gal. Tank Diameter,
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7 ft 6 in.
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auxiliary feedwater and refueling w
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................ ................ -
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I .,I I , , . ............. .),.I.
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I i , .. ! 'It-
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LLYtL GMDL PLUS 73 it
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and roof are of reinforced concrete
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tection cabinets installed in the s
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ndependent. Two ha? f-size tanks we
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BORON INJECTION TANK No. Required T
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Design Pressure, PSIG Design Temper
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Doalgn Pranouto, PSIC 150 Design Te
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. Provides for isolation of fluid l
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I-- 38.7~1 (127 ftj Figare 3-21. U
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I ( N.C.* I I I 4-kV CLASS 1E EMERG
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, Alignment of reactor coolant pump
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Electrical Power The major electric
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The cooling air inlet and discharge
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Design Temperature, "F Material of
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Design Pressure, PSIS Deslqn Tcnper
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DIESEL GENET(ATOR - LVBE OIL STORAG
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Table 3-5 1:~:s the elping concecti
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Loop J lC.L.1 Loop 1 lC.L.I-*:..mal
Page 802 and 803:
ability to isolate it to prevent lo
Page 804 and 805:
The excess letdown line is a small
Page 806 and 807:
4.1 GENERAL I 4. COST ESTIf4ATES Th
Page 808 and 809:
4.2.2 , Hardening Option 2, Reinfor
Page 810 and 811:
xcavat ion and Backfill Mat, 3 feet
Page 812 and 813:
TABLE 4-5 STUDY ESTIMATE, NOVEMBER
Page 814 and 815:
ITEM OF WORK TABLE 4-7 STUDY ESTIMA
Page 816 and 817:
The approach to the estimate, there
Page 818 and 819:
Substructure Excavation and Backfi
Page 820 and 821:
TABLE 4-10 STUDY ESTIMATE, NOVEMBER
Page 823 and 824:
6L:ained. In tk,e case of rne RHi+
Page 825 and 826:
TECHNICAL MPlORANDUn EVALUATION OF
Page 827 and 828:
TECHNICAL MEMORANWn ABGQNNE NATIONA
Page 829 and 830:
4.1 Sources of Information .4.2 Air
Page 831 and 832:
polar Plot for a11 hudiur hndira Ac
Page 833 and 834:
Thir report providu a revieu and ev
Page 835 and 836:
extenrively rtudied, but other crar
Page 837 and 838:
; 6 . ..,~ spective, presmt' polici
Page 839 and 840:
8 narios. mechaniraa, ad credibilit
Page 841 and 842:
ased on aircraft and topographical
Page 843 and 844:
IAU Safmty Gui& ad include the dete
Page 845 and 846:
4.1 Sources of Information 4. AIRCR
Page 847 and 848:
General Aviation refera to the oper
Page 849 and 850:
18 accounted for 81 percent of all
Page 851 and 852:
Table 1. Critical Civil Aviation Ac
Page 853:
Fig. 1 Polar Plot for all Canadian
Page 856 and 857:
2 5 procedures a d directions, misj
Page 858 and 859:
2 1 thane rerult umarired belw for
Page 860 and 861:
These race# aaruw tha: a crash can
Page 862 and 863:
hble 6 Detailed Crash btes - Fatal
Page 864 and 865:
DISTANCE FROM LANDING OR TAKE -OFF
Page 866 and 867:
the calculatiod where desirable. Bo
Page 868 and 869:
i are equivalent to randm craah eve
Page 870 and 871:
T PATH Fig. 5. Crash Sites Orthonor
Page 872 and 873:
accidents froll 1962 to 1966, 26 fi
Page 874 and 875:
Uircellaneous 0.01 mf* 0.02 mi2 tn*
Page 876 and 877:
4 5 large ones within 75 oiler. His
Page 878 and 879:
4 7 giw aircraft crashing into the
Page 880 and 881:
0 emergency core cooling system (EC
Page 882 and 883:
zero: Paat .xh?ience h a ahown that
Page 884 and 885:
5 3 lw it to deprearurirs the PHtS
Page 886 and 887:
mgklw imposed upon the plant struct
Page 888 and 889:
the calculatioru were repeated with
Page 890:
strength). The reaction load for th
Page 894 and 895:
Fig. 12 Displacements-Time-~Iiutori
Page 896 and 897:
cross-sectional area of the strikin
Page 898 and 899:
LOADING AREA REINPORCEYE STILL E'LA
Page 900 and 901:
4 6 lo-' 2 4 6 10 t? 2j3 PERIOD t s
Page 902 and 903:
Fig. 18 Comparinon of Response spec
Page 904 and 905:
I Fig. 22 Response Spectra. Compari
Page 906 and 907:
the gener.~?vicinity of the crash s
Page 908 and 909:
77 such an even nvironaent will be
Page 910 and 911:
, .';,,>,~robabilit~ . . . _ of occ
Page 912 and 913:
and conclurio 81 0 1 Aviation aircr
Page 914 and 915:
itself a coditional probability, co
Page 916 and 917:
acceptrblY -11, and the risk evalua
Page 918:
then aviation zones concentrate tra
Page 921 and 922:
Scenarios - Plan: methodologies for
Page 923 and 924:
REFERENCES 1. U.S. Nuclear Regulato
Page 925 and 926:
Crarrro, U. and Lucenet, C., "Zvalu
Page 927 and 928:
96 Viti, C., Olivieri, X., and Trav
Page 929 and 930:
Offslte Hazards: Aircraft Crash Typ
Page 931 and 932:
Offaite Hazards: Aircraft Crash Spe
Page 933 and 934:
so11.1tion of the dynamic analysic
Page 935 and 936:
I 104 airport. Inpact forciw functi
Page 937 and 938:
Offaite Hazards: Aircraft Crash Typ
Page 939 and 940:
Offsite rcraft Crash diagram and co
Page 941 and 942:
hi tr a numbar of techniques which
Page 943 and 944:
aircraft fraac is examined and it w
Page 945 and 946:
113 idual probabilities that an air
Page 947 and 948:
'Ihir paper giver a rrm~ry of extre
Page 949 and 950:
111 Offrite Rarardr craft Crash -pa
Page 951 and 952:
Internal: E. S. Beckjord C. E. Till
Page 953 and 954:
ABSTRACT The purpose of this projec
Page 955 and 956:
, . 5.0 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Page 957 and 958:
Given an carthquakc large enough to
Page 959 and 960:
Relay chatter was not treated at al
Page 961 and 962:
6.1 lntroductlon SECTION 6 SUhlhlAR
Page 963 and 964:
were found to be important). These
Page 965 and 966:
6.3 Plant-spccllic lnslghts for LaS
Page 967 and 968:
11) We believe that, on balance, th
Page 969 and 970:
conservative but we are not certain
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SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON NRC PROPOSED RULE ...

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