- Page 1 and 2: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary U.S.
- Page 3 and 4: No. (3) Comment aircraft impact, wi
- Page 5 and 6: No. (5) Comment December 14, 2007 P
- Page 7 and 8: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
- Page 9 and 10: ABSTRACT . Using a modern design fo
- Page 11 and 12: CONTENTS (Continued) Traditional Co
- Page 13 and 14: ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued ) Figure 7
- Page 15 and 16: Table TABLES (Continued) 8-2 Probab
- Page 17 and 18: RCS RHRS RPS RSS RTS RWST SAFE SIS
- Page 19 and 20: : A sahotaqe t-hreat nay arise from
- Page 21 and 22: I Public risk clue to sabotage is,'
- Page 23 and 24: Somewhat contrary to the physical s
- Page 25 and 26: I General Program Flow and Scope 2.
- Page 27 and 28: Baseline Plant Characterizatlon The
- Page 29 and 30: * Damage Control Options - In this
- Page 31 and 32: Evaluation of Preliminary Reference
- Page 33 and 34: :iabotaye . Vault '~'rcc for Plant
- Page 36 and 37: Prom a fault tree, an equlvdlent ii
- Page 38 and 39: 4. Reactor protrrt ion syster (PI'S
- Page 41 and 42: loss-of-coolant accident (LoCA) rit
- Page 43 and 44: mitigate or prevent damage to the c
- Page 45 and 46: Vital - Area Analysis The primary e
- Page 47 and 48: When the complement of the location
- Page 49: . , 3 ..: 1. Hardening critical sys
- Page 53 and 54: Table 4-1 Categorization of Design
- Page 55 and 56: Although the attributes described a
- Page 57 and 58: A summary of the initial findings o
- Page 59 and 60: observation can be made for isolati
- Page 61 and 62: Several options (i.4, 11.6, and 11.
- Page 63 and 64: Table 4-5 Categorization of Design
- Page 65 and 66: , . .,. . . - . . . . ~ Findings on
- Page 67 and 68: For example, additional remote indi
- Page 69 and 70: would be to use the plant fire prot
- Page 71 and 72: with such events and because the co
- Page 73 and 74: initial condition, the time availab
- Page 75 and 76: ' All reactor control rods are assu
- Page 79 and 80: Option Function Table 5-3 Evaluatio
- Page 81 and 82: the fifth option, which has only mi
- Page 83 and 84: the problem, ( 3) assess the diffic
- Page 85 and 86: other difficulties that were beginn
- Page 87 and 88: Table 6-1 Cost Estimate Summary of
- Page 89: of 4 to 13 minutes based upon data
- Page 94 and 95: excavation, a base mat, and tank. T
- Page 96 and 97: 0 J @ a CONTAINMENT ELM;. PENETRATI
- Page 99: RECIRC. O OVERHEAD CDNTAlMNT LCY-HE
- Page 102 and 103:
opq BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS .
- Page 105 and 106:
.. . 2 (ft I . . .'._ . ,, . ., ' .
- Page 107 and 108:
were considered, but their inclusio
- Page 109 and 110:
Table 6-4 Cost ~stimates for. Equip
- Page 111 and 112:
modified plant (see Appendix G) and
- Page 113 and 114:
qp PRESSURIZER
- Page 116 and 117:
DHRS, startup of the diesel generat
- Page 118 and 119:
The compressor also supplies contro
- Page 120 and 121:
Table 6-6 Cost Estimates for Harden
- Page 122 and 123:
Table 6-8 Piping Connections to Rea
- Page 124 and 125:
I The normal letdown piping, being
- Page 126 and 127:
7. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEH The p
- Page 128:
Secure central alarm station, Locks
- Page 131 and 132:
I is doors between the turbine hall
- Page 133:
Figure 7-4. Locations of Locked and
- Page 138 and 139:
,,.' Table 7-1 Characteristics of E
- Page 141 and 142:
with the baseline plant, there is a
- Page 143 and 144:
KEY 'ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE WATE
- Page 145 and 146:
KEY 0 STAnDARD DOOR: CARD READER/AL
- Page 147 and 148:
KEY fl STANOAR0 DOOR: KEY Figure 7-
- Page 149:
Table 7-4 Characteristics of Interi
- Page 152 and 153:
2. Increase the number of individua
- Page 154 and 155:
last barrier to vital equipment is
- Page 156 and 157:
Vital Area mergmncy cwling piping/v
- Page 158 and 159:
are generally comparable with the b
- Page 160 and 161:
caution is appropriate. For example
- Page 162 and 163:
Table 8-3 Typical Permanent Staffin
- Page 164:
Plant Ares Control rom PYR containm
- Page 167 and 168:
. , access to both trains as part o
- Page 169 and 170:
CHARGE PUMP Figure 8-3. CHARGE PUMP
- Page 171 and 172:
Effectiveness of Hardened Decay Hea
- Page 173 and 174:
the future to examine impacts or co
- Page 175 and 176:
compartments are adjacent or access
- Page 177 and 178:
If total plant costs are assumed to
- Page 179 and 180:
event that manual [peration is nece
- Page 181 and 182:
!X torque limiters on selected letd
- Page 183 and 184:
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- Page 185 and 186:
APPENDIX A Glossary of Terms Used i
- Page 187 and 188:
system vulnerability) or to better
- Page 189 and 190:
APPENDIX B Public Riek Due to Sabot
- Page 191 and 192:
where The risk due to sequence j le
- Page 193 and 194:
of damage control or consequence mi
- Page 195 and 196:
4 3. Physically separate vital comp
- Page 197 and 198:
APPENDIX C The Design Study Technic
- Page 199 and 200:
Name Alan R. Kasper Tobias W. T. Bu
- Page 201 and 202:
'5. W. Hickman, "Systems Analysis,
- Page 203 and 204:
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
- Page 205 and 206:
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
- Page 207 and 208:
TAKING ADVANTAGE or NATURAL PROTECT
- Page 209 and 210:
4.11 SEI'AIU'PION OF SAFETY IICIATE
- Page 211 and 212:
. . . , ' . . . . . . , ., , , , .
- Page 213 and 214:
,.. . ,. Providing enhaxed protecti
- Page 215 and 216:
2 1 . 3 Desirable Attr~tutes of Can
- Page 217 and 218:
TABLE 1-1 (can't) 'The column head~
- Page 219 and 220:
. . ... . l I I. SYSTEM DES IG3 CHA
- Page 222:
CATECORlZATlOll OF DESICI~I ALT - ,
- Page 225 and 226:
GENE RAL 3. DESCRIPTIOtG AND CISCUS
- Page 227 and 228:
of war. The ring tunnel containment
- Page 229 and 230:
3.3 MARDENED CONTAINMENT BUILDING,
- Page 231 and 232:
. ' :, mcnt entry. These factors op
- Page 233 and 234:
3.4.5 Summary - - - of DSTSG - Inpu
- Page 235 and 236:
. . . , It was also pointed out dur
- Page 237 and 238:
3.6.5 Summary of DSTSG Input There
- Page 239 and 240:
. . . . . , , mcntator felt that co
- Page 241 and 242:
3.8.1 Disadvantages. If ,this conce
- Page 244 and 245:
systems and houzing them in separat
- Page 246 and 247:
. , in some G.S. ~lsnts. At San Cno
- Page 248 and 249:
well as location of the spent fuel
- Page 250 and 251:
3d3.2 -. Sources This concept h.3::
- Page 252 and 253:
There were no side benefits idcntif
- Page 254 and 255:
3.14.4 - Disadvantages t The main d
- Page 256 and 257:
3.15.3 Advantages .. . The sabotage
- Page 258 and 259:
3.16.2 ---- Sources Physically sepa
- Page 260 and 261:
Indqpcndencc is considered low for
- Page 263 and 264:
3.18.2 Advantages The counter-sabot
- Page 265 and 266:
Depending on the means of implement
- Page 267 and 268:
power jumper cables, etc., to facil
- Page 269 and 270:
epairs under satotace emergency con
- Page 271 and 272:
3.21.3 Advantages The alternate con
- Page 273 and 274:
The counter-sabotayc aspects of und
- Page 275 and 276:
3.22.4 Disadvantages > The disadvan
- Page 277 and 278:
3.23.4 . . Disadvantages This conce
- Page 279 and 280:
3.24.6 Discussion The discussion pr
- Page 281 and 282:
' There was no clear indication of
- Page 283 and 284:
Thc DSTSG considered inpacts for th
- Page 285 and 286:
3.27.6 Discussion This concept ellm
- Page 287 and 288:
The concept of a RHR system designe
- Page 289 and 290:
Appendix C contains a description o
- Page 291 and 292:
. System capacty is limited in time
- Page 293 and 294:
The DSTSS has raised questions on t
- Page 295 and 296:
controls and hardened enclosures, t
- Page 297 and 298:
. Summary Comparison of Ee$t Europe
- Page 299 and 300:
Applying Gernan Safety Philosophy a
- Page 301 and 302:
4.16 ALTERXhl'E CONTROL ROOF! ARRAN
- Page 303 and 304:
. Design of Kr;Z' Lh'R Safety Syste
- Page 305:
. Standby and Esergency Power Suppl
- Page 308 and 309:
This Addcndun cuntai ns sununar ies
- Page 310 and 311:
I CATEGORY: 1.2 HARDENED CONTAINMEN
- Page 312 and 313:
CATEGORY: 1.4 HARDENED ENCLOSURE OF
- Page 314 and 315:
CATEGORY: 1.6 HARDENED ULTIMATE HEA
- Page 316 and 317:
CATEGORY: 1.8 HARDENED ENCLOSURE FO
- Page 318 and 319:
CATEGORY: 11.2 SEPARATION OF PIPZNG
- Page 320 and 321:
CATEGORY: 11.4 SPENT FUEL STORED RE
- Page 322 and 323:
CATEGORY: 11.6 SEPARATE ROOMS OR AR
- Page 324 and 325:
CATEGORY: 11.8 ECCS COMPONENTS WITH
- Page 326 and 327:
CATEGOPY : I I I. 1 ISOIAT ION OF L
- Page 328 and 329:
CATEGORY: 111.3 ALTERNATE CONTAINKE
- Page 330 and 331:
CATEGORY: 111.5 ADDITIOSAL PROTECTE
- Page 332 and 333:
CATEGORY: 111.7 TURBINE RUNBACK NUI
- Page 334 and 335:
PEASIUILI'fY STATE OF TIIE AIVI' PR
- Page 336 and 337:
CATEGORY: IV.l HARDENED CECAY HEAT
- Page 338 and 339:
Systt:m st~ou~d rlnt bc rt,str ictc
- Page 340 and 341:
System Description Independent Safe
- Page 342 and 343:
. , 2. A sinqle system: : 3. A sing
- Page 344 and 345:
I period of 10 hours without operat
- Page 346 and 347:
the initial phase of shutdown cooli
- Page 348 and 349:
Actuation of the ISSS results in th
- Page 350 and 351:
prcsurizer relief valves. Gradually
- Page 352:
Some of these fluid lines arc pro-~
- Page 355 and 356:
. ~ ,. : " The turbine is driven by
- Page 357 and 358:
. . coolant pressure that can be ob
- Page 359 and 360:
Feedwater Storaye Tank Each feedwat
- Page 361 and 362:
ISSS A:mosphcr1c D G T ~ Val.io?, ?
- Page 363 and 364:
A conceptudl arrdngement 1s st,~wn
- Page 367 and 368:
systems would he employed in thc BW
- Page 369 and 370:
As long as the time for ISSS opcrat
- Page 374 and 375:
., ! 4 I 3 1 2 - . ! I,. ,.Y- .,.I'
- Page 376 and 377:
Potential Safcguar
- Page 378 and 379:
SECTION 3.5 Reactor Vessel Head Ven
- Page 380 and 381:
FIGURE 2-12 : 2-13 5,: . .. . 2-14
- Page 382 and 383:
P;IR Systems AC Power 1.7 Reactor C
- Page 384 and 385:
DESIGN CHANGE Table 1.1. AC Power S
- Page 386 and 387:
DESIGN CHANGE Increase battery capa
- Page 388 and 389:
I I Replace I I (1) Table 1.5. Gene
- Page 390 and 391:
Table 1.7. PWA AC Power Syst DESIGN
- Page 392 and 393:
I I I I Table 1.9. PWR Auxtttary Fe
- Page 394 and 395:
i Tahle 1.10. Emergency Core Coolin
- Page 396 and 397:
1.. DESIGN CHANGE Table 1.12.BWRRes
- Page 398 and 399:
DAMAGE CONTROL ACTIVITY Jrovide a s
- Page 400 and 401:
Figure 2-1. AC Power System Design
- Page 402 and 403:
2.2 SWITCHGEAR AN0 K CATEGORY I I1
- Page 404 and 405:
are discussed in mre detail in a la
- Page 406 and 407:
2.5 UICSEL ft4CINE REV:SED COOLING
- Page 408 and 409:
Figure 2-3. Diesel Cooling and Lubr
- Page 410 and 411:
2.6.5 Discussion An emergency diese
- Page 412 and 413:
equipnent. !%tor. controllers and d
- Page 414 and 415:
Table 2-1. Safety-Related DC Loads
- Page 416 and 417:
fnstrunrntation channel powered fro
- Page 418 and 419:
2.11.5 Oi scussion The concern over
- Page 420 and 421:
2.12.2 Source This concept was iden
- Page 422 and 423:
equipment during routine plant surv
- Page 424 and 425:
insider sabotage and the dlfflcul t
- Page 426 and 427:
2.16.3 Advantages The advantage of
- Page 428 and 429:
2.17.1 Concept Thls concept 1nvolve
- Page 430 and 431:
2.18 COFPONEKT COOLING MOOIFICATION
- Page 432 and 433:
to accomplish both functions with o
- Page 434 and 435:
2.19.4 . Disadvantages The lujor di
- Page 436 and 437:
VALVE C00113B WATER ISOLATION VALVE
- Page 438 and 439:
....,.. c., Frol Other Loads To Ult
- Page 440 and 441:
g u Outslde Alr / I Roof or Ida11 a
- Page 442 and 443:
, . accessibility to the diesel and
- Page 444 and 445:
. . .,,. . .. . .,. ,, ..* . . .. ,
- Page 446 and 447:
3.3.4 Disadvantages No disadvantage
- Page 448 and 449:
jI..'$ . $ 5 $!, .. . .:.;,: . ., I
- Page 450 and 451:
Vmt Path A Figure 3-1. Reactor Vess
- Page 452 and 453:
3.7.2 Source Thls concept was tdent
- Page 454 and 455:
Pressurl zer c + hxlllrry Elect. /
- Page 456 and 457:
3.9 INCREASED EMERGEtiCY FEEOWATER
- Page 458 and 459:
pmvfded. In the case of a narltiple
- Page 460 and 461:
3.11.3 Advantages The advantage of
- Page 462 and 463:
For operating plants which utilize
- Page 464 and 465:
3.14.5 Discussion As mentioned in S
- Page 466 and 467:
3.16.4 Dl sadvantages The disadvant
- Page 468 and 469:
utfll ttd f n the RHR suction 1 lne
- Page 470 and 471:
0 The heat exchanger shell provides
- Page 472 and 473:
of two tube bundles imacrsed in a l
- Page 474 and 475:
0 Provide an offsite reserve supply
- Page 476 and 477:
condtttons, is a straightforward ma
- Page 478 and 479:
REFERENCES '''power Plant Insulatto
- Page 480 and 481:
Introduction EVALUATION AND SUMMARY
- Page 482 and 483:
Table A-1 (Continued) Cdtryorlzntio
- Page 484 and 485:
. , 2.4 MULTIPLE UNIT V;lAL kC LRUS
- Page 486 and 487:
3.1 CLASS 1E AUXILIARY STEAM TCRBIN
- Page 488:
envirorments. with the presence of
- Page 491 and 492:
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
- Page 493 and 494:
Table of Contents List of Tables Li
- Page 495 and 496:
Fiq n-1 Fig C2-1 Fig C2-2 Fig C2-3
- Page 497 and 498:
1.3 PURPOSE The purpose of this wor
- Page 499 and 500:
2.1 DA.NAGE CONTROL ACTIONS The dam
- Page 501 and 502:
ased on a variety of events (e.y..,
- Page 503 and 504:
2.2.4 Reactor Vessel Decay Neat Rem
- Page 505 and 506:
2.2.5 Spent Fuel Pool L I If sabota
- Page 507 and 508:
5. Keeping damage control storage l
- Page 511 and 512:
V., ,"". van lour
- Page 513 and 514:
COMMENTS : . This may add another s
- Page 515 and 516:
ENGINEERING CONCERNS: The proper NP
- Page 517 and 518:
COMMENTS : I . . . . Hydraulic Limi
- Page 519 and 520:
ITEM: EVALUATION NO. 5 (PWR) Manual
- Page 521 and 522:
EVALUATION NO. 7 ITEM: (BWR) Substi
- Page 523 and 524:
, ; . ,. . ITEM : FUNCTION : EVALUA
- Page 525 and 526:
EVALUATION N e ITEM: (BWR) Provide
- Page 527 and 528:
ITEM: FUNCTION : EVALUATION NO. 12
- Page 529 and 530:
EVALUATION NO. 13 ITEM: (BWR 6 PWR)
- Page 531 and 532:
COMMENTS : . Any condensate used mu
- Page 533 and 534:
COMMENTS : Regulatoey concerns abou
- Page 535 and 536:
ENGINEERING CONCERNS: Some componen
- Page 537 and 538:
EVALUATION NO. 18 ITEM: (PWR) Steam
- Page 539 and 540:
ENGINEERING CONCERNS: A desiqn effo
- Page 541 and 542:
ITEM : FUNCTION : EVALUATION NO. 21
- Page 543 and 544:
EVALUATION NO. 22 ITEM: (BWR & PWR)
- Page 545 and 546:
F-G 0 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERAT1:ONS :
- Page 547 and 548:
ITEM: EVALUATION NO. 25 (PWR & BWR)
- Page 549 and 550:
1 A 1: AVAllAR1.E TISE CASE SEI.ECT
- Page 551 and 552:
Case number: 2 Description: A charg
- Page 553 and 554:
Case number: 3 . . ~escription: The
- Page 555 and 556:
Case number: 5 Description: The res
- Page 557 and 558:
Case number: 6 Description: Loss of
- Page 559 and 560:
TO Calculate the heat required for
- Page 561 and 562:
Case number: 7 Description: Loss of
- Page 563 and 564:
Results: Assuming the initial condi
- Page 565 and 566:
Case number: 10 Description: RHR pi
- Page 567 and 568:
Case number: 12 Description: Drain
- Page 569 and 570:
case Huther Table 8-22 AVAILAb1.E T
- Page 571 and 572:
Case number: 2 Description: Loss of
- Page 573 and 574:
The heat required for each p h~se i
- Page 575 and 576:
Case number: 5 Description: Loss of
- Page 577:
lr~ss-01 -cwlant yceater than charg
- Page 580:
APPENDIX B: INITIAL APPROACH TO DAM
- Page 583:
I i i i ~ClncheI :c .%r:a-;cw: ' w
- Page 586 and 587:
however, not all systems listed by
- Page 588 and 589:
Acquire Damage Assuming there are s
- Page 590 and 591:
6. Establishing the Limits of Trans
- Page 592 and 593:
TABLE 0-3: SABOTAGE TIME LINE RESUL
- Page 594:
Hllog in fuel ull inuck LC
- Page 598 and 599:
LC TIME MWIW ULSIW -ntsk:- l!*uf"l
- Page 600 and 601:
3 lnqlne starts or rrtanpcs Ea star
- Page 602 and 603:
2 Enqtce s:ops. wall nor car=/ load
- Page 604 and 605:
" ., . Initratfan 0 sabotaqa event
- Page 606 and 607:
0 enq-he starts or at:empts t3 Star
- Page 608 and 609:
SXBCTACE XODE: 5tar:l-q alr tank de
- Page 610 and 611:
inirration 0 Albms and indications
- Page 612 and 613:
SYSTS..: Relidudl Heat Ramova?. jys
- Page 614 and 615:
Initilz~on 0 Demand tar X. syeern.
- Page 616 and 617:
Iaitiacion 0 Demand :sr Afi4 yYtel.
- Page 618 and 619:
34-i~2 min. Note: Riarnq stem '~alv
- Page 620 and 621:
SYSTZX: Auxa;;ar( Peedwe-er System
- Page 622 and 623:
C~n=:?l Room Response u :ntar!al fo
- Page 625 and 626:
:2itlrtion 0 Sabocaqe event occurs.
- Page 627 and 628:
112-1147 min. IAsswrnq sp1ic:nq. no
- Page 629 and 630:
Xiamo and :ndrcatrans 9-13 nm. Cont
- Page 631:
SYSTPV: 48OV Class :E Electrical 3i
- Page 634 and 635:
For each model (BWR and PWR), the f
- Page 636 and 637:
FUNCTIONS - Primary Coolant Invento
- Page 638 and 639:
Chemical and Volume Control System
- Page 640 and 641:
electric power is interrupted, the
- Page 642:
." ,.,- 4160 VAC (vital) 125 VDC TA
- Page 645 and 646:
does not have an extensive power hi
- Page 647 and 648:
TABLE C2-5 PAlN FEEDWATER SYSTEM i
- Page 650 and 651:
ESW pumps are on standby with cooli
- Page 653 and 654:
features (ESF) transformer. Table C
- Page 655 and 656:
FIGURE C2-7 DC Electric Distributio
- Page 657 and 658:
FIGURE CZ-8 Coinponent Coolli~g h'a
- Page 659 and 660:
. ESW'S~S~~~. The ESW system could
- Page 661 and 662:
C3. BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) APP
- Page 663 and 664:
I - -1- -- .
- Page 665 and 666:
via the main steam safety/relief va
- Page 667 and 668:
250 VDC FUNCTIONS TABLE C3-3 HIGH P
- Page 669 and 670:
125 VDC 4160 VAC (vital) Condensate
- Page 671 and 672:
41 hU VAC 125 VIK' TABLE C3-5 CORE
- Page 673 and 674:
I*.',. -.- taw Residual Iledt Remov
- Page 675 and 676:
eactor vessel by manually dumping s
- Page 677 and 678:
Service Water System
- Page 679 and 680:
cooling on an individual basis. Suc
- Page 681 and 682:
Emergency Service Water System FUNC
- Page 683 and 684:
FIGURE C3-7 DC Electric Distributio
- Page 685 and 686:
Therefore, onl: valves accessible f
- Page 687 and 688:
, : %..- ~ DC 1. Reactor Water Leve
- Page 689 and 690:
APPENDIX D: COMPUTER CALCULATIONS F
- Page 691 and 692:
69 F i yur c 1)- 1 : HEACI'OR MOIIE
- Page 693:
680.0 660.0 640.0 620.0 600.0 JBO.0
- Page 696 and 697:
- - - - - - - - - STATION BLACKOUT
- Page 698 and 699:
TIHE (SECONDS) XI0 j - 7 PHESSUHI Z
- Page 700 and 701:
. LMTAI: 050141 [ 2Zon.tt I -1. I .
- Page 704:
'-. - - - . - - - -- . . . HEAT S i
- Page 707 and 708:
APPENDIX E: INDUSTRY SUR'JEYS At th
- Page 709 and 710:
2. In the cases of the oil refineri
- Page 711 and 712:
Concept De~e~lopment and Cost Estim
- Page 714 and 715:
- PAGE ' 4.5 Cost Estimates for Iso
- Page 716 and 717:
!;cl~crn;~tic Arrangemcrnt of ESF h
- Page 718 and 719:
descriptions or descriptions of ope
- Page 720 and 721:
2. SUWlARY Cost estimates for const
- Page 722 and 723:
3. CONCEPT DEVELOPFIENT .3.1' .HARD
- Page 724 and 725:
..: +". .. . . : ,. \,.L . . , .: f
- Page 726 and 727:
., %W ; : ;,' : .? vent system cons
- Page 728 and 729:
2 ft 6 in. 3 ft\ \ - N SLOPE SLOPE
- Page 730 and 731:
Tank Capacity, Gal. Tank Diameter,
- Page 732 and 733:
7 ft 6 in.
- Page 734 and 735:
auxiliary feedwater and refueling w
- Page 739:
................ ................ -
- Page 748 and 749:
I .,I I , , . ............. .),.I.
- Page 750:
I i , .. ! 'It-
- Page 758:
LLYtL GMDL PLUS 73 it
- Page 763 and 764:
and roof are of reinforced concrete
- Page 766 and 767:
tection cabinets installed in the s
- Page 768 and 769:
ndependent. Two ha? f-size tanks we
- Page 770 and 771:
BORON INJECTION TANK No. Required T
- Page 772 and 773:
Design Pressure, PSIG Design Temper
- Page 774 and 775:
Doalgn Pranouto, PSIC 150 Design Te
- Page 776:
. Provides for isolation of fluid l
- Page 780:
I-- 38.7~1 (127 ftj Figare 3-21. U
- Page 784 and 785:
I ( N.C.* I I I 4-kV CLASS 1E EMERG
- Page 786 and 787:
, Alignment of reactor coolant pump
- Page 788 and 789:
Electrical Power The major electric
- Page 790 and 791:
The cooling air inlet and discharge
- Page 792 and 793:
Design Temperature, "F Material of
- Page 794 and 795:
Design Pressure, PSIS Deslqn Tcnper
- Page 796 and 797:
DIESEL GENET(ATOR - LVBE OIL STORAG
- Page 798 and 799:
Table 3-5 1:~:s the elping concecti
- Page 800 and 801:
Loop J lC.L.1 Loop 1 lC.L.I-*:..mal
- Page 802 and 803:
ability to isolate it to prevent lo
- Page 804 and 805:
The excess letdown line is a small
- Page 806 and 807:
4.1 GENERAL I 4. COST ESTIf4ATES Th
- Page 808 and 809:
4.2.2 , Hardening Option 2, Reinfor
- Page 810 and 811:
xcavat ion and Backfill Mat, 3 feet
- Page 812 and 813:
TABLE 4-5 STUDY ESTIMATE, NOVEMBER
- Page 814 and 815:
ITEM OF WORK TABLE 4-7 STUDY ESTIMA
- Page 816 and 817:
The approach to the estimate, there
- Page 818 and 819:
Substructure Excavation and Backfi
- Page 820 and 821:
TABLE 4-10 STUDY ESTIMATE, NOVEMBER
- Page 823 and 824:
6L:ained. In tk,e case of rne RHi+
- Page 825 and 826:
TECHNICAL MPlORANDUn EVALUATION OF
- Page 827 and 828:
TECHNICAL MEMORANWn ABGQNNE NATIONA
- Page 829 and 830:
4.1 Sources of Information .4.2 Air
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polar Plot for a11 hudiur hndira Ac
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Thir report providu a revieu and ev
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extenrively rtudied, but other crar
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; 6 . ..,~ spective, presmt' polici
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8 narios. mechaniraa, ad credibilit
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ased on aircraft and topographical
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IAU Safmty Gui& ad include the dete
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4.1 Sources of Information 4. AIRCR
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General Aviation refera to the oper
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18 accounted for 81 percent of all
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Table 1. Critical Civil Aviation Ac
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Fig. 1 Polar Plot for all Canadian
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2 5 procedures a d directions, misj
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2 1 thane rerult umarired belw for
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These race# aaruw tha: a crash can
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hble 6 Detailed Crash btes - Fatal
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DISTANCE FROM LANDING OR TAKE -OFF
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the calculatiod where desirable. Bo
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i are equivalent to randm craah eve
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T PATH Fig. 5. Crash Sites Orthonor
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accidents froll 1962 to 1966, 26 fi
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Uircellaneous 0.01 mf* 0.02 mi2 tn*
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4 5 large ones within 75 oiler. His
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4 7 giw aircraft crashing into the
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0 emergency core cooling system (EC
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zero: Paat .xh?ience h a ahown that
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5 3 lw it to deprearurirs the PHtS
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mgklw imposed upon the plant struct
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the calculatioru were repeated with
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strength). The reaction load for th
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Fig. 12 Displacements-Time-~Iiutori
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cross-sectional area of the strikin
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LOADING AREA REINPORCEYE STILL E'LA
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4 6 lo-' 2 4 6 10 t? 2j3 PERIOD t s
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Fig. 18 Comparinon of Response spec
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I Fig. 22 Response Spectra. Compari
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the gener.~?vicinity of the crash s
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77 such an even nvironaent will be
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, .';,,>,~robabilit~ . . . _ of occ
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and conclurio 81 0 1 Aviation aircr
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itself a coditional probability, co
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acceptrblY -11, and the risk evalua
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then aviation zones concentrate tra
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Scenarios - Plan: methodologies for
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REFERENCES 1. U.S. Nuclear Regulato
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Crarrro, U. and Lucenet, C., "Zvalu
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96 Viti, C., Olivieri, X., and Trav
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Offslte Hazards: Aircraft Crash Typ
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Offaite Hazards: Aircraft Crash Spe
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so11.1tion of the dynamic analysic
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I 104 airport. Inpact forciw functi
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Offaite Hazards: Aircraft Crash Typ
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Offsite rcraft Crash diagram and co
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hi tr a numbar of techniques which
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aircraft fraac is examined and it w
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113 idual probabilities that an air
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'Ihir paper giver a rrm~ry of extre
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111 Offrite Rarardr craft Crash -pa
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Internal: E. S. Beckjord C. E. Till
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ABSTRACT The purpose of this projec
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, . 5.0 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
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Given an carthquakc large enough to
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Relay chatter was not treated at al
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6.1 lntroductlon SECTION 6 SUhlhlAR
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were found to be important). These
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6.3 Plant-spccllic lnslghts for LaS
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11) We believe that, on balance, th
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conservative but we are not certain