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Codbout. P. J.. "A Methodology for 1 Assessing Aircraft Crash Probabilities and Severity as Related to the Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Stationm," Ecole Polytechnlque de Montreal, ALCB-1204- 1: bin Report, AECB-1204-2:Appendices 1-11, May 1975. i Godbout, P. J. and Brais, A., "A Methodo:ogy for Assessing Aircraft Crash Probabilities and Severity as Related to the Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Pover Stations," Ecole Polytechnlque de Montreal, AECB-1204- 3: Final Report, September 1976. I Solomon, K. A,, "Estimate of the Probability that an Nrcraft will Impact the PVNCS," NUS Corporation, NUS-1416, June 197 . f i Solomon. K. A., "Analysis of Cround Hazards Due 'to Nrcrsfcs and Missiles," Hazard Prevention Journal, Volume 12, Number 4, March/Aprll 1976. $ Solomon, K. A., "Analyois of Reactor Hazarda Due to Mrcraft and Missiles," Trans. her. Nucl. Soc. 23:312-313, Toronto, Canada, June 1976. Gottlieb, P., "Estimation of Nuclear Power Plant Aircroft Hazards," Probabilistic Analysis of Nuclear Reactor Safety; Topical Meeting, Lo8 Angeles, CA, by, 1978. Nrcraft Crash Probabilities, Nuclear Safety, Vol. 17. No. 3, by-June 1975. Bonnin, D. M., "An Aircraft Accident Probability Distribution Function," Trans. her. Nucl. Soc. 18:225-226, June 1974. Solomon, K. A., Erdmann, R. C., Hicks. T. E., and Okrenc, D., "Airplane Crash Riaks to Cround Population." UCLA-ENC-'1424, March 1974. Solomon, K. A. and Okrent, D., "Airplane crash' Risks," -- Hazard Prevention Journal, Volume 11, Number 3, January-February 1975. Hornyik, K., Robinson, A. H., and Crund, J. E., "Evaluation of Aircraft Hazards at the Boardman Nuclear Plant Slte," Portland General Electric Company, Report No. PCE-2001, Hay 1973. Hornyik, K. and Crund, J. E., "The Evsluation of the Nr Traffic Harsrds at Nuclear Plrnts." Nuclear Tecimologp Volume 23. July 1974. Hornyik, K., "Nrplane Crash Probability Near a Flight Target," hana. her. Nucl. Soc., 161209-210, 1973. Codbout, P. and Brais, A., "A bthodology for Assessing Nrcraft Crash Probabilities and Sevarity as Related to the Safety Evalustion of Nuclear Power Ststions - Phase I Final Report, Atomic Energy Control Board (Canada), March 1980.
Crarrro, U. and Lucenet, C., "Zvaluation of the Gobability of an Aircraft Crash on a Nuclear Power Plant," Proceedings of the Fast Reactor Safety Ueeting, Beverly Hilla, California. April 1974. ir Joerissen, C. and Zuend, M., "Risk of an Aircraft haah on a Nuclear Power Plant,' International Nuclear Industries Ylar. D.sel/Switterland, October 1973. d Wall, 1 B , Probabilistic Aaaessment of Mrcraft ki sk for Nuclear PoWer Plants," Nuclear Safety, 15(3): 276-284, May-June, 1974. a Selvidge, J. E., "Probabilities of Aircraft Crashes at Rocky Flats and Subsequent Radioactive Release," Rockwell International, TID-4500-R65, April 1977. Nuclear Regulatory Loamission, WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), "Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in; U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," October 1975. Otvay, H. J. and Erdmann. R. C., "Reactor Siting end Design from a Risk Vievpolnt," Nucl. Eng. Des. 13:365-376, August 1970. Wall. I. B., "Probabilistic Assessment of Risk for Reactor Design and Siting," Trans. her. 1 Soc. 12:169, 1969. t Riera, D. J., "On the Stress Analysic of Structures Subjected to Aircraft Impact Qorcea," Nucl. Eng. ks., Vol. 8, pp. 415-426, 1968. '4 Rice, J. S., ct 81. "Reaction-Time Relationship and Structural Design of Reinforced Concrete Slabs and Shells for Aircraft Impacts," 3rd SMRT, Paper 5513, London, 1975. i Docket-50443-169, "Seabrook Station Containment Aircraft Impact Analysis," Jan. 24. 1975. A Wolf, J. P., Bucher, K. H., and Skrikcrud, P. E., "Response of Equipmant to Aircraft Impact," Nucl. Eng. Des. 47 (1978) 169-193. It Bahar, L. Y., and Rice, J. S.. "Simplified krivetion'of the Reaction *iac Hirtory in Aircraft Impact on a Nuclear Power Plant," Nucl. Eng. ,. 49 (1978) 253-268. i' C Drittler, R. and Cruner, P., "Calculation of the Total Force Acting Vpm a Rigid Well by Projectiles," Nucl. Eng. Des. 137 (1976) 231-244. Drittler, K. and Gruner, P., "The Force Resulting from Impact of Qast- Plying Uilitary Aircraft Upon a Rigid Wall," Nucl. Eng. Dra. 37 (1976) 245-248. Zimsrssnn, nl., Rebors, B. and Rodriguez, C., "Aircraft Impact on Reinforced Concrete Shell.: Influence of Uaterlal Nonlinearities on Equipent Response Spectra," Computers and Structurer 2, pp. 263-274, 1981.
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Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary U.S.
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No. (3) Comment aircraft impact, wi
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No. (5) Comment December 14, 2007 P
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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN CONCEPTS
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ABSTRACT . Using a modern design fo
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CONTENTS (Continued) Traditional Co
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ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued ) Figure 7
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Table TABLES (Continued) 8-2 Probab
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RCS RHRS RPS RSS RTS RWST SAFE SIS
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: A sahotaqe t-hreat nay arise from
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I Public risk clue to sabotage is,'
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Somewhat contrary to the physical s
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I General Program Flow and Scope 2.
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Baseline Plant Characterizatlon The
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* Damage Control Options - In this
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Evaluation of Preliminary Reference
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:iabotaye . Vault '~'rcc for Plant
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Prom a fault tree, an equlvdlent ii
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4. Reactor protrrt ion syster (PI'S
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loss-of-coolant accident (LoCA) rit
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mitigate or prevent damage to the c
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Vital - Area Analysis The primary e
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When the complement of the location
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. , 3 ..: 1. Hardening critical sys
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I Addition of Systems -- The final
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Table 4-1 Categorization of Design
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Although the attributes described a
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A summary of the initial findings o
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observation can be made for isolati
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Several options (i.4, 11.6, and 11.
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Table 4-5 Categorization of Design
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, . .,. . . - . . . . ~ Findings on
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For example, additional remote indi
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would be to use the plant fire prot
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with such events and because the co
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initial condition, the time availab
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' All reactor control rods are assu
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Option Function Table 5-3 Evaluatio
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the fifth option, which has only mi
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the problem, ( 3) assess the diffic
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other difficulties that were beginn
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Table 6-1 Cost Estimate Summary of
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of 4 to 13 minutes based upon data
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excavation, a base mat, and tank. T
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0 J @ a CONTAINMENT ELM;. PENETRATI
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RECIRC. O OVERHEAD CDNTAlMNT LCY-HE
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opq BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS .
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.. . 2 (ft I . . .'._ . ,, . ., ' .
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were considered, but their inclusio
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Table 6-4 Cost ~stimates for. Equip
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modified plant (see Appendix G) and
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qp PRESSURIZER
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DHRS, startup of the diesel generat
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The compressor also supplies contro
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Table 6-6 Cost Estimates for Harden
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Table 6-8 Piping Connections to Rea
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I The normal letdown piping, being
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7. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEH The p
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Secure central alarm station, Locks
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I is doors between the turbine hall
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Figure 7-4. Locations of Locked and
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,,.' Table 7-1 Characteristics of E
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with the baseline plant, there is a
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KEY 'ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE WATE
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KEY 0 STAnDARD DOOR: CARD READER/AL
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KEY fl STANOAR0 DOOR: KEY Figure 7-
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Table 7-4 Characteristics of Interi
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2. Increase the number of individua
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last barrier to vital equipment is
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Vital Area mergmncy cwling piping/v
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are generally comparable with the b
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caution is appropriate. For example
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Table 8-3 Typical Permanent Staffin
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Plant Ares Control rom PYR containm
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. , access to both trains as part o
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CHARGE PUMP Figure 8-3. CHARGE PUMP
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Effectiveness of Hardened Decay Hea
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the future to examine impacts or co
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compartments are adjacent or access
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If total plant costs are assumed to
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event that manual [peration is nece
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!X torque limiters on selected letd
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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APPENDIX A Glossary of Terms Used i
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system vulnerability) or to better
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APPENDIX B Public Riek Due to Sabot
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where The risk due to sequence j le
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of damage control or consequence mi
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4 3. Physically separate vital comp
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APPENDIX C The Design Study Technic
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Name Alan R. Kasper Tobias W. T. Bu
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'5. W. Hickman, "Systems Analysis,
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TAKING ADVANTAGE or NATURAL PROTECT
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4.11 SEI'AIU'PION OF SAFETY IICIATE
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. . . , ' . . . . . . , ., , , , .
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,.. . ,. Providing enhaxed protecti
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2 1 . 3 Desirable Attr~tutes of Can
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TABLE 1-1 (can't) 'The column head~
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. . ... . l I I. SYSTEM DES IG3 CHA
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CATECORlZATlOll OF DESICI~I ALT - ,
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GENE RAL 3. DESCRIPTIOtG AND CISCUS
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of war. The ring tunnel containment
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3.3 MARDENED CONTAINMENT BUILDING,
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. ' :, mcnt entry. These factors op
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3.4.5 Summary - - - of DSTSG - Inpu
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. . . , It was also pointed out dur
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3.6.5 Summary of DSTSG Input There
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. . . . . , , mcntator felt that co
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3.8.1 Disadvantages. If ,this conce
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systems and houzing them in separat
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. , in some G.S. ~lsnts. At San Cno
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well as location of the spent fuel
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3d3.2 -. Sources This concept h.3::
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There were no side benefits idcntif
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3.14.4 - Disadvantages t The main d
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3.15.3 Advantages .. . The sabotage
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3.16.2 ---- Sources Physically sepa
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Indqpcndencc is considered low for
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3.18.2 Advantages The counter-sabot
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Depending on the means of implement
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power jumper cables, etc., to facil
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epairs under satotace emergency con
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3.21.3 Advantages The alternate con
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The counter-sabotayc aspects of und
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3.22.4 Disadvantages > The disadvan
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3.23.4 . . Disadvantages This conce
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3.24.6 Discussion The discussion pr
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' There was no clear indication of
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Thc DSTSG considered inpacts for th
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3.27.6 Discussion This concept ellm
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The concept of a RHR system designe
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Appendix C contains a description o
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. System capacty is limited in time
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The DSTSS has raised questions on t
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controls and hardened enclosures, t
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. Summary Comparison of Ee$t Europe
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Applying Gernan Safety Philosophy a
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4.16 ALTERXhl'E CONTROL ROOF! ARRAN
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. Design of Kr;Z' Lh'R Safety Syste
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. Standby and Esergency Power Suppl
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This Addcndun cuntai ns sununar ies
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I CATEGORY: 1.2 HARDENED CONTAINMEN
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CATEGORY: 1.4 HARDENED ENCLOSURE OF
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CATEGORY: 1.6 HARDENED ULTIMATE HEA
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CATEGORY: 1.8 HARDENED ENCLOSURE FO
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CATEGORY: 11.2 SEPARATION OF PIPZNG
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CATEGORY: 11.4 SPENT FUEL STORED RE
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CATEGORY: 11.6 SEPARATE ROOMS OR AR
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CATEGORY: 11.8 ECCS COMPONENTS WITH
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CATEGOPY : I I I. 1 ISOIAT ION OF L
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CATEGORY: 111.3 ALTERNATE CONTAINKE
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CATEGORY: 111.5 ADDITIOSAL PROTECTE
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CATEGORY: 111.7 TURBINE RUNBACK NUI
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PEASIUILI'fY STATE OF TIIE AIVI' PR
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CATEGORY: IV.l HARDENED CECAY HEAT
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Systt:m st~ou~d rlnt bc rt,str ictc
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System Description Independent Safe
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. , 2. A sinqle system: : 3. A sing
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I period of 10 hours without operat
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the initial phase of shutdown cooli
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Actuation of the ISSS results in th
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prcsurizer relief valves. Gradually
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Some of these fluid lines arc pro-~
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. ~ ,. : " The turbine is driven by
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. . coolant pressure that can be ob
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Feedwater Storaye Tank Each feedwat
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ISSS A:mosphcr1c D G T ~ Val.io?, ?
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A conceptudl arrdngement 1s st,~wn
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systems would he employed in thc BW
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As long as the time for ISSS opcrat
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., ! 4 I 3 1 2 - . ! I,. ,.Y- .,.I'
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Potential Safcguar
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SECTION 3.5 Reactor Vessel Head Ven
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FIGURE 2-12 : 2-13 5,: . .. . 2-14
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P;IR Systems AC Power 1.7 Reactor C
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DESIGN CHANGE Table 1.1. AC Power S
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DESIGN CHANGE Increase battery capa
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I I Replace I I (1) Table 1.5. Gene
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Table 1.7. PWA AC Power Syst DESIGN
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I I I I Table 1.9. PWR Auxtttary Fe
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i Tahle 1.10. Emergency Core Coolin
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1.. DESIGN CHANGE Table 1.12.BWRRes
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DAMAGE CONTROL ACTIVITY Jrovide a s
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Figure 2-1. AC Power System Design
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2.2 SWITCHGEAR AN0 K CATEGORY I I1
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are discussed in mre detail in a la
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2.5 UICSEL ft4CINE REV:SED COOLING
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Figure 2-3. Diesel Cooling and Lubr
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2.6.5 Discussion An emergency diese
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equipnent. !%tor. controllers and d
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Table 2-1. Safety-Related DC Loads
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fnstrunrntation channel powered fro
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2.11.5 Oi scussion The concern over
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2.12.2 Source This concept was iden
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equipment during routine plant surv
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insider sabotage and the dlfflcul t
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2.16.3 Advantages The advantage of
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2.17.1 Concept Thls concept 1nvolve
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2.18 COFPONEKT COOLING MOOIFICATION
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to accomplish both functions with o
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2.19.4 . Disadvantages The lujor di
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VALVE C00113B WATER ISOLATION VALVE
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....,.. c., Frol Other Loads To Ult
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g u Outslde Alr / I Roof or Ida11 a
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, . accessibility to the diesel and
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. . .,,. . .. . .,. ,, ..* . . .. ,
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3.3.4 Disadvantages No disadvantage
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jI..'$ . $ 5 $!, .. . .:.;,: . ., I
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Vmt Path A Figure 3-1. Reactor Vess
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3.7.2 Source Thls concept was tdent
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Pressurl zer c + hxlllrry Elect. /
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3.9 INCREASED EMERGEtiCY FEEOWATER
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pmvfded. In the case of a narltiple
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3.11.3 Advantages The advantage of
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For operating plants which utilize
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3.14.5 Discussion As mentioned in S
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3.16.4 Dl sadvantages The disadvant
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utfll ttd f n the RHR suction 1 lne
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0 The heat exchanger shell provides
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of two tube bundles imacrsed in a l
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0 Provide an offsite reserve supply
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condtttons, is a straightforward ma
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REFERENCES '''power Plant Insulatto
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Introduction EVALUATION AND SUMMARY
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Table A-1 (Continued) Cdtryorlzntio
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. , 2.4 MULTIPLE UNIT V;lAL kC LRUS
Page 486 and 487:
3.1 CLASS 1E AUXILIARY STEAM TCRBIN
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envirorments. with the presence of
Page 491 and 492:
Page 493 and 494:
Table of Contents List of Tables Li
Page 495 and 496:
Fiq n-1 Fig C2-1 Fig C2-2 Fig C2-3
Page 497 and 498:
1.3 PURPOSE The purpose of this wor
Page 499 and 500:
2.1 DA.NAGE CONTROL ACTIONS The dam
Page 501 and 502:
ased on a variety of events (e.y..,
Page 503 and 504:
2.2.4 Reactor Vessel Decay Neat Rem
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2.2.5 Spent Fuel Pool L I If sabota
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5. Keeping damage control storage l
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V., ,"". van lour
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COMMENTS : . This may add another s
Page 515 and 516:
ENGINEERING CONCERNS: The proper NP
Page 517 and 518:
COMMENTS : I . . . . Hydraulic Limi
Page 519 and 520:
ITEM: EVALUATION NO. 5 (PWR) Manual
Page 521 and 522:
EVALUATION NO. 7 ITEM: (BWR) Substi
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, ; . ,. . ITEM : FUNCTION : EVALUA
Page 525 and 526:
EVALUATION N e ITEM: (BWR) Provide
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ITEM: FUNCTION : EVALUATION NO. 12
Page 529 and 530:
EVALUATION NO. 13 ITEM: (BWR 6 PWR)
Page 531 and 532:
COMMENTS : . Any condensate used mu
Page 533 and 534:
COMMENTS : Regulatoey concerns abou
Page 535 and 536:
ENGINEERING CONCERNS: Some componen
Page 537 and 538:
EVALUATION NO. 18 ITEM: (PWR) Steam
Page 539 and 540:
ENGINEERING CONCERNS: A desiqn effo
Page 541 and 542:
ITEM : FUNCTION : EVALUATION NO. 21
Page 543 and 544:
EVALUATION NO. 22 ITEM: (BWR & PWR)
Page 545 and 546:
F-G 0 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERAT1:ONS :
Page 547 and 548:
ITEM: EVALUATION NO. 25 (PWR & BWR)
Page 549 and 550:
1 A 1: AVAllAR1.E TISE CASE SEI.ECT
Page 551 and 552:
Case number: 2 Description: A charg
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Case number: 3 . . ~escription: The
Page 555 and 556:
Case number: 5 Description: The res
Page 557 and 558:
Case number: 6 Description: Loss of
Page 559 and 560:
TO Calculate the heat required for
Page 561 and 562:
Page 563 and 564:
Results: Assuming the initial condi
Page 565 and 566:
Case number: 10 Description: RHR pi
Page 567 and 568:
Case number: 12 Description: Drain
Page 569 and 570:
case Huther Table 8-22 AVAILAb1.E T
Page 571 and 572:
Page 573 and 574:
The heat required for each p h~se i
Page 575 and 576:
Page 577:
lr~ss-01 -cwlant yceater than charg
Page 580:
APPENDIX B: INITIAL APPROACH TO DAM
Page 583:
I i i i ~ClncheI :c .%r:a-;cw: ' w
Page 586 and 587:
however, not all systems listed by
Page 588 and 589:
Acquire Damage Assuming there are s
Page 590 and 591:
6. Establishing the Limits of Trans
Page 592 and 593:
TABLE 0-3: SABOTAGE TIME LINE RESUL
Page 594:
Hllog in fuel ull inuck LC
Page 598 and 599:
LC TIME MWIW ULSIW -ntsk:- l!*uf"l
Page 600 and 601:
3 lnqlne starts or rrtanpcs Ea star
Page 602 and 603:
2 Enqtce s:ops. wall nor car=/ load
Page 604 and 605:
" ., . Initratfan 0 sabotaqa event
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0 enq-he starts or at:empts t3 Star
Page 608 and 609:
SXBCTACE XODE: 5tar:l-q alr tank de
Page 610 and 611:
inirration 0 Albms and indications
Page 612 and 613:
SYSTS..: Relidudl Heat Ramova?. jys
Page 614 and 615:
Initilz~on 0 Demand tar X. syeern.
Page 616 and 617:
Iaitiacion 0 Demand :sr Afi4 yYtel.
Page 618 and 619:
34-i~2 min. Note: Riarnq stem '~alv
Page 620 and 621:
SYSTZX: Auxa;;ar( Peedwe-er System
Page 622 and 623:
C~n=:?l Room Response u :ntar!al fo
Page 625 and 626:
:2itlrtion 0 Sabocaqe event occurs.
Page 627 and 628:
112-1147 min. IAsswrnq sp1ic:nq. no
Page 629 and 630:
Xiamo and :ndrcatrans 9-13 nm. Cont
Page 631:
SYSTPV: 48OV Class :E Electrical 3i
Page 634 and 635:
For each model (BWR and PWR), the f
Page 636 and 637:
FUNCTIONS - Primary Coolant Invento
Page 638 and 639:
Chemical and Volume Control System
Page 640 and 641:
electric power is interrupted, the
Page 642:
." ,.,- 4160 VAC (vital) 125 VDC TA
Page 645 and 646:
does not have an extensive power hi
Page 647 and 648:
TABLE C2-5 PAlN FEEDWATER SYSTEM i
Page 650 and 651:
ESW pumps are on standby with cooli
Page 653 and 654:
features (ESF) transformer. Table C
Page 655 and 656:
FIGURE C2-7 DC Electric Distributio
Page 657 and 658:
FIGURE CZ-8 Coinponent Coolli~g h'a
Page 659 and 660:
. ESW'S~S~~~. The ESW system could
Page 661 and 662:
C3. BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) APP
Page 663 and 664:
I - -1- -- .
Page 665 and 666:
via the main steam safety/relief va
Page 667 and 668:
250 VDC FUNCTIONS TABLE C3-3 HIGH P
Page 669 and 670:
125 VDC 4160 VAC (vital) Condensate
Page 671 and 672:
41 hU VAC 125 VIK' TABLE C3-5 CORE
Page 673 and 674:
I*.',. -.- taw Residual Iledt Remov
Page 675 and 676:
eactor vessel by manually dumping s
Page 677 and 678:
Service Water System
Page 679 and 680:
cooling on an individual basis. Suc
Page 681 and 682:
Emergency Service Water System FUNC
Page 683 and 684:
FIGURE C3-7 DC Electric Distributio
Page 685 and 686:
Therefore, onl: valves accessible f
Page 687 and 688:
, : %..- ~ DC 1. Reactor Water Leve
Page 689 and 690:
APPENDIX D: COMPUTER CALCULATIONS F
Page 691 and 692:
69 F i yur c 1)- 1 : HEACI'OR MOIIE
Page 693:
680.0 660.0 640.0 620.0 600.0 JBO.0
Page 696 and 697:
- - - - - - - - - STATION BLACKOUT
Page 698 and 699:
TIHE (SECONDS) XI0 j - 7 PHESSUHI Z
Page 700 and 701:
. LMTAI: 050141 [ 2Zon.tt I -1. I .
Page 704:
'-. - - - . - - - -- . . . HEAT S i
Page 707 and 708:
APPENDIX E: INDUSTRY SUR'JEYS At th
Page 709 and 710:
2. In the cases of the oil refineri
Page 711 and 712:
Concept De~e~lopment and Cost Estim
Page 714 and 715:
- PAGE ' 4.5 Cost Estimates for Iso
Page 716 and 717:
!;cl~crn;~tic Arrangemcrnt of ESF h
Page 718 and 719:
descriptions or descriptions of ope
Page 720 and 721:
2. SUWlARY Cost estimates for const
Page 722 and 723:
3. CONCEPT DEVELOPFIENT .3.1' .HARD
Page 724 and 725:
..: +". .. . . : ,. \,.L . . , .: f
Page 726 and 727:
., %W ; : ;,' : .? vent system cons
Page 728 and 729:
2 ft 6 in. 3 ft\ \ - N SLOPE SLOPE
Page 730 and 731:
Tank Capacity, Gal. Tank Diameter,
Page 732 and 733:
7 ft 6 in.
Page 734 and 735:
auxiliary feedwater and refueling w
Page 739:
................ ................ -
Page 748 and 749:
I .,I I , , . ............. .),.I.
Page 750:
I i , .. ! 'It-
Page 758:
LLYtL GMDL PLUS 73 it
Page 763 and 764:
and roof are of reinforced concrete
Page 766 and 767:
tection cabinets installed in the s
Page 768 and 769:
ndependent. Two ha? f-size tanks we
Page 770 and 771:
BORON INJECTION TANK No. Required T
Page 772 and 773:
Design Pressure, PSIG Design Temper
Page 774 and 775:
Doalgn Pranouto, PSIC 150 Design Te
Page 776:
. Provides for isolation of fluid l
Page 780:
I-- 38.7~1 (127 ftj Figare 3-21. U
Page 784 and 785:
I ( N.C.* I I I 4-kV CLASS 1E EMERG
Page 786 and 787:
, Alignment of reactor coolant pump
Page 788 and 789:
Electrical Power The major electric
Page 790 and 791:
The cooling air inlet and discharge
Page 792 and 793:
Design Temperature, "F Material of
Page 794 and 795:
Design Pressure, PSIS Deslqn Tcnper
Page 796 and 797:
DIESEL GENET(ATOR - LVBE OIL STORAG
Page 798 and 799:
Table 3-5 1:~:s the elping concecti
Page 800 and 801:
Loop J lC.L.1 Loop 1 lC.L.I-*:..mal
Page 802 and 803:
ability to isolate it to prevent lo
Page 804 and 805:
The excess letdown line is a small
Page 806 and 807:
4.1 GENERAL I 4. COST ESTIf4ATES Th
Page 808 and 809:
4.2.2 , Hardening Option 2, Reinfor
Page 810 and 811:
xcavat ion and Backfill Mat, 3 feet
Page 812 and 813:
TABLE 4-5 STUDY ESTIMATE, NOVEMBER
Page 814 and 815:
ITEM OF WORK TABLE 4-7 STUDY ESTIMA
Page 816 and 817:
The approach to the estimate, there
Page 818 and 819:
Substructure Excavation and Backfi
Page 820 and 821:
TABLE 4-10 STUDY ESTIMATE, NOVEMBER
Page 823 and 824:
6L:ained. In tk,e case of rne RHi+
Page 825 and 826:
TECHNICAL MPlORANDUn EVALUATION OF
Page 827 and 828:
TECHNICAL MEMORANWn ABGQNNE NATIONA
Page 829 and 830:
4.1 Sources of Information .4.2 Air
Page 831 and 832:
polar Plot for a11 hudiur hndira Ac
Page 833 and 834:
Thir report providu a revieu and ev
Page 835 and 836:
extenrively rtudied, but other crar
Page 837 and 838:
; 6 . ..,~ spective, presmt' polici
Page 839 and 840:
8 narios. mechaniraa, ad credibilit
Page 841 and 842:
ased on aircraft and topographical
Page 843 and 844:
IAU Safmty Gui& ad include the dete
Page 845 and 846:
4.1 Sources of Information 4. AIRCR
Page 847 and 848:
General Aviation refera to the oper
Page 849 and 850:
18 accounted for 81 percent of all
Page 851 and 852:
Table 1. Critical Civil Aviation Ac
Page 853:
Fig. 1 Polar Plot for all Canadian
Page 856 and 857:
2 5 procedures a d directions, misj
Page 858 and 859:
2 1 thane rerult umarired belw for
Page 860 and 861:
These race# aaruw tha: a crash can
Page 862 and 863:
hble 6 Detailed Crash btes - Fatal
Page 864 and 865:
DISTANCE FROM LANDING OR TAKE -OFF
Page 866 and 867:
the calculatiod where desirable. Bo
Page 868 and 869:
i are equivalent to randm craah eve
Page 870 and 871:
T PATH Fig. 5. Crash Sites Orthonor
Page 872 and 873:
accidents froll 1962 to 1966, 26 fi
Page 874 and 875: Uircellaneous 0.01 mf* 0.02 mi2 tn*
Page 876 and 877: 4 5 large ones within 75 oiler. His
Page 878 and 879: 4 7 giw aircraft crashing into the
Page 880 and 881: 0 emergency core cooling system (EC
Page 882 and 883: zero: Paat .xh?ience h a ahown that
Page 884 and 885: 5 3 lw it to deprearurirs the PHtS
Page 886 and 887: mgklw imposed upon the plant struct
Page 888 and 889: the calculatioru were repeated with
Page 890: strength). The reaction load for th
Page 894 and 895: Fig. 12 Displacements-Time-~Iiutori
Page 896 and 897: cross-sectional area of the strikin
Page 898 and 899: LOADING AREA REINPORCEYE STILL E'LA
Page 900 and 901: 4 6 lo-' 2 4 6 10 t? 2j3 PERIOD t s
Page 902 and 903: Fig. 18 Comparinon of Response spec
Page 904 and 905: I Fig. 22 Response Spectra. Compari
Page 906 and 907: the gener.~?vicinity of the crash s
Page 908 and 909: 77 such an even nvironaent will be
Page 910 and 911: , .';,,>,~robabilit~ . . . _ of occ
Page 912 and 913: and conclurio 81 0 1 Aviation aircr
Page 914 and 915: itself a coditional probability, co
Page 916 and 917: acceptrblY -11, and the risk evalua
Page 918: then aviation zones concentrate tra
Page 921 and 922: Scenarios - Plan: methodologies for
Page 923: REFERENCES 1. U.S. Nuclear Regulato
Page 927 and 928: 96 Viti, C., Olivieri, X., and Trav
Page 929 and 930: Offslte Hazards: Aircraft Crash Typ
Page 931 and 932: Offaite Hazards: Aircraft Crash Spe
Page 933 and 934: so11.1tion of the dynamic analysic
Page 935 and 936: I 104 airport. Inpact forciw functi
Page 937 and 938: Offaite Hazards: Aircraft Crash Typ
Page 939 and 940: Offsite rcraft Crash diagram and co
Page 941 and 942: hi tr a numbar of techniques which
Page 943 and 944: aircraft fraac is examined and it w
Page 945 and 946: 113 idual probabilities that an air
Page 947 and 948: 'Ihir paper giver a rrm~ry of extre
Page 949 and 950: 111 Offrite Rarardr craft Crash -pa
Page 951 and 952: Internal: E. S. Beckjord C. E. Till
Page 953 and 954: ABSTRACT The purpose of this projec
Page 955 and 956: , . 5.0 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Page 957 and 958: Given an carthquakc large enough to
Page 959 and 960: Relay chatter was not treated at al
Page 961 and 962: 6.1 lntroductlon SECTION 6 SUhlhlAR
Page 963 and 964: were found to be important). These
Page 965 and 966: 6.3 Plant-spccllic lnslghts for LaS
Page 967 and 968: 11) We believe that, on balance, th
Page 969 and 970: conservative but we are not certain
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