Kayishema et Ruzindana - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

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opinion that it was open to the Appeals Chamber to grant such an extension of its own accord; it did not do so because of a view, which I consider was not right, that there was no “good cause” for an extension. In sum, the position of the Appeals Chamber was this: (i) The extension of time granted by the Pre-Hearing Judge on 11 April 2000 would not be disturbed; it would stand. (ii) The Appeals Chamber proceeded on the basis that the Pre-Hearing Judge did not grant a further extension of time to regularise the late filing on 2 May 2000. (iii) Regard being had to the general behaviour of the Prosecutor, there was not “good cause” for granting such a further extension; the Appeals Chamber did not itself grant one. 385. With respect, (i) is correct. I have the misfortune to be unable to support (ii) and (iii); I shall deal with these under (d) and (e) below. In (f) below I consider whether I am entitled to enter into the merits in circumstances in which the Appeals Chamber has not done so. But first there are two matters of a preliminary nature to be considered; they are treated of under (b) and (c) below. (b) Is the question of dismissal of an appeal, for non-observance of a time-limit set by the Pre-Hearing Judge for the filing of an appellate brief, one for the Pre-Hearing Judge? Or, is it one for the Appeals Chamber? 386. The Defence submits that, although briefing time-limits could of course be fixed by the Pre-Hearing Judge, the question whether an appeal should be dismissed because of nonobservance of a time-limit set by him for the filing of an appellate brief is one for the full Appeals Chamber, not one for him. 637 That is true. The occasions on which a single Judge can act are specified in the Statute. They do not include the case of a Pre-Hearing Judge: the institution of a Pre-Hearing Judge is not known to the Statute. The rule-making power conferred by Article 14 of the Statute on the Judges is wide enough to empower them to make a Rule authorising a single Judge to take certain preparatory steps. But, wide as the power is, it is not wide enough to empower them to make a Rule authorising a single Judge to exercise the substantial judicial power of the Appeals Chamber to dismiss an appeal where this has been properly brought under Article 24 of the Statute and therefore to 7 Case No.: ICTR-95-1-A 19 July 2001
withdraw the case from the jurisdiction of the full Appeals Chamber which is lawfully seised of it. There is no such Rule; if one existed, it would be ultra vires for that reason. It would be difficult to find any other authority: the general principle, I apprehend, is that, absent any clear enabling competence conferred by legislation, judicial power cannot be delegated 638 . 387. It is not the case, however, that the Pre-Hearing Judge in this case purported to exercise a power to dismiss or not to dismiss the Prosecutor’s appeal. He granted an extension of time for the Prosecutor to file her appellate brief. As is more fully set out below, the argument of the Defence is that, at the time when he granted that extension, the Prosecutor’s appeal had already become time-barred for failure to file her appellate brief; as from the moment of such failure, the time-bar was in force. The subsequent granting of the extension could not remove the time-bar, for the reason that, as it was said, “time-barring is not a scheduling, pre-hearing problem; it is a substantive issue which falls within the jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber, not of the Pre-Hearing Judge, who may not dispose of it”. 639 388. But, although the effect of a time-bar is a matter for the Appeals Chamber, the question whether there is a time-bar depends on what were the time-limits fixed by the Pre- Hearing Judge. The Pre-Hearing Judge has power to grant an extension of time; the power may be exercised either directly or indirectly. If a filing falls within an extension of time directly or indirectly granted by him, the Appeals Chamber cannot dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-observance of a time-limit. As will appear below, much in this case turns on whether the Pre-Hearing Judge is to be regarded as having indirectly made such an extension to regularise the late filing on 2 May 2000. I think that he did, and that, when account is taken of that, the conclusion is that the Appeals Chamber cannot dismiss the Prosecutor’s appeal. 637 See paragraph 25 of the judgement of the Appeals Chamber. 638 “[T]he judicial function can never be delegated”, per Donaldson, LJ, in R. v. Gateshead, Ex parte Tesco Stores Ltd. [1981] Q.B. 470. 639 Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, para. 25. This and other excerpts from the judgement are provisional English translations from the French; the official English version of the judgement is not available at the time of writing. 8 Case No.: ICTR-95-1-A 19 July 2001
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United nations Nations Unies Tribun
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c) Sur l’appréciation par la Cha
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e) Gravité des infractions .......
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I. INTRODUCTION A. Procès en premi
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B. L’appel 3 9. La Chambre d’ap
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14. Ayant identifié ces motifs d
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était forclos dans le dépôt de s
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le 2 mai 2000, en d’autres termes
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2. Discussion 27. La question princ
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d'appel, sans exposer clairement la
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dans le même temps, le Procureur s
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d’appelant, le Procureur n’avai
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III. QUESTIONS SOULEVÉES EN APPEL
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aux qualités personnelles du juge,
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2. L’égalité des armes a) Argum
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70. La Chambre d’appel fait sien
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76. Il soutient de surcroît que le
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1997 le Procureur a communiqué à
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Procureur soutient toutefois que, l
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93. Arrêté le 20 septembre 1996,
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C. Alibi 98. Aussi bien Kayishema (
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Kayishema n’a pas démontré le c
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d’une infraction, notamment en ra
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instance. Si la Défense n’est pa
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) Sur la méthode adoptée par la C
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couleur d’encre différente, n’
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présentation, à l’existence de
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) Discussion i) Contestation des co
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de Kibuye, on peut présumer que la
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lieu au Rwanda en 1994 étaient le
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147. Kayishema soutient que la Cham
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152. Kayishema semble contester un
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158. La Chambre d’appel relève t
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162. Tel qu’évoqué supra, la Ch
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soutient que la Chambre de premièr
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3. Conclusion 173. Vu l’analyse q
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arguments développés dans le Mém
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individuelle de Ruzindana doit êtr
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Ruzindana ne conteste pas la défin
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5) La Chambre de première instance
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s’ensuit… [et] selon les circon
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c) Conclusion 194. Ruzindana n’a
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d’éléments de fait 305 qu’il
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témoignages ; et (c) la question d
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expert 321 relatifs à la faiblesse
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chaque argument présenté par les
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apprécier la crédibilité d’un
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place de l’Appelant. Elle estime
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identifié Kayishema et/ou Ruzindan
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Mubuga aux dates des massacres, Kay
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des faits il était couché sous le
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témoins tels que G 405 , DD 406 ,
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présence de survivant dans la grot
Page 107 and 108: Rouge 428 . Selon lui, il y a, dans
Page 109 and 110: 264. La Chambre d’appel remarque
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Page 113 and 114: « Considérées ensemble, les dép
Page 115 and 116: 282. La Chambre d’appel note que
Page 117 and 118: commis une erreur de droit 489 . Se
Page 119 and 120: 293. Kayishema soutient que les con
Page 121 and 122: 296. La Chambre d’appel relève q
Page 123 and 124: orienter, ordonner, donner des inst
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Page 129 and 130: 317. A l’audience en appel, le Pr
Page 131 and 132: égion de la colline de Bisesero av
Page 133 and 134: G. Appels de la sentence 1. Argumen
Page 135 and 136: ) Critère d’examen en cas d’ap
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Page 141 and 142: Chambre de première instance a ten
Page 143 and 144: acte ou l’avait fait, il n’a pa
Page 145 and 146: a estimé que le refus d’admettre
Page 147 and 148: e) Gravité des infractions 367. En
Page 149 and 150: 619 Arrêt Kambanda, par. 125. 144
Page 151 and 152: [signé] [signé] [signé] ________
Page 153 and 154: DECLARATION OF JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA 37
Page 155 and 156: clarification of the time limits to
Page 157: DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABU
Page 161 and 162: the “court is not required to dis
Page 163 and 164: applications for extensions of time
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Page 167 and 168: speaking in reference to the extens
Page 169 and 170: point (paragraphs 29, 36 and 40 of
Page 171 and 172: major one: it was capable of being
Page 173 and 174: 427. Thus, I regret that I am not a
Page 175 and 176: 431. Le 21 octobre 1999, statuant s
Page 177 and 178: jours suivant le dépôt de la trad
Page 179 and 180: 1999 685 la Chambre a statué sur l
Page 181 and 182: 451. Le 26 mai 2000, Ruzindana a d
Page 183 and 184: l’absence de mémoire responsif d
Page 185 and 186: contre la peine Réponse de Ruzinda
Page 187 and 188: Arrêt Furundžija Arrêt Kambanda
Page 189 and 190: Article 3 commun Article 3 commun a
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Kayishema et Ruzindana - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

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