journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

6
by Jan van der Harst
not all – its delegation took a position similar to that of Belgium (see also the
contribution by Jérôme Wilson). This is not to say that the Luxembourg position on
The Hague is irrelevant, as will be shown later. Of the applicant countries, only
Britain bears a part in this volume (Alan S. Milward’s contribution), first and
foremost because it was exactly this ‘outsider’ that attracted the bulk of attention
during the summit’s deliberations. Talking about EC enlargement basically meant
talking about the UK, rather than Denmark, Ireland or Norway. Having said that,
the Hague story can never be complete without taking into account also the
positions of the other three applicants. We hope that this gauntlet will be taken up
soon by those historians working on the period and topic in question.
During a small workshop in Groningen held in September 2002, 3 the
contributors to the present volume convened and discussed the central issues to be
dealt with. They agreed that studying The Hague 1969 is useful and relevant for
reasons of historical evidence and analytical verification, rather than the trivial
personal motive I mentioned in the opening lines of this introduction. Many
questions arose. Was The Hague really so significant as has been depicted in most
textbooks on European integration? 4 And if the conference was successful, how
could this be explained? Was its impact visible and tangible at once or only in
retrospect? The lifting of the 30-year-embargo for most government archives has
certainly helped us in our attempt to answer these questions.
The importance of the summit could be analysed with the help of four
interpretations, each giving a different assessment of the results booked:
1. The Hague’s significance is overrated because some crucial decisions furthering
development in European integration had been taken at an earlier stage, in the
course of the period 1958-1968. Especially the year 1968 was important, in that it
brought the complete removal of EEC internal customs duties, the establishment
of a common external tariff and acceptance of a common agricultural policy.
These were exactly the issues and areas dominating the EC during the next
decades to come. The definite regulation on the financing of agriculture, concluded
soon after the Hague summit, was important but basically an indispensable
corollary to decisions taken the year before. 5
3. With thanks to prof. L.W. Gormley for making this workshop possible.
4. See e.g. D. DINAN, Ever closer Union. An Introduction to the European Community, Macmillan,
London, 1994, p.73; S. GEORGE, Politics and Policy in the European Union, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1996, p.11; P. GERBET, La construction de l’Europe, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris,
1983, pp. 352-356; A.M. EL-AGRAA, The European Union. History, Institutions, Economics and
Policies, Prentice Hall Europe, London, 1998, pp.545-546.
5. A similar argument can be found in: A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose &
State Power from Messina to Maastricht, UCL Press, London, 1998. On p.312 Moravcsik notes:
“Agreements on permanent CAP financing and British membership at The Hague are often seen
as beginning of a new era, but […] they were, in fact, the final steps in the consolidation of a […]
bargain that had taken over a decade to negotiate”. For an apt analysis of the early CAP years (and
a critical review of Moravcsik’s interpretation of 1960s European integration developments), see:
A.C. LAURING-KNUDSEN, Defining the Policies of a Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical
Study, PhD thesis EUI Florence, 2001.