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In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 81
Undoubtedly, it was the clear stance of Brandt in favour of the enlargement issue
that encouraged Pompidou to yield at that point in time. The chancellor clearly
exerted greater pressure on France than his predecessor Kiesinger had done. Since
the beginning of July the still Foreign minister openly discussed the sensitive issue
of surplus production and – in doing so – subtly left Pompidou in doubt as to the
German assent to the definite ruling of financing the agricultural market.
Furthermore, acting as a conciliator between the extreme attitudes of France on the
one hand and the Benelux on the other, Brandt clearly demonstrated his esprit
communautaire and thus gave his policy high credibility. In doing so, he succeeded
in taking German national interests into consideration without jeopardising the
relationship to the French and British allies.
If there were any conceptions about the long-term effects of the conference,
they certainly were not completely outlined at this stage. Though the EMU had
played a prominent role in the German drafts, its future development and failure in
the early Seventies were not foreseeable. It is true of course, that the German
administration was a bit naive in assuming that Germany would follow through on
its ‘economist’ approach as opposed to the ‘monetary’ approach which Pompidou
and several other member states had adopted.
The European Political Cooperation, however, would emerge with a promising
future, although it took a marginal position on decisions regarding the preparations
for the conference. It was “a few lines tucked away” in the final communiqué. 94
However, the Davignon report of October 1970 established the framework for a
common foreign policy with the European Political Cooperation (EPC). It was a
sort of alternative route (“zweiten Gleises”) outside of the Rome Treaties that,
together with the entry of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland, helped in setting the
decisive course for further development of Western European co-operation in the
Seventies. 95
Finally, the Hague summit had set a precedent for the European Council, which
would convene regularly from 1975, in helping to institutionalise the summit
conferences which had initially been rejected. But obviously, the Hague summit
was a success worth repeating. It facilitated the work of EC institutions such as the
Committee of Permanent Representatives, which had been blocked in 1969 for lack
of political guidelines by their governments. 96 In the case of the Hague summit,
Brandt’s search for the greatest common denominator had resulted in a decisive
step forward in the European integration process, a procedure which normally
moves at a snail’s pace.
94. C. HILL, K.E. SMITH, European Foreign Policy: key documents, Routledge, London/New York,
2000, p.72.
95. K. D. BRACHER, W. JÄGER, W. LINK, Republik im Wandel 1969-1974. Die Ära Brandt, DVA/
Brockhaus, Stuttgart/Mannheim, 1986, p.243.
96. PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1440, Bericht des Ausschusses der Ständigen Vertreter, 24.11.1969 and the
commentary statement of the German Foreign Office from 26 November.