Teorias de Mudança de Crenças (Dinâmica Doxástica) - IFCS

A possible explanation:
Justificação epistêmica
Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970) has presented a theory
of belief changes (theory changes). According to that theory large scale belief changes
– paradigm shifts – do not bow to rational control. (Though Kuhn also asserted that
changes within a paradigm are largely governed by the methodological rules of that
paradigm.)
• Kuhn’s theory (sufficiently vulgarized) has enforced for decades relativistic tendencies
in philosophy and – even more so – in neighbouring disciplines. Such tendencies are
rarely shared by epistemologists.
· Belief changes, on the one hand, appeared under the Kuhnian perspective as rationally
impredictable and not subject to normative contraints.
· Most epistemologists agreed that knowledge claims, on the other hand and to the
contrary, are subject to rational assessment.
• Consequence: The static problem remained within traditional epistemology; the dynamic
problem – together with its relativistic side effects – was exiled to the History
of Science.
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