Handbook of intelligence studies / edited by

sets of congressional committees. This not only complicates effective oversight but opens up
possibilities for disguising activities by juggling roles and missions between the civilian agency
and the military forces. Further, the changing distribution of covert action resources between
the CIA and the military will complicate this problem, as well as blur reporting requirements
attached to covert action, which are located within statutes that apply to the intelligence
agencies. Second, given the propensity of the current administration to avoid such requirements
by invoking ultra-high levels of secrecy and restricting knowledge to a very small circle of
legislators, the ability of Congress to play a role as a check and balance against overambitious
operational schemes will be greatly reduced.
No one – not Michael Hayden, not John Negroponte or Donald H. Rumsfeld, not Stephen
Cambone or Stephen Hadley; certainly not George W. Bush or his successor – has ever lived in
an era of full-spectrum Pentagon covert action capability where the CIA is the relatively
disadvantaged agency. When the United States Special Operations Command attains the size
of a full army corps, and Langley’s Special Activities Division is a fraction of that, it may be the
CIA furnishing technical services to the military’s covert operators and not the other way
around. Secretary Rumsfeld expects to reach that level of force within the current defense
budget plan. Under those conditions a working agreement that ensures CIA primacy in
covert action may not be acceptable to the military. This viewpoint is already in evidence –
officers arguing on the basis of experience in the 2001–2002 Afghan opening campaign and
sequel maintain that CIA officers fighting alongside the military should be under Pentagon
control. 15
Apart from anything else the US intelligence reforms have created a new set of lacunae
for covert operations, issues that will have to be worked through even while the war on terror
is going on. It is probably right to say there is never a “good time” for reform, but George W.
Bush seems to have chosen an especially awkward moment.
This brings the discussion full circle. Driven by the war on terror there will be new covert
actions, managed by a system with its kinks yet to be fully worked out. Langley’s secret warriors,
hampered by a non-permissive international environment, will have trouble recruiting third
force groups, and they will need help from military operators who may be doing this stuff for
the first time. Alternatively, the military will engage in a covert action that goes beyond its
traditional commando raids, say a “Bay of Goats,” as the pundits styled one scheme to oust
Saddam Hussein, triggering an uprising against him by means of landing a force of dissidents in
Iraq. Again, such a large-scale covert action will be a first-time experience for the US military.
Due to a variety of structural weaknesses in the nature of covert action the odds will be against
success, odds further diminished by management problems and operational inadequacies. The
hand of the United States will almost inevitably be revealed. Further negative impact on the
international environment is predictable.
These methods have been oversold. Covert action is also under-engineered in the sense that
problems inherent in the use of the technique have never been solved. The result is a set of
policymakers seduced by visions of golden bullet solutions who are likely to face significant
disasters instead. The consequences of those are indeterminate but problematical. The future
for American covert action is cloudy, not bright.
Notes
THE FUTURE OF COVERT ACTION
1 For a detailed history of CIA covert operations see John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the
CIA. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.
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