Handbook of intelligence studies / edited by

HANS BORN AND THORSTEN WETZLING
persuade Congress and the American public to support the war, turned out to be wrong.” L. Britt
Snider, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence after September 11”, in: Jennifer E. Sims and Burton
Gerber (eds.), Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005),
p. 242.
4 For further insights into the aspect of intelligence politicization, see: Joseph Cirincione et al., WMD
in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2004); Seymour M. Hersh, “The Stovepipe: How Conflicts between the Bush Administration and the
Intelligence Community Marred the Reporting on Iraq’s weapons”, The New Yorker, 27 October
2003; Harry Howe Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence”, in: Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.),
Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Press, 1987).
5 Le Monde, “L’Elysée accuse les services secrets d’avoir enquêté sur M. Chirac sous le gouvernement de
M. Jospin”, 22 June 2002.
6 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practices for Oversight of
Intelligence Services (Oslo: Publishing House of the Norwegian Parliament, 2005), p. 68.
7 Bundestag, Drucksache 16/990.
8 “Secretary General’s report under Article 52 ECHR on the question of secret detention and transport
of detainees suspected of terrorist acts, notably by or at the instigation of foreign agencies”, Council of
Europe, SG/Inf (2006) 5, Strasbourg, 28 February 2006, point 101. Available at . The European Parliament has established a temporary committee
on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of
prisoners. The committee’s first draft interim report was released on 24 April 2006 and is available
online at: .
9 In a previous publication we accounted in greater detail for challenges with respect to the internal
control at the level of the agency, executive control, parliamentary oversight and oversight by
independent oversight bodies. See Hans Born and Ian Leigh, op. cit.
10 We mention recommended accountability mechanisms from intelligence legislation in North and
South America, Europe, Africa and Asia and Oceania. Our sample includes “new” (Poland, Hungary)
and “old” (United Kingdom, The Netherlands) as well as examples from different constitutional
models (US, Germany, the United Kingdom, respectively).
11 With the notable exception of France and Turkey, which have yet to fully incorporate parliamentary
intelligence oversight into domestic practice. On the French experience with intelligence governance,
see Hans Born and Thorsten Wetzling “Checks and Imbalances? Intelligence Governance in
contemporary France” in: Hans Born and Marina Caparini (eds), Democratic Control of Intelligence
Services (London: Ashgate Publishing, forthcoming). At last (in 2006), France seems ready to
remedy this democratic deficit: Prime Minister de Villepin has introduced a “projet de loi” to the
National Assembly which pertains to creating the country’s first parliamentary intelligence oversight
committee. Assemblée Nationale, Projet de loi No. 2941, 08 March 2006.
12 Ben Hayes, “There is no Balance between Security and Civil Liberties – Just Less of Both”, Essays for
Civil Liberties and Democracy in Europe, Number 12. Available online at: http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2005/oct/ecln/essay–12.pdf.
13 Modern intelligence agencies serving democratic nations are providing an important service to their
people by identifying and assessing new security threats. What is more, they are not comparable –
neither with respect to the means nor with respect to the command structure – to the likes of the
Gestapo or the KPG.
14 Loch K. Johnson “Governing in the Absence of Angels: On the Practice of Intelligence Accountability
in the United States”, in Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Loch K. Johnson (eds), op. cit., p. 102.
15 Ibid.
16 In this regard, one can also point to the connections between different layers: deficiencies at one level
can affect other levels. For instance, parliamentarians can effectively scrutinize the performance of
ministers only if the parliament possesses sufficient powers to control the executive, including spending
and investigative authorities.
17 Andrzej Zybertowicz, “An Unresolved Game. The Role of the Intelligence Services in the Nascent
Polish Democracy”, in: Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson and Ian Leigh (eds), A similar observation with
respect to German practice in intelligence oversight is documented in a recent article in the German
weekly, Die Zeit. The author cites insufficient cooperation from the Bundesnachrichtendienst as the
main cause of a series of resignations of parliamentary overseers from office. Martin Klingst, “Der Frust
der Kontrolleure”, in: Die Zeit, Nr. 4/2006, p. 3.
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