Handbook of intelligence studies / edited by

JAMES J. WIRTZ
contributed to the calamity, and to suggest fixes to prevent future instances of strategic surprise.
The most famous, or at least the longest-lived, intelligence inquiry involved the surprise attack
suffered by the United States at Pearl Harbor, Oahu on December 7, 1941. To date, there have
been ten official investigations of this incident. In fact, the last, official word on the attack was
issued December 15, 1995 when Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn rejected a plea to
restore posthumously Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (who was the commander
of the US Pacific Fleet in December 1941) and Major General Walter Short, USA (who was
responsible for the defense of Hawaii in December 1941) to their highest wartime rank.
Similarly, the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States, chaired by Senator Bob Graham and Congressman Porter Goss, and the subsequent
9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terror Attacks) issued significant
reports on the events leading up to the al-Qaeda strikes against the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. Influenced by the Pearl Harbor inquiries, especially the way Roberta Wholstetter
used the findings of the penultimate investigation of Pearl Harbor, the Joint Congressional
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to write her famous treatise on
surprise, Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision, the 9/11 commissioners attempted to capture the
context of the September 11, 2001 disaster. The Commissioners wanted to create an historical
record that would be a launching point for future scholarship on the tragedy. 5 In the aftermath
of intelligence failure, the American intelligence community has been subjected to intense
public and official scrutiny, which creates a treasure trove of information for scholars interested
in intelligence.
Second, accusations of scandal or abuse of intelligence power often push aside the veil of
secrecy surrounding intelligence organizations, providing scholars with additional insights into
relationships between officials and intelligence professionals. These investigations not only
reveal much about the sources and methods used to produce finished intelligence, but also
information about covert intelligence operations. Investigations by the Pike and Church
Committees in the 1970s, for example, produced a laundry list of questionable Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations, everything from experiments with LSD to various
assassination attempts against Fidel Castro. In a political atmosphere dominated by the US
defeat in Vietnam and revelations about the Watergate scandal, many Americans believed that
the CIA was a “rogue elephant” that was beyond the control of elected officials and standard
government regulation. More recently, Congressional scrutiny of the Iran-Contra scandal
during the Reagan administration provided insights into the shadowy world of covert
operations and diplomacy. 6 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction also offered insights into US collection and
analytic capabilities following the failure to assess accurately the status of Iraq’s ability to
manufacture and stockpile chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. 7
Third, elected officials sometimes deliberately reveal classified information in support of
US foreign policy and diplomacy. These revelations not only divulge classified information, but
they also disclose much about the sources and methods that go into intelligence production.
Probably the most famous and dramatic use of intelligence to bolster US diplomacy was
undertaken by the John F. Kennedy administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis. On
October 25, 1962, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s use of photo reconnaissance pictures taken by
U-2 spy planes and low-level surveillance aircraft in a presentation at a UN Security Council
meeting convinced the world that the Soviets were deploying ballistic missiles in Cuba, while
simultaneously highlighting US photoreconnaissance capabilities. In a speech delivered to the
nation on September 5, 1983, President Ronald Reagan also provided insights into US Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities by playing a tape of conversations between Soviet ground
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