Handbook of intelligence studies / edited by

Conclusion
The development of national intelligence control systems is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
many democracies intelligence control has long been considered an executive prerogative, as
demonstrated by the fact that early intelligence control mechanisms were based on decrees
instead of laws enacted by parliament. In the United Kingdom, intelligence services operated
on executive decrees until the end of the 1980s, whereas French intelligence services are to this
day not based on an act of parliament. Although the deepening and widening of democratic
oversight of intelligence services has generally much progressed in recent decades, one can also
point to new challenges and different levels of precision and aptitude in national oversight laws.
There could scarcely be a more appropriate time to address new challenges to the oversight
of intelligence services. In the wake of 9/11 and the now re-named “long war” against terror,
national parliaments, governments (inter alia in the US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Canada) as well as the parliamentary assemblies of regional international organizations (e.g. the
European Parliament and the Council of Europe) have started to investigate the functioning
of intelligence services and the use of intelligence by national governments. Other countries,
such as France, have launched legislative initiatives to strengthen parliament’s role in national
intelligence control.
Drawing on research into national oversight legislation in liberal democracies, this chapter
highlights intelligence accountability mechanisms that address well the challenges for the
contemporary control of intelligence. We have confined our analysis to aspects that touch on
(1) parliamentary ownership, (2) embedded human rights protection, and (3) political neutrality
of the services.
Bearing in mind that most intelligence oversight systems are relatively young, the underlying
question is to what extent they are strong enough to confront the new challenges in the current
war against terror. Among the most prominent challenges are the higher level of international
intelligence cooperation and the danger of politicization of the services. Concerning the
former, the increase in bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the services begs
the question whether national oversight systems have sufficient statutory powers and the
capacity to oversee international cooperation activities. A second challenge is the danger of
politicization of the services, i.e. the use of intelligence services for personal or political party
purposes, something that is common in both new and old democracies. Interestingly, the
danger of politicization of the intelligence services can be regarded as a downside of the
increasing democratization of intelligence oversight. On the one hand, introduction of more
transparency and public accountability leads to a better system of checks and balances on the
services. On the other hand, the services and their activities are becoming part of the normal
political debate, which leads to the danger that the actors in that political debate will use the
services and their work for their own benefit.
Notes
INTELLIGENCE ACCOUNTABILITY
1 Philip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the 20th Century (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1988).
2 Peter Gill, “The Politicization of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq”, in: Hans Born, Loch
K. Johnson and Ian Leigh (eds), Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
3 Peter Gill, op. cit., p. 20. L. Britt Snider puts it somewhat more mildly: “The intelligence judgments
that had ostensibly prompted President Bush to wage war on Iraq . . . which Bush in turn had used to
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