Handbook of intelligence studies / edited by

HANS BORN AND THORSTEN WETZLING
and 6 of Figure 24.1 give parliament access to classified information and seem to be adequate
procedures to keep classified information secret. Mechanism 7 and 8 contribute to the ownership
of the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee over its reports to parliament and
the wider public. It signifies that parliament is sovereign in how it wants to render account
to the public. Mechanisms 9 and 10 give parliament a substantive role in overseeing and
approving the intelligence budget. It is precisely because taxpayers’ money is involved that
budget control over government spending is at the heart of parliamentary control in general,
and intelligence agencies are not exempt from this.
If it is not to be merely a veneer of democratic legitimacy, and to be effective truly, parliamentary
intelligence oversight stands and falls with the pro-active, non-glamorous routine
work that its members must engage in. Yet the parliamentarians’ devotion to oversight tasks
is often difficult to maintain – parliamentarians cannot speak openly to their constituencies on
these matters, yet openness is important to attract people’s votes so as to stay in office. A related
danger shall be briefly alluded to, i.e. the danger that the intelligence services are drawn into
political controversy. This can be the result of an immature approach by parliamentarians that
allows unsubstantiated accusations and conspiracy theories being introduced into the public
realm. 33 Should an intelligence oversight committee take on a sensationalist approach, this
general public is likely to form an inaccurate picture and may discourage intelligence officials
and executives from being benign supporters of the parliament’s important oversight task. This
can be avoided by introducing precautionary measures such as promoting only experienced
parliamentarians to intelligence oversight committees and by extending regulations for the
handling of documents to the committees’ secretariat. 34
Embedded human rights in intelligence affairs
Some activities that intelligence services engage in can be gravely at odds with fundamental
human rights. Depending on whether the remit of intelligence agencies includes the direct
countering or disruption of threats to security, some activities risk the violation of nonderogable
human rights 35 whilst others risk the violation of human rights permissible only in
exceptional circumstances. 36
In this section, we refer to embedded human rights in respect of the internal organization
of national intelligence structures. Ideally, it ought to be designed in such a way as to function as
the first firewall against potential human rights abuses. To implement such a firewall requires
adequate whistleblower protection, ample internal complaints mechanisms as well as the regular
training of intelligence staffers to a codified code of intelligence ethics. 37
Such purposeful design of internal intelligence control relates to the entire forum of
intelligence activity – yet for the purposes of this chapter we focus on two hard cases: the
authorization of special powers and the international cooperation of national intelligence
services.
With regard to the former, special powers come into play with direct surveillance missions,
body and house searches, the monitoring of conversations and the use of special interrogation
techniques. To ensure human rights protection it is vitally important that the use of special
powers is based on the law and in proportion to the security threat. Specific legal authority is
necessary and for this the pertinent legislation should be clear as to the grounds for using special
powers, the persons who may be targeted, the exact means that may be employed, and the
period for which they may be used. Hence, if the law covers only some of the available
techniques of information-gathering there will be an in-built temptation for an agency to
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