25.02.2013 Views

Merger Controls First Edition - J Sagar Associates

Merger Controls First Edition - J Sagar Associates

Merger Controls First Edition - J Sagar Associates

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Boyanov & Co. Bulgaria<br />

The CPC’s assessment of the merger was challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court by a major competitor<br />

over allegations that it failed to take into account Lidl’s imminent expansion into Bulgaria, and also that it failed to<br />

adjust market share data based on turnover, by reference to commercial space, but relied on data that the Decision<br />

itself recognised may be distorted in some areas. The Supreme Administrative Court, in Judgment No. 11012/2011,<br />

rejected all the arguments and upheld the Commission’s assessment of the relevant market and the methodology of its<br />

analysis. In particular the court confirmed that the Commission was correct to use national average consumption data<br />

to estimate the total size of the market, even though this data was likely to underestimate consumption in more affluent<br />

areas, and overestimate consumption in less developed residential areas, since the hypothetical differences in<br />

consumption would not yield a different result in terms of the existence or lack of dominance. The court further<br />

confirmed that turnover was the real measure of market power. Finally the judgment underlined that the Commission<br />

had done a prognostic analysis taking into account Lidl’s imminent expansion into Bulgaria, but that when assessing<br />

a merger the competition authority’s analysis was limited to the effects that the merger itself would bring about in the<br />

structure of the market, and not to the effects of other factors that would materialise even in the absence of the merger,<br />

such as one of the parties’ organic expansion plans. The judgment was not appealed and has come into effect.<br />

2010 also saw the biggest media merger in Bulgaria – the USD 400 million acquisition of bTV, the leading national<br />

free-to-air television channel, by CME. In its Decision No. 385/08.04.2010, on Case KZK-177/2010, the CPC<br />

authorised the acquisition on account of the fact that while the transaction would strengthen the existing dominant<br />

position of the target in the television market, it would not result in a significant impediment to effective competition.<br />

The concentration resulted in the local combination of CME’s existing free-to-air and pay-TV channels with those of<br />

Balkan News Corporation, including bTV. The CPC found that the distinction between free-to-air and pay-TV channels,<br />

in terms of their business model, was blurred in Bulgaria, since both of them derived revenues from advertising.<br />

Advertising revenues was the principle basis on which the authority reviewed the market and held that viewer share<br />

was only a secondary informative criterion, that had an interplay with advertising through the “currency” of gross<br />

rating points (GRPs), which was the “commodity” purchased by advertisers to ensure the reach of their advertising.<br />

The authority discounted publicly available data on gross advertising revenue, and conducted its own market study in<br />

respect of net advertising revenue, which it considered the more reliable measure of the parties’ market power. As a<br />

result, it held that the target’s share of advertising revenue was in excess of 58%, however, taking into account CME’s<br />

pre-existing minor share of slightly more than 1%, the transaction would not bring about a tangible change in the<br />

structure of the market. It also held that the combined group would continue to be subject to the significant competitive<br />

pressure of the second biggest operator in Bulgaria – MTG.<br />

Key economic appraisal techniques applied<br />

The CPC’s assessment of mergers, including its officially published Methodology, remains largely focused on market<br />

definition and market share analysis. Nonetheless, the CPC has always underlined that market shares are only the<br />

starting point of the analysis and a number of other factors, in particular the structure of the market and the nature and<br />

key driving forces of competition in it, may be decisive in respect of its final conclusions as regards the effects of the<br />

merger. In this respect, the increasingly sophisticated analysis that the Bulgarian competition authority employs,<br />

particularly in complex cases, drives it more and more towards more modern merger assessment techniques that<br />

increasingly move away from the focus on delineating markets and estimating shares, towards a more global view of<br />

the sources and effects of competition.<br />

Approach to remedies (i) to avoid second stage investigation and (ii) following second stage investigation<br />

In accordance with the PCA, the CPC may impose remedies, directly related to the implementation of the concentration,<br />

which are necessary to maintain effective competition and mitigate the negative impact of a concentration on the<br />

affected market.<br />

In a phase 1 (accelerated) proceeding, remedies can be offered only by the notifying party, where they are called<br />

“changes” to the concentration. Presumably, such remedies may also be offered with the notification itself. If accepted<br />

by the Commission, they can be attached as conditions and obligations to the clearance decision following phase 1<br />

review.<br />

If the review of the merger extends into a phase 2 proceeding, the CPC may, on its own discretion, impose conditions<br />

and obligations attached to its clearance decision. While no strict procedure exists, the practice of the Commission<br />

shows that even though it is not required by law to discuss proposed remedies, it does so in the interest of finding a<br />

workable solution to competition concerns. Such remedies may also be proposed by the notifying party and accepted<br />

by the Commission.<br />

It should be underlined that the imposition of remedies is not linked directly to the merger test – creation or<br />

strengthening of dominant position –, which would significantly impede effective competition. This has made it<br />

possible for the Commission to impose remedies even in cases which do not lead to the creation or strengthening of<br />

dominance, but which for various other reasons, could reduce effective competition (see Decision No. 63/25.03.2004<br />

Global Legal Insights ­ <strong>Merger</strong> Control <strong>First</strong> <strong>Edition</strong><br />

—21—<br />

© Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London<br />

www.globallegalinsights.com

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!