Merger Controls First Edition - J Sagar Associates
Merger Controls First Edition - J Sagar Associates
Merger Controls First Edition - J Sagar Associates
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Boyanov & Co. Bulgaria<br />
The CPC’s assessment of the merger was challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court by a major competitor<br />
over allegations that it failed to take into account Lidl’s imminent expansion into Bulgaria, and also that it failed to<br />
adjust market share data based on turnover, by reference to commercial space, but relied on data that the Decision<br />
itself recognised may be distorted in some areas. The Supreme Administrative Court, in Judgment No. 11012/2011,<br />
rejected all the arguments and upheld the Commission’s assessment of the relevant market and the methodology of its<br />
analysis. In particular the court confirmed that the Commission was correct to use national average consumption data<br />
to estimate the total size of the market, even though this data was likely to underestimate consumption in more affluent<br />
areas, and overestimate consumption in less developed residential areas, since the hypothetical differences in<br />
consumption would not yield a different result in terms of the existence or lack of dominance. The court further<br />
confirmed that turnover was the real measure of market power. Finally the judgment underlined that the Commission<br />
had done a prognostic analysis taking into account Lidl’s imminent expansion into Bulgaria, but that when assessing<br />
a merger the competition authority’s analysis was limited to the effects that the merger itself would bring about in the<br />
structure of the market, and not to the effects of other factors that would materialise even in the absence of the merger,<br />
such as one of the parties’ organic expansion plans. The judgment was not appealed and has come into effect.<br />
2010 also saw the biggest media merger in Bulgaria – the USD 400 million acquisition of bTV, the leading national<br />
free-to-air television channel, by CME. In its Decision No. 385/08.04.2010, on Case KZK-177/2010, the CPC<br />
authorised the acquisition on account of the fact that while the transaction would strengthen the existing dominant<br />
position of the target in the television market, it would not result in a significant impediment to effective competition.<br />
The concentration resulted in the local combination of CME’s existing free-to-air and pay-TV channels with those of<br />
Balkan News Corporation, including bTV. The CPC found that the distinction between free-to-air and pay-TV channels,<br />
in terms of their business model, was blurred in Bulgaria, since both of them derived revenues from advertising.<br />
Advertising revenues was the principle basis on which the authority reviewed the market and held that viewer share<br />
was only a secondary informative criterion, that had an interplay with advertising through the “currency” of gross<br />
rating points (GRPs), which was the “commodity” purchased by advertisers to ensure the reach of their advertising.<br />
The authority discounted publicly available data on gross advertising revenue, and conducted its own market study in<br />
respect of net advertising revenue, which it considered the more reliable measure of the parties’ market power. As a<br />
result, it held that the target’s share of advertising revenue was in excess of 58%, however, taking into account CME’s<br />
pre-existing minor share of slightly more than 1%, the transaction would not bring about a tangible change in the<br />
structure of the market. It also held that the combined group would continue to be subject to the significant competitive<br />
pressure of the second biggest operator in Bulgaria – MTG.<br />
Key economic appraisal techniques applied<br />
The CPC’s assessment of mergers, including its officially published Methodology, remains largely focused on market<br />
definition and market share analysis. Nonetheless, the CPC has always underlined that market shares are only the<br />
starting point of the analysis and a number of other factors, in particular the structure of the market and the nature and<br />
key driving forces of competition in it, may be decisive in respect of its final conclusions as regards the effects of the<br />
merger. In this respect, the increasingly sophisticated analysis that the Bulgarian competition authority employs,<br />
particularly in complex cases, drives it more and more towards more modern merger assessment techniques that<br />
increasingly move away from the focus on delineating markets and estimating shares, towards a more global view of<br />
the sources and effects of competition.<br />
Approach to remedies (i) to avoid second stage investigation and (ii) following second stage investigation<br />
In accordance with the PCA, the CPC may impose remedies, directly related to the implementation of the concentration,<br />
which are necessary to maintain effective competition and mitigate the negative impact of a concentration on the<br />
affected market.<br />
In a phase 1 (accelerated) proceeding, remedies can be offered only by the notifying party, where they are called<br />
“changes” to the concentration. Presumably, such remedies may also be offered with the notification itself. If accepted<br />
by the Commission, they can be attached as conditions and obligations to the clearance decision following phase 1<br />
review.<br />
If the review of the merger extends into a phase 2 proceeding, the CPC may, on its own discretion, impose conditions<br />
and obligations attached to its clearance decision. While no strict procedure exists, the practice of the Commission<br />
shows that even though it is not required by law to discuss proposed remedies, it does so in the interest of finding a<br />
workable solution to competition concerns. Such remedies may also be proposed by the notifying party and accepted<br />
by the Commission.<br />
It should be underlined that the imposition of remedies is not linked directly to the merger test – creation or<br />
strengthening of dominant position –, which would significantly impede effective competition. This has made it<br />
possible for the Commission to impose remedies even in cases which do not lead to the creation or strengthening of<br />
dominance, but which for various other reasons, could reduce effective competition (see Decision No. 63/25.03.2004<br />
Global Legal Insights <strong>Merger</strong> Control <strong>First</strong> <strong>Edition</strong><br />
—21—<br />
© Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London<br />
www.globallegalinsights.com